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1. TIIE DIVIDEND POLICY IN EUROPE' UNITED KINGDOM, GERMANY, FRANCE AND 
" The effect of a firm's dividend policy on the current price of its shares is a matter of 
considerable importance, not only to the corporate officials who must set the policy, but to 
investors planning portfolios and to economists seeking to understand and appraise the 
functioning of the capital markets" 
Miller and Modigliani, 1961 
This thesis empirically investigates the dividend policy in Europe and particularly in the United 
Kingdom, ' Germany, France and Italy. My interest in this topic arose not only from the 
importance of dividend policy in the area of finance, but from the fact that explaining dividend 
policy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing financial economists. Despite decades 
of study, theoretical and empirical literature has yet to completely understand the factors that 
influence dividend policy and the manner in which these factors interact. Two decades ago, Black 
(1976) noted that "The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, 
with pieces that just don't fit together" (page 5). The situation is pretty much the same today. In a 
recent survey of dividend policy, Allen and Michaely (1995) conclude, "Much more empirical 
and theoretical research on the subject of dividends is required before a consensus can be 
reached" (page 833); while Brealey and Mayers (2003) list dividends as one of the ten important 
unsolved problems in finance. 
Nevertheless, the literature has to offer valuable and significant theories and explanations to the 
dividend puzzle and the dividend theory of the firm. The different theories developed, can be 
categorised into three major areas 
- 
Taxation Effect Iiypothesis, 2 Signalling Information 
Content of Dividends Hypothesis, 3 and Agency Conflict Iiypothesis. 4 However, studies mainly 
concentrate on the US market and country comparative studies are limited. Since literature has 
also proposed that dividend policy is significantly related to the market, financial, organisational, 
institutional and legal characteristics of the firm, s the differences in corporate governance systems 
and taxation systems between European countries constitute a major motivation for a cross- 
country comparative study. The European countries under consideration are categorised into 
market-oriented countries (UK) and bank-oriented countries (Germany, France and Italy) when 
1 Henceforth UK 
2 Brennan (1970), Poterba and Summers (1985), Miler and Scholes (1978,1982), King (1977), Auerbach (1979), 
Bradford (1981), Elton and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), Lasfer (1995,1996), 
3 Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987). 
° Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), Rozeff (1982), Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
s For example La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), consider the legal protection of minority shareholders in 
an attempt to explain the dividend policy around the world. 
i 
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considering the corporate governance systems; ' while in terms of the dividend taxation systems, 
these may be partial (as in the UK) or full imputation systems (as in Germany, France and Italy). 
The purpose is to test whether dividend policy theories can be applied in markets outside the US, 
as well as to observe and compare the differences of theory predictions under different taxation, 
market and financial environments. Particularly, I test whether different dividend taxation systems 
result in lower (higher) taxation burden when profits are distributed as dividends and whether this 
is reflected in the share price on the ex-dividend day; therefore, the predictions of the taxation 
hypothesis would differ in different countries. Similarly, I assume that under different corporate 
governance systems, there exist lower (higher) information asymmetry and/or agency conflicts; 
therefore, the role of dividend as a signalling mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry 
and/or as a mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders is less 
(more) important. According to the theory predictions the importance of dividends would be 
reflected in the share price behaviour on the announcement days.? Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
investigate the Capital Structure using international data and note that the extent to which other 
countries are similar to the US, they provide an independent sample to test the theory and 
evidence developed, whereas differences would increase the ability to discriminate among 
alternative theories. Taking advantage of the recent improvement and availability of international 
data I conduct a comparative study across European countries, the first of its kind, to investigate 
the dividend policy in an attempt to shed light on the long existing and contradicting literature of 
dividend policy. 
In the next section of this introductory chapter I highlight the importance of the dividend policy of 
the firm and discuss the major theories developed around this issue: the rightist position who 
argue that dividends affect positively the value of the firm, " the leftist who argue that dividends 
have a negative effect on the value of the firm, 9 and the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend 
irrelevance proposition. Miller and Modigliani argue that under certain assumptions1° dividend 
policy does not have any impact on the firm's value and thus, it does not affect the shareholders' 
wealth. Miller and Modigliani theory and assumptions are discussed in Section 1.2. Perhaps the 
most important contribution of the Miller and Modigliani pioneer paper is the careful description 
of the conditions under which dividend policy is irrelevant. The subsequent studies that have 
relaxed the Miller and Modigliani assumptions are discussed in Section 1.3. In Section 1.4 the aim 
and motivation of my study are discussed. European country differences in taxation systems and 
corporate governance systems, which are described in Section 1.5, are expected to affect the 
6 See Franks and Mayer (1994,1997). Berglöf (1990), Zysman (1983) 
7 See for example Pettit (1972), Lang and Litzenberger (1989). 
e This is generally known as the Bird-in-the-hand fallacy (Gordon, 1959). 
9 Mainly because of the higher taxation imposed on dividends as compared to capital gains. For example, in the US 
dividends are taxed twice, firstly at the corporation level and secondly, as income in the hands of the investors. 
2 
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testing of dividend policy and the hypotheses to be tested in my study. In the last section, the rest 
of the thesis is presented. 
j1 THE IMPORTANCE ANI) TIIr BASIC THEORY Or DIVIDEND POLICY 
Dividend policy continues to be a well-examined area of managerial decision-making. It is 
interesting because a good descriptive model of a firm's dividend policy is important for 
managers and portfolio managers in studying aspects of firm behaviour such as interactions 
between investing and financing decisions. More precisely, the attractiveness of the dividend 
policy lies in the fact that the dividend decision is one of the three major categories of corporate 
long-term financial decisions, that the firm's management face. " Management can affect 
shareholder wealth through Capital Investment, Capital Structure and Dividend Decisions. The 
investment decisions of the firm determine the level of future earnings and future potential 
dividend. Secondly, capital structure influences the cost of capital, which determines, in a way, 
the accepted investment opportunities; and thirdly, dividend policy influences the amount of 
equity in the capital structure of the firm through retained earnings. As a consequence it also 
influences the cost of capital. Allen and Michaely (1995) strengthen the importance of dividends 
as they note that theories of asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions and capital 
budgeting all rely on a view of how and why dividends are paid. 
By the term "Dividend Policy", one is referring to the practice that management follows in 
making dividend payout decisions, or, the size and pattern of cash distributions to the 
shareholders over time. When deciding how much to distribute to shareholders, financial 
managers must keep in mind that the firm's objective is to maximise shareholder value. 
Consequently, the target payout ratio, defined as the percentage of net income to be paid out as 
cash dividends, should be based on a large extent on investors' preferences for dividends over 
capital gains. Shareholders attach value to shares because they expect to receive a stream of 
dividends and hope to receive an eventual capital gain. Other things being equal, shareholders 
prefer higher to lower dividends, but issues such as capital investment strategy and taxation may 
cloud the relationship between dividend policy and share value. Based on this reservation, the 
Dividend Valuation Model (DVM) has been developed, which states that the value of a share 
now, Po, is the sum of the future discounted dividends plus the value of the share when sold, in 
the future: 
_ 
D, D2 D" 
+ 
P" P° (1+ke) + (l+k1)2 +... + (1+k1)" (1+k1)" (1) 
10 Mainly under perfect market conditions 
3 
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Where, ke is the cost of equity, D is the amount of dividend and n is the year in which the share is 
sold. Therefore, the value of the share at any time may be found by valuing all future expected 
dividend payments over the lifetime of the company. If the company lifespan is assumed infinite 
and the annual dividend is constant, then the value of the share would be equal to: 
D, 
_ 
D1 P° 
_- 
1-1 (1+k, )` k` ' 
Where D1=D2=... D 
(2) 
This model implies that the company is distributing all its earnings as dividends, thus D, = I, 
. 
It 
is, however, too restrictive as dividends grow through time and companies do not pay all their 
earnings as dividends. A simplified version of this case is to assume that dividends grow at a 
constant rate g, implying that D, = Do(l+g), D2 = D1(l+g) = Do(1+g)2 
, 
etc. In this case, Equation 
(1) results in the following form, referred to as the Dividend Growth Model (DGM): 
_ 
Do(l+g) 
- 
D, Pý (k, 
- 
g) (k, 
- 
g) 
(3) 
The growth rate, g, is usually expressed as the product of the return on equity (ROE) times the 
retention ratio (earnings less dividends over earnings). The dividend growth model however, is 
subject to some key assumptions namely, that dividends grow at a constant rate and that ke is 
higher than g. 
If the company increases the payout ratio, then dividend, D, increases. This increase in the 
numerator, taken alone, would cause the share price to rise. However, if dividend is increased then 
less money will be available for reinvestment, and consequently the expected growth rate, g, will 
decline. This will tend to lower the share prices. Therefore, the company's Optimal Dividend 
Policy must strike a balance between current dividends and future growth so as to maximise the 
share price. 
However, the opinion of the economists as to whether dividend policy affects the value of the 
firm differs. One endearing feature of economics is that it can always accommodate not just two 
but three opposing points of view. And indeed this is the case with the controversy about dividend 
11 See Copeland and Weston (1992), Brealey and Myers (2001), Lease, John, Kalay, Loewenstein and Sarig (1999) 
4 
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policy. The question of whether paying dividends or paying larger than smaller dividends has a 
positive, negative or neutral effect on share prices is yet to be answered. Three theories have been 
developed. 
Firstly, the conservative or rightist position represented by Graham and Dodd (195 1), 12 states that 
dividends affect positively the value of the firm, that is, an increase in dividends, increases firm 
value. According to the rightists, dividends are valued more by investors than capital gains, 
mainly because of the risk involved in capital gains. In their security analysis, Graham and Dodd 
(1934) propose that investors buy shares in order to receive dividends. That is, dividends 
represent the return to the investor who puts money at risk in the corporation. At the same time, 
paying dividends is the ultimate goal of the firm. Corporations pay dividends to reward existing 
shareholders and to encourage others to buy new issues of common shares at high prices. Perhaps 
investors pay attention to dividends because through dividends, or the prospect dividends, they 
receive a return on their investment or the chance to sell their shares at a higher price in the future. 
One of the most popular and durable arguments for dividends is the Bird-in-the-hand theory, 13 
which posits that since share prices are highly variable, dividends represent a more reliable form 
of return than capital gains. The greater certainty associated with dividends leads investors to 
place higher value on dividends (bird in the hand) than on equivalent amount of uncertain and 
riskier capital gains (bird in the bush), regardless of how much the birds enjoy themselves in the 
bush. 
Secondly, on the left, the radical economists believe that dividends affect the value of the firm 
negatively. They support that whenever dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, 14 
firms should pay the lowest cash dividend they can get away with and then available cash should 
be retained or used to repurchase shares. By shifting their distribution policies in this way, 
corporations can transmute dividends into capital gains. If this financial alchemy results in lower 
taxes, it should be welcomed by any taxpaying investor. This is the basic point made by the leftist 
party when it argues for low-dividend payout. 
Finally, the middle of the roaders, Miller and Modigliani, in their pioneering theoretical paper 
show that in a world without taxes, transaction costs, or other market imperfections, the dividend 
12 In 1951, Graham and Dodd, highlighted the importance of dividends: 
"... The considered and continuous verdict of the stock market is overwhelmingly in favour of liberal dividends as 
against niggardly ones. The common stock investor must take this judgement into account in the valuation of stock for 
purchase. It is now becoming standard practice to evaluate common stock by applying one multiplier to that portion of 
the earnings paid out in dividends and a much smaller multiplier to the undistributed balance" 
13 See Gordon (1963), Lintner (1962) 
14 Even when the taxation rates on dividends and capital gains are equal, for example after the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
(TRA) in the US, there is a tax disadvantage to dividends because capital gains are only taxed on realisation. See 
Constantinides (1983,1984) 
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policy is irrelevant to the firm value. It is widely accepted that Miller and Modigliani made a 
scientific inquiry into the motives and consequences of corporate dividend policy, which 
constitutes the starting point of one of the longest and most intractable controversies in the 
literature of finance. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) content that a firm's value is determined solely by its investment 
decisions and that the dividend payout ratio is a mere detail, as the net payout is only a residual 
i. e. the difference between earnings and investments. They maintain that the effect of any 
particular dividend policy could be exactly offset by other forms of financing, such as the sale of 
new common equity shares. 
The essence of the Miller and Modigliani theory is that investors can create their own dividends 
by selling shares of stock. If the firm retains earnings and invests them in new projects, existing 
shareholders can sell stock and consume the proceeds, leaving themselves in the same position as 
if the firm had paid a dividend. Alternatively, if management elects to pay a dividend, new stock 
must be issued to undertake new projects. If shareholders prefer to reinvest rather than consume, 
then they can do so by buying a pro rata share of the new stock issue with the dividends paid. In 
this instance, shareholders would be in the same position that they would have been in, if no 
dividend had been paid. Therefore, regardless, of corporate dividend policy, investors can create 
their own dividend position costlessly. This is referred to as the home made dividend. The 
situation will also lead to the "Clientele Hypothesis" according to which, the firms' dividend 
policy tends to attract "clienteles" consisting of those investors who are in favour of the firm's 
particular dividend policy. For these reasons, stockholders are indifferent to corporate dividend 
policy; as a consequence, the value of the firm is independent of its dividend policy. 15 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the Miller and Modigliani paper was the careful and 
detailed description of the conditions under which dividend policy is relevant. 16 Dividend policy 
may be relevant if one or more of the assumptions underlying the Miller and Modigliani theory 
are violated. The Miller and Modigliani assumptions are listed below: 
0 INDEPENDENCE OF TILE COMPANY'S INVESTMENT AND DIVIDEND POLICIES: The firm's 
investment policy is fixed; known by investors and not affected by its dividend policy. The 
firm follows a value maximising policy by accepting all Positive Net Present Value projects. 
" 
PERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS: 
15 A simple proof of the Miller and Modigliani dividend irrelevancy model is provided in Appendix 1. 
16 See Allen and Michaely (1995) for a detailed discussion of the MM (1961) dividend irrelevance theory and the 
underlying assumptions. 
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There are no taxes. The reason for this assumption is clear. Because dividends have 
been traditionally taxed more heavily than capital gains, at least in the US, in the 
absence of taxes investors are indifferent between receiving cash in the form of 
dividends or capital gains. 
  
There is no information asymmetry. All investors have the same information and 
that investors have the same information as the managers of the firm. However, in 
practice this is rarely the case. Managers are insiders and are likely to know more 
about the current and future prospects of the firms than outsiders. Dividends may 
reveal some information to outsiders about the value of the firm, or may be used to 
change the market's perception about the firm's value. 
" There are no contracting or agency costs associated with stock ownership. This 
assumption means that there is no agency problem amongst managers and 
shareholders. 17 In this case, motivating management's decisions is possible though the 
use of forcing contracts. Without complete contracting possibilities, dividend policy 
may, for example, help to ensure that managers act in the interest of shareholders. " 
  
There are no transaction or flotation costs. If this is the case, firm managers could 
distribute dividends and raise external funds to finance the investments of the 
company. 19 Similarly investors are indifferent between dividends and selling their 
shares to obtain cash. 20 
" Markets are complete. In order to realise the importance of this argument, assume 
that because trading opportunities are limited, there are two groups with different 
marginal rates of substitution between current and future consumption. By adjusting 
its dividend policy, the firm may be able to increase its value by appealing to one of 
these groups. Explanations along these lines, have received very little attention in the 
literature. 21 Nevertheless, they may be important if some investors desire stocks with a 
steady income stream, and markets are incomplete because of high transaction costs. 
About forty years after the Miller and Modigliani dividend irrelevance proposition, dividend 
policy has received considerable theoretical and empirical attention in the literature and great 
17 Or shareholders and other claimants in the company (for example, bondholders, creditors); See Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). 
1e A high payout ratio may force the management to be more disciplined in the use of the firm's resources and 
consequently increase firm value. See Jensen (1986). 
19 A number of studies violated this assumption, including Rozeff (1982), Dempsey and Laber (1992), Alli, Khan and 
Ramirez (1993), Schooley and Barney (1994), Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994), Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995), 
Holder, Langrehr and Flexter (1998) found a negative relationship between dividends and issuing costs. 
20 Levy and Sarnat (1990) noted that shareholders seeking to increase their investment in the firm would prefer not to 
receive cash dividends, thereby increase his/her investment in the firm without incurring any transaction costs. By 
contrast, investors who desire to decrease their investment in the firm would prefer to receive dividends thereby 
avoiding transactions costs, which would apply to the alternative of selling shares on the market. 
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amount of work has been done in an attempt to explain the dividend policy phenomenon. The 
Miller and Modigliani proposition is today widely accepted, and the controversy around dividend 
policy concentrates on the question of whether and how in the presence of market imperfections 
such as taxes and/or information signalling dividend policy affects the value of the firm. Clearly, 
the observed interest in dividends must be related to some violation of the Miller and Modigliani 
assumptions. In the next section I provide a brief literature review, concentrating on relaxing each 
of the Miller and Modigliani assumptions as well as other factors identified to affect the dividend 
policy of the firm. 
1.3 DIVIDEND POLICY BEYOND TIIF. MILLER AND MODIGLIANI ASSUMPTIONS 
The principal conclusion of Miller and Modigliani dividend irrelevance theory is that dividend 
policy does not affect the required rate of return on equity, ke. This conclusion has been debated 
by academics. In particular, Gordon (1963) and Lintner (1962) argue that ke decreases as the 
dividend payout is increased because investors are less certain of receiving the capital gains which 
are supposed to result from retaining earnings than they are of receiving dividend payments. 
Gordon and Lintner support that investors value a dollar of expected dividends more highly than a 
dollar of expected capital gains because the dividend yield component, DY/P0, is less risky than 
the capital gains, g, component in the total expected return equation, ke=(DY/Po)+g. This theory is 
today generally referred to as the "Bird-in-the-hand Theory. "22 However, according to 
Frankfurter (1999) the Miller and Modigliani thesis is just a special case of the bird-in-the-hand 
model. In perfect markets, there cannot be two different opportunity rates, given risk. Therefore, 
according both to Miller and Modigliani and the bird-in-the-hand theories, firms should be 
indifferent between paying any, all, or some of their earnings as dividends. 
Black (1976) examines each one of Miller and Modigliani assumptions in an attempt to solve the 
dividend puzzle as to why firms pay dividends. When considering dividend taxation, Black notes 
that investors and corporations are not indifferent to the level of dividends but they prefer smaller 
dividends or no dividends at all. On the other hand, transaction costs do not tell us much about 
why corporations pay dividends because if investors are concerned about transaction costs then 
non-dividend paying companies can arrange for other forms of distributing cash, such as 
automatic share repurchase plans. Moreover, dividend changes often convey information about 
the management perception of the firm; therefore we are unable to answer the question of why 
corporations pay dividends if dividend policy gives information to investors about the true 
management beliefs. Black also considers the creditors of the company who are in conflict with 
" See Allen and Michaely (1995), Brealey and Myers (2001) for a discussion. Also DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
amongst others. 22 One bird in the hand is better than two in the bush (regardless of how much the birds enjoy themselves in the bush). 
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the shareholders. That is, what helps the creditors will harm the shareholders; therefore, if the 
company pays dividends then the extra cash flow of the company will not end up in the hands of 
the creditors. However, if the company pays no dividends, then creditors might agree to better 
credit conditions and this would eliminate the negative effects of cutting the dividend on the 
position of the shareholders relative to the creditors. Moreover, the puzzle of why firms pay 
dividends gets more complicated when considering the investment policy of the company. 
Dividend decreases is a low cost way to raise money for new investments but on the other hand, 
dividend increases will prevent unprofitable investments. Black concludes that the harder we look 
at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don't fit together. 
Studies that relaxed the Miller and Modigliani assumptions and dealt with the dividend policy of 
the firm could be categorised in three major areas: Taxation, Signalling information content of 
dividends, and the agency conflict, which are examined in this study. 23 
1.3 
.1 TAXATION EFFECT IIYPOTllLSIS 
In the real world the Miller and Modigliani assumption of no taxation is violated. Three opposing 
views have been developed as to the effect of taxation on the dividends. The "Tax Irrelevance 
View" (Miller and Scholes, 1978) argues that taxes have no influence on dividends because 
shareholders can avoid dividend taxes; the "New View"(Zadrow, 1991), supports that taxes have 
no impact on dividends because dividends are simply the residual after investments have been 
financed from post-corporate taxes. This view is also known as the "Capitalisation View. s24 
Thirdly, the "Traditional View" supports that dividend taxation is an additional cost on corporate 
profits. Studies in the literature that compare between the three taxation views include McKenzie 
and Thompson (1996); Poterba and Summers (1985); Harris, Hubbard and Kemsley (1999); 
Hubbard, Kemsley and Nissim (2001); Allen and Michaely (1995,2001) amongst others. The tax 
related literature on dividends is extensive but remains inconclusive and mixed. Two basic tax 
approaches to the dividend puzzle have been developed in the literature. 
The first examines the relationship between (risk-adjusted) before-tax rates of return and dividend 
yields. This is a variant of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) first developed by Brennan 
(1970). If the effective tax rate on dividends exceeds the effective tax rate on capital gains for the 
marginal investor, then, all else equal, the before-tax (risk adjusted) rate of return on stocks with 
higher anticipated dividend yields must be higher to compensate for the higher tax rate on 
23 An additional view is provided by the behavioural models under which, the Miller and Modigliani 
assumption that investors are rational (i. e. prefer more wealth to less wealth) is violated. However, this has 
been a rare target of research in finance because this theory is not directly testable. The two major 
contributions to this area of dividend policy are the work of Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Shefrin and 
Stateman (1984). The explanation presented is that investors prefer a managed dividend policy to provide 
discipline in their investment and consumption decisions. 
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dividends relative to capital gains. Tests of the Brennan relationship have been carried out by 
Morgan (1982), Poterba and Summers (1984,1985), Keim (1985), Rosenberg and Marathe (1979) 
and Kalay and Michaely (1993,2000) amongst others. Moreover, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
(1979,1980,1982) test the Brennan (1970) CAPM and interpret the positive dividend yield 
coefficient as evidence of a tax effect. Investor's aversion to dividends should result in higher 
expected returns and lower share prices. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy studies have been 
supported by Blume (1980), Hess (1983), Keim (1985), Morgan and Thomas (1998) amongst 
others. However, the empirical evidence based on this approach has been mixed. Black and 
Scholes (1974) express strong scepticism about the logic of the tax case against dividends and 
conclude that firms cannot influence the share prices by pursuing a high yield or low yield 
dividend policy. Moreover, Gordon and Bradford (1980), Miller and Scholes (1982) and Chen 
Grundy and Stambaugh (1990) amongst others find support for the notion that the 
dividend/capital gains tax differential does not affect before tax returns. 
A second approach to the dividend policy of the firm is to examine the ex-dividend day behaviour 
of share prices and compare the expected price drop relative to the dividend per share. Without 
personal taxes on equity, arbitrage arguments imply that share prices should fall by the full 
amount of dividend on the ex-dividend day (Elton and Gruber, 1970). If the effective tax rate on 
dividends exceeds that on capital gains, similar arguments suggest that the reduction in the price 
should be less than the amount of dividend. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) provide a detailed 
discussion of this approach and its shortcomings. Elton and Gruber (1970) find evidence that the 
dividend and capital gains tax differential is important for the marginal investor. Evidence from 
the US25 shows that share prices fall by less than the amount of dividend, implying that the 
dividend and capital gains differential was positive for the marginal investor. This is interpreted 
as evidence consistent with the "Tax Effect Ilypothesis". Studies consistent with Elton and 
Gruber (1970) include Lasfer (1995,1996), Bell and Jenkinson (2001), Heath and Jarrow (1988), 
Kaplanis (1986), and Barclay (1987). 
However, these tax arguments were challenged by Kalay (1982) who developed the "Short- 
Trading Effect hypothesis", which implies that in the presence of dividends and capital gains tax 
differential, arbitrage opportunities for short-term traders exist, for example for institutional 
investors who are taxed at the same rate on dividends and capital gains. 26 These traders may enter 
the market around the ex-dividend days in response to these arbitrage opportunities, effectively 
24 Dividends are capitalised into share prices, developed by King (1977), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981). 
25 Also see Campell and Barenek (1955) 
26 Dividend Capturing activities are prohibited in the UK under the anti-tax avoidance legislation dealers, tax-exempt 
institutions and individuals are prevented from trading around the ex-day for the sole purpose of capturing dividends 
and/or avoiding taxes. See Poterba and Summers (1984) for details on the 1970 Anti-Avoidance Act. 
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becoming the marginal or price-setting investors around those days by virtue of their lower 
transaction costs. In the presence of these traders, it may be difficult to infer the effective tax rate 
on dividends by observing price drops, which could just represent transaction costs. Moreover, if 
such traders are the price setters around ex-dividend days, the absence of a tax effect may not 
mean that dividend taxes are irrelevant to dividend policy and investment decisions, as different 
groups of investors, with different tax characteristics, may form the company's usual marginal 
investor clientele. Karpof and Walking (1988), Eades, Hess and Kim (1984,1994), Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1986), Koski (1996) find evidence in favour of the Short-Term Trading 
Hypothesis in the US. 
The ex-day hypothesis is also reflected by studies that focus on market microstructure effects. 
Two studies recognise the fact that prices fall by less than the dividend, but they put forth 
explanations, which are neither related to taxes nor to short-term trading around the event. Bali 
and Hite (1998) argue that the drop in share prices by less than the dividend is due to discreteness 
in prices rather than taxes. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) on the other hand, hypothesise that the 
collection and reinvestment of dividends is bothersome for individual investors but not for market 
makers who tend to buy before a stock goes ex-dividend and then sell on the ex-date. They argue 
that the bid-ask bounce contributes to, if not totally to explain a phenomenon others interpret as 
tax/short-term trading effects. 
Studies overcome the problem of interpretation of ex-dividend day pricing by analysing changes 
in the tax law. This provides natural experiments for investigating the impact of taxes on share 
prices based on the notion that if taxes are relevant to the marginal investor, changes in the 
differential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains should be reflected in share prices as soon 
as the tax changes are announced or anticipated. Poterba and Summers (1985) use this approach 
to analyse tax changes in the United Kingdom, and find that the impact of announcements of 
dividend tax reductions on share prices is positively (although not statistically significant) related 
to dividend yields. In effect, they find that changes in dividend taxation has a significant impact 
on ex-dividend price movements while changes in capital gains taxes do not, suggesting while the 
effective capital gains tax rate is close to zero, the effective tax rate on dividends is not. Laster 
(1995) analyses the effect of the 1988 ICTA in the UK, which is equivalent to the US 1986 Tax 
Reform Act that eliminated the preferential taxation of capital gains over dividends; and finds 
strong evidence to support the taxation effect hypothesis. In contrast, Michaely (1991) finds an 
ex-dividend price drop equal to dividend per share before and after the 1986 Tax Reform ACT, 
suggesting that ex-day returns are not affected by taxes. Menyah (1993) tests the tax effect 
hypothesis as opposed to the short-term hypothesis during four major tax changes in the UK and 
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results hardly show any support for the taxation effects. In summary, the evidence regarding tax 
effects and dividends remains controversial. Regardless of the methodology used, there is no clear 
consensus in the literature and in fact some studies suggest that other economic forces might 
explain dividend share price behaviour. 
1.3.2 THE INFO MATION SICNAL. i. ING HYPoTimsis 
The primary alternative explanation for why dividends are paid is that dividends send a signal to 
the market about the management's view on the future prospects of the firm. Studies, that analyze 
the signalling effects of dividend policy attempt to violate Miller and Modigliani assumption of 
no information asymmetry. Dividend signalling is an important topic because by paying dividends 
a firm can prove it is able to generate cash, not just accounting profits. 27 In turn, by revealing its 
profitability in this manner, the firm can be differentiated from less profitable firms. Another 
reason signalling is important to management is that it has an incentive to perform well enough to 
maintain its dividend and avoid the adverse consequences of a dividend cut or equity issues to 
replace funds paid out. 
The first major dividend signalling study is credited to Bhattacharya (1979). He assumes that 
outside investors have imperfect information about the firm's profitability, and that cash 
dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. Under these assumptions, dividends 
function as a signal of expected cash flows. Bhattacharya's result concerning the shareholders' 
planning horizon is that the shorter the horizons over which the shareholders have to realise their 
wealth, the higher the equilibrium proportion of dividends to expected earnings. In his model, the 
announcement effects of dividends increases (decreases) are positive (negative). Dividend payouts 
are lower, with larger adverse tax consequences and higher flotation costs of external finance. 
Bhattacharya's work is followed by a number of papers, which hypothesise that dividends are 
used by managers to transmit information to the capital market. The signalling paradigm for 
dividends is used, inter alias, in Heinkel (1978), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams 
(1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) and Williams (1988). Typically in signalling models 
there is a dissipate cost either in the form of higher taxation of dividends vis-ä-vis capital gains as 
in Bhattacharya (1979), or in the form of cost of raising external capital, as in John and Williams 
(1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) and Williams (1988); or in the form of reduced 
investments, as in Heinkel (1978), Miller and Rock (1985). Kumar (1988), signalling paper shows 
that dividends can support a semi-separating equilibrium. 
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John and Williams (1985) explain why it might be optimal for a firm to pay cash dividends and 
raise new equity financing or repurchase stock in the same planning period. In their model, 
dividends are paid to reduce the under-pricing of the shares issued to raise new outside financing. 
Miller and Rock (1985) demonstrate, from a theoretical point of view, that there exists a 
signalling equilibrium under asymmetric information and examine dividends net of external 
financing based on the earnings, dividend and financing announcements, and the impact of the 
firm's policies on an optimal investment level. They find that earnings and dividend 
announcements convey the same information, while the financing and dividend announcements 
effects are of opposite sign. Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) construct an efficient signalling 
equilibrium with dividends and investments identifying its properties in an attempt to provide 
some explanation as to why dividends persist despite dissipative costs. 
The signalling hypothesis is based on the "Dividend Smoothing Model" which is in turn based on 
the work of Lintner (1956) who suggests a "Partial Adjustment Model" in an attempt to explain 
corporate dividend behaviour. Managers focus more on dividend changes than on absolute levels, 
and they smooth dividends changes to move gradually towards a long-run desired target dividend 
level, in accordance with sustainable earnings. Smoothing models suggest that dividends are set 
conditional on future earnings expectations that are formed based on the information available (at 
time t-1), before the dividend decision is made (at time t). Dividend smoothing is conditional on 
the managers' earnings expectations, that is, if earnings conditions remain unchanged, the 
managers' past expectations is fulfilled and dividends are smoothed according to the managers' 
original plans. Therefore, current dividends reflect the expectations on future earnings. Fama and 
Babiak (1968) extend Lintner's model and suppressing the constant term and adding a term for 
the lagged level of earnings. They conclude that managers only increase dividends after they are 
sure that they will be able to maintain them permanently at a new level. 
Chen and Wu (1999) examine the predictive relations between corporate dividends, earnings and 
prices and the implication of these relations for dividend signalling and smoothing. They find 
dynamic relations between dividends, earnings and prices. They also find that dividend changes 
are driven by both signalling and smoothing motives and that information about unexpected 
changes in future earnings can be provided by dividend changes. Garrett and Priestley (2000) 
provide evidence of dividend smoothing and dividends conveying information regarding 
unexpected positive changes in current permanent earnings. 
27 Kaplan and Roll (1972,1973) argue that profits can be "manipulated" by clever accounting practices, and so may be 
interpreted with scepticism by investors. 
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Much of the literature on asymmetric information and dividends examine the effect of dividend 
changes, i. e. increases/initiations and/or decreases/omissions, on share prices. Pettit (1972) finds 
that announcements of dividend increases (decreases) are followed by significant share price 
increases (drops). Aharony and Swary (1980) examine the dividend and earnings announcements 
and stockholders returns and find strong evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in 
quarterly cash dividends provide useful information beyond that provided by the corresponding 
quarterly earnings numbers. They also observe that on average, the stock market adjusts in an 
efficient manner to new quarterly dividend information. However, Penman (1983) finds that there 
is not much information conveyed by dividend changes themselves, after adjusting for 
management's future earnings forecasts. Healy and Palepu (1988) examine dividend initiations 
and omissions and find evidence consistent with Petit (1972). Christie (1994) find that despite the 
fact that dividend omissions trigger a substantial decline in share value, those losses are much 
smaller in magnitude than cases where reduction of dividends was less than 100 percent. Other 
studies that examine the information effect on dividends include Watts (1973), Brickley (1983), 
Kalay and Lowenstein (1985,1986), Kumar (1988), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Bajaj and 
Vijh (1990,1995), Kao and Wu (1994), Lee (1995) amongst others. 
Watts (1973) tests the hypothesis whether dividends could convey substantial information in 
addition to the information conveyed by earnings. He developes the "Unexpected Change in 
Dividends hypothesis" according to which, the additional information must be reflected in the 
difference between actual current dividends and the conditional expectation of current dividends 
(conditional on current earnings). He concludes that in general, the information content of 
dividends can only be trivial. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992,1996) provide arguments 
against the use of dividends as a signal of the firm quality, as little evidence is found to support 
the hypothesis that dividend decisions help to identify firms with superior future earnings. Results 
in contrast with the predictions of the signalling hypothesis are also provided by Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997), Jensen and Johnson (1995) amongst others. 
1.3.3 AGENCY MODF.. S AND DIVIDEND POLICY 
Relaxing the Miller and Modigliani assumption of complete contracts, different forces that 
operate within firms may cause the interests of different groups in the firm to conflict. Literature 
has identified three groups within the firm that may be affected by the dividend policy, namely, 
the shareholders, the managers and the bondholders. The agency conflict literature can be divided 
into two major categories. Firstly, studies that examine the relationship between shareholders and 
managers, and secondly, studies concentrating on the conflict between shareholders and 
debtholders. In this study I mainly concentrate on the shareholders-managers conflict while the 
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study of the shareholders-bondholders conflict in European countries is a theme of further 
investigation. 
The essence of the agency problem is the separation of ownership and control. " Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principals/shareholders) engage another person (the agent/managers) to perform some service on 
their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If both 
parties to the relationship are to maximise utility, there is good reason to believe that the manager 
will not always act in the best interests of the shareholders. The shareholders can limit 
divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the management and by 
incurring monitoring costs designed to limit their atypical activities. 
One of the best-known studies to find an empirical relationship between agency costs and 
dividend policy is Rozeff (1982). He examines a number of unregulated firms in 64 different 
industries and finds that if a firm has a high percentage of insider share ownership, it will pay a 
small dividend and in the opposite case where a firm has greater number of shareholders, a high 
dividend policy would be adopted in order to reduce agency costs. An optimal dividend policy 
may exist even when tax considerations are ignored. Moreover, he argues that increased dividend 
payments would reduce the volume of funds over which management has discretionary control, 
therefore the agency costs would be reduced, but the transaction costs of external financing 
increase. Therefore, there is an optimal dividend payout, which minimises the sum of these 
opposing costs. Rozeff `s conclusions (1982) were later supported by Jahera et al (1986), 
Dempsey and Laber (1992), Schooley and Barney (1994), Hasen, Kumar and Shome (1994), Rao 
and White (1994), Holder et al (1998), to name a few. 
Grossman and Hart (1982), and Easterbrook (1984) address the management-shareholder conflict 
and suggest that shareholders can minimise the cash that managers control, and this will prevent 
managers from investing in negative net present value projects. One way of minimising the 
managers' access to free cash flows is through increasing dividend policy. 29 In effect the dividend 
payout increase would cause an increase in the firm value by reducing potential over-investment. 
Moreover, dividends may keep firms in the capital market, where management monitoring is 
available at lower cost and may be useful in adjusting the level of risk taken by managers and 
different classes of investors (Easterbrook, 1982). 
28 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), Coase (1937) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a 
discussion. 
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The "Free Cash Flow Hypothesis" suggests that there are some interrelationships between a 
firm's investment and dividend decisions. The greater the amount of new investment undertaken 
by the firm, the smaller the cash dividend can be paid out, or the more new equity must be issued. 
The important point is that firms that have more growth options are expected to pay lower cash 
dividends. The starting point of Jensen's (1986) free cash flow analysis is that managers with 
large balances of free cash flow may use this money for purposes that do not serve the best 
interests of the shareholders. Therefore, Jensen argues that shareholders' best interests might be 
served if cash balances not needed for investment are minimised by dividends, which extract 
surplus cash from management control. Alternatively, a way of reducing management control 
over free cash flow is to increase the firm's leverage, which would result in regular interest 
payments. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) attempt to distinguish between the predictions of the free cash 
flow/overinvestment hypothesis as opposed to the cash flow signalling hypothesis by 
investigating the share price behaviour around dividend change announcements. They use the 
Tobin's Q3° as a proxy of investment opportunity and distinguish between overinvestment (Q<1) 
firms and value maximising firms (Q>1). They show that Q<1 firms had greater price reactions, 
on average, to dividend changes than Q>1 firms which provides direct support of the free cash 
flow hypothesis over the cash flow signalling hypothesis. ' Further tests of the revisions of the 
analysts' earnings forecasts provide further support of the Jensen's (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis. Yoon and Starks (1993) use the same methodology to examine Q>1 and Q<1 firms. 
Overall, they note that although results indicate that the free cash flow hypothesis does not 
explain the information effects of dividend change announcements, 32 the free cash flow 
hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out as it explains the observed cross-sectional differences 
in dividend policy. The fact that low Q firms have higher dividend yield and larger dividend 
change that high Q firms is consistent with the implications of the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Moreover, Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) find evidence to support that dividend policy and 
growth have an inverse relationship and that large firms have significantly higher dividend yields. 
Further they reject the taxation and the free cash flow hypotheses in favour of the signalling 
hypothesis. Lie (2002) investigates the relationship between excess funds and firm's payout 
policies and finds evidence that dividend-increasing (or repurchase) firms have cash in excess of 
29 These theories suggest significant departure from the original MM assumption that dividend policy and investment 
policy are inter-related. 
° Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to its replacement cost of assets 
31 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) note that under the cash flow signaling hypothesis, for firms with Q>l the predicted 
impacts on returns of announcements of dividend changes is larger in absolute value for dividend decreases than for 
dividend decreases. However, the overinvestment hypothesis predicts a symmetrical impact. For firms with Q<I, the 
two hypotheses predict a significant impact on return in both dividend increase and decrease cases. 
32 Their results provide more evidence to support the free cash flow signaling hypothesis. Also see (Denis, Denis and 
Sarin 
, 
1994) 
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peer firms in the industry. He also finds that the market reaction to the announcement of special 
dividends (and repurchases) is positively related to the amount of excess cash the firm has, and 
negatively related to the firm's investment opportunity measured by Tobin's Q. 
1.4 TIIF. AIM AND MOTIVATION OF TIIE STUDY 
The long existing dividend puzzle as well as the importance of dividend policy in the area of 
finance constitute the primary motivation of my study. Almost half a century after the Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevancy theorem and a considerable number of years after Black's 
(1976) statement, the literature has not proved to be successful in providing strong and widely 
accepted theoretical and empirical evidence to the controversies around the dividend policy of the 
firm. However, despite the fact that the dividend policy discussion is an enigma with no obvious 
optimal strategy, literature has identified some broad recommendations to guide both financial 
managers and investors. Three major theories have been developed namely the Taxation Theory, 
Signalling Theory and Agency Conflict Theory. As shown above 33 the empirical evidence is 
mixed and contradictive therefore, the need for further research constitutes a great challenge for 
this study. 
Secondly, a great motivation is the fact that the majority of studies in the literature mainly 
concentrate on one market, namely the US, and to a lesser extent the UK. A number of other 
studies examined the dividend policy in other single countries, for example, Japan, 34 Australia" 
and Canada; 36 but dividend policy has not been examined extensively in European countries. 37 An 
important motivation for this study is the question of whether the dividend policy theories 
developed in the US can be applied to European countries. 
Studies that looked at cross-country analysis of dividend policy are very limited. 38 Given that 
dividends are likely to be affected by differences across countries in financial, structural, 
institutional, accounting, legal and political environments, I carry out a European cross-country 
comparative study to test whether these differences (and/or similarities) can provide some insight 
into the long existing dividend controversy. 
33 Most of these results are summarised in Appendix 2. 
34 See for example Prowse (1992), Bergloff and Perotti (1994), Kato and Loewenstein (1995). 
35 See for example Graham (1989), Justin (1997), Brown, Clarke, How and Kadir (2000). 
36 See for example Booth and Johnston (1984), Morgan and Jacques (1978). 
37 See for example, Michaely and Murgia (1995) for Italy, Lasfer (1995,1996) for the UK, Romon (2000) for France, 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2001), Amihud and Murgia (1997) for Germany. 
 The exemption is, Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2001) who compared the dividend policy of developed versus 
emerging markets. 
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It is difficult to generalise regarding the dividend policy of the firm. Efforts to develop a dividend 
policy must reflect consideration of a variety of issues. The future capital requirements of the 
corporation, the expected stream of earnings and cash flows and variability of these flows, 
shareholder expectations and attitudes, changes in corporate tax policy, the future cost and 
availability of capital, the strategy of corporation with respect to investment and new product 
development, the cash requirements and tax position of both the corporations and shareholders all 
play a role in determining a dividend policy. Some of these factors tend to differ between 
countries while other factors appear to be similar. This constitutes an ideal opportunity to test the 
effects of these factors on the dividend policy of the firm. Moreover, a consideration of dividend 
policy in different countries across time, that is, comparisons between different periods of time 
where factors observed to affect the dividend policy have changed (for example, changes in the 
dividend taxation systems) would be able to provide some concluding results to the controversy. 
In addition it should be noted that the results may not only provide a comparative basis against 
which prior empirical studies carried out in the US can be evaluated, but also help stimulate 
further tests of the dividend policy in European markets. Because various imperfections affect 
firms differently, dividend policy may vary substantially from one firm to another, from one 
market to another, from one country to another. Although researchers focus on each market 
imperfection in isolation, complex interactions may exist among these frictions. If the 
imperfections are insignificant or offsetting, the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend 
irrelevance proposition may hold. Otherwise, these market imperfections may be relevant to the 
dividend setting process and to the value of the firm. 
Also, it could be argued that the dividend puzzle is studied in the literature from two points of 
view. The first group of studies seeks those factors considered by the managers of the firm when 
setting the rate of dividend distribution of the companies they manage, i. e. the allocation of the 
shareholders' returns in terms of immediate and/or future benefits; while a second group attempts 
to discover the relationship that exists between the dividends distributed by a company amongst 
its shareholders and the price the shareholders are prepared to pay for the company's shares. It 
follows that a study of dividend policy is not only important for the managers who take decisions 
about the firm, but also to the shareholders. The study will also provide useful information to both 
international and domestic investors. The analysis of dividend behaviour across countries, besides 
being helpful to improve international portfolio management, is likely to provide an 
understanding of how country's regulatory, financial and economic environments affect the 
corporate dividend policy. Therefore, the study is not only useful to different types of investors 
and managers, but could also prove important to policymakers who determine the laws and rules 
of the market. To the best of my knowledge there is neither a comparative study comparing the 
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dividend policy in European countries and particularly in the UK, Germany, France and Italy, nor 
a study to provide a detailed description/analysis of the dividend taxation (and or governance) 
systems in these countries. The sample countries are selected to provide both an economic and 
political balance. Also, the UK, German, French markets, and to a lesser extent the Italian market 
are amongst the most important markets in Europe (and the rest of the world). 
In Rajan and Zingales (1995) terminology, the cost of using an international sample is that some 
time has to be spent in analysing the differences between countries ranging from accounting 
practises to legal and institutional environments. The purpose of the following section is 
threefold. I describe the differences in the factors affecting the dividend policy between the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy. I give further insight to the reasons of selecting these particular 
countries and I provide a further discussion of the motivation of my study. 
1.4.1 DIVinFNI TAXATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND THEIR EFFECT ON DIVIDI: NIIS 
The dividend puzzle becomes even deeper when taxation is considered. The issue relates to the 
fact that since dividends are usually taxed more heavily than capital gains (for example in the 
US), companies should retain all of their earnings and provide returns to the shareholders through 
increases in share prices. 39 Under the classical system, mainly adopted in the US, corporation tax 
operates separately from personal tax; consequently dividends are subject to double taxation, first 
at the corporation level and then in the hands of shareholders at their personal income tax rate. 
However, in European countries, the classical system was replaced by the imputation tax system, 
under which shareholders are entitled to a partial/full tax credit for the corporation tax paid on the 
underlying profits distributed; but no tax credit is provided on capital gains. Thus, imputation 
systems are designed to alleviate the double taxation on dividends and reduce the shareholders' 
preference for retained earnings (i. e. shareholders are expected to reward high dividend payout 
companies). Yet there are major differences in the dividend taxation systems between the four 
European countries under consideration. 
In the UK a partial imputation tax system was adopted in 1973, under which when a company 
distributes profits it must also pay Advanced Corporation Tax, 40 equivalent to the basic income 
tax rate, on the gross dividend. The distributing company pays ACT to the Inland Revenue 
fourteen days after the quarter in which the announcement of dividend is made and then ACT is 
deducted from the firm's corporation tax liability. 41 At the shareholder level, income tax is levied 
39 See Allen and Michaely (1995), Poterba and Summers (1985) 
40 Henceforth, ACT. 
41 The difference between the company's total corporation tax liability and ACT paid (on gross dividends) is the 
Mainstream Corporation Tax Liability and is usually payable nine months after the end of the accounting period. Other 
things equal, the corporation tax liability remains the same regardless of the company's dividend policy, but there is a 
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on the gross dividend received and the related tax credit 42 The UK imputation tax system is 
complex in the sense that imputation is granted at the basic rate of tax; therefore, due to the 
progressive marginal rate of income tax structure, shareholders who are taxed at the higher tax 
rate are required to pay additional tax on dividends received, whereas lower taxpayers are 
refunded the tax credit. Basic income tax payers have no further tax obligations as to the 
dividends received. Capital gains in the UK are taxed at the shareholders' personal income tax 
rate. Since 2 July 1997, the dividend tax credit is no longer refundable to pension funds (who are 
tax exempt investors) and corporations receiving dividends. 
The current German dividend taxation system was adopted in 1977 and combines the features of a 
split rate system with those of a full imputation system. At the company level, distributed profits 
are subject to a lower corporation tax rate than retained profits. As from 1998 headline tax rates of 
40 percent on retained profits and 30 percent on distributed profits were augmented by a 5.5 
percent solidarity surcharge and additional local taxes on corporate profits ranged from around 13 
percent to 20 percent. Shareholders are entitled to a tax credit on dividends received equal to the 
full amount of tax paid at the company level, which is credited against their tax liability. Tax- 
exempt shareholders are not entitled to the tax credit and are liable to no further tax liability on 
dividends received; while foreign investors are not entitled to any tax credit. 43 Capital gains for 
corporations in Germany are taxed as ordinary income; in contrast, individuals are not liable to 
capital gains tax if the holding period exceeds six months (twelve as of 1999). °" 
In France a full imputation tax system was introduced in 1993 following a partial imputation 
system since 1966. The French system remains very different from those of other European 
countries, as the top marginal income tax rate is amongst the highest in Europe, but the average 
rate of this tax is one of the lowest. This paradox is one example of the uniqueness of the French 
tax system. 45 Companies are liable to corporation tax on their annual profits at the rate46 of 362/3 
percent while net profits available for distribution are grossed up by the Avoir Fiscal (imputation 
tax credit rate) and then taxed at the corporate income tax rate of 362/3 percent. Dividends 
distributed out of profits that have not borne the full corporation tax (for example, profits not 
generated in France) are subject to equalisation tax, the "precompte". Shareholders are entitled to 
timing difference; Lasfer (1996) documents that firms who are unable to recover their ACT (are in surplus ACT 
position) pay lower dividends. 
2 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 $20. Henceforth, ICTA 
43 However, it should be noted that in Germany dividend stripping remains possible as corporate and individual non- 
residents may sell their shares to German residents who are entitled to the dividend and credits attaching thereto. In 
contrast, in the UK dividend stripping is subject to institutional regulation introduced by the 1970 Finance Act and 
could incur tax penalties. 
as Short-term capital gains are taxed at the individuals' income tax rate. 
as See Bond and Chennells (2000), Ault (1997) 
46 See taxation rates table in Appendix 3 
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the avoir fiscal47 (the dividend tax credit fraction of corporation tax already paid by the company). 
The avoir fiscal is added to the shareholders' taxable income and its amount is deducted from the 
tax chargeable to the shareholder in order to avoid economic double taxation borne by distributed 
corporate profit. Capital gains from the sales of shares (or bonds) are taxed at a rate of 16 percent 
plus a 3.9 percent social contribution tax. 48 
As Germany and France, Italy operates under a full imputation system adopted in 1977. Italian 
companies are subject to IRPEG, 49 the corporate income tax; and 11,011 50 a so-so called local 
income tax, which in effect is best thought as an additional levy on corporate profits. To foster 
company capitalisation, Dual Income Tax5' has been introduced in 1997, which carries a 
reduction for part of corporate gains and applies in the event of any increase in net assets in the 
form of capital conferment by business partners or out of undistributed dividend reserves. Since 
1998 companies must form two separate baskets "A" and "B" when preparing their income tax 
return and calculate the tax credit of the dividends received. Tax credit basket A consists of the 
amount of income tax actually paid by the company that distributes dividendS52 while basket B is 
the "figurative tax" corresponding to the receipt of tax-free profits distributed as dividends. 
Shareholders are taxed on the grossed-up dividend received and they are entitled to a full dividend 
tax credit including a credit of 10 percent withholding tax on the dividend payment. Moreover, it 
should be noted that in the Italian market companies issue two different types of equity firstly, the 
Common Stocks and Preferred stocks, which are registered stocks and the shareholders have to be 
listed in the company's book also provided to the tax authorities and; secondly, convertible and 
non-convertible savings which are bearer stocks and shareholders can maintain their anonymity. 
These shares do not provide any voting rights but provide a privilege for yearly dividends of no 
less than 5 percent of par value or the common stock dividend plus 2 percent of par value 
whichever is the greater53. Capital gains accrued from substantial holdings are taxed at 27 percent, 
while capital gains on all other equity holdings are taxed at 12.5 percent. 
Appendix 3 provides the corporation, imputation, income and capital gains taxation rates in the 
UK, Germany, France and Italy for the period 1987 to 2002; while Appendix 4 illustrates the four 
taxation system mechanisms both at the corporation level and shareholder level in the case where 
47 Until 1993 the Avoir Fiscal was only half of the French corporate tax paid by the distributed company. Since 1993 
France is operating a full imputation tax system where the Avoir Fiscal is exactly equal to corporation tax. 
48 As of January 1,1999 capital gains are generally taxable as ordinary income. 
49 Imposta sul reddito delle persone giuridiche 
so Imposta locale sui redditi. In 1997 IRPEG was equal to 37% and ILOR rate was 16.2 percent. In 1977 ILOR was 
made deductible from IRPEG and in 1991 the deductibility rate was reduced to 75% while in 1993 was totally 
abolished. 
51 Henceforth, DIT 
52 The rational of this provision is to grant full imputation tax credit to the Italian resident shareholder but only to the 
extent that corporation tax has been actually paid by the distributing company. 
53 See Michaely and Murgia (1995) 
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a company generates 100 units of profits. It is illustrated that in each of the four European 
countries under consideration, the dividend taxation suffered both at the corporation and the 
shareholders' level differs as a result of the imputation system differences. Therefore, it would be 
reasonable to argue that higher/lower taxation suffered when profits are distributed would result to 
lower/higher changes in the value of the distributing company depending on the preferences of the 
shareholders. 
My analysis of the tax impact of dividends is based on the tax discrimination variable (King, 
1977), which is defined as the opportunity cost of retained earnings in terms of post-tax earnings 
foregone, that is, the additional disposable income a shareholder would receive if one unit of 
retained earnings were distributed. The tax discrimination variable is generally expressed as ((1- 
m)/[(1-s)(1-z)]}, where m is the marginal income tax rate, s is the imputation tax rate and z is the 
capital gains tax rate. King (1977) argues that if cash in the hands of the company and cash in the 
hands of the shareholder can be interchanged without attracting an additional tax liability (or 
credit), then there is no discrimination and the value of tax discrimination variable equal to unity. 
If the tax discrimination variable is less than unity, dividends are taxed more heavily than capital 
gains, whereas capital gains (retentions) tax burden is higher when the tax discrimination variable 
exceeds unity. Additionally, Lasfer (1995) shows that the overall tax burden on dividends and 
capital gains is a function of corporation tax, the dividend payout ratio and the differential 
taxation of dividends and capital gains. Therefore, it would be reasonable to argue that in 
countries where the overall tax burden on dividends is higher (lower) than the overall tax burden 
on capital gains shareholders would reward lower (higher) dividend payout policies. The 
European taxation systems briefly discussed above (and considered in greater detail in Chapter 
2) constitute a great motivation for further research on the Taxation Effect Hypothesis. The 
purpose is to test whether existing differences between the four systems under consideration 
would result in higher/lower tax differential between dividends and capital gains which would 
affect the shareholder preferences and consequently differences in the value of the distributing 
firm. 
HYPOTHESIS: In countries where dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, 
companies pay lower dividends and thus, ex-day returns are expected to be higher. 
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AN CnUPnRATF 
Corporate Governance has been defined 54 as the system in which business corporations are 
directed and controlled by shareholders and other stakeholders. Accordingly, corporate 
governance specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in 
the corporation, such as the board of directors, managers, shareholders and stakeholders and spells 
out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. Zingales (1997) provide a 
broader definition of corporate governance mechanism. He states that this mechanism may 
include allocation of ownership, capital structure, managerial incentive schemes, takeovers, board 
of directors, pressure from institutional investors, product market competition, labour market 
competition and organisational structure. The corporate governance system also incorporates the 
financial system since the latter has a role to play in conditioning the behaviour of corporate 
sector. The financial system is the structure of financial contracts that governs the distribution of 
claims on all cash flows generated from productive assets in the economy. Therefore, it provides 
the structure through which corporate objectives are set, and it also provides the means of 
ss attaining those objectives and monitoring performance 
Studies argue that international differences in dividend policies are likely to be caused by 
differences in corporate governance structures across nations. Dewenter and Warther (1998) find 
that dividend announcements between US and Japanese firms are associated with distinct levels 
of information asymmetry and agency conflicts, which were in turn related to the types of 
corporate governance structures in each country. Once we move away from a model of perfect 
capital markets in which financial decisions and real investment decisions are separable, we raise 
the possibility that different financial systems may have different effects on company's dividends. 
Heterogeneity across European countries has been well documented, 56 for example in patterns of 
investment finance, corporate ownership patterns, corporate governance rules, " the market for 
corporate control and the relative importance of the financial markets and institutions. 58 
Monitoring of managers and the monitoring of entities vary as a function of the ownership 
structure of the equity, the structure of corporations, the role of the banking system in the 
economy, business circumstances, the efficient functioning of capital markets and the level of 
product market and capital market competition, both domestic and international. 
54 OECD (1999). Definition also consistent with the Cadbury Committee (1992) definition. 
ss See Halpern (1999) for a full discussion. 
56 See Stoneman (2001). Schmidt (1999), Danthine, Giavazzi and Thadden (2000) 
57 See Gregory (2001) for international comparison of corporate governance 
58 See Mayer (1990,1994) 
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The differences between the Anglo-American "market-oriented" and Japanese, Continental 
Europe "bank-oriented" systems have received particular attention. In this study I suggest that the 
arms-length relation between firms and suppliers of finance that tends to characterise the market- 
oriented systems may be less effective at dealing with problems of asymmetric information or 
principal-agent conflicts. Consequently dividends would play a more vital role in market-oriented 
countries than in bank-oriented countries. I test this prediction by investigating and comparing the 
share price reaction to dividend change announcements; higher excess returns are expected in 
market-oriented countries than in bank-oriented countries. Perhaps, surprisingly, there has been 
little investigation of the role of dividend policy in the European corporate governance. Moreover, 
the question whether differences in European dividend policy are related to differences in 
financial systems has received little empirical attention. 
According to Zysman (1983) the financial systems vary in three ways: the importance of different 
financial markets, the way prices are set in these markets, and the role the government plays in the 
financial system. He categorises the US and the UK as capital-market based systems where the 
level of debt to equity ratio59 is low, stocks and bonds are the main source of long-term financing, 
owners exercise influence through selling of their shares and prices are established in competitive 
markets. In contrast Continental Europe and Japan are categorised as credit-based systems where 
the debt to equity ratio is high (i. e. debt is the main source of finance), owners exercise influence 
through voting rights and prices are established in non-competitive markets. Berglof (1988,1990) 
distinguishes between market-oriented and bank- oriented systems. He shows that in market- 
oriented (bank-oriented) systems, the size of the financial markets is high (low), the degree of 
internal finance is low (high), the ratio of bank credits to total liabilities is low (high), the 
importance of bond financing is low (high), the degree of concentration is low (high), commercial 
banking is insignificant (significant) and institutional shareholding is less common (wide spread). 
Franks and Mayer (1994,1997) distinguish between the outsider system in the US and the UK 
and the insider system in Continental Europe and Japan. The outsider systems are characterised 
by dispersed equity ownership with large institutional holdings, the recognised primacy of 
shareholders interest, a strong emphasis on the protection of minority investors and relative strong 
requirements of disclosure. These systems are market-oriented systems, inasmuch as they rely 
heavily on the capital market as a means of influencing behaviour. They are also characterised by 
a legal regulatory approach that favours countries with outsider systems, as the legal framework 
supports clearly the right of shareholders to control the company and makes the board and the 
59 Henceforth, D/E ratio 
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management explicitly accountable to shareholders. 60 Secondly, in the insider systems few 
companies have publicly traded shares, ownership and control are largely and closely held by 
identifiable and cohesive groups of insiders who have long-term stable relationships with the 
company. Insider groups are relatively small, their members are known to each other and they 
have some connection to the company other than their financial investment, such as banks or 
suppliers. Groups of insiders typically include some combination of family interests, allied 
industrial concerns, banks and holding companies. Insider systems are usually bank-oriented. In 
these systems banks tend to have more complex and longer-term relationships with corporate 
clients. Capital markets are in general less developed than outsider systems. In contrast to the 
market-based systems, which insist upon public disclosure of information, the insider system is 
more willing to accept the way a bank interacts with borrowers. 61 Reflecting the reliance on bank 
finance and the lack of sophisticated institutional investors in the insider systems, the range of 
financial assets available to the public has been comparatively narrow and banks have dominated 
financial intermediation. 62 
The discussion indicates that views on the financial system overlap each other to a large extent 
but they all discuss the differences between the two aforementioned types: market-oriented and 
bank-oriented systems. It is well documented that the UK system is typified as a market-oriented 
system in contrast to the German system, 63 which is a bank-oriented system. France and Italy, also 
follow the characteristics of bank-oriented systems. This is illustrated in Table 1.1 which 
considers the corporate governance characteristics in the countries under consideration and 
distinguishes between the two systems. 
60 See LaPorta et al (1997). They also argue that the legal environment might be a more meaningful distinction between 
different corporate governance systems around the world. 
61 See Schmidt (1998) and Charkham (1994) 
62 See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Diamond (1984) 
63 See Franks and Mayer (1995) 
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TABLE 1.1. TIIF CHARACTERISTICS OF MARKFT-O R NFD SYSTEMS VERSUS BANK- 
ORIENT FD SYSTEMS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. 
MARKET- 
ORIENTED BANK-ORIENTED SYSTEMS 
SYSTEMS 
PANEL A: GENERAL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
UK GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
Market Capital isation/GDP2.25 0.67 1.17 0.68 
Number of Listed 2436 751 1131 291 Companies 
Accounting Standards 0.87 0.69 0.77 0.69 
Ownership Concentration 0.15 0.50 0.24 0.60 
Equity Owned by Banks 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.06 
GDP Growth' IN 2.27 2.60 2.54 2.82 
Source: Carlin and Mayer (1998), Rajan and Zingales (2001) 
'Rajan and Zingalcs (2001); 1999 Figures; Market Capitalisation to GDP is the aggregate market value of equity of 
domestic companies to GDP. According to Rajan and Zingales (2001), market capitalisation/GDP is a good proxy for 
the fraction of fixed capital finance via public traded equity. 
2 All listed domestic companies. Source: European Stock Exchange Statistics, 2002; Federation of European Stock 
Exchanges, Table 5, April 2002. For France the Euronext number of listed companies is reported. 
31s the number of accounting standards on a scale from 0 to 90 reported in Rajan and Zingales (1998) from a survey 
conducted by the Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research normalised to lie in the range 0 to 1. 
° LaPorta and Silanes (1998), is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the ten largest non-financial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country. A firm is considered privately owned if 
the State is not a know shareholder in it. 
5The proportion of total equity capitalisation in different countries held by banks. Carlin and Mayer (1998) note that 
there is no single source of data is available for this series. 
6La Porta and Silanes (1998), is the average annual percent growth per capita gross domestic product for the period 
1970-1993 
PANEL B: SOU RCES OF FUNDS 
UK GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
Group 4.44 9.26 2.21 9.59 
Privates 1.96 6.65 2.37 3.50 
Public Sector 0.28 5.61 0.76 2.50 
Banks 21.85 52.24 31.15 71.18 
Pension Funds 34.64 0 2.33 0 
Insurance Companies 15.50 12.11 10.59 1.50 
Others 4.37 14.09 12.18 0 
Self Financing 16.93 0 38.36 11.71 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
Source: European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) Yearbook 2000; All listed com anies included. 
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PANEL C: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
UK GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
Financial Companies 57.8 % 37.2% 23 % 22.2 % 
(Of Which Banks) (1%) (14%) (6%) (N/A) 
Non-Financial Companies 1.5 % 30.9 % 16.4 % 21.6 % 
Private Investors 24.8 % 16.8 % 32.1 % 25.8 % 
Public Sector 0.0 % 2.9% 6.4 % 23.8 % 
Foreign 15.9% 12.2% 22.1 % 6.6% 
Source: Oslo Stock Exchange (1998). 
The study was conducted on behalf of the Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE). Financial Companies 
represent the domestic institutional investor segment; the category covers holdings by listed companies, limited 
companies and private organisations and trusts. Non-Financial Companies include holdings by listed companies, limited 
companies and private organisations and trusts. Private investors mainly represent households' ownership, while public 
sector category includes both central and local government holdings. 
PANEL D: OWNERS HIP CONCENTRATION 
UK GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
Total Mean 40.8 More than 65 52 68.4 
Ownership 
Concentration Median 39 More than 65 30 62.3 
Largest Mean 15.2 N/A 29.4 51.9 
Shareholding Median 10.9 52.1 20 54.5 
Number of Companies in 250 Listed' 374 Listed2 40 CAC3 216 Listed Studies (All) 
Disclosure Threshold 3% 5% 5% 2% 
Source: Crama, Leruth, Lenneboog, Urbain (1998). All studies are included in Barca and Becht (2000): Georgen et al 
(2000) for the UK, Becht and Bochmer (2000) for Germany, Bloch and Kemp (2000) for France and Bianchi, Bianco 
and Enriques (2000) for Italy. 
Random Sample of all Non-Financial Firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
Z All Listed From the Official Market 
3 For All 680 French Listed Firms, the Largest Owner controls an average of 56% if voting rights. Companies, which 
are part of an index, have to assure sufficient liquidity. 
Another important imperfection when determining dividend policy is the legal environment under 
which firms operate, therefore it is important to consider the differences of this factor between the 
countries when a cross-country analysis is to be done. La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) do not directly provide an explanation but they offer a possible reason for the stylised fact 
that dividend policies vary considerably across the world, as well as an interesting insight into the 
role of institutional mechanisms; the legal system, the importance of which may lead managers to 
feel compelled to pay dividends to shareholders. They distinguish between the common law 
(including the UK) and the civil law tradition" (including Germany, France and Italy) and 
examine the laws governing investor protection, the quality of enforcement of these laws and 
ownership concentration in 49 countries around the world. They observe that laws differ markedly 
around the world; in common law countries investors are better protected than in civil law 
countries. 
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Recently, La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) compare the corporate dividend policy 
across 33 countries. They distinguish between two models. Firstly, under the outcome model 
dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash, 
therefore stronger minority shareholder rights would be associated with higher dividend payouts. 
Shareholders who feel protected would accept low dividend payouts, and high reinvestment rates, 
from a company with good opportunities because they know that when this company's 
investments pay off, they could extract dividends. Secondly, under the substitute model insiders 
interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent 
treatment of minority shareholders. 65 They provide evidence to support that dividend policy is 
dependent on the effective legal protection of shareholders, which enables minority shareholders 
to extract dividend payments from corporate insiders (supporting the outcome model). Empirical 
evidence showed that dividend policies vary across legal regimes in ways consistent with the 
outcome model "version" of the agency theory of dividends. 
La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide evidence to support that countries develop 
substitute mechanisms for poor investor protection, for example, mandatory dividends (e. g. in 
Greece) or legal reserve requirements; more importantly, they find that good accounting standards 
and shareholder protection measures are associated with lower concentration of ownership, 
indicating that concentration is indeed a response to poor investor protection. Indeed Table 1.1 
Panel D illustrates that in the UK where shareholder rights are well protected by the UK common 
law system, ownership concentration is low in contrast to Germany, France and Italy. Ownership 
concentration is important because monitoring is only cost effective if a single party becomes 
large enough to internalise the costs of corporate control. Such costs are borne by the monitoring 
shareholder individually, but the financial benefits resulting from corporate governance actions 
are only reaped in proportion to the cash flow rights. 66 Concentrated ownership mitigates free- 
riders problemb' of corporate control and as a consequence, owners are more active in exercising 
control over managers. 
Gadhoum (2000) argues that ownership concentration creates a stronger link between managers 
and shareholders, decreases information asymmetry and the need to signal the firm's prospects 
through frequent changes in dividends. Generally, literature suggests that the less concentrated the 
structure of a company, the higher the dividends paid. Walker and Petty (1978) and Dwyer and 
64 The civil law tradition has three main families, the French family (including France and Italy), the German family 
(including Germany) and the Scandinavian family. This further distinction of the civil law is beyond the scope of my 
study. 
65 LaPorta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny argue that a reputation for good treatment of shareholders is worth more in 
countries with weak legal protection of minority shareholders, who have little else to rely on; therefore, all else equal, in 
these countries dividend payouts should be higher than in countries with good legal protection. 66 Grossman and Ilart (1988) 
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Lynn (1989) examine a sample of US firms and provide evidence that closely or privately held 
companies rarely pay dividends in contrast with public companies which pay a substantial 
fraction of their earnings as dividends each year. Rozeff (1982) also finds a significant negative 
relationship between dividend policy and the firm's past and expected future growth rate of sales, 
the beta coefficient and the amount of stock held by insiders, while a positive relationship 
between dividends and the number of common shareholders is observed. In addition, Megginson, 
Nash and Van-Randenbourgh (1994) find a significant increase in dividend payouts by newly 
privatised firms in 18 different countries. Other studies, investigate the dividend policy of the 
firms characterised by high foreign ownership. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) provide evidence 
that foreign investors show preference for large firms paying low dividends and demonstrate that 
most of the features associated with foreign ownership are driven by the fact that foreign investors 
are mutual funds or other institutional investors; hence, they identify an institutional investor bias 
rather than a foreign investor bias on the dividend policy of the firm. 
Megginson (1996) observes that some of the international differences in dividend policies are, at 
least partially, a reflection of the degree of reliance of companies on capital markets financing. He 
observes that countries, which rely more on capital markets financing generally, tend to have 
higher payouts than countries that rely more on intermediate financing. As compared to the other 
countries, a higher proportion of UK firms have their shares listed and actively traded on the stock 
market. In the UK a higher proportion of shares is owned by financial institutions, in particular 
pension funds, insurance companies and unit/investment trusts, and a smaller proportion of shares 
is owned directly by individuals, or controlled by family blocks. Related to this, ownership tends 
to be much less concentrated in the UK, since financial institutions themselves tend to own highly 
diversified portfolios of shares in many different companies, rather than controlling stakes in 
particular firms. 68 In the other three countries, financial companies are less important investors as 
compared to the UK but still they hold an important share of the market. In Germany, financial 
companies are the largest class of investors holding 37.2 percent of the market, while in France 
and Italy financial companies hold 23 percent and 22.2 percent respectively and they are the 
second largest shareholders on the market. Differences also exist between the countries in the 
involvement of banks. Table 1.1 Panel A shows that banks provide a higher portion of equity 
capital in Germany (13.6 percent), in France (6.4 percent) and in Italy (5.7 percent) than in the 
UK where banks only hold 1.7 percent of the market equity. Further, differences between the four 
countries exist when considering the importance of bank debt as a source of funds. Table 1.1 
Panel B illustrates that companies bank debt in the UK only equals to 21.85 percent in contrast 
67 See Demsetz (1983) 
68 Detailed discussion in Edwards and Fisher (1994) and Franks and Mayer (1995) 
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with their counterparts in Germany (52.24 percent), France (31.15 percent) and Italy (71.18 
percent). 
Moreover, it should be noted that in the UK banks limit their involvement in the companies to the 
extend which they provide finance and typically they neither subscribe for shares in their 
customers nor seek to exercise a control function via board representation. 69 Berglof (1997) notes 
that the Bank of England strongly discourages controlling stakes in manufacturing companies. In 
contrast, German banks play a prominent role in financing and controlling of the companies, as 
banks have traditionally viewed their relationship with clients as a long-term one, and they are 
often willing to step in to help a company to avoid bankruptcy. Moreover, the control of equity 
voting rights in large companies by German Banks and the bank's associated representation on 
the supervisory boards of such companies have been argued to permit them to constrain the 
managements of large German companies to act more closely in accordance with shareholders' 
wishes and hence reduce the agency costs involved in the owner-manager relationship of large 
firms. 70 However, the major source of bank's voting power at shareholders' meetings comes not 
from their own holdings of equity, but from the proxy votes they exercise on behalf of those 
shareholders who place their shares with a bank for custody. " LaPorta, Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999) characterised the France as a "strong bank" country where banks are allowed to both own 
majority stakes in industrial firms and invest more than 60 percent of their capital in such firms. 
Until 1993, however, the Bank of Italy precluded banks from acquiring significant shareholdings 
in non-financial firms. 'Z 
Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a signalling model that emphasises asymmetric information as a 
primary reason to explain the existence of financial intermediaries. They argue that financial 
intermediaries can signal the proprietary information of many borrowers at a cost that is lower 
than that of each individual borrower attempting to signal alone. Diamond (1984) extends Leland 
and Pyle (1977) and shows that private information about borrowers can be monitored more 
efficiently by a financial intermediary on behalf of its depositors (as suppliers of funds) rather 
than by many individual depositors acting as individual lenders. Diamond (1984) provides further 
insight by showing that financial intermediaries possess a cost advantage in producing 
information and that the monitoring function provided by intermediaries is cost effective in 
resolving the financial contracting problems caused by asymmetric information. Rajan (1992) 
explores the costs and benefits of borrowing from informed versus arm's-length sources, and 
69 See Edwards and Fisher (1994), Charkham (1994), Solomon, Tylecote and Solomon (1999) 70 See Edwards and Fisher (1994), Brook, Hendershott, Sarin (1996), Edwards and Nibler for a full discussion on the 
role of banks in Germany 
'1 Baums and Rainer (2001), also provide a discussion on voting as a management control mechanism 72 See Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques (1997) 
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offers an explanation of why firms may seek alternatives to bank monitoring and control of firm 
investment decisions. Other models of financial intermediaries'; suggest that in a market with 
imperfect information, financial intermediaries have a comparative advantage in collecting private 
information and monitoring the activities of borrowers relative to the direct monitoring by many 
individual lenders. Fama (1985) distinguishes banks from other types of financial intermediaries 
and argues that banks are indeed a special type of financial institution. He draws a distinction 
between inside and outside debt and classifies bank debt as inside debt, defined as a contract in 
which the creditor (the bank) gets access to private information about the borrowing firm that is 
not available to other market participants. This confidential disclosure of information by mangers 
allows banks to know more about the quality of the firm than any other investor. Recently, Low, 
Glorfeld, Hearth and Rimbey (2001) establish a link between the theories of banking and dividend 
policy in an examination of how bank monitoring and dividend signals complement one another 
to resolve information asymmetries. Results indicate that, for small firms, investors interpret the 
dividend decision as a function of bank monitoring and the dividend signals taken together. 
Therefore, banks appear to have a comparative advantage in monitoring firms and close bank 
monitoring would reduce managers' opportunity to invest in negative net present value projects, 
reducing the need to restrict management's investment discretion. 
Since both the ownership concentration and the involvement of banks would result in lower levels 
of information asymmetry and agency conflicts in bank-oriented countries than in market-oriented 
countries, dividends are expected to be less important as a mechanism to mitigate information 
asymmetries and agency conflicts. Moreover, In France and Italy the ownership structure of 
corporations can basically be characterised by family control, financial holding companies, cross- 
shareholding companies and state ownership. For example in Italy, powerful families, such as the 
Agnellis, have control over nearly all listed companies. According to Cobham, Cosci and 
Mattesini (1999) the share of firms' assets held by families in the late 1990s was 50.8 percent in 
Italy, against 27 percent, 16.9 percent and 13.3 percent respectively in France, Germany and the 
UK respectively. Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) find support for the hypothesis that levels of 
insider ownership differ systematically across firms, with high insider ownership firms adopting 
lower levels of dividends. Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) and Fenn and Liang (2001) 
conclude that management stock options are related to the composition of dividend payouts and a 
strong negative relationship between dividends and management options was observed. 
Following this discussion it can be concluded that in market-based countries there is higher 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders than in bank-based countries. 
73 Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986) 
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Therefore, it would be interesting to test whether this information asymmetry is reflected in the 
dividend policy of the firm. In other words, a great motivation exist to test whether in market- 
based countries the role of dividends as a mechanism to mitigate these information asymmetries is 
more vital than in bank-based countries. According to the signalling hypothesis of dividends it 
should be expected that: 
1! YPOTIIF. SIS: In market-based countries, where information asymmetries are large, 
companies are less likely to change their dividends and the market reaction to dividend 
changes is stronger than in bank-based countries. 
Generally, the information asymmetry models argue that managers know more than investors 
about the firm's prospects and that dividends reveal some information to the market. 74 This 
implies that dividend change announcements should be positively related to share returns because 
a higher (lower) dividend signals higher (lower) current and/or future expected cash flow. A 
number of studies report a significant positive relationship between dividends and excess returns 
on the dividend announcement day. 75 Secondly, literature proposes the effect of agency conflicts 
on dividend behaviour. Agency theories focus on the different incentives of managers and 
shareholders and the role of dividends as a disciplinary mechanism. By reducing the amount of 
free cash flow, dividends force managers to submit to the discipline of the financial markets. 76 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) document lower excess returns when higher growth opportunities 
exist indicating that agency conflict problem is less severe in the presence of high growth as 
managers are less likely to invest in negative net present value projects. As in the information 
asymmetry models, the agency models predict that dividend change announcements should be 
positively related to stock returns because a higher dividend level reduces managers' tendency to 
waste free cash, even in negative net present value projects. Therefore, both explanations predict 
that dividend changes should result in excess returns on the dividend announcement day, in the 
same direction as the dividend change. In this study I argue that the magnitude of dividend 
changes (cuts, increases, initiations and omissions) excess returns differs across Europe due to 
differences in the corporate governance systems. In different countries corporate governance 
systems provide alternative mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts; t is difficult however to 
distinguish between the predictions of the information signalling and the agency conflict theories. 
I test the agency conflict explanation of dividends in the light of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
and I use the market to book ratio in order to distinguish between over-investing and value 
maximising firms in order to test whether 
74 See Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) 
75 See Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), 1 lealy and Palepu (1988) 76 See Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986) 
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HYPOTIHESIS: The relationship between the market reaction to dividend changes and firms 
growth opportunities is stronger in market-based countries. 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF TIE THESIS 
The rest of my thesis is organised as follows. 
CHAPTER 2: "Taxes and Dividends: Evidence from the UK, Germany, France and Italy" 
The purpose of this part of my thesis is to provide a detailed analysis and comparisons of the 
dividend taxation systems in the UK, Germany, France and Italy for the period 1987 to 2002. 
Moreover, I consider the dividend taxation changes during the years of my study in order to 
enable inter-country comparisons under different taxation periods. 
In Section 2.1, I provide an introduction of this part of my thesis. In Section 2.2, I compare the 
Classical and the Imputation Tax Systems. The US classical taxation system discourages 
companies to distribute profits in the form of dividends as they carry higher taxation as compared 
to capital gains (i. e. dividends are subject to double taxation firstly at the corporation level and 
secondly at the shareholder level as personal income). In contrast, the European imputation tax 
systems provide tax incentives to shareholders since the taxation suffered at the corporation level 
is reimbursed in the form of tax credits. 
In Section 2.3, following Lasfer (1996) I analyse the capital gains and dividend taxation burdens 
under the European imputation systems in an attempt to derive the tax discrimination variable 
(King, 1977). Moreover, I provide an illustration of dividends and personal tax systems under the 
imputation and classical systems. In Section 2.4, I introduce the European countries tax regimes. 
Full descriptions of the dividend taxation systems in countries under consideration are provided 
through time (also accounting for taxation system changes), in an attempt to derive the tax 
discrimination variables under different systems. In each country I divide my sample in taxation 
periods and I calculate the tax discrimination variable in the different tax periods identified. The 
purpose of this analysis is to determine how the tax discrimination variable varies across 
European countries and in which countries the discrimination between dividends and capital gains 
is minimized, i. e. tax discrimination variable close or equal to unity. I will then test whether 
dividend payout policies are higher (lower) in countries where the tax discrimination variable is 
lower (higher). I expect payouts to be higher in countries (UK) where the majority of shareholders 
are either basic income individuals or tax 
-exempt investors (with tax discrimination variable 
equal to unity or lower than one) as compared to countries (German, France and Italy) where the 
majority of investors are higher tax payers (with tax discrimination variable higher than one). 
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In Section 2.5, I provide a detailed literature review relating to the taxation effect on the dividend 
policy of the firm. I particularly concentrate on the theories of the impact of taxes on dividends 
and firm valuation (the Traditional View, The Tax Irrelevance View, the Tax Capitalisation View 
and the Clientele Effect View). Also, I consider theories relating to the relationship between long- 
term stock returns and dividend yield and the ex-dividend day share price behaviour. The latter 
provides an introduction for the next Chapter. 
CHAPTER 3: "The Taxation Impact on the Ex-Dividend Dates in Europe: Evidence From the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy"In 
this chapter I study the ex-dividend day behaviour of share prices, which has been a long- 
standing object of interest in the literature. The share price change on the ex-dividend day is found 
to be less than the value of dividends. " According to the taxation effect hypothesis this is due to 
the differential taxation of dividend and capital gains. The imputation systems in Europe differ to 
the extend that in the UK investors are imputed a partial tax credit where as in Germany, France 
and Italy the tax credit attached to dividends is equal to the full amount of tax suffered at the 
company level. This results in differences between the dividends and capital gains tax differential. 
I test the hypothesis that ex-dividend day abnormal returns are higher in countries with high tax 
discrimination variable (UK) compared to countries with lower tax discrimination variables 
(Germany, France and Italy). 
In Section 3.1, I provide an introduction of my Chapter. In Section 3.2, I provide a literature 
review on the ex-dividend day share price behaviour. The literature can essentially be categorised 
in four groups. Firstly, I consider studies that support the taxation effect hypothesis on the ex- 
dividend day share price behaviour (e. g., Elton and Gruber, 1970, Barclay, 1987, Kaplanis, 1986, 
Lasfer, 1996, McDonald, 2001) and provide a detailed analysis of the Elton and Gruber (1970) 
ex-dividend day share price behaviour model taking into account the tax systems in the four 
countries in the sample. Secondly, I summarize studies that support the short-term trading effect 
on the ex-dividend day behaviour (e. g., Karlay, 1982, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986, Eades, 
Hess and Kim, 1984, Koski, 1996, Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994). Thirdly, I review studies that 
provide an explanation around the microstructure effect on the ex-dividend day behaviour (e. g., 
Bali and Hite, 1998, Frank and Jahannathan, 1998). Finally, I focus on studies that look at the ex- 
dividend date share price behaviour before and after major tax reforms (e. g., Lasfer, 1995, Poterba 
and Summers, 1985, Michaely, 1991). 
77 Campbell and Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber (1970). 
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Following the literature review, it seems reasonable to argue that US evidence provides mixed 
results on the Elton and Gruber (1970) hypothesis. Despite the long existing literature, the ex- 
dividend stock price behaviour puzzle remains unsolved. This together with the differences on the 
dividend taxation systems under consideration described in Chapter 2 (and the differences in the 
tax discrimination variables between the countries) constitute the main motivation of this Chapter. 
The motivation is described in Section 3.3, where I also set the hypothesis tested. 
In Section 3.4, I describe the data and methodology used to test my hypothesis. I employ an event 
study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) to investigate the share price behaviour around the 
ex-dividend days in the UK, Germany, France and Italy for the period 1987- 2002. In Section 3.5, 
I discuss the empirical results. Firstly, I provide a country-based analysis of the ex-dividend day 
behaviour. In all the countries under consideration results78 show that abnormal returns are 
statistically different from zero only on the ex-date. Thus, results support the ex-date taxation 
effect hypothesis. Moreover, I investigate the share price behaviour around different event 
windows (for example, 
-20 to -2, -1 to +1 and +2 to +20 Days). However, cumulative abnormal 
returns around day 0 are not significant. Similarly, consistent with my hypothesis, when 
examining the share price behaviour around the ex-date according to the tax discrimination 
variable, in countries where the tax discrimination variable is higher (UK) I observe significantly 
higher abnormal returns than in Germany, France and Italy. Moreover, I examine the distribution 
of the ex-date returns before and after major tax reforms where I observe evidence consistent with 
the tax explanation of dividends. I also consider the ex-date returns according to the dividend 
yield I find a strong positive relationship between the ex-day returns and dividend yield which 
provide further support for the taxation effects. Further, I examine the ex-day returns in relation to 
the dividend yield and bid-ask spread. Finally, I regress the ex-dividend day abnormal returns 
against the dividend yield, the bid-ask spread and the market value variables. " in order to test for 
the tax and short-term trading effects hypotheses. In Section 3.6, the ex-dividend day share price 
behaviour study concludes. 
CHAPTER 4: "The Information Content of Dividend Announcements in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France and Italy: A comparative Study" 
In this chapter I examine the information content of dividend announcements in the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy. In a framework of asymmetric information existing within companies, 
the theory of signals defines dividend policy as a signalling mechanism through which managers 
78 Results reported are calculated using the Market Mode (Brown and Warner, 1985). Results obtained using alternative 
methods, for example the Raw Return Model, the Market-Adjusted Model (0=1 and a=0), the Mean Adjusted Returns 
Model, the Schools and Williams and Dimson specifications confirm the robustness of my results. 79 The bid-ask spread and the market value variables are used as a proxy for transaction costs. See Karpoff and Walking (1990), Lasfer (1995) 
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reveal their incentives and private information to external shareholders. Traditionally, literature 
has observed that dividend announcements reveal information and signal the future prospects of 
the company; therefore the share price behaviour of the company should be positively related to 
the dividend change; that is, announcements of dividend increases (decreases) should result in 
positive (negative) abnormal returns. 
Differences in the corporate governance characteristics as briefly described above are expected to 
affect the level of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. However, it is 
difficult to generalise on the information asymmetry as it depends on both the corporate 
governance and individual firm characteristics. In Chapter 4, I provide evidence to show that 
higher information asymmetries between managers and shareholders exist in market-based 
countries (UK) as compared to bank-based countries (Germany, France and Italy). This evidence 
is based on the differences in corporate governance, institutional and financial characteristics 
between the countries in my sample. Consequently, I test the hypothesis that the market reaction 
to dividend changes in bank-based countries is expected to be lower than in market-based 
countries if dividends mitigate the information asymmetries between managers (insiders) and 
shareholders (outsiders). 
In Section 4.1, I introduce the theme of the chapter. In Section 4.2, I review the literature around 
the signalling effect hypothesis and the share price behaviour around the dividend announcement 
day. The review considers the theoretical models of the dividend-signalling hypothesis (e. g., 
Bhattacharya, 1979, Miller and Rock, 1985, John and Williams, 1985); studies that investigate the 
market reaction to dividend changes (e. g., Pettit, 1972, Aharony and Swary, 1980, Healy and 
Palepu, 1988); studies that examine the relationship between dividends and future earnings (e. g., 
Watts, 1973, Gonedes, 1978, Penman, 1983); studies that argue for the firm size effects (e. g., 
Bhushan, 1989, Bajaj and Vijh, 1990); studies that support the existence of contagion effects (e. g., 
Firth, 1996, Laux, Starks and Yoon, 1998); studies that examine the dividend information 
signalling hypothesis and the role of banks as monitors (e. g., Low, Glorfeld, Hearth and Rimbey, 
2001); and finally, I consider the international studies (e. g., Dewenter and Warther 
, 
1998 in the 
US and Japan, Amihud and Murgia, 1997 in Germany, Romon, 2000 in France). 
In Section 4.3,1 discuss the motivation of the study which centres on the institutional, financial 
and corporate governance differences between the European countries and I set the hypothesis to 
be tested. In Section 4.4, I provide a description of the data and methodology used to test my 
hypothesis. I use an event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) in order to investigate 
the share price reaction to dividend change announcements. To the best of my knowledge this is 
the first study to simultaneously test announcements of dividend increases, decreases, no changes, 
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initiations and omissions in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Moreover, I investigate the share 
price reaction to dividends and earnings announcement changes. The purpose is to isolate the 
impact of dividend change announcements on the share price from the impact of earnings 
announcements (e. g., Aharony and Swary, 1980, Eddy and Sheifer, 1992) and to investigate 
whether dividends provide information beyond of that provided by earnings announcements. It 
should be noted that the situation in which earnings news and dividend news appear to conflict 
(for example, when a company announces earnings decreases/increases and dividend 
increases/decreases)80 should be of special interest. 
In Section 4.5, I describe the results of the study. Results provide evidence to support my 
hypothesis. Indeed results show that in the UK where there is higher information asymmetry than 
in Germany, France and Italy, abnormal returns on the dividend change announcement day are 
significantly higher. Generally, results indicate that in the UK, where information asymmetry is 
high, managers use dividends as a mechanism to mitigate information asymmetries. Therefore, 
positive (negative) abnormal return behaviour following dividend increases/initiations 
(decreases/omissions) indicate that that investors perceive dividend increases (decreases) as good 
(bad) signals for the prospects of the company. However, results in bank based countries indicate 
that in these countries where shareholders are better informed about the current performance and 
future prospects of the companies an increase in dividends is perceived as lack of investing 
opportunities while a decrease in dividends is thought to be a way of raising costless sufficient 
funds for investing in positive net present value opportunities. In Section 5.6, I conclude the 
Chapter and I make recommendations for further development of the study. 
CHAPTER 5: "The Agency Conflict in Europe: A Test of the Cash Flow Ilypothesis" 
In the final chapter of my thesis I investigate the agency conflict explanation of dividends in the 
UK, Germany, France and Italy. According to the agency conflict theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), the interests of the managers (agents) deviate from those of the shareholders (principals). 
As a result, managers of the companies do not always act to the best interests of the shareholders, 
but instead they try to pursue their own personal benefits and goals at the expense of the 
shareholders. This may include managers investing beyond the optimal investment level of the 
company, in negative net present value projects. The free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) 
proposes dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency conflicts by decreasing free cash flows in 
the hands of managers, enforcing them to seek financing on the market and therefore reducing the 
ability of the managers to overinvest. However, the level of agency conflicts in each country is 
affected by the ownership structure and concentration, legal and corporate governance 
80 See Woolridge and Ghosh (1985) 
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characteristics as briefly described above and further analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. Based on 
these differences which are expected to result in higher agency conflicts in the market-based 
countries (UK) I test whether the abnormal returns on the dividend announcement day are higher 
than in bank-based countries. 
The signalling and agency conflict hypotheses both predict a positive relationship between the 
direction of dividend policy change and the share price reaction. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
provide tests to distinguish between the two hypotheses in respect of the level of growth 
opportunities faced by the firm. Their results provide evidence to support the free cash flow 
hypothesis over the signalling hypothesis. I follow Lang and Litzenberger (1989) in order to test 
between the predictions of the two hypotheses in European countries. I test whether in market- 
based countries overinvesting firms experience significantly larger abnormal returns on the 
announcement of a dividend change than in bank-based countries. Similarly, in market-based 
countries the market reaction to dividend changes of value maximising firms is expected to be 
higher than in bank-based countries. 
In Section 5.1,1 introduce the theme of this Chapter. In Section 5.2,1 review the literature around 
the monitoring role of dividends and the cash flow hypothesis. In Section 53, I describe the 
motivation of my study, which centres on the differences in the corporate governance system 
characteristics between the countries in my sample; and I set the hypothesis to be tested. 
In Section 5.4,1 discuss the data and methodology used to test my hypothesis. I employ the 
results obtained in Chapter 4 that is the abnormal returns around the dividend announcement day 
in the UK, German, French and Italian data for the period 1987 to 2002 and follow Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) in order to test whether the free cash flow hypothesis also outperforms the 
signalling hypothesis in countries outside the US. I use the market to book value in order to 
distinguish between overinvesting and value maximising firms. 8' The purpose is to test whether 
the share price reaction to dividend change announcements significantly differs according to the 
market-to-book value of the company and according to the direction of the dividend change 
announced (increase, decrease, no change, initiation, omission). In Section 5.5, I discuss the 
results. 
Results show that on the announcement day in all the countries under consideration overinvesting 
firms earn statistically higher returns than value maximising firms. Country comparisons between 
the value maximising firms show that the announcement day abnormal returns in the UK are 
81 As used in Beiner (2001), Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) 
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significantly higher than in Germany, France and Italy. I should draw attention to the 
insignificance of the differences in abnormal returns between Germany and France. This further 
reinforces my hypothesis; as the share price behavior does not differ in bank-based countries 
where there are equal levels of agency conflicts. Similarly, the overinvesting firms' country 
comparisons show that day 0 differences between countries are significant only when comparing 
the UK with the other three countries (i. e. the differences between the bank-based countries are 
not significant). Further, I consider the share price reaction for overinvesting and value 
maximising firms according to the direction of dividend changes. Finally, in Section 5.6, I 
conclude and I provide recommendations for further developments of the study. 
CIIAPTZR 6: "Conclusion and Further Research in the Area" 
The thesis provides an addition to the literature as it investigates empirically and draws 
conclusions on the dividend policy of companies in Europe, focussing mainly on the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy. 
The full imputation system in the UK and the partial imputation systems in Germany, France and 
Italy, result in significant differences across European countries with respect to the tax 
discrimination variables. Thus, the preferences of shareholders between dividends and capital 
gains vary across European countries. Also, results show that the dividend and capital gains tax 
burden is also affected by taxation reforms. 
In all the countries ex-dividend day returns are positive and significant, suggesting that ex-day 
prices fall by less than the amount of dividends. The results confirm that in countries where the 
differential between dividends and capital gains is high, ex-day returns are high. Moreover, tests 
whether changes in tax differential in each country are reflected in the ex-day returns show that 
ex-day returns are not homogeneous across the alternative tax regimes. I also find that in each of 
the four countries, changes in the tax systems that affect taxes on dividends and/or capital gains 
alter significantly ex-day returns. However, there is some indication that in countries such as 
Germany, where short-term trading is allowed and when transaction costs are low, the pre-and 
post-ex-day returns are significant suggesting that investors trade to capture dividends. For the 
other countries, results provide further evidence on the tax effect on ex-day returns. 
The investigation of the share price behaviour around the dividend announcements indicates that 
in the UK investors perceive dividend increases/initiations (decreases/omissions) as good (bad) 
news for the current performance and future prospects of the company. However, in the bank- 
based countries, where information asymmetry is lower than in market-based countries, investors 
perceive dividend increases/initiations negatively, while dividend decreases/omissions result in 
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positive abnormal returns. The results provide evidence to conclude that companies in bank-based 
countries companies decrease dividends in order to use the less costly internal funds to take 
positive net present value opportunities. At the same time, the negative market reaction to 
dividend increases indicates that companies are running out of good investment opportunities. 
Finally, further tests lead to the conclusion that dividend announcements provide information 
beyond of what is provided by earnings announcements. 
The share price reaction to dividend announcements in European countries is also analysed in the 
context of the agency conflict hypothesis. Originally results provide evidence to support both the 
signalling and overinvestment hypotheses. However, further tests of the results according to the 
market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for growth opportunities) do not reveal any significant 
differences in the abnormal returns between overinvesting and value maximising firms. Therefore, 
evidence obtained is not strong enough to reject the signalling hypothesis over the overinvestment 
hypothesis. 
This research is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
dividend payments across European countries and test for the impact of institutional factors such 
as taxes and corporate governance on the propensity to pay dividends and the market reaction to 
dividend changes. In each chapter I specify areas for further research. 
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CIIAPTF. R 2" TAXATION AND DIVInENDS: EVIWENCF. FROM TIIF. 
IJK GERMANY. FRANCE AND ITALY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) established that in a frictionless world and when the investment 
policy is held constant, the company's dividend policy is irrelevant to its value and consequently 
to the shareholders' wealth. Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, when a firm pays 
dividends, money is simply transferred from one "form" to another: before the payment of the 
dividend, the money is in the form of shareholder claim on the firm's assets, whereas after the 
payment of the dividend, the shareholder has cash in hand. As long as the transfer is a fair market 
transaction, shareholders are indifferent between capital gains and the payment of dividends. But 
when income taxes are introduced, dividend policy appears to be relevant to the firm's valuation 
as there is a differential tax advantage of capital gains versus dividend income. This is firstly due 
to the double taxation of dividends (both at the corporation and individual shareholder level) and 
secondly to the historically higher tax rate on ordinary income than on capital gains income. ' 
Therefore, shareholders' wealth is maximised if companies retain their earnings and provide 
returns to their shareholders through increases in share prices. ' In contrast, companies pay a high 
proportion of their earnings as dividends and according to Lintner (1956) managers are reluctant 
to cut dividends. According to Black (1976) this constitutes a puzzle. 
Several controversial theories have been developed in the literature in an attempt to fit the pieces 
of the dividend puzzle together. Results are contradicting and fail to provide a comprehensive 
explanation. In addition, the majority of the studies concentrate on the US dividend taxation 
system and the US dividend policy of the firm. At a later stage of the present part of my study, I 
illustrate that the US classical taxation system discourages companies to distribute profits in the 
form of dividends as they carry higher taxation as compared to capital gains. Moreover, OECD 
data3 reveals that the US has the second highest top tax rate on dividends, when considering both 
the corporate and individual taxes. It has been argued4 that high dividend tax rates reduce the 
economic growth by creating numerous distortions. First, high dividend taxes add to the income 
tax code's general bias against savings and investments; second, high dividend taxes cause 
1 Capital gains have a tax advantage even when the tax rate on realised capital gains equals the tax rate on dividends 
because unrealised capital gains are not taxed until the asset is sold; investors can affect the timing and amount of their 
tax payments by choosing when and what shares to trade. Rational investors, for example, could selectively liquidate 
parts of their portfolios to minimise their tax liability (i. e. sell shares with no capital gains or losses) and could also 
defer unrealised capital gains forever. See Constandinides (1983,1984) who modelled this deferral feature of the tax 
code and labelled it the "tax-timing option". Also see Lease, Kose, Kalay, Lowenstein and Sarig (1999) for a full 
discussion. 
2 Allen and Michaely (1995), Poterba and Summers (1985) 
3 OECD Tax Database and Joumard (2001) 
4 See Edwards (2003), Gentry and Hubbard (1998) 
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corporations to rely too much on debt rather than equity financing (highly indebted firms are more 
vulnerable to bankruptcy in economic downturns); third, high dividend taxes reduce the incentive 
to payout dividends in favour of retained earnings which may cause corporate executives to invest 
in wasteful or unprofitable projects; fourth, high dividend tax rates create a bias against business 
organised in the corporate firm and; fifth, high tax rates on dividends and other types of capital 
income greatly increase the wasteful efforts of financial engineers to design ways of avoiding and 
evading taxes. In Europe, the situation differs significantly because dividend taxation systems 
provide shareholders with tax credits, in an attempt to alleviate the double taxation of dividends 
and, tax rates are lower as compared to the US. The study is the first to build on the advantage of 
these differences in order to further investigate the effect of taxation on the dividend policy of the 
firm. Still, there are many differences on the treatment of dividends between the European tax 
systems under consideration, which provide an ideal environment to distinguish between the 
predictions of the different and contradicting explanations provided in the literature as well as to 
further explore the tax hypotheses of the dividend policy of the firm. During my sample period 
(1987-2002), these countries have also adopted a set of reforms that affected their respective tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains, which provides additional incentive into the 
study. Therefore, the analysis will be conducted both in intra- and inter- European country levels. 
Lasfer (1996) models the dividend and capital gains taxation burden under the UK imputation 
system, and argues that the overall tax burden on dividends and capital gains is a function of 
corporation tax, the dividend payout ratio and the differential taxation of dividends and capital 
gains. King (1977) provides a formal definition of the extend to which the tax system 
discriminates against dividends in terms of the "Tax Discrimination Variable" which is defined as 
the opportunity cost of retained earnings in terms of net dividends forgone. 5 In Chapter 3, I test 
the predictions of the taxation effect hypothesis, that is whether in countries with higher tax 
discrimination variables, ex-dividend day share prices would drop by less than the amount of 
dividend, and therefore higher abnormal returns would occur, as compared to counties with lower 
tax discrimination variables. Some studies6 overcame the problem of the interpretation of the ex- 
day pricing by analysing the effects of changes in taxation codes. Therefore, I also examine the 
taxation changes in each country and their effect on dividends in order to observe whether 
changes in taxation that caused the tax discrimination variable to change also affected the ex- 
dividend share price behaviour. 
s If dividends and capital gains are taxed equally then the tax discrimination variable is equal to unity; if tax 
discriminatin is lower (higher) than unity dividends are taxed more (less) heavily than capital gains. 
6 See Poterba and Summers (1985), Lasfer (1995), Michaely (1991), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983), Bell and 
Jenkinson (2001) 
42 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 2 
The study proceeds as follow. In Section 2.2, I describe and compare the classical and imputation 
systems of dividend taxation; I analyse the taxation burden on dividends and capital gains under 
both systems and illustrate the imputation taxation system influence on the preference of the 
shareholders and consequently the dividend policy of the firm. To do this I use the UK imputation 
system as a benchmark. I also provide the theory behind the tax discrimination variable. In 
Section 2.4, I describe the dividend taxation systems, in the UK, Germany, France and Italy both 
from the corporation and the investor views of perspective in an attempt to calculate the tax 
discrimination variables and identify the differences on the dividend taxation burden between the 
countries. The major Tax Reforms in each country are also analysed in order to perceive the 
effects of taxation changes on the dividend payout policy as well as on the preferences of 
shareholders between dividends and capital gains (i. e. changes in the tax discrimination variable). 
This will also constitute the grounds for testing my hypotheses in the next chapter. In Section 2.5, 
I provide the literature review of the taxation effect on the dividend policy of the firm. Particularly 
I summarise the different theories of the taxation impact on dividends (the traditional view, the 
tax irrelevance view, the tax capitalisation view and the clientele effect view) as well as the 
dividend taxation and the relationship between long-term stock returns and dividend yield. The 
literature review around the taxation effects on the ex-dividend day share price behaviour is 
analysed in the next Chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes on the taxation effect on the dividend 
policy of the firm in the UK, Germany, France and Italy and sets the grounds for forming and 
testing the hypothesis in Chapter 3. 
'ITTATif1N (FTTu(1PIi 
There are mainly two systems of dividend taxation namely the classical system and the imputation 
system, which can take the form of either partial, full or dual imputation system. Under the 
classical system, mainly adopted in the US, corporation tax operates separately from the personal 
tax. The company pays a flat rate of corporation tax on its taxable profits, and then shareholders 
pay income tax on the dividends received. Consequently, the classical system ignores the 
relationship between the company and its shareholders; and total tax is equal to the corporation 
tax plus the effective capital gains tax and the income tax on dividends. This is a simple system, 
but raises considerable objections because it leads to "Double Taxation of Dividends". The 
controversy surrounding the double taxation of dividends relates to the fact that income 
distributed to shareholders should only be taxed once, at a firm level (at the corporation tax rate), 
or at the shareholder level (at the personal income tax rate). Typically, under the classical system 
dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, therefore there is a tendency for low dividend 
payout. One way of alleviating this burden is to exempt totally dividends as currently proposed by 
the US Government. The alternative is to adopt an imputation system where the total tax collected 
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by the tax authorities from companies and their shareholders would remain approximately the 
same regardless of the company's dividend policy. The key feature of the imputation system is to 
alleviate the double taxation on dividends since a partial (UK) or full (Germany, France and Italy) 
credit is given to the shareholders for the corporation tax paid on the underlying profits 
distributed. In other words, the company's tax liability on distributed profits is "imputed" to the 
shareholder and is regarded as a prepayment of his/her income tax on dividends. 7 
Under the imputation taxation system, corporation tax is assessed and charged on profits in any 
given period. Considering the UK imputation system as an example, Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
payment of corporation tax when a company does not pay any dividends to the shareholders. For 
example, in 1998 fiscal year, the accounting period starts on 1 January 1998, and ends on 31 
December 1998. On the 300' of March 1999 the company announces its earnings and on the 30`h 
of September 1999 the corporation tax at the rate of 33 percent is due. Assuming profits of £100, 
the company's corporation tax liability is £33. 
1/1/1998 31/12/1998 30/3/1999 30/9/1999 
Accounting Period Announcement of Payment of 
Profit Before Tax £1000 Earnings Corporation Tax 
at 33% 
FIGURE 2.1 
On the other hand, Figure 2.2 illustrates the case when a company distributes profits as dividends 
to its shareholders. To illustrate how the system works, I assume profits before taxes for the 
accounting period 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1998, of £100 and that the company announces 
dividends on 30 March 1999 of d=£10. The Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) is due on 14 April 
1999 at the basic rate of 20 percent on gross dividends (D). Gross dividends are equal to d/(1- 
0.20) i. e., 10/0.80= £12.50. Therefore ACT payable is equal to D-d, which is £2.50. On 30 
September 1999 mainstream corporation tax is due. This is equal to corporation tax (Tc) minus 
ACT, i. e. (£100*33%)-£2.5. The company's tax liability to the Inland Revenue tax is £33.3 - £2.5 
= 
£30.50. For taxation purposes shareholders are deemed to receive a gross dividend of £12.50, 
which consists of Net Dividend (d) of £10 and ACT of £2.50. 
7 In some cases, where the rate of dividend tax credit exceeds the marginal personal income tax rate, (for example, the 
UK pension funds who are tax exempt) the shareholder receives a rebate for, in effect, overpaying the income tax due 
on the dividend. 
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1/1/1998 31/12/1998 30/3/1999 14/6/1999 
Accounting Period Announcement of Companies 
Profit Before Tax £100 Dividends £10 pay ACT of 
20% on Gross 
Dividends 
= 
£2.50 
30/9/1999 
I 
Companies pay 
Mainstream 
Corporation Tax at 
33% of £33 less 
ACT of £2.50 
As illustrated in the above example, under the imputation system, when a company distributes a 
net cash dividend (d), it must also pay ACT8 equivalent to the basic rate of income tax (s), on the 
gross dividend (D), which is equal to d/(1-s). Thus ACT is equal to sD, or [(sd)/(1-s)J. The 
distributing company pays ACT to the Inland Revenue fourteen days after the quarter in which 
the announcement of dividend is made and then deducted from the firm's corporation tax liability, 
which is usually payable nine months after the end of the accounting period. Therefore, there is 
only about three months gap between the day ACT is paid and the day ACT is deducted form the 
company's tax liability. 
The essence of the imputation system is that when a shareholder receives dividends of £10, he/she 
is deemed to have already paid income tax at the basic rate. Shareholders pay tax mD, where m is 
their personal rate of income tax and receive a tax credit of sD. Therefore, shareholder's dividend 
tax is equal to (m-s)D, i. e. d(m-s)/(1-s). Tax-exempt investors receive a full tax credit equal to s, 
£2.5, therefore the after tax dividend received is £12.50. Basic rate taxpayers for whom m=s, 
receive an after tax dividend of £10, and have no further tax liability. Whereas high tax payers 
with m equal to 40% (i. e. m>s) are subject to an additional income tax of £2.50 and the after tax 
dividend is £7.50, [10-(12.5*40%)-2.5]. In this case the effective dividend tax rate is equal to 
25%, that is (40%-20%)/(1-20%). On the other hand, cash dividends received by corporate 
investors from other companies (for example, in the UK) are not taxed again as profits. The 
authorities cannot refund the associated tax credit but corporate investors can use it to frank their 
own dividend payments or offset it against their previous tax liability. 9 From the above, a clear 
incentive of tax-exempt investors to prefer dividends to earnings retention could be observed. 
Therefore, for this class of investors, 10 at the limit, the effective tax rate on capital gains is zero, 
whereas the tax credit on dividend income provided by the imputation system results in a negative 
overall tax rate on dividends for the tax-exempt institutions. 
e It should be noted that ACT rate reduced to 10 percent by the 1999 Finance Act, which imposed also a number of 
restrictions on its claim. A full explanation of this reform and the changes in the dividend taxation system are to be 
analysed at a later stage of this chapter. 
9 Lasfer (1996) found that firms which are unable to deduct the ACT from their tax liability pay low dividends 
10 Tax Exempt investors constitute the largest shareholder class in the UK 
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2.3 CAPITAL GAINS, TAXES, DIVIDEND TAX ATION ANI) TIIE TAX DISCRIMINATION D 
VARIAB 
Lasfer (1995) models the capital gains and the dividend taxation burdens under the UK 
imputation system. Firstly, in the case where the company's earnings are retained and reinvested 
at the cost of capital, the company will generate an after-tax capital gains, g., = r(1-z), where r is 
the firm's after-tax earnings that are retained, and z is the effective capital gains tax rate. The 
)], and the individual tax rz, capital gains tax burden is the sum of corporation tax paid, [tc r/(1-tc 
all divided by the pre-corporate taxed capital gains as shown in Equation (1). 
r t, + rz 
Capital Gains Tax Burden =1-tr=1- (1 - t, )(1 - Z) (1) 
1-tr 
On the other hand, when the company distributes profits in the form of dividends, the dividend tax 
burden is the sum of corporation tax paid, [tcd/((1-tj], and the individual taxes paid, [d(m-s)/(1. 
s)], as a percentage of the pre-corporate tax dividend, [d/(1-t, )]; as shown in Equation 2: 
tcd 
+d 
(m 
- 
s) 
1-to (1-s) (1-tß)(1-m) 
Dividend Tax Burden =d=1 1- s 
(2) () 
(1-to) 
The overall tax burden on dividends and capital gains can therefore be calculated as a function of 
the corporation tax, the dividend payout ratio (d/E) and the differential taxation of dividends and 
capital gains. Equation 3 shows the overall tax burden on dividends and capital gains: 
d (1- t_)(1- m) dd (1- n: ) 
E 1- (1-s) + 1-E 
ý1-(1-tß)(1-z)ý=1-(1-tý) 
E (1-s) -(1-z) +(1-z) 
(3) 
From this equation it can be observed that the overall tax burden on dividends and capital gains is 
a function of corporation tax, the dividend payout ratio, WE, and the differential taxation of 
dividends and capital gains. Undoubtedly, one of the factors influencing dividend policy is the tax 
variables represented by the income tax m, the imputation rate s and the capital gains tax rate z. 
King (1977) models the combination effects of these rates as shown in Equation 4. 
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TD = 
(-m) 
0- s)(1- z) 
(4) 
Where, TD is the tax discrimination variable between taxes on dividends and capital gains taxes 
and measures the opportunity cost of retained earnings in terms of post-tax earnings foregone, " 
that is, the additional disposable income a shareholder would receive if one unit of retained 
earnings were distributed. To recall, the objective of the imputation system is to alleviate the 
double taxation of dividends and to reduce the taxpayer's preference for retained earnings. 
Therefore, one would expect that the higher the imputation rate s, the higher the after-tax 
shareholder's wealth, and the higher the expected level of dividends. 
Substituting the tax discrimination variable in Equation 3, the overall Tax Burden on dividends 
and capital gains equation can be expressed as in Equation 5: 
1-(1-tß)(1-z d(TD-1)+1 (5) 
Therefore, when the dividend tax credit is equal to the tax on capital gains, the tax discrimination 
is unity and the dividend payout ratio does not affect the overall tax burden. However, when the 
tax discrimination variable is higher (lower) than one, the overall tax burden decreases (increases) 
as the payout ratio increases. Tax discrimination variable is a function of the individual income 
tax rate. In other words, if cash in the hands of the company and cash in the hands of the 
shareholder can be interchanged without attracting an additional tax liability (or credit) then the 
tax discrimination variable would be equal to unity denoting that shareholders are indifferent 
between dividends and capital gains. In the case when the tax discrimination variable is less than 
unity dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains and investors would be expected to 
reward low dividend payout policy. On the other hand, when the tax discrimination variable is 
higher than unity, shareholders would prefer dividends than capital gains, as the latter are more 
heavily taxed, and high dividend payout policy companies would be rewarded. Therefore, it 
would be expected that in countries with higher discrimination variable shareholders would 
reward higher dividend payout companies. 
One shortcoming of the imputation system is that tax relief is only available for the profits paid 
out as dividends to the shareholders. That is, there is no taxation relief available for profits that are 
retained by the company, and the corporation tax paid on retained profits is not reflected in tax 
" See King (1977) 
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credits paid to tax-exempt shareholders. Thus, under the imputation system dividends offer a tax 
advantage for tax-exempt shareholders that result in a desire for higher level of dividend 
payments by firms. On the other hand, higher taxpayers have the opposite tax preferences, while 
only basic-rate shareholders pay the same tax regardless of the company's decision to pay 
dividends or not, because the rate of imputation is set equal to the basic rate of tax on dividend 
income. Hence, in countries where the majority of investors are tax exempt'2 (higher tax payers) 
companies are expected to adopt high (low) dividend payout ratios, as shareholders would reward 
such a policy. 
Table 2.1 illustrates the effect of personal taxes on dividend payout under imputation system as 
compared to the classical system of dividend taxation. The amount of net dividend received is 
significantly higher for all classes of investors under the imputation system. The difference 
reflects the tax credit imputed to investors as a compensation for the corporation tax suffered. The 
income tax is based on gross dividends of £446.67. The dividend received by the investor, £335, 
is net of tax on dividends received. The tax on dividends received is calculated as the ratio of the 
difference between the net dividend and the dividend received over the dividend received i. e. 
[(446.67-335)/335=33%]. 
In Panel A and B the capital gains tax, z, is equal to the marginal income tax rate of dividends, m. 
The tax discrimination variable is equal to unity implying that investors are indifferent between 
dividends and capital gains under the classical system. However, under the imputation system, the 
tax discrimination variable for both tax exempt and basic rate taxpayers is equal to 1.33 implying 
that they both favour dividends to capital gains. In contrast, Panel C shows that higher taxpayers 
under the classical system favour capital gains to dividends, as the tax discrimination variable is 
lower than unity. Assuming an effective capital gains tax rate of zero percent, the tax 
discrimination variable for the higher rate taxpayer is 0.80 under the classical system and 0.60 
under the imputation system, implying that higher taxpayers reward low dividend payout policy in 
any case. This illustrates the notion that for higher taxpayers, dividends are always more heavily 
taxed than capital gains. These investors will only favour dividends if the effective capital gains 
tax rate, z, is higher than the additional dividend tax, [i. e. z>(m-s)/(1-s)]. For the basic taxpayer 
the respective tax discrimination variable values are I and 0.75. This implies that under the 
classical system basic taxpayers are indifferent between dividends and capital gains, i. e. the 
payout policy does not affect their tax liability. Under the imputation system however, this class 
of investors will reward lower dividend payout policy as their after tax value will be lower if 
dividends are distributed. 
12 For example, in the UK the majority of shareholders are pension funds who are tax-exempt 
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DIVIDEND TAX SYSTEMS IMPUTATION IMPUTATION CLASSICAL 
0% DPR 50% DPR 50% DPR 
PANEL A: NON-TAX PA YER z=m=O% 
Dividend Received 0 335 335 
Tax Credit 0 111.67 0 
Net Dividend 0 446.67 335 
Tax on Dividend Received 0% 33% 0% 
Tax Discrimination 1.33 1.33 1.00 
PANEL B: BASIC TAX PAYER z=m=25% 
Dividend Received 0 335 335 
Income Tax (25%) 0 111.67 83.75 
Tax Credit 0 111.67 0 
Net Dividend 0 335 251.25 
Tax on Dividend Received 0% 0% 25% 
Tax Discrimination 1.33 1.33 1.00 
PANEL C: HIGH TAX PAYER m=40% z=25% 
Dividend Received 0 335 335 
Income Tax (40%) 0 178.67 134 
Tax Credit 0 111.67 0 
Net Dividend 0 268 201 
Tax on Dividend Received 0% 20% 40% 
Tax Discrimination 1.07 1.07 0.80 
Source: M. A. Laster, rrII) Financial Economics, city university Business School, 2000 
Following this analysis, I would expect that 
IIYroTnrsis 1: Countries with full imputation system pay higher dividends than countries 
with partial imputation system. 
However, based on the discussion above this might also depend on the shareholder structure in 
each country under consideration. Unfortunately, there is no source of data on ownership 
structure. Data obtained from different sources, is not disaggegated enough (in order to indicate 
in which taxation bracket each individual shareholder falls). This ranking should ideally be by 
shareholder tax rates. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the shareholding structure in the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy: 
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TArI 2.2 Tim SIIA FIIO 
.D NC. STRUCTURE IN , TROPE 
Table Provides a Summary of the Shareholder Structure in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Data should ideally 
reveal the shareholder structure by taxation rates. However. data is not available on machine readable form. 
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
Individuals and 
Individuals 18% Non-Profit 17% Individuals 34% Individuals 26% 
Organisations 
Banks 1% Banks 14% Banks 6% Financial Institutions 22% 
Institutional 62% Other 15% Institutional 18% Industrial 22% Investors Institutional Investors Companies 
Inter-Corporate 2% Corporate 39% Inter-Corporate 21% Public Sector 24% 
Government 1% Government 3% Government 2% Government 
-- 
Foreign 16% Foreign 12% Foreign 19% 
Foreign % Inventors Investors Investors 
Source: International Capital Markets croup; M. A. Laster (ZUUU) rºnanciai tconomics, aty university uusincss 
School. 
Notes: 'Insurance Companies and Investment Funds 
In the UK, institutional investors are pension funds hold 62 percent of the market and they are tax 
exempted. The second largest shareholding class is the individual investors holding 18 percent of 
the market followed by foreign investors who hold 16 percent. In contrast, institutional investors 
are relatively unimportant in Germany, because most German companies accrue pension 
liabilities and use the funds as working capital. 13 The majority of German shareholders are 
industrial companies and the second larger class of investors is individuals and non-profit 
organisations. Therefore, it is inter-company shareholding rather than private shareholding, which 
is most widespread in Germany. In the French market, the majority of investors are individuals 
while companies also represent a large percentage. This can be assigned to the tradition of the 
French family controlled companies preferring to make portfolio investments through the family 
company rather than in the names of individuals. Traditionally institutional investors have not 
held a large percentage within the overall pattern of investment, mainly because most pension 
provisions are made via the state scheme. In Italy however, the share ownership is more balanced 
with each class of investors hold almost the same share percentage on the market with the 
exemption of the foreign investors who only hold 7 percent share of the market. There are no tax- 
exempt investors in Italy (unlike pension funds in the UK). Consequently, the hypothesis whether 
the shareholder structure affects the dividend policy of the firm is testable, 
13 See Doing Business in Germany (2001), Charkham (1994), Edwards and Nibler (2000) 
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HYPOTIIF. CIS 2: In countries where an imputation system is in operation and where the 
majority of the shareholders are either basic income tax payers or tax-exempt investors 
(UK), dividend payouts are high. 
2.4 TAXES ACROSS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: UK, GERMANY, FRANC E. AND ITALY 
There are very close similarities in the imputation systems of the UK, Germany, France and Italy. 
In general, in all four countries, each unit of cash dividend received by the shareholder is taxable 
under income tax and entitled to a dividend tax credit; which fully or partially offsets the tax 
charged at the corporate level. Germany, France and Italy operate systems that are close to being 
full imputation systems, that is, the corporate and personal tax systems are in effect fully 
integrated. The UK has a partial imputation system, where only part of the corporation tax charge 
can be used as a credit against income tax. 
Table Shows the Dividend Tax Treatment in the UK, Germany, France and Italy 
DIVIDEND TAX TREATMENT PRE-IMPUTATION SYSTEM 
UNITED KINGDOM Partial Imputation System Pre 
- 
1973: Classical System 14 
GERMANY Full Imputation S stem Pre 
- 
1977: Split Rate System 
FRANCE Full Imputation System Pre - 1993: 1966 Partial Imputation System 
ITALY Full Imputation System Pre 
- 
1977: Classical System 
Table 2.4 shows the major elements of the UK, Germany, France and Italy tax regimes covering 
the tax treatment of dividends receivable by a company's shareholders, the tax base used for 
calculating taxable income and a brief summary of other significant taxes levied on corporations 
operating in each country. Moreover, a brief report of the major tax reforms in each country is 
provided. Dividend related items in this introductory table, are treated in more detail in the next 
Section. 
14 Until the 1997 Tax Reform Act, please see discussion of the Tax Reform below 
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Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 2 
In the next section a common framework is adopted in order to provide a description of the four 
European systems. I particularly consider the taxation systems both at the corporation and shareholder 
level when dividends are distributed. I also concentrate on major taxation reforms in each country, which 
affected the taxation burden on companies paying and shareholders receiving dividends as well as the tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains. Corporation, Income and Capital Gains Taxation Rates, 
as well as the Imputation Taxation Rates are provided in Appendix 3. The tax discrimination variable is 
calculated for each country under consideration for the period 1987-2002 in order to measure the 
differential taxation of dividend and capital gains. 
2.4 
.1 
Tim IMP JTATION TAXATION SYSTEM IN TIIF. UK 
The Finance Act" 1972, introduced the UK imputation system (as described in Section 2.1.2), which 
replaced the classical system. Appendix 4.1 illustrates the taxation system both at the corporation level 
and the shareholder level when 100 units of profit are generated and retained earnings equal to zero (i. e. 
all profits are distributed to the shareholders in the form of dividends18). At the company level, taxation is 
equal to 31 percent, therefore, after-tax profits available for distribution equal to 69 units. ACT has to be 
paid (20 percent on the Gross Dividend) to the Inland Revenue, which is equal to 17.25 units. The 
shareholder receives 69 units of dividends, which includes a tax credit equal to ACT. Tax exempt 
shareholders are entitled to a tax credit equal to the taxation amount (17.25 units) paid at the company 
level, basic income shareholders have no further obligation to the Inland Revenue since their personal 
income tax liability (on the dividends received) is equal to the ACT paid at the company level, while 
higher tax payers have a further liability equal to 17.25 units since their income tax rate is 40 percent. 
When a UK company distributes dividends out of after-tax profits, ACT is also due. From 1 April 1994 
to April 1999, ACT was set at 20 percent19. At the company level, ACT is fully offset against the total tax 
liability of the company but there is a timing difference. 20 The difference between the corporation tax 
liability (33 percent of taxable profits) and ACT (20 percent of gross dividends) is the mainstream 
corporation tax liability (13.75 units), which can be offset against the corporation tax liability. 2) For the 
five years ended 31 March 1993 the set-off limit was 25 percent of the company's profits chargeable to 
corporation tax, reduced to 221/2 percent for the year to 31 March 1994 and 20 percent thereafter. 
17 Henceforth, FA 
1e In the study, dividends mentioned are considered to be cash dividends 
19 Equal to the basic income tax rate 
20 The ACT payment by the company is due quarterly when dividends are paid, however, ACT is only offset against the annual 
corporation tax liability nine months after the accounting year end. 
21 For full details on the Mainstream Corporation Tax Treatment see the Inland Revenue, Corporation Tax, Section TI 1.1 
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Dividends and attaching tax credit, received from a resident company is known as "Franked Investment 
Income", and is exempt from corporation tax, and the 20/80 ACT paid thereon. It is imputed to the 
recipient company's own ACT liability for set-off. This means that as long as dividends are paid between 
resident companies, only one charge to ACT arises. Moreover, one of the features of the UK system is 
the issue of "Surplus Advance Corporation Tax". Firms whose UK taxable profits are too low or nil22 
and are not able to recover all payments of ACT in the same year are described as being in a "Surplus 
ACT Position", or as "Tax Exhausted Companies". In particular companies cannot offset ACT paid on 
gross dividends in excess of UK taxable profits. Any ACT that cannot be deducted in the current year is 
classified as surplus ACT and it can be either offset against corporation tax payments of the two previous 
years or carried forward indefinitely to offset against future corporation tax liabilities. However, if its 
recoverability is not reasonably certain and foreseeable in the future, ACT is directly written off in firms' 
accounts increasing the tax cost on dividends and resulting in higher tax burden on dividends relative to 
the implied on retained earnings. 23 Lasfer (1996) notes that the imputation system is fully operational 
only when ACT is recovered, i. e., when dividends are not paid from profits generated abroad and taxable 
profits exceed gross dividends. 
The UK imputation system at the shareholder level is illustrated in Appendix 4.1. Personal income tax is 
levied on the aggregate distribution received and the related tax credit (ICTA 1988 s20). Shareholders 
receive 69 units of cash dividend from the company, which includes 17.25 units of tax credit. Tax- 
exempt investors whose personal income tax rate is equal to zero are eligible for a full reimbursement of 
the tax credit, which makes the dividend received equal to 86.25 units. Basic tax payers have no further 
tax liability (as their personal income tax rate is equal to the ACT rate); whereas higher tax payers who 
are taxed at 40 percent are liable to a further 17.25 units of income tax which makes dividends received 
equal to 51.5 units. The UK Imputation Tax System is complex in the sense that the imputation is granted 
at the basic rate of tax, and because of the progressive marginal rate income tax structure, some 
shareholders are required to pay additional tax on dividends whereas others are refunded the tax credit. 
The system of tax credits is needed to ensure that the correct amounts are paid. These complications 
could be avoided, if there were a single tax rate on investment income applicable to all investors, 
including pension funds. 
As 2 July 1997 the dividend tax credit was no longer refundable to corporations and pension funds. The 
tax credit however, remained refundable to individuals until the 1999 Finance Act, which abolished ACT 
(from April 6,1999), and a system of "Shadow ACT" was been introduced. The purpose was firstly, to 
do away with the need for companies to make group income elections so that they can pay dividends to 
22 In the 1970s and early 1980s other corporate tax allowances, such as capital allowances and stock reliefs, reduced significantly 
firms' present and future taxable profits to below their gross dividend payments. These allowances led companies to be tax 
exhausted where their corporation tax liability is nil or negative and their tax is unrelieved; See Devereux (1987) and Edwards et 
al. (1987) 
23 For example, from Equation (3) Section 2.1.3, any dividend paid by tax exhausted firms for which, say t,; =0, to tax-exempt 
investors (whose m=z=O) carries a tax burden of [s/(1-s)) compared to the tax burden on capital gains of 0. Therefore, it could be 
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their parent companies without having to account for ACT and secondly, to simplify the tax rules 
covering dividend payments. 24 Under the new FA shadow ACT is to be used solely to limit the recovery 
by a company of past surplus ACT and only affects companies with past surplus ACT as at 1999, and 
only until they have utilised it. 
More precisely, a shareholder receives the dividend with an accompanying tax credit equal to 10 percent 
of the dividend plus tax credit. The tax credit is equivalent to the basic rate of income tax on dividends. 
Companies do not pay tax on dividends received and companies that paid dividends before April 1999 
had to pay ACT of one quarter of the dividend. The ACT could usually be set against a company's 
corporation tax liability. However, there is a limit on the amount, which may be set against corporation 
tax liabilities (i. e. 20% of the corporation tax profits is retained). The offset capacity is allocated to 
shadow ACT for the accounting period, computed on a similar basis and at the same rate as applied 
before 1999, although no actual corporation tax relief is given for the amounts allocated. Any balance of 
the offset capacity available for an accounting period is allocated to surplus ACT brought forward at 6 
April 1999, for which actual corporation tax relief is given. Special provisions apply where shadow ACT 
exceeds the offset capacity for the period and to group companies. Dividends received from resident 
companies continue to be exempt from corporation tax, being franked investment income. Thus, there is 
no economic double taxation of dividends paid among resident companies. Table 2.5 illustrates the UK 
dividend paying mechanism after the abolition of ACT: 
TAn 2 
.5 THE UK 1999 ABOLITION OF ACT 
Takle illustrates the imnutation tax system in the UK after the 1999 FA that abolished ACT. 
Corporate Profits 100 
Corporation TaX25 at 30% (30) 
Dividend Paid 70 
Attaching Non-Re a able 1/9 Tax Credit 11.11 
"Grossed-Up" Dividend for Individual Income Tax 81.11 
Under this UK imputation system, used as a benchmark to illustrate the effect of corporation and personal 
taxation on the dividend policy of the company, the tax discrimination variable is equal to: 
TDUK 
= 
(1-m) 
(1- z)(1- s) (6) 
argued that these tax arguments imply that where dividend tax-clienteles do not prevail, a firm is expected to set its dividend 
policy to minimise its tax liability and to maximise the after-tax return of its shareholders. See Lasfer (1996) 
For example, after the abolition of ACT there is no further build up of surplus ACT, thus, profits earned overseas are not 
subject to double taxation when they are distributed by a UK company. Consequently, there is no need for special rules to enable 
international companies to pay dividends out of foreign income. For details see Inland Revenue: Company Tax Division, Section 
3. 
25 Payable I January 2001 
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In order to illustrate the effect of the Taxation on dividends and capital gains, and for country comparison 
purposes, the tax discrimination Variable is calculated and shown in the Table 3.6, using the basic 
taxation rates in the UK. The tables also illustrate the effect of Taxation Reforms. The tax discrimination 
variable is calculated using the UK historical taxation rates for the period 1986-2002 provided in 
Appendix 3.1. 
Table Shows the Tax Discrimination Variable for the three classes of investors in the UK for the Period 1986 to 2002 calculated 
using the taxation rates provided in Annendix 3.1. 
YEAR HIGHER TAX PAYER BASIC TAX PAYER TAX-EXEMPT 
INVESTOR 
1986-87 0.805 1.429 1.408 
1987-March 1988 0.783 1.429 1.369 
6 April 1988-1994 1.333 1.333 1.333 
1 April 1994-1997 1.250 1.250 1.250 
2 July 1997-1999 1.250 1.250 1.000 
6 April 1999-2002 1.125 1.000 1.000 
The 6 April 1988 Taxation Reform Act in the UK was equivalent to the 1986 Income and Corporation 
Tax Reform in the US, which eliminated the preferential tax treatment of long term-capital gains. The 
capital gains taxation rate was set equal to the individual income taxation rate. From the tables above, it 
can be clearly obtained that the impact of this tax reform fell on the higher taxpayers and to a lesser 
extent, on the basic and tax-exempt taxpayers. For the higher taxpayers, the capital gains taxation burden 
was significantly increased by 6.5 percent while the dividend taxation burden was decreased by 16.3 
percent. Consequently, as a result of the tax reform higher taxpayers would shift their preferences to 
favour dividends. The trend in the tax discrimination variable indicates that after the tax reform Act, this 
class of investors would prefer higher dividend payouts. 
The 1994 Tax Reform Act set the tax credit equal to 20 percent. The tax discrimination variable was then 
set equal to 1.25 for all classes of investors in the UK. In effect, there was a general preference of 
dividends over capital gains until the 2 July 1997 when the incoming labour government in the UK 
introduced the 1997 Finance Act, which abolished the right of pension funds to be repaid the imputation 
tax credit. After the reform there was no significant change in the tax discrimination variable for either 
the higher or the basic investors. In contrast, the tax-exempt investors' dividend taxation burden was 
increased from 16.25 percent to 31 percent, which was equal to the capital gains taxation burden. As a 
result the tax discrimination variable was set equal to unity indicating the indifference between dividends 
and capital gains for this class of investors. 
The Finance Act 1999 abolished the Advance Corporation Tax, accordingly, the tax credit on dividends 
is reduced from 1/4 to 1/9 (representing 10 percent of the tax-credit) and it is not repayable in cash. 
Calculations illustrate that the impact of this taxation reform, fell on the basic taxation payers, as the 
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dividend taxation burden was increased to 37 percent, and the tax discrimination variable was set equal to 
unity, indicating the indifference of this class of investors between dividends and capital gains. There was 
no impact of the reform on the tax-exempt investors however the higher taxpayers' tax discrimination 
variable was decreased, lowering the preference of this class of investors for dividends over capital gains 
as a result of the significant increase of the dividend taxation burden from 48 percent to 52.75 percent. 
This analysis, based on standard rates, shows that, in general all investors would either be indifferent or 
would prefer dividends over capital gains. With the effective tax rates, the preference of dividends over 
capital gains may, however be altered because while the standard income tax rates are likely to be the 
same as the effective rates, the effective capital gains tax rates are likely to be lower than standard rates 
because of allowances and deferrals of capital gains. I test this preference by analysing the behaviour of 
share prices on the ex-dividend dates in Chapter 3. 
2.4 
.2 
TIE IMPUTATION TAXATION SYSTEM IN GERMANY 
The dividend taxation system in Germany was adopted in 1977 in order to abolish the double taxation of 
dividends. The system combines the features of a split rate system26 (under which companies suffer 
higher taxation on retained than on distributed profits) with those of full imputation system. Appendix 
4.2 illustrates the taxation system in Germany at the corporation level (both in the case where the 
company distributes the profits and/or where profits are retained within the company), and the 
shareholder level when the company generates 100 units of profit. At the company level, when profits are 
retained, the after tax income is 48.55 units, while if profits are distributed income after taxes is 57.41 
units, due to lower corporation and solidarity tax charges. Distributed profits are also subject to further 
taxation (analysed in detail below) and shareholders receive 42.27 units of dividend. Dividends in the 
hands of the shareholders are subject to the individual income tax (on gross dividends), but entitled to 
dividend tax credit (not available for tax-exempt shareholders) which results to 56.62 units, 57.39 units 
and 40.47 units of net dividends in the hands of tax-exempt, basic income and higher income taxpayers 
respectively. 
As shown in the example above, corporation tax Law lists two different standard rates; with profits 
distributed as dividends subject to a lower corporation tax rate than retained profits. In the pre-1990 
period, retained profits were taxed at 56 percent while distributed profits were taxed at 50 percent. The 
1990 Tax Reform Law lowered these rates, to 50 percent, and 46 percent respectively. As for January 
1994, a further reduction of these rates from 50 percent to 45 percent, and from 46 percent to 42 percent 
came in force. It should be noted however, that since 1995 there has also been a 7.5 percent surcharge, 
26 One of the major changes in the German corporation tax was the introduction of a "Split-rale System" in 1953, which 
provided partial relief for the double taxation of dividends at the corporate level. Under this system, profits distributed to 
shareholders were subject to a tax rate of 15 percent, whereas retained profits were taxed at 51 percent. In 1958 a new tax rate 
structure was introduced which comprised a low exemption level, a bracket with a constant marginal tax rate, a second bracket 
with progressive rates and a final bracket with also a constant marginal tax rate. The tax rates on retained earnings and 
dividends were changed repeatedly in 1953,1955 and 1958. 
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the so-called unification tax or solidarity charge27 affecting all corporate and personal taxes. Despite 
reductions in German corporate income tax rates in 1990 and 1994, at the end of 1998 the German 
corporate income tax was still characterised by high tax rates in comparison to other countries in this 
study. Headline tax rates of 40 percent on retained profits and 30 percent on distributed profits were 
augmented by a 5.5 percent solidarity surcharge, and additional local taxes on corporate profits 
(Gewerbesteuer) that ranged from around 13 percent to 20 percent. Combining these taxes, the tax rate 
typically paid by a corporation on an additional unit of prof its was about 56 percent if these profits where 
retained and about 42.8 percent if they were paid out as dividends. In 1999, the federal corporate tax rate 
on retained profits was reduced from 45 percent to 40 percent, while for the distributed profit was 30 
percent. 
Therefore, the resulting corporation income tax is to be reduced to the lower distribution rate if and to the 
extent the profits are distributed. As long as the company retains the profits the retention rate applies. A 
complication arises if and at the time when the company decides to distribute profits which were firstly 
retained. In this case, the difference between the tax paid at the retention rate and the applicable lower 
distribution rate will be refunded from the tax office to the company. 28 Since the tax credit is fixed at 
30/70ths of the dividend, the mechanics of the imputation system do ensure that any dividend leaving the 
company bears a corporation income tax burden of exactly that amount. This is accomplished by 
segregating the company's income after tax (the distributable equity) into several baskets according to 
the corporation income tax charge they have suffered before its distribution is taken into account. Franke 
and Hax (1990, p448)29 show that if the company retains earnings in one year, reinvests them, and 
distributes the earnings in the following year as dividend, the tax-inferiority of retained earnings for 
individual investors is reduced. 
Dividends paid to non-residents are also subject to Withholding tax (Kapitalertragsteuer) at a rate of 25 
percent, increased to 26.38 percent by the solidarity surcharge. The required holding is reduced from 25 
percent to 10 percent if an exemption or a tax credit for underlying German corporate tax is granted to the 
parent in its country of residence in respect of the dividends; or if the parent's country or residence 
exempts from withholding tax dividends paid to German resident companies in respect of similar 
holdings. Where a company receives dividends, the net dividend received, grossed-up by both the 
withholding tax (25 percent of the actual distribution) and the underlying corporate income tax at the rate 
27 Solidarity Contribution (Solidaritätsbeitrag) is an additional tax on the individual income and the corporation profitsas a 
contribution towards the cost of reconstructing the economy of the new Eastern States of the Federal Republic, introduced after 
the reunification of Germany. It was introduced for one year only in 1991 at a rate of 3.75 percent followed by a pause, and then 
re-introduced in 1995 with indefinite duration. The rate is equal to 7.5 percent on the personal and corporation income and was 
reduced to 5.5 percent in 1998. The 1998 corporate rate, therefore, was actually 0.45(1+0,055)=47.475 percent. The surcharge 
does not however, affect the amount of tax credit. For full discussion see McDonald (2001). 
28 For example in 1997, the corporate tax rate was 45 percent, thus a corporation would have paid tax of 45 units on earnings of 
100 units. However, at the point when these earnings are distributed, there is a corporate-level credit of 15 units, which results in 
a net 30 units tax on earnings paid as dividends. Shareholders receive the 70 units of dividend along with 30 units of tax credit. 
29 Franke, Günter and Ilebert Ilax, 1990, "Finanzwirtschaft des Unternehmens und Kapitalmark-i", 2 Aulf., Ileidelberg, sited in 
Amihud and Murgia. 1997. 
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of 30 percent constitutes the taxable income in the hands of the company. The effects of the German 
imputations system are: 
0 All taxable corporate profits, whether distributed or not, are subject to corporate income tax levied at 
the normal rate 
" Part or all of the corporate income tax paid on the distributed profits is set off against the 
shareholder's tax liability on dividends or refunded if the corporate income tax paid exceeds the 
shareholder's income tax liability. 
" The withholding tax paid on the dividends may also be credited by resident shareholders against their 
own tax liability and any excess credit is refundable. 
At the shareholder level, all resident individuals in Germany are subject to Individual Income Tax 
(Persönliche Einkommensteuer) on their worldwide income. Germany's tax schedule is based on a 
formula, an arithmetic progression at rates30 between 25.9 and 53 percent, and does not have brackets. 
The full amount of each investor's share of the pre-tax distributed profits, not just the dividend received 
net of corporate income taxes31 paid, is treated as taxable income to the investor. Therefore, the yield for 
the shareholder consists of two portions, both of which are liable to income tax. Firstly, the dividend paid 
by the company before deduction of the capital yields tax and secondly, the creditable corporation tax 
(tax credit or tax balance) which is considered received together with the taxable income tax. 
The shareholder is entitled to a full credit for the 30 percent (36 percent before 1994) when his/her 
income tax liability is computed. Appendix 5 provides a full discussion of the dividend tax credit in 
Germany. It is important to note that foreigners have to bear the full tax burden on distributions as well as 
the additional dividend withholding tax. In other words, the imputation of the corporation income tax 
paid is restricted to German resident individuals and companies as well as certain other entities resident 
in Germany. There are at least three rules, which restrict the ability of German investors to use the tax 
credit. Firstly, only the economic owner to the stock is entitled to the tax credit. Depending on the 
interpretation of this rule, this has a potential to defeat many arbitrage strategies; for example it prevents 
custodial banks from receiving the credit. Secondly, Paragraph 3632 of the German Income Tax Law 
limits the use of the tax credit in cases where shares are borrowed from foreign investors. 33 Thirdly, 
Paragraph 15c34 of the German Income Tax Law makes the capital loss on shares non-deductible to the 
extent they are attributable to a dividend payment if (i) the shares are not held at least ten days or (ii) the 
position is hedged. Appendix 5 provides a full discussion of the mechanics of the dividend tax credit 
under the German Tax Law. 
30 Appendix 3.2 provides the German corporation income tax rates (both on retained and distributed profits), income tax rates, 
capital gains tax rates and imputation credits. 
31 Corporation Profits Tax (Körperschaftsteuer): Corporations (Aktiengesellschaft (AG) or Gesellschaft mit beschrankter 
Haftung (GmbH)) are generally subject to two taxes on income, the corporation profits tax and the trade tax on income. They are 
also liable to two kinds of net assets taxes, the property tax and the trade tax on capital. 
32 See Appendix 5 
33 Stock loans provide an obvious mechanism for temporary transference of stock; this rule is aimed at reducing their value. 
34 See Appendix 5 
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Dividends paid to non-residents are subject to withholding tax at a rate of 25 percent, increased to 26.38 
percent by the solidarity surcharge. The required holding is reduced from 25 percent to 10 percent if an 
exemption or a tax credit for underlying German corporate tax is granted to the parent in its country of 
residence in respect of the dividends; or if the parent's country or residence exempts from withholding 
tax dividends paid to German resident companies in respect of similar holdings. 
This system implies that, in Germany, dividend stripping remains possible with regard to dividend 
withholding tax. Dividend stripping refers to transactions in which shareholders not entitled to a credit of 
corporation and dividend withholding tax (corporate and individual non-residents not holding the shares 
in domestic permanent establishments) "sell" their shares to persons entitled (residents) so that the latter 
may receive the dividend and the credits attaching thereto. If the buyers are able to offset part or the 
entire dividend against losses, they will receive a tax refund. Thereafter, the shares are resold to the 
original shareholder. 
The German Taxation system is interesting in the sense that at the company level retained profits are 
taxed more heavily than distributable profits, however at the shareholder level, capital gains are taxed 
favoured compared to income from distributed profits. Capital gains for corporations in Germany are 
taxed as ordinary income but individuals are not liable to capital gains tax. 35 If the holding period exceeds 
six months, twelve months as of 1999, gains are not taxed. Sales and certain "dispositions" of property 
held for short periods are, however, treated as "speculative gains" and included in the individuals' taxable 
income. 
Consequently, under the German tax system the total tax liability is composed of a rate of corporation tax 
on retained earnings, Tc, re. plus the corporation tax rate on distributed profits, tc, de, plus the shareholders' 
rate of income tax on dividends and can be expressed in the following equation: 
(P-D) tc, 
re +D tc, de +mD (7) 
Where, P is the company before tax profits, D is the gross dividends paid, tc, re is the corporate taxation 
rate on retained earnings and tc, d is the corporate taxation rate on distributed earnings while m is the 
shareholders' personal tax rate. 
33 Murphy and Schlag (1999) argue that the relative attractiveness of dividend income is affected by the existence of special rules 
for taxation on capital gains. They draw attention to the fact that capital gains and losses for German individuals are reported as 
normal taxable income only if the assets are held less than 6 months and are not subject to tax otherwise. They tested the effect 
of varying dividend tax rules in Germany by utilizing the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework suggested by 
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If the profits are retained within the company and reinvested, the company's after tax profits would be 
equal to Investors would generate after-tax capital gains of (1-tc,,. e)z, where z is the shareholders 
personal tax rate (z=m=0 if assets held for more than a year). Therefore the total tax burden on capital 
gains would be equal to (1-tare)-(1-tc, re)z, which is equal to (1-z)(1-tc, re). In the case where dividends are 
distributed the company after tax profits would be equal to (1-tcde) and the shareholders would generate 
(1-tc, de)m. Therefore the total tax burden on distributed earnings would be equal to (1-tc, de)-(1-tc, de)m 
which is equal to (1-m)(1-tc, de). Therefore, the tax discrimination variable can be expressed as: 
(1-m)(1-tc, de) 
TDGER, ST 
= (1- z)(1- td re ) (8) 
However, long-term investors are not liable to capital gains income tax if assets are not disposed within 
one year of purchase. Therefore for long-term investors the tax discrimination variable can be expressed 
as: 
(1- m)(l 
- 
tc, de) (9) TDGER, LT - (I 
- 
tc. 
") 
Table shows the Tax Discrimination Variable in Germany for the period 1986 to 2002 calculated using the 
taxation rates provided in Appendix 3.2. 
F PANEL A: ASSETS QUALIFY FOR CAPITAL GAINS TAX 
EXEMPTION 
YEAR 
E 
Higher Basic Tax-Exempt 
l986-90 0.500 0.886 1.136 
January 1991-93 0.508 0.875 1.080 
January 1994-98 0.496 0.854 1.055 
November 1998-2002 0.548 0.865 1.167 
YEAR PANEL B: SIIORT-TERM HOLDING PERIOD 
Higher Basic Tax-Exempt 
1986-90 1.136 1.136 1.136 
1990-93 1.080 1.080 1.080 
January 1994-98 1.055 1.055 1.055 
November 1998-2002 1.166 1.166 1.167 
Table 2.7 Panel A reports the values of tax discrimination variable for each tax-bracket investor over 
various periods reflecting tax changes, assuming long-term capital gains, (i. e. investors hold the assets for 
longer than six months, one year as of 1999), to be eligible for capital gains tax exemption. As shown in 
the table the tax discrimination variable both higher and basic tax payers in Germany is less than unity, 
Murphy (1990). This particular framework, is especially suitable for Germany because Sauer and Murphy (1992) found risk- 
return tradeoffs in Germany to be fairly well characterised by Sharpe's CAPM. 
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illustrating a preference for capital gains, as under the German tax system dividends are more heavily 
taxed than capital gains. However, the tax discrimination variable for tax-exempted shareholders 
indicates that capital gains are taxed more heavily than dividends therefore, this class of shareholders 
would reward higher dividend paying companies. The 1990 taxation reform impact fell mostly on the tax 
exempt shareholders as the tax discrimination variable decreased significantly by 5.63 percent while the 
1994 taxation reform had an impact on both the basic and tax-exempt shareholders' tax discrimination 
variable. The 1998 Tax Reform significantly affected all shareholders' preference for dividends over 
capital gains, as the tax discrimination variable was significantly increased for all classes of investors. 
Table 2.7 Panel B, on the other hand, shows that all classes of shareholders would suffer less taxation if 
profits were distributed rather than realised through capital gains in the short-term. This evidence is 
contradictive with the Miller and Modigliani prediction, that dividend policy is irrelevant as it is simply a 
transfer of money from the company to the shareholders. If the shareholder is in the immediate need of 
liquidity, will suffer higher taxes on short-term capital gains than on dividends; in the opposite case 
where profits are distributed as dividends, shareholders with excess cash can reinvest the money in the 
company. 
2.4 
.3 THE IMP 1TATION TAXATION SYST. .M IN 
FRANCE 
The full imputation system in France was introduced in 1993, following the partial imputation system, 
since 1966. The French system remains very different from those of other developed countries. The top 
marginal income tax rate is among the highest in developed countries, but the average rate of this tax is 
one of the lowest. This paradox is one example of the uniqueness of the French tax system. 36 Appendix 
4.3 illustrates the taxation system in France at the corporation level and the shareholder level. The 
company is liable to corporation tax (36 2/a percent) on the profits generated (100 units), while profits 
available for distribution (63.34 units) are grossed up by the Avoir Fiscal (i. e. the imputation tax credit 
rate, equal to 40 percent) and then taxed at the corporate income tax rate of 36'/3 percent. Tax payable by 
the company for the profits distributed is 7.11 units and shareholders receive dividends of 56.17 units. 
Shareholders are liable to personal income tax on gross dividends received (cash dividend plus the avoir 
fiscal, 81.50 units) and are entitled to a reimbursement of the avoir fiscal. Consequently, 81.5 units of net 
dividends is received by the tax-exempt investors, while basic and higher tax payers' after tax dividends 
received are equal to 52.98 and 35.20 units respectively. 
Under the French law corporation tax is normally an annual tax on the total profits made by the 
companies and other legal entities. In general, France gradually reduced its corporate income tax rate 
from 50 percent to 33.33 percent, although the effect of this reduction has been partially reversed by 
significant surcharges introduced in January 1995 and November 1997. The standard rate is 33 1/3 
percent, but it decreases to 19 percent for long-term capital gains put into reserves and for part of the 
36 See Bold and Chennells (2000), Ault (1997) 
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accounting profit, at most equal to 25 percent of such accounting profit. It is however limited to 24 
percent or 10 percent on property income of non-profit organisations. The Finance Amendment Act of 
1995 subjects legal entities to a surcharge corresponding to 10 percent of the corporation tax assessed on 
their taxable profits. Therefore, the effective corporate income tax rate, including the surtax is 36 2/3 
percent. Particularly, the law of November 1997 involving urgent tax and financial matters burdens legal 
entities liable to corporation tax with a standard temporary surcharge equal to 15 percent for the periods 
ending in December 1998 while this is reduced to 10 percent for the 1999 fiscal year. 
The French corporation tax system has taken its modern aspect in 1966 with the creation of the dividend 
tax credit known as the "Avoir Fiscal". This is a dividend tax credit fraction of corporation tax already 
paid by a company on dividend paid to its shareholders. The evolution from 1966 to 1993 goes from a 
period where the Avoir Fiscal is only half of the French corporate tax paid by the distributing company, 
to a period beginning in 1993 where the Avoir Fiscal is exactly equal to the corporation tax, i. e. the 
Avoir Fiscal has passed from 50 percent to 100 percent, in 1993. As shown in the example, the dividend 
tax credit is added to the shareholder's taxable income and its amount is deducted from the tax 
chargeable to the shareholder in order to avoid economic double taxation borne by distributed corporate 
profit. Credit is available to individuals but not to corporations, moreover, subject to the provisions of 
international conventions, only residents of France are entitled to the dividend tax credit. 
Every dividend (Appendix 6 provides a full definition of dividends for tax purposes in France) is 
matched with an Avoir Fiscal of 50 percent (100%) of the dividend's amount, but an equalization tax is 
necessary every time a dividend is generated by non-taxed profits or profits taxed at a lower rate. The 
French equalisation is a mechanism that cannot be disassociated from the Avoir Fiscal. It is not a kind of 
corporation tax, it is the only way of financing the obligatory Avoir Fiscal. When the Avoir Fiscal was 
created in 1966, there was a choice between either giving Avoir Fiscal to only the dividends coming from 
profits having borne the French corporation tax at the normal rate; or give Avoir Fiscal to all 
distributions. The second solution was adopted, but giving Avoir Fiscal to dividends coming from profits 
not taxed in France at a normal rate would have been contrary to the economic double taxation on 
dividends. In order to re-establish the balance, a mechanism of equalisation, "precompte mobilier", was 
created. In general, dividends paid out of income that has not borne French corporation tax are subject to 
an equalization tax at the level of the company 
- 
the precompte 
-, which is equal to the tax credit 
received by shareholders. The pr6compte is only applied on dividends distributed to shareholders entitled 
to dividend tax credits and those resident in non-treaty countries. The pr6compte is charged on dividends 
paid out of fully taxed profits that have been retained for more than five years. These profits suffered a 
corporate tax of 19%, therefore the pr6compte is equal to 14.33% in order to equalise to corporation tax 
rate of 33.33%. Therefore, the rate at which the pr6compte is charged depends on the tax paid on the 
relevant income: the principle is that the pr6compte should raise the rate of tax to 33 1/3 percent; this 
implies that in cases of tax exempt income, such as dividends from foreign subsidiaries, the pr6compte is 
charged at 33 1/3 percent. 
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This system requires French companies to supply, the segregate income that is liable to the full rate of 
corporation tax from other income; the latter income is liable to precompte on distribution. However, 
since the level of tax under the precompte depends on how much tax an item of profit has already borne, 
it is necessary to keep detailed accounting records of different forms of profit and their tax treatment. In 
order to minimise the liability to the precompte French companies tend to pay dividends out of fully 
taxed profits before drawing on other profits. The system permits companies to do this. Dividends are 
deemed to be paid from profits in the following order: 
1. Profits of the preceding accounting year subject to the full corporation tax rate 
2. Fully taxed profits of the previous four accounting years, in any order, however FIFO" is 
generally more advantageous 
3. Profits, which have not been fully taxed under the French corporation tax, in any order at the 
discretion of the taxpayer. However, parent companies may redistribute dividends received from 
their subsidiaries in any order. 
Dividends and other ordinary income distributions may qualify for the participation exemption if the 
recipient is a parent company. To qualify the parent company must be an entity that is liable for corporate 
income tax at the standard rate and must hold a minimum of 10 percent of the share capital of the 
subsidiary at the time of distribution. Dividend paid to foreign affiliates by French companies subject to 
corporate tax are subject to a 25 percent withholding tax. Depending on treaty provisions, recipients may 
be entitled to the Avoir Fiscal. Dividends paid to a parent company located in the European Union are 
exempt from withholding tax provided the parent company has held at least 25 percent of the distributing 
company for two years. 
For individual income tax is normally an overall tax imposed on the entire income, i. e. all income is 
aggregated, regardless of its origin, to determine an overall net income to which a single tax rate 
applies. 38 This rate follows a progressive income brackets up to a maximum rate of 56.8 percent in 1997 
(this rate is reduced to 53.25 percent by 2001). The tax rate takes into account the family coefficient39 and 
the computation method of income tax goes together with many other provisions allowing for highly 
personalised taxation. Moreover, certain types of income and capital gains derived from securities are 
subject to proportional tax levies. The authorities compute income tax on the basis of the amounts 
declared by the taxpayer who must file a tax return reporting the total income received the previous year 
by the taxpayer. Although the rate was simplified recently, computation of income tax remains relatively 
complex given the methods implemented to take into account the taxpayer's personal situation. Such 
personalisation of tax is particularly expressed in the use of the "quotient familiar technique" (income 
37 First In First Out 
38 See Appendix 3.3 for corporation, income and capital gains taxation rates as well as the Avoir Fiscal rates. 39 Each household is assigned a family coefficient of taxation rate, which reduces the tax liability according for example, the 
number of children in the family. 
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splitting system) on the one hand and the attribution of tax reductions to taxpayers in respect of some of 
their personal expenses on the other hand. 
Since its inception in 1945, the social security system has been financed mostly form contributions levied 
on earned income. In order to remedy the problem of financing social security, the authorities were 
induced to enlarge the spectrum of traditional ways (e. g. higher social security contributions) by enacting 
supplementary levies in the form of taxes. The best example is the Generalised Social Contribution, 
("Contribution Sociale Generalisee"), was introduced in February 1991, which was a new flat-rate tax 
on income, and applies to labour income as well as capital gains, dividends and interest. 
The corporate income tax is proportional to the profits of the companies, and the other important taxes 
like Value Added Tax, the property tax, and the business tax, which are not linked to the income of the 
taxpayer. The only progressive levies are the personal income tax, the gift and inheritance taxes and the 
wealth tax, but the share of the latter in total tax receipts is too low and their bases too narrow to allow 
them to play a significant role in the redistribution of income and wealth. The top rate of personal income 
tax was to be reduced from 56 percent to 52 percent in 1997 with the intention of reducing it to 47 
percent in 2001. However, the Socialist Government elected in June 1997 set the top rate at 54 percent. 
Capital Gains are subject to tax under various provisions. In some cases, they are included in taxable 
income, either wholly or partially. In other cases, they are subject to a separate flat-rate tax and excluded 
from the tax base. Capital gains from the sales of shares and bonds are taxed at a rate of 16 percent plus a 
3.9 percent social contribution. 
. 
As of January 1,1999 capital gains are generally taxable as ordinary 
income, regardless of whether assets have been held for more or less than two years. 
As mentioned above, the imputation credit is basically a refund of the underlying corporate tax; therefore 
companies distributing profits that have not borne corporate tax at the full rate40 must pay an equalisation 
tax (precompte), which is equal to the attached imputation credit. Like the imputation credit, the 
equalisation tax due on distributions to corporate shareholders is equal to 40 percent of the dividends or 
50 percent if the dividends qualify for the participation exemption. The 50 percent equalisation tax is also 
due on the distribution of profits realised more than 5 years earlier even if corporate tax was fully 
imposed upon the realisation. Finally the equalisation tax is due on the distribution of profits that have 
been subject to corporate tax, but at reduced rate. 41 In this case, however, the equalisation tax is deemed 
to be a substitute corporate tax; its amount is limited to the difference between the tax due at the standard 
rate and the tax already paid at the reduced rate. 
For the purpose of calculating the tax discrimination variable in France, I firstly consider the case where 
profits are retained within the company and reinvested. In this case, the company's after tax profits would 
40 For example, dividends qualifying for participation exemption 41 For example, distribution of long-term capital gains 
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be equal to (1-Q. Investors would pay capital gains of (1-4)z, where z is the individuals capital gains tax 
rate. The total tax burden on capital gains would be the sum of corporate tax paid and the individual tax 
paid which is equal to (1-z)(1-t, ). Secondly, in the case where the company's profits are distributed to the 
shareholders, the shareholders would generate (1-ta) m. Considering that the Avoir Fiscal, is equal to 
40% of the corporation tax liability; the tax discrimination variable can be expressed as: 
TDFR 
= 
(1- m) (10) (1- AF)(1- z) 
Table 2.8 shows the tax discrimination variable, calculated using the basic taxation rates in France for 
the Period 1986-2002 without taking into consideration any additional corporation or income taxes 
imposed through the years. 42 
Table shows the Tax Discrimination Variable in France for the period 1986 to 2002 calculated 
n-inv the taxatinn rates nrnvided in Annendix 3.3. 
YEAR TD 
Higher Basic (35% Tax Bracket) Tax-Exempt 
1986-92 0.674 1.014 1.250 
January 1993-97 0.899 1.352 1.667 
November 1997-98 0.957 1.352 1.667 
January 1999-02 1.667 1.896 1.667 
The tax discrimination variable observed in France differs from the other two countries under 
consideration in the sense that the French full imputation system, although reformed through the years, 
results in the preference of dividends over capital gains for all classes of investors except for higher tax- 
bracket. At the beginning of the sample period, the higher tax payers in France faced the highest taxation 
on dividends relative to capital gains. 
The 1993 Taxation Reforms, which effectively changed the partial imputation system into a full 
imputation system, had an impact on all classes of investors. The tax discrimination variable for the 
higher taxpayers was increased by 22.5 percent, closer to unity, which indicates that the preferential 
taxation of capital gains was eliminated. Moreover, the incentive of the other two classes of investors in 
France to reward higher dividend payout companies was also increased. The taxation reform in 
November 1997 decreased the preferential taxation treatment of capital gains over dividends for the 
higher taxpayers while the 1999 Taxation Reform had a major impact on both the higher and basic 
taxation payers. The 1999 capital gains tax reform in France resulted in a significant increase, above 
unity, of the tax discrimination variable for the higher taxpayers, consequently this class of investors 
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faced higher taxation on capital gains than on dividends. The preferential taxation of dividends for the 
basic shareholders was also increased while the reform had no impact on the tax exempt investors. 
In sum, this analysis based on standard rates suggests that the French tax system has always favoured 
dividends received by basic-taxpayers and tax-exempt investors. The higher tax brackets are expected to 
prefer dividends over the capital gains only in recent years. 
The Italian system underwent a process of rationalisation, simplification and harmonisation with the 
typical European Tax System, after the enactment of the basic tax reform of 1973-1974, and through the 
1980s until the end of the 1990s. The Italian tax system is a complex set of rules and regimes for 
different classes of stocks and bonds. Since 1977, taxes on dividends have been based on the full 
imputation system, which allows stockholders to obtain a credit on the dividend tax payment. The tax 
credit has ranged from one-third of total cash dividends received to 56.25 percent (58.73 percent after 
1998), which permits total recovery of the corporate national tax. In general, the Italian taxation system is 
characterised by the light taxation on dividends and capital gains compared to other European countries. 
Appendix 4.4 presents an overview of the taxation of corporate profits and the Italian tax-credit 
mechanism, both for individual investors with different personal tax brackets and for corporate and 
mutual fund equity holders. Michaely and Murgia (1995) use a simple stylised example to demonstrate 
the Italian Tax Credit on dividends, considering a corporation that pays all profit as dividends and 
analysing the tax effect, including the imputation system on different claimholders. Withholding taxes are 
10 percent of the dividend paid and personal taxes are calculated as a percentage of the sum of the cash 
dividends plus the recovery (through the imputation system) of the national taxes paid by the corporation. 
The Italian tax credit mechanism for individual investor with different tax brackets and for corporate and 
mutual fund equity holders is also illustrated. Dividends must be included in the taxpayers' tax returns. 
According to the Imputation System in Italy, investors in a tax bracket lower than 36 percent are entitled 
to a cash rebate from the tax authorities. To avoid double taxation, a tax credit is allowed for taxes paid 
by corporations. The dividend tax credit or relief is calculated as follows. An individual investor with a 
marginal tax rate of 20 percent who receives a cash dividend net of withholding tax of 48.27 units is 
entitled to a tax refund of 18.77 units therefore the actual dividend received is equal to 67.04 units. For 
corporate traders, capital gains are taxed as ordinary income and taxes on dividends are fully recovered as 
illustrated in the example. Finally, mutual funds suffer a 10 percent withholding tax on dividends, which 
is not refundable and is considered as a final tax. 
In the Italian market, companies issue different types of equity securities. Firstly, the Common Stocks 
and Preferred Stocks are registered stocks, that is, the shareholder's name is listed in the company 
42 It has been proved difficult to calculate the effective taxation rates in the countries under consideration. However, this 
constitutes a subject of further research. 
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shareholders' book and provided to the tax authorities. Secondly, Convertible Savings and Non- 
convertible Savings are bearer stocks, the holders of which can maintain their anonymity. These shares 
do not provide any voting rights but they provide a privilege for dividends and for assets in liquidation. 
Savings stocks have the right to receive a yearly dividend of no less than 5 percent of par value or the 
common stock dividend plus 2 percent of par value, whichever is greater. However, in some cases the 
dividend payment to the holders of savings stocks exceeds this constant. The most important feature of 
the savings stocks is the homogeneous taxation of dividends across investors. 
Italian companies are subject to IRPEG (Imposta Sul Reddito Delle Persone Giuridiche). This is the 
corporation income tax on all income earned in Italy, by a corporation (S. p. n). The corporation tax rate43 
has been equal to 36 percent, while in 1995 moved up by one percentage point, to 37 percent. To foster 
company capitalisation, Dual Income Tax (DIT) has been introduced in 1997. This carries a reduction 
(from 37 percent to 19 percent) for part of corporate gains and applies in the event of any increase in net 
assets throughout the year in the form of capital conferment by partners or of undistributed dividend 
reserves. ILOR (Imposta Locale Sui Redditi) is a local Income tax, on profits levied at a uniform national 
rate of 16.2 percent, and it is non-deductible from the corporate tax base. 
In 1993 a provision was added, in order to avoid the tax subsidy to dividend recipients. Since the 
dividend tax credit applied to all dividends received and since there were numerous corporate tax 
reductions, 44 dividends that come from such favoured sources were liable to 9/16 tax credit. As it is 
impossible, in practice, to trace the source of dividend income, an additional corporate tax was 
introduced namely the "Balancing Tax" (Imposta di Conguaglio). This tax is paid by a company in 
proportion to the amount of distributed income, which exceeds the net income subject to full taxation, 
and therefore comes by definition from tax-favoured income. As a result of integration, the corporation 
income tax as such is a tax on undistributed taxable profits. 
Equalisation tax has been abolished effective from January 1,1998. The local ILOR has been replaced 
by a new tax, IRAP (Imposta Regionale sulle Attivita' Produttive), a tax levied by the regional 
administrations with a coefficient of 4.25 percent. The TRAP is related to the incremental income while 
IRPEG is related to the net operating income. The new tax system provided that resident shareholders 
receiving dividends from a resident company were entitled to a tax credit equal to 58.73 percent under 
certain conditions and to the extent that income taxes effectively paid by the company. The effective 
income tax rate paid by Italian corporations is not always equal to 37 percent (IRPEG rate), as companies 
may benefit from tax incentives such as dual income tax and reduced taxation for inter-company 
dividends and for investments in depressed zones, amongst others. As a consequence, after the abolition 
of the Equalisation Tax, two separate baskets "A" and "B", must be formed in preparing the company's 
income tax return and calculating the tax credit of the dividends received. 
43 A full list of the relevant Italian Taxation Rates for the period 1986 to 2002 is provided in Appendix 3.4. 44 For example, reduced rates on income originating from South Italy 
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Tax credit Basket A consists of the amount of income tax actually paid by the company that distributed 
the dividends. The rationale of this provision is to grant full imputation tax credit to the Italian resident 
shareholder but only to the extent that corporation tax has been actually paid by the distributing company. 
Tax credit Basket B is the "Figurative Tax" corresponding to the receipt of tax-free profits distributed as 
dividends. The so-called "Limited Tar Credit" is granted to any Italian resident shareholder. This 
"Limitation" implies that the shareholder cannot obtain any tax reimbursement and/or cannot transfer the 
tax credit to any other group company. 
In February 1999 new rules have been introduced with regard to payments of dividends. An ex-dividend 
date was introduced, prior to the payment day. Shares traded after the dividend date, are quoted ex- 
dividend and the settlement takes place on a cum-dividend basis up to the date of the actual payment. 
Each issuer will have to set a date for dividend payments on the fifth working day following the 
established ex-dividend day, Data Stacco, as set by the Italian Stock Exchange Calendar. Shares listed in 
the official market, the payment date of which is set, are negotiated "ex" (i. e. minus rights to receive the 
dividend), five working days before the date of the actual payment. Shares traded after the ex-dividend 
day, are quoted ex-dividend; settlements nevertheless take place on a cum-dividend basis (i. e. plus the 
rights to receive the dividend) up to the date of the actual payment. 
On the payment date, common stock holders, both individuals and corporations receive a net cash 
dividend of 90 percent, since 10 percent is withheld at the source as partial tax payment. Investors 
subsequently calculate their tax liability by grossing up dividends with the tax credit. Personal taxes, 
distinct from corporate taxes, are progressive, currently ranging from 18.5 to 45.5 percent. 
Individual Income tax IRPEF (Imposta Sul Reddito Delle Persone Fisiche) is the income tax on 
individuals, whether resident or non-resident. The tax is applied on the aggregate income, which for 
residents include all income earned and for non-residents include solely income earned in Italy. IRPEF is, 
but only in principle, a comprehensive income tax. Subtracting from total gross income a number of 
income deductions derives total taxable income. Tax rates from the rate schedule are then applied to get 
gross tax liability. From the gross tax liability a number of tax, or personal credits or deductions are 
subtracted to get the net tax liability, which is the amount finally due by the taxpayers. 
Resident shareholders are taxed on the grossed-up income, receiving both the dividend tax credit under 
the imputation system and a credit of 10 percent withholding tax on the dividend payment. In 1998 the 
dividend tax credit rate was increased by one percentage point, to 58.73 percent. The dividend tax credit 
can be set against the tax liability arising form the dividend receipt, against the tax liability arising from 
other income, carried forward or refunded. Dividends form part of the taxable income of Italian 
companies, but they can use the dividend tax credit to reduce the corporation tax liability to almost zero 
as the dividend tax credit rate is 36%, whereas the full corporation tax rate is 37%. Companies are also 
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entitled to a refund where there is an excess dividend tax credit. Dividends tax credits are only available 
where dividends form part of the taxable income of the shareholder. This is not true of tax-exempt 
entities, which therefore cannot claim the dividend tax credit or receive a refund of the dividend 
withholding tax. 
Formerly institutions and companies paid capital gains tax at the normal corporate rate, but a new two- 
tiered system of taxation of investment income and capital gains is in force, since 1 July 1998, under 
which the level of taxation depends upon whether or not an investment is classified as a substantial 
holding. For listed companies a substantial holding is defined as more than 2 percent of the voting rights 
or more than 5 percent of the capital, and for unlisted companies is more than 20 percent of the voting 
rights or 25 percent of the capital. Capital gains accrued by private resident investors from substantial 
holdings are taxed at 27 percent, while gains on all other equity holdings are taxed at 12.5 percent. Non- 
resident investors are exempt from capital gains taxation and non-substantial holdings and other income 
that would normally be subject to the 12.5 percent rate. 
Generally, in the Italian tax system there are separate tax schedules for dividends on common and saving 
stocks; capital gains for individual investors are not taxed and trading is prohibited for brokers own 
account (that means that brokers have no role in setting the ex-dividend day); and that there is a fixed tax 
on mutual funds' holdings and their 10 percent tax on common stock dividends and 15 percent tax on 
savings stock dividends. 
For the purpose of calculating the Italian tax discrimination variable I follow Dessy (1994)°' who 
analyses the impact of the tax reforms realised in Italy during the nineties. Dessy assumes that the 
corporate tax rate is equal to ti, = iQ+T., where 'r is the notional tax rate (36 percent) on corporate income 
(IRPEG) and TL is the local tax-rate (16.2 percent) on corporate income (ILOR). The total tax-cost related 
to distributed dividends can be defined as: 
td = tic (l+a) D (11) 
Where, i, is the marginal corporate tax rate and D= X(NOI-Q is the net dividend. NOI represents the net 
operating income before taxes and a= tg /(1-tig) is the coefficient used to compute the tax-credit 
recognised on distributed dividends. In Italy the tax credit is equal to 
zR 0.36 9 
a (1-z8) (1-0.36) 16 
45 Dessy A; (1994); "Imposte, Politiche Finanziarle e Valore Azionario ", Egea Milano. Paper is discussed in 
(12) 
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The capital gains are subject to a nominal tax rate, z, of 25 percent unless the underlying asset remains 
into the investors' portfolio of a period longer than 15 years. The capital gains tax is equal to the sum of 
the taxes suffered at the corporation and individual level. Therefore the total capital gains taxation burden 
is equal to (1-z)(1-t,, ). The calculations of the tax discrimination variable assume that assets do not 
qualify for capital gains tax exception. 
From the above analysis the tax discrimination variable in Italy can be derived. The Italian imputation 
credit is s=36%, and the higher band personal income tax is m=45.5%. When the holding is substantial 
capital gains tax rate z equals to 27% and when the shareholding qualifies for no-relevant participation 
capital gains tax is lowered to 12.5%. Therefore, when the holding is substantial the higher taxpayer faces 
a tax discrimination equal to: 
TD = 
(1- m) 
(1-z)(1-s) 
However, after the 1998 Taxation Reform Act, and the introduction of a two-tier system the tax 
(13) 
discrimination variable should be equal to: 
TD= (1-m) (1-tIRPE() (1- Z) (1- S) (1- tDIT) (14) 
Where, tIRPEG is the corporation tax rate and tDIT is the dual income tax rate. Table 2.9 shows the tax 
discrimination variable for different classes of investors, for the period 1986-2002. For capital gains tax 
purposes, calculations assume that that the participation is "Qualified". 
TAB Ix, 2.9: THE TAX DISCRIMINATION VAR 1AB 
.T IN 
ITALY 
Table shows the Tax Discrimination Variable in Italy for the period 1986 to 2002 calculated using the taxation rates provided in 
Annendix 3.4. 
YEAR HIGHER 
BASIC 
36% Bracket) LOWER TAX-EXEMPT 
1986-March 91 1.4628 1.0925 1.0925 1 
April 1991-June 95 0.9557 0.9760 1.3110 1 
Jul 1995-january 99 0.9408 0.9413 1.2836 1 
Februar 1999-02 1.4070 1.2753 1.5630 1 
At the beginning of our sample period, shareholders in Italy were in favour of high dividend payout with 
the exemption of the tax-exempt shareholders who were always indifferent between dividends and capital 
gains. The lower class investors' tax discrimination variable has always been greater than unity, however 
the dividend preference was increased significantly after the 1991 and 1998 taxation reforms. The higher 
and basic classes of investors under consideration were significantly influenced by the tax reforms in 
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1991 and 1998. Results illustrate that the two reforms had the opposite effects on the preferences of the 
shareholders. After 1991 until 1998 shareholders were in favour of capital gains as dividends taxation 
burden was higher. This was reversed in 1998, as all classes of investors in Italy suffer higher taxation 
when profits are distributed in the form of capital gains, consequently higher dividend payout policy is 
rewarded. In contrast the increase 1995 IRPEG of one percentage point, had the effect of reducing the 
total income available to the shareholders. Results imply that the change of IRPEG had not a significant 
impact on the difference between the dividend and capital gains tax burden on the shareholders. After 
1997 the tax credit was no longer a fixed percentage but it was set proportionate to the tax that the 
company effectively pay on profits distributed. For reasons of simplicity, calculations assume that 
dividends are distributed out of earnings; therefore corporation tax is considered to be levied at the full 
rate. 
In sum, unlike previous countries analysed, the tax discrimination variable in Italy is much smaller for 
basic and higher tax-payers indicating a lower preference for dividends. Tax-exempt investors are 
indifferent between dividends and capital gains throughout the sample period. 
2.5 LITERATURE REVIFW" TIIF TAXATION EFFECT ON THE DIVmEND POLICY OF T1w FIRM 
2.5 
.1 
THEORIES ON TIIE IMPACT OF TAXES ON DIVIDENDS 
The impact of taxes on dividends has long been a controversy in the literature; however, evidence is still 
inconclusive and mixed46. There are mainly three prevailing views of how dividend taxes levied on 
shareholders may affect dividend policy, corporate investment, financial policy, and share values of the 
firm47. Both the new and the traditional views of dividend taxation begin with the premise that dividends 
are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, 48 but still they are two very different views49 as to the role of 
taxes on dividend payout decisions have quite different policy implications for evaluating the tax 
systems. Thirdly, the tax irrelevance view concerns the tax characteristics of the marginal investors. It 
rejects the presumption of the new and traditional views that the tax rate on dividends needs to be higher 
than the tax rate on capital gains for the marginal investor. 
In detail, the "Traditional View" supports that dividend taxation is an additional cost on corporate profits 
and this is the implicit view of many proponents of tax integration 50. Despite the heavier tax burden on 
dividends than in capital gains, firms are rewarded for paying dividends however, the reason for this 
reward is not clear. One rationale is the managerial signalling perspective. Therefore, despite of the 
shareholders' higher tax liability, firms can be indifferent to marginal changes in their dividend 
46 See Allen and Michaely (1995), Poterba and Summers (1985) and Lease et al (1999) for a full discussion. 
47 See Poterba (1987), Poterba and Summers (1983 and 1985), Zordow (1991) and McKenzie and Thompson (1996) 
as The key distinction between the new and the traditional views concerns the marginal source of equity funds used 
to finance incremental investment, in particular whether the marginal source of equity is retained earnings (new 
view), new share issues, or some combination of both (traditional view). 
49 See Gerardi, Graetz and Rosen (1990) and Zodrow (1991) 
S° Poterba and Summers (1985) 
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payments. This view suggests that the relevant tax burden for firms considering marginal investments is 
the total tax levied on investment returns at both the corporate and personal level. Dividend tax 
reductions both raise share values and provide incentives for capital investment, because they cause the 
required pre-tax return to decrease. Dividend changes would therefore affect the economy's long run 
capital intensity. In other words, the tax-penalty hypothesis, as it is also known, posits that the firm value 
should decrease as the dividend payout ratio and dividend tax rates increase, because the tax rate on 
dividends is greater than the accrual-equivalent tax rate on capital gains, and paying out dividends 
imposes the high tax rate of dividends on shareholders (Brennan, 1970). If equity prices decrease in 
dividend payouts, then firms increase the cost of their equity capital whenever they distribute dividends. 
The "Tax Irrelevance View" supporters argue that taxes have no influence on dividends because 
shareholders can avoid dividend taxes; consequently, contrary to naive expectations, dividend-paying 
firms are not penalized in the market place. The tax irrelevance view concerns the tax characteristics of 
the marginal investors and rejects the presumption of the traditional view that the effective tax rate on 
dividends need to be higher than the effective tax rate on capital gains for the marginal investor. This 
view was first proposed by Miler and Scholes (1978,1982) who claim that the shareholders that matter 
are the tax-exempt investors, and so face no bias either for or against dividend payments in the classical 
system. They propose this in the US context and it is based firstly on the notion that marginal 
shareholders are tax-exempt and secondly on the fact that the tax discrimination parameter, which 
determines the relative tax advantage of dividend income compared to capital gains is equal to unity. 
However, in the UK for example, where tax-exempt investors (majority shareholders) have a preference 
for dividends, this view has much less appeal 
. 
s' Moreover, changes in dividend tax rates or dividend 
policies should neither affect the total value of any firm, its investment decisions, the share prices or the 
economy's long-run capital stock. If this view is correct then according to Poterba and Summers (1985) 
there is no dividend puzzle. 
The proponents of "Tax Capitalisation View" first developed by King (1977), Auerbach (1979), 
Bradford (1981) argue that dividend taxation increase would result in an immediate decrease of share 
prices, however this would have no impact on the firm's marginal incentive to invest. This in turn implies 
that any integration scheme that reduces or eliminates dividend taxes, or allows firms a partial or full 
deduction for dividends paid, would result in huge windfall gains to existing shareholders without 
altering corporate investment incentives. A central empirical implication of dividend tax capitalisation 
view is that the market value of the firm generally should not equal the market value of the assets within 
the firm, because the market value of inside assets does not reflect the shareholders' future dividend taxes 
on undistributed profits. Similarly, according to Zadrow (1991) the "New View" supports that taxes have 
no impact effect on dividends because dividends are simply the residual after investments have been 
financed from post-corporate tax earnings, and neither investments nor post-corporate tax earnings are 
affected by dividend taxes. The premise of this view is that the only way for firms to provide returns to 
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investors is through dividend payments. The market value of corporate assets is therefore equal to the 
present value of the after-tax dividends which firms are expected to pay. The future dividend taxes are 
capitalised in share prices. As a result, shareholders are indifferent between dividend and retaining 
earnings decisions. 
Poterba and Summers (1985) use UK data, which because of several major dividend tax reforms provides 
ideal experiment to test the three competing hypotheses, aforementioned, in order to examine how 
dividends taxes affect decisions by firms and their shareholders. Evidence supported that dividend taxes 
result in the double taxation of corporate income, consistent with the traditional view. Dividend taxes 
reduce corporate investment and exacerbate distortions in the intersectional and intertemporal allocation 
of capital. On the other hand, they rejected both the tax capitalisation view that dividend taxes are non- 
distortionary lump sum taxes on the owners of corporate capital and the hypothesis that firms pay 
dividends because marginal investors are effectively untaxed. 
Harris, Hubbard and Kemsley (1999) test the prediction that dividend taxes result in a lower value for 
retained earnings than for paid-in equity, after controlling for the predictable influence of dividend taxes 
on the valuation of earnings. Tests are conducted for five US tax regimes and the dividend taxation in 
Australia, France, Germany, Japan and two different UK tax regimes. They firstly, find evidence 
consistent with the capitalisation of future dividend taxes in retained earnings. Secondly, they conclude 
that the differences in dividend tax rates across US tax regimes are associated with predictable 
differences in the implied tax discount for retained earnings. Thirdly, evidence shows that the cross- 
country variation in dividend tax rates is associated with predictable variation in the implied tax discount. 
Furthermore, Harris et al (1999) note that the difference in dividend tax rates across two different tax 
regimes in the UK is associated with predictable differences in the estimated value discount. In a later 
study Harris et al (2001) document similar results indicating that at least a substantial portion of the 
dividend tax is capitalised in equity values. This evidence was not found to be inconsistent with either the 
signalling or agency factors in firm decisions. 
Collins and Kemsley (2000) extend the Harris et al (1999) model 
- 
that takes a residual-income approach 
and provide evidence that future dividend taxes reduce the valuation of retained earnings, which are 
taxable as dividends upon distribution to shareholders 
- 
by adding capital gains taxes to the model, and 
by directly examining the influence of dividend taxes on current earnings as well as on retained earnings 
for the period 1975 to 1997. The new model is subject to three primary preconditions52: firstly, both 
capital gains and dividend taxes reduce investors' implicit valuation of the reinvested portion of earnings; 
secondly, dividend taxes reduce the valuation of the portion of earnings distributed as dividends, but 
capital gains taxes do not, and; thirdly, dividend taxes reduce the valuation of existing retained-earnings 
51 See Lasfer (1995,1996) 
52 These predictions depend critically on the assumption that firms will eventually payout earnings as taxable dividends and it is 
crucial to examine these predictions because firms sometimes distribute accumulated earnings to shareholders through non- dividend means (e. g. share repurchases). 
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equity, but again capital gains taxes do not. They find a negative relation between (i) the valuation of 
dividends and taxes on dividends but not tax rates on capital gains and (ii) investors' valuation of 
retained-earnings equity and dividend tax rates, but not capital gains tax rates. This is to suggest that 
investors capitalise both dividend and capital gains taxes into share prices and the magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients for reinvested earnings and dividends suggest that investors do not merely 
capitalise a weighted average between capital gains and dividend tax rates into prices, as if future 
earnings will be subject to one type of tax or the other. Rather, their evidence is generally consistent with 
the hypothesis that capital gains taxes represent a third layer of taxes that investors incur in addition to 
corporate and full dividend taxes, although the possibility that dividend tax capitalization may be less 
than complete. Finally, they argue that (i) raising capital gains and/or dividend tax rates decreases share 
prices and thus imposes a tax burden on existing shareholders and (ii) when fully accounting for the 
effects of implicit dividend taxes, dividend payouts may provide a net tax benefit for shareholders, rather 
than a net tax penalty as commonly assumed. 
In a recent study, Hubbard, Kemsley and Nissim (2001) employ time-series variation in tax rates and 
both cross-sectional and time-series variation in dividend payouts to empirically examine the 
implications of the three primary shareholder-tax hypotheses in the US. Results show that the market 
value of equity decreases with both dividend and capital gains tax rates increases, but the price effects of 
dividend taxes are not a function of current dividend policy. This provides evidence to rejected the tax- 
penalty hypothesis that the price effects of dividend taxes are a function of payouts. Moreover, results 
show that the firm value decreases in statutory capital gains taxes over time; hence evidence is more 
consistent with the tax-capitalisation hypothesis. Overall, they suggest that shareholder taxes many drive 
a potentially large wedge between costs of using internal versus external equity capital. In addition 
Hubbard et al (1999) suggest that because the firm valuation effects of dividend taxes appear to be 
independent of current dividend policy, firms could pay out dividends whenever they exhaust profitable 
investment opportunities without incurring tax penalties. 
2.5.2 TIIF. CLIENTELE EFFECT VIFw 
The "Clientele Effect" proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961), can be defined as the case when a 
firm sets a dividend payout policy, which tends to attract a "clientele" consisting of those investors who 
are in favour of the firm's particular dividend policy. The firm would therefore, attract those shareholders 
whose preferences are with respect to the dividend payment pattern and stability exhibited by the firm. In 
effect the firm's dividend policy is independent of the tax position of its shareholders and, for a given set 
of dividend policies, investors are expected to hold portfolios chosen on the basis of their after-tax rates 
of return. Therefore, according to Miller and Modigliani (191 clientele effect hypothesis, taxes have no 
effect on dividends because companies do not really consider the tax consequences for their shareholders, 
simply because different shareholders face different tax considerations and hold portfolios which best fit 
their tax position. This refers to the tendency of investors to buy stocks in firms, which have dividend 
policies that meet their preferences for high, low or no dividends. 
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Petit (1977) tests for dividend clientele effects by examining the portfolio positions of approximately 914 
individual accounts. He argues that stocks with low dividend yields are preferred by investors with high 
income, by younger investors, by investors whose ordinary and capital gains tax rates differ substantially, 
and by investors whose portfolios have high systematic risk. Petit finds evidence consistent with the 
clientele effect, as a significant portion of the observed cross-sectional variation in individual portfolio 
dividend yields can be explained by the data. However, the study finds no evidence to support that the 
market price of a security is determined by the dividend policy followed by the firm. Lewellen, Stanley, 
Lease and Schlarbaum (1978) follow Pettit (1977) and use the same data, but reach different conclusions. 
They run a multiple regression to explain the dividend yields of investor portfolios as a function of 
various investor characteristics and suggest only a very weak dividend clientele effect. 
More recently, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (1998) note that institutional investors are relatively less taxed 
than individual investors, and that this induces dividend clientele effects. They argue that these clientele 
effects are the very reason for the presence of dividends, because institutions have a relative advantage in 
monitoring firms or in detecting firm quality. Firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutions 
and perform better. They find evidence consistent with some documented regularities, such as the 
reluctance of firms to cut dividends, and offer novel empirical implications, that is the tax difference 
between institutions and retail investors that determines dividend payments, not the absolute tax 
payments. 
In contrast with previous studies that assume a single marginal clientele, Williams (2001) models 
equilibrium in a financial market with multiple tax clienteles and multiple assets in order to investigate 
how the interaction of the former can influence relative returns of the latter (implicit taxes). Generally, 
results show that the implicit tax on an asset is often driven by a mixture of tax characteristics of different 
clienteles, including clienteles that do not own the asset in question, as well as tax characteristics that are 
unrelated to the asset, such as capital gains taxes for an interest-generating bond. More precisely, 
Williams first concludes that implicit taxes on equity exhibit an inverted "trapezoid" shape as a function 
of dividend yield, cross-sectionally, where only the lowest and highest yielding stocks bear any implicit 
tax; secondly, a market-wide reduction in dividend yields is found to result in lower implicit taxes on 
low-yield stocks and; thirdly, implicit taxes on municipal bonds involve a mixture of dividend and capital 
gains tax rates faced by the marginal clientele who can be either individuals or corporations or both. 
Finally, Williams criticises previous studies relating dividend yields and stock returns, by indicating that 
studies generally test for a linear association whereas the model is found to be a non-monotonic one 
which implies that the time series relationship between dividend yield and return is far different from the 
cross-sectional one. 
In contrast, Alltizer and Hamil (2001) note that the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains 
will create investor clienteles because investors are assumed to acquire an investment portfolio with an 
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after-tax rate of return consistent with the portfolio's risk. Thus, a change in how investment gains are 
taxed may then change investors' demand for securities with differing tax exposure; and firms may also 
alter their dividend policy in response to tax changes. They argue that the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) in 
the US offers an opportunity to test for tax clienteles because it had a dramatic effect on the tax rates 
applicable to both dividend and capital gain income, with rates increasing for the latter and decreasing for 
the former. In this light they hypothesise that high dividend yield firms will outperform low dividend 
yield firms during the periods surrounding the TRA. Results support the existence of dividend tax 
clienteles and provide additional evidence that investors adjust their investment decisions in response to 
external factors affecting after-tax returns. The market response to the TRA changes produced significant 
abnormal returns for high-dividend yielding firms relative to low-dividend yielding firms and this effect 
was concentrated in larger firms. They argue that studies, which reject the clientele hypothesis, are 
confounded by failure to account for size and the beta shifts, thus, may be introducing systematic bias. 
2.5.3 TILE TAXATION IMPACT ON Tim DiyiD E. ND POLICY AND SHARP VALUATION OLTJIE FIRM 
The question of sensitivity of dividends to taxes remains an empirical puzzle with major and multiple 
contradictions in the literature of dividend taxation. Consideration of the impact of taxes on dividends is 
complicated by the lack of convincing theoretical explanation of why firms pay dividends. It is not that 
there are no theoretical explanations for why firms pay dividends, but rather there are several 
explanations with little more general agreement or evidence as to which models are more appropriate. 
Literature analysing the impact of taxation on dividends can be categorised into studies investigating, 
" The relationship between long-term stock returns and dividend yield. 
" The behaviour of share prices when shares are quoted ex-dividend. 
2111 11V UENI) IAXA I It IN ANil 11111, KV-1-A I111N11III' I)LI V'LLr4 UNIS 1 1tM 'I ll)Lli nil, 1 UKN5 ANI 
DIVIDEND YIF. r. D 
The relation between dividend yields and common stock returns has received considerable attention. 
Much of this research has been conducted as tests of an after-tax Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
which predicts that the positive relation between dividend yields and stock returns is induced by the 
disparity in the tax rates for dividend yields and capital gains. The central question is whether stocks with 
higher anticipated dividend yields earn higher risk-adjusted returns. There are two central competing 
hypotheses: the "Tax-Effect Ilypothesis" and the "Dividend Neutrality Ilypothesis". 
The Tax-Effect Hypothesis proposed by Brennan (1970) predicts that investors receive higher before- 
tax, risk-adjusted returns on stocks with higher anticipated dividend yields to compensate for the 
historically higher taxation of dividend income relative to capital gains income. Brennan is the first to 
develop an After-Tax Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), under the assumptions of unlimited 
borrowing and lending at the risk free rate of interest, unrestricted short sales and that a dollar dividends 
paid by corporations were assumed to be certain and known to investors 
In equilibrium: 
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E(R, 
-rf)=b0ß, +c0(d, -rf) (15) 
Where, Ri is the before tax total rate of return on asset i, 6, is the systematic risk on asset i, d, is the 
dividend yield on asset i, rf is the risk free rate of interest and co is a weighted average of the marginal 
tax rates of investors. Brennan (1970) notes that the structural parameters bo and co in this pricing 
relationship are not dependent on the level of the dividend yield. The parameter co is a weighted average 
of the investors' marginal tax rates, with the weights being proportional to the individuals' global risk 
tolerances at the optimum. It also has to be noted that tax effects exist if co>0. In this case, evidence of 
tax disadvantage of dividends exists. Brennan concludes that for any given level of risk, investors require 
a higher total return on a security with respect to its prospective dividend yield as long as the tax rate 
levied on dividends is higher than capital gains. 
However, empirical tests of the above equation failed to derive consistent conclusions. Black and Scholes 
(1974) express strong scepticism about the logic of the tax case against dividends. They begin their 
approach by stating that investors may require current income for consumption purposes. While selling 
part of their holdings is always an alternative, these transactions are costly and dividends may be the least 
costly way of providing the necessary income. Black and Scholes argue that investors weight the benefits 
of receiving dividends against the tax disadvantage. Thus, investors may prefer high and other lower 
dividend payouts. The results indicate that it is not possible to demonstrate that the expected returns on 
high yield common stocks differ from the expected returns on low yield common stocks either before or 
after taxes. 
Black and Scholes (1974) propose the Dividend-Neutrality Hypothesis stating that if investors require 
higher returns for holding higher yield stocks, corporations would adjust their dividend policy to restrict 
the quantity of dividends paid, lower than their cost of capital, and increase their share price. Similarly, if 
investors require a lower return on high-yield stocks, value maximising firms would increase their 
dividend payouts to increase their share price. In equilibrium, value maximizing behaviour would lead to 
the aggregate supply of dividends that meets, but does not exceed, the aggregate investors' demand for 
dividend income that value dividends at least as highly as capital gains. As a result there would be no 
predictable relation between anticipated dividend yields and risk-adjusted stock returns. They find no 
statistically reliable link between a portfolio's monthly stock return and its long-run dividend yield. 
Black and Scholes (1974) test the Brennan (1970) hypothesis by adding a dividend payout term to an 
empirical version of the CAPM: 
(16) R; =yo +[Rm-Yo1ßj+yi(DYj -DY.. )IDYm+ej 
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Where: Rj is the rate of return on the j`h portfolio, To is an intercept term that should be equal to the 
risk-free rate, Rf, (according to the CAPM), R. is the rate of return on the market portfolio, (3j is the 
systematic risk on the jt, portfolio, yl is the dividend impact coefficient, DYE is the dividend yield on the 
j'h portfolio, measured as the sum of dividends paid during the previous year divided by the end-of-year 
stock price, DYm is the dividend yield on the market portfolio measured over the prior 12 Months and c 
is the error term. The null hypothesis is that dividend payout has no impact on the required rate of return 
for securities and it will be rejected if the dividend yield coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
Results suggest that the impact coefficient, y1, is not significantly different from zero, which means that 
the expected returns on high-yield securities are not significantly different from expected returns on low- 
yield securities, other things being equal. The two most influential empirical tests of the Brennan (1970) 
model 53 are the Black and Scholes (1974) and the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) models, which 
present conflicting results. 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) extend the Brennan (1970) model by incorporating wealth and 
income related constraints on borrowing along with a progressive tax scheme. The income related 
constrains on borrowing serve to limit the interest deductions that can be utilised by individuals, to the 
amount of dividend income their portfolios generate. The wealth related constraint on borrowing causes 
the expected return on a zero-beta portfolio (having a dividend yield equal to the riskless rate) to exceed 
the riskless rate of interest. The new equilibrium relationship, which indicates that the before tax 
expected return on a security is linearly related to its systematic risk and to its dividend yield, is given by: 
E(P 
-rf)=a, +b, ßß, +c, (d, -rf) (17) 
Where a, >0 is the risk premium on a zero beta portfolio that has a dividend yield equal to the risk-less 
rate, and reflects the presence of the margin constrain. The positive and non-linear relationship found 
between common stock returns and expected yields cannot be attributed directly to information effect. 
The results show that there is a strong positive relationship between before tax expected returns and 
dividend yields of common stock. The coefficient of the dividend yield variable is positive, less than 
unity, and significantly different from zero. The data indicates that for every dollar increase in return in 
the form of dividends, investors require an additional 23 cents in before tax return. Effectively, the 
hypothesis, whether the effect of dividend yield reverses itself in non-ex-dividend months, is rejected. 
Results indicate that the effect of a dividend payment on before tax expected returns is positive in both 
the ex-dividend month and in the subsequent non-ex-dividend months. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
classify a stock as having a positive dividend yield only during the ex-dividend months, while during any 
other month stocks have a zero dividend yield. They conclude that risk-adjusted returns are higher for 
53 Other studies discussing the Brennan (1970) model are Blume (1980), Gordon and Bradford (1980), 
Morgan (1982), Poterba and Summers (1984,1985) and Rosenberg and Marathe (1979) 
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securities with higher dividend yield. They interpret their findings as a support for Brennan's pre-tax 
CAPM; this suggests that the positive dividend yield coefficient is evidence of tax effect. However, 
Litzerberger and Ramaswamy fail to determine whether the effect of dividend yields on common stock 
returns is attributed to taxes or some other overlooked factors. They suggest that the heavy taxation of 
dividend income relative to capital gains, result in investors demanding superior before-tax returns from 
stocks, which provide a large proportion of their total, return in the form of highly taxed dividends. 
Blume (1980), extends the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM to include anticipate yield coefficient for a sample of 
NYSE stocks for the period 1936 to 1976. He tests two critical assumptions, firstly that the mean-zero 
disturbance is uncorrelated with the independent beta and dividend yield variables and secondly, that the 
values of a, b and c coefficients implicit in the investors' subjective distributions of stock returns, beta 
and dividend yield, did not vary in any systematic way from their true underlying values over the 
estimated period. He uses cross-sectional regressions estimated with quarterly returns stating that if there 
were a measure tax effect associated with dividend yield, the effect would differ as between months or 
periods in which a stock went ex-dividend and those in which did not and argued that since most 
dividend-paying stocks paid dividends quarterly, the use of quarterly returns should make the estimated 
regression less sensitive to any possible differential effects. Results show that for the portfolios grouped 
first on beta and then on dividend yield the average coefficients were 0.5232 (t-stat=2.07) and 0.0125 (t- 
stat=3.42) respectively. Results were virtually the same for the cross-sectional regressions using 
portfolios grouped first on dividend yield and then on beta. However, he notes that the significance of the 
dividend yield variable, varied over time. Overall the results show that within the context of Sharpe- 
Lintner CAPM the expected returns of individual assets are solely a function of their beta coefficients. 
Moreover the model was found too restrictive and concluded that dividend yield was acting as a proxy 
for some unspecified variable omitted from the model. 
Miller and Scholes (1982) are the first to make the distinction between the short-run and long-run 
estimates of dividend yield. The rational behind using a short-term definition of dividend yield 
(Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979) is the tax-induced cum-ex-dividend day return differential. The 
difference is essential for indifference at the beginning of the ex-month, on the part of the shareholders, 
between buying or selling the shares cum- or ex-dividend. They argue that if short-term traders or tax- 
exempt institutions, who face the same taxation on dividends and capital gains dominate the equilibrium, 
then any tax-induced return differential will be eliminated. Empirical tests document a positive yield 
effect with both short-run and long-run (Blume, 1980) definitions of dividend yields. Miller and Scholes 
(1982) argue that yield-related effects associated with short-term definitions of dividend yield are due to 
information biases and not tax. They recognise that a yield effect might exist; nevertheless, since 
transaction costs may well keep the ex-dividend price from falling by the full amount of the dividend. 
They criticise Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) for ignoring the potential effect of dividend omission 
announcements. The dividend omission announcement reduces the return of the zero dividend yield 
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group and tend to bias upward the dividend yield coefficient. Later Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) 
use alternative measures of expected short-term dividend yield to address this criticism. 
Keim (1985) examines the empirical relation between stock returns and long-run dividend yields 
investigating whether results can be attributed to tax effects or whether they are related to anomalous 
effects documented in the literature. Firstly, he focuses on the relation between raw returns and dividend 
yield, which in line with Blume (1980), found to be non-linear. Secondly, he finds that much of the 
relation is due to a significant non-linear relation between dividend yields and returns in the month of 
January, which is contradictive to the tax-effect hypothesis. Results provide evidence that the average 
returns of the dividend yield portfolios are non-linearly related with average yields. Zero dividend 
securities appear to have, on average, the largest returns equal to 1.78, while returns for dividend paying 
stocks tend to increase as dividend yield increased. The hypothesis that average returns are equal across 
portfolios is rejected (F-test=5.30). To analyse the relation between risk-adjusted returns and dividend 
yields abnormal returns are estimated using the on-period Sharpe-Lintner CAPM and found to be non- 
linear. Furthermore, Keim investigates the relation between yields and size, using the total market value 
of equity as a proxy for size and concluded that the peaks and troughs of the non-linear long-run yield 
function may be due to the location of small and large firms within the dividend yield continuum. Keim 
concludes that the results, at a minimum, suggest that the observed relation between long-run dividend 
yields and stock returns is not solely attributable to differences in marginal tax rates for dividends and 
capital gains. 
In contrast with previous studies using CAPM-adjusted excess returns models, Christie (1990) uses a 
size-based expected returns model, to analyse the returns of zero-yield stocks benchmarked against the 
performance of dividend-paying stocks of similar market capitalisation for a number of NYSE firms with 
ordinary common shares outstanding for the period 1926 to 1985. Evidence contradictive to previous 
studies, reveals that zero-yield stocks earn significantly negative average excess returns, and represent a 
natural extension of the excess returns estimated across firms with positive anticipated yields. Christie 
also finds that the estimated ßs of zero-dividend firms significantly exceed those of dividend paying 
firms. More precisely, Christie finds that zero dividend firms tend to incur an average loss of 
-0.41 per 
month in relation to dividend-paying firms of similar size. The negative average excess returns appear to 
occur in every size decile and every month other than January. Excluding January the number of 
size/month combinations yielding negative average excess returns dominate those with positive values by 
a factor approaching 4 to 1. In conclusion, Christie argues that the magnitude of the effect is too large to 
be a tax effect and might be better explained by the market overvaluing the prospects of non-dividend- 
paying stocks. 
Chen, Grundy and Stambaugh (1990) show that tests relating returns to dividend yields are sensitive to 
the method of risk-return adjustment. For a sample of NYSE stocks, excluding zero-yield stocks, they use 
a pooled cross-section, time-series regression methodology to document a positive yield/return relation 
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when utilising a single stock market factor model. They conclude that the positive relation between 
returns and dividend yields is not robust to the inclusion of various controls for risk. Naranjo, 
Nimalendran and Ryngaert (1998) follow Chen et al (1990) and construct an ex-ante measure of long-run 
taxable dividend yield. They demonstrate that returns are positively related to that yield, even after 
controlling for risk factors from the asset pricing literature. They find no evidence to support that the size 
of the yield effect is related to the level of the implied tax rate, and hence the potential tax penalty from 
receiving taxable dividend income. 
Erickson and Maydew (1998) use an event-study approach surrounding a change in tax regimes and also 
find no statistically significant difference in pre-tax rates of returns between high-dividend yield and low- 
dividend yield stocks. Using a different approach Fama and French (1998) examine the relationship 
between prices and dividends. After controlling for profitability, they hypothese that the tax penalty on 
dividends should result in a negative price effect. Instead, they reveal a positive relationship between 
prices and dividends, concluding that the signalling effects of dividends must outweigh the tax effects. 
Morgan and Thomas (1998) test the Taxed-Based Theory which, when applied to US data, predicts a 
positive relation between stock returns and anticipated dividend yields. However, in the UK where the 
tax system treats dividend income compared to capital gains relatively moderately than in the US, taxed- 
based models would predict a negative relation between anticipated dividend yields and risk adjusted 
stock returns. Low yielding stocks should generate higher returns than high yielding stocks, in order to 
compensate investors for the increased tax burden associated with capital gains. Zero yielding stocks 
should be required to produce the highest returns of all, since all their returns will be received by 
investors in the form of capital gains. The UK tax system as well as the other European imputation 
systems where dividends are treated more moderately that in the US provide a valuable opportunity to 
assess the validity of the Taxation Hypothesis. 
Morgan and Thomas (1998) expand the methodology of Keim (1985) and examine the robustness of the 
relationship between dividend yields and returns. They find that the positive relationship persists even 
after controlling for systematic risk, the impact of zero-dividend stocks and the size effects. Dividend 
yield is defined by Keim (1985) as: 
f-1 
DYr DIV r Pr-13 LT=s-I2 
(18) 
Where, DIVT is the Dividends paid in the period of 12 months and Pt-13 is the stock's price at the 
beginning of the sample period. Evidence suggests that high yielding stocks earn positive risk adjusted 
returns, whereas low yielding stocks earn negative risk adjusted returns. Moreover, there is evidence of 
non-linearity in the performance of zero-dividend stocks. Overall, the results suggested a strong, positive 
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and non-seasonally-specific influence of dividend yield on risk-adjusted stock returns in the UK, which is 
in clear contrast to the predictions of the taxation hypothesis. In general, they find evidence to reject the 
tax-based explanation for the relation between dividend yields and stock returns, supporting that the UK 
tax structure is such that tax-based models of the dividend-yield return relation do not imply a positive 
correlation between dividend yields and returns, as is the case in the US. 
However, Dempsey (2001) re-examines the theoretical basis of Morgan and Thomas (1998) conclusion 
and supports that the empirical evidence of market behaviour might be interpreted as consistent with 
investor tax-based rationality that capitalises the firm's earnings on an after-personal tax basis. He 
suggests that the results provide evidence consistent with the tax effect hypothesis as in Elton and Gruber 
(1970), Auerbach (1979) and Lasfer (1995,1996). The implication is that as long as dividends represent 
the ultimate mechanism by which firm distributes earnings to its shareholders, a firm cannot add value by 
converting earnings into capital gains (which represent long-term dividends) as opposed to short-term 
dividends: adding value requires that the firm reinvests in projects with a positive net present value. 
Dempsey observes that the tax-rational relationship between a share's ex-dividend day return and its 
dividend yield may be either positive or negative depending on how the dividend yield is itself defined- 
gross or net of imputation credits. Based on this notion, the observations of UK share price performance 
by Morgan and Thomas appear to be consistent with investor tax rationality. 
The next section draws on the literature around the ex-dividend day share price behaviour which is 
extensively investigated in the next chapter of my study. Briefly, the literature around the ex-dividend 
day share price behaviour distinguishes between the two major competing hypotheses Taxation 
Hypothesis (Elton and Gruber, 1970) and the Short-Term Hypothesis (Kalay, 1982). More recent 
explanations relate the ex-day premium on microstructure effects (Bali and Hite, 1998; Frank and 
Jagannathan, 1998). Additionally, others overcome the problem of interpreting the ex-dividend day 
pricing by looking at the behaviour of stocks around major tax reforms (Lasfer, 1995; Poterba and 
Summers, 1985; Bell and Jenkinson, 2001). 
2.53.2 TIIF. EX-DIVImEND DAY SHARE PRICE BEHAVIOUR 
Previous studies show that the risk-adjusted abnormal returns on the ex-dividend dates are positive and 
significantly related to the dividend yield. However, the interpretation of these findings is controversial. 
The question relates to what category of investors sets ex-day prices. Campbell and Baranek (1955) note 
that the ex-dividend behaviour of stock prices influences the portfolio decisions of investors and they 
observe that if the prices of shares fall by the full amount of dividends, taxable investors will, at the 
margin, accelerate their sales before ex-dividend days and delay their purchases until after ex-dividend 
days. The authors find that on average, ex-day stock prices fall by less than the amount of dividends 
paid. This finding was the initialisation of a puzzle in asset pricing, which has received a vast amount of 
literature attention. 
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Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that ex-dividend day share prices are set in such a way, as the marginal 
long-term investors are indifferent between buying and/or selling before and after the ex-dividend day. 
As a consequence, the ex-dividend day premium should reflect the differential taxation of dividends and 
capital gains of these long-term investors, and the magnitude of the drop on ex-dividend day prices 
relative to dividends will indicate the identity of the long-term investor. This study was followed by a 
vast amount of other studies either questioning or supporting the original Elton and Gruber findings. The 
literature can be divided into four categories: Firstly, studies that replicate the Elton and Gruber (1970) 
original results on non-US marketS54 or on US markets in other time periods; secondly, studies overcome 
the problem of ex-day pricing and examine the ex-dividend day share price behaviour around changes in 
tax laws in order to observe whether changes in ex-day price drops are related to changes in the tax 
policy; " thirdly, studies that observe a decrease of ex-day prices by less than the dividend but argue that 
the fall is due to reasons unrelated to tax rates and related to arbitrage by short-term traders56 and; finally, 
a more recent part of the literature argues that even in the absence of differential taxes, ex-dividend day 
share price would fall by less than the dividend due to microstructure characteristics. " 
In the next chapter I investigate the share price behaviour around the ex-dividend day in the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy. The chapter builts on the findings of the present chapter, i. e. the differences 
in the taxation systems in the countries under consideration as well as the tax discrimination variables 
calculated. The uniqueness of my theses lies in the fact that it is a comparative European study, which 
will add in the literature. Firstly, to the best of my knowledge, has not been previously conducted; and 
secondly the differences between countries and between different taxation periods within countries will 
provide the ideal environment to test the predictions of the literature. 
2.6 oN 
_I. 1SION 
The present part of my theses illustrates firstly the differences between the classical dividend taxation 
system (US) and the Imputation taxation systems (UK, Germany, France and Italy). The latter provides 
tax credits to the shareholders for the taxation suffered at the corporation level in an attempt to alleviate 
the double taxation of dividends, i. e. to "homogenise" the taxation burden on dividends and capital gains. 
I follow Lasfer (1995) to provide the theory behind the dividend and capital gains taxation burden as well 
as the theory behind the tax discrimination variable under both the classical and imputation systems. A 
common frame is engaged in order to describe the taxation systems in the countries under consideration 
considering the dividend taxation at the company level, the shareholder level and the taxation of capital 
gains. In this analysis I also consider the taxation changes in each country, which affected the tax burden 
on dividends and/or capital gains in an attempt to provide in addition to the-intra country and inter- 
country comparison between different periods. These enable me to calculate on a common basis the tax 
54 See Chapter 3, Footnote 9 for a various studies in different countries. 
55 See Lasfer (1995), Athanassakos (1996), Gammie (1997), Grammatikos (1989), Flan (1994), Koski (1996), Kamdin and 
liiemstra (1993), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983), Michaely (1991), Poterba and Summers (1984), Robin (1991), Skinner (1993), Wu Han Su (1996) amongst others. 
56 See Kalay (1982), Kaplanis (1986), Karpoff and Walking (1988,1990), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) amongst others. 
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discrimination variable in each country. According to the theory, if cash in the hands of the company and 
cash in the hands of the shareholder can be interchanged without attracting an additional tax burden (or 
credit), then there is no discrimination and tax discrimination equals to unity. If tax discrimination is 
lower (higher) than unity, dividends (capital gains) are taxed more heavily than capital gains (dividends). 
Results show that there are significant differences between the European countries dividend taxation 
systems that result in variations of the tax discrimination variable. Also, it is shown that taxation reforms 
affect the tax discrimination variable and consequently the preferences of shareholders between 
dividends and capital gains. These provide an ideal environment to further investigate the taxation impact 
on the dividend policy of the firm and distinguish between contradicting theories. Extensive literature has 
been provided up to date, however theories developed are contradicting and lack of strong empirical 
support. I continue the investigation of the taxation impact on the dividend policy of the firm in next 
chapter as I use these findings in order to study the ex-dividend day share price reaction in the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy. 
" See Bali and Hite (1998), Frank and Jaganathan (1998) 
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CHAPTER 3: THE TAXATION IMPACT ON TIIE EX-DIVIDEND DATES IN F. UROPI? I EVIm, N 
.R 
FROM Tim UNITED KINGDOM, G ý. RMANY, FRANCE AND ITA Y 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter of my Thesis, I examine the behaviour of share prices around the ex-dividend 
dates across four major European Countries: the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Previous studies 
show that the risk-adjusted abnormal returns on the ex-dividend days are positive and 
significantly related to the dividend yield. The question relates to what category of investors sets 
ex-dividend share prices. The empirical evidence provided to date has been unable to provide a 
single acceptable explanation for the ex-dividend share price behaviour, partly because ex-day 
returns may be affected by more than one factors, i. e. differential taxation of dividends and capital 
gains, transaction costs, risk exposure and market micro-structure effects. This ambiguity in the 
area constitutes one of the major motivations of this part of my study. Essentially, the literature 
can be categorised into four major areas, but let me first explain the importance of studying the 
ex-dividend day before I proceed further. 
The investigation of the ex-dividend day share price behaviour is important because it provides a 
direct comparison between the market valuation of one unit of dividend to the valuation of one 
unit of realised capital gains. This has been a long-standing object of interest and controversy for 
financial economists. As Kalay (1982) states, the ex-dividend offers a unique opportunity to 
compare capital gains (i. e. the price drop) to ordinary income (i. e. the dividend); comparing the 
value investors ascribe to returns in these two forms is important because each is taxed 
differently. How such differential taxation influences security price has financial consequences 
for corporations and governments that design tax codes and rely on tax revenues. ' 
Campbell and Beranek (1955)2 note that the ex-dividend day3 behaviour of stock prices influences 
the portfolio decisions of investors. They observe that if the share prices fall by the full amount of 
dividends, taxable investors will, at the margin, accelerate their sales before the ex-dividend days 
and delay their purchases until after the ex-dividend day. 4 Elton and Gruber (1970) specify the 
conditions for "no profit" opportunities around the ex-dividend day in the presence of tax 
differentials and present empirical evidence to show that on the ex-dividend day the share prices 
drop less than the amount of dividends. They argue that ex-day prices are set in such a way, as the 
Originals in Italic. 
2 Also see Barker (1959) 
3 Ex-dividend day is defined as the last day investor can sell his/her shares and keep the right to the forthcoming 
dividend. After the ex-dividend day, shares are said to be traded without their dividend rights. 
4 In perfect capital markets, assuming certainty, the share price drop should equal the dividend per share. Any other 
share-price behaviour provides arbitrage opportunities. A smaller (larger) price drop provides arbitrage profits for 
buying (selling short) on the cum-dividend day and selling (covering) on the ex-dividend day. 
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marginal long-term traders are indifferent between buying and/or selling before and after the ex- 
dividend day. As a consequence, the ex-dividend day premium should reflect the differential 
taxation of dividends and capital gains of these long-term investors, resulting in ex-day returns 
reflecting both the tax differential and the identity of the long-term investor. This is consistent 
with the tax effect hypothesis, that investors have a tax-induced preference for capital gains. 
On the other hand, Kalay (1982) proposes the short-term trading hypothesis, according to 
which the ex-dividend share price drop less than the dividend per share provides profit 
opportunities for the short-term traders (these are investors who are not subject to the differential 
taxation of dividends and capital gains) who will capture dividends and will eliminate any excess 
returns on the ex-dividend dates. In this case, ex-day returns, if any, reflect the transaction costs of 
these traders exercising a dividend-capturing activity. 
Consistent with short-term activity, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) study the trading volume 
around ex-dividend days and report evidence on unusual patters around ex-days. Short-term 
traders are also found to capture dividends in the NYSE5, in NASDAQ6 and in the Canadian 
Market'. 
Moreover, studies overcome the problem of ex-dividend day pricing and analyse the changes in 
the tax regime that affected dividend and capital gains taxation burden. Still, results continue to be 
ambiguous. For example, Lasfer (1995) and Bell and Jenkinson (2002) find that changes in the 
UK tax system that altered the tax discrimination between dividends and capital gains resulted in 
changes in ex-day premiums. In contrast, Michaely (1991) shows that the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
in the US did not result in any increase in ex-day returns. However, Heath and Jarrow (1988) 
relaxed the assumption of risk neutrality and showed that ex-day share prices are not likely to be 
set by any category of investors. 
More recently, a part of the literatures deviates from the above hypotheses and relate the ex-day 
premium to market microstructure characteristics suggesting that ex-day premium can deviate 
from one in the absence of taxes to reflect tick size and bid-ask bounce. For example, Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998) find that price discreteness has a similar effect on the observed price 
behaviour as would be in the case if prices were determined by long-term investors. These studies 
suggest that the behaviour of share prices on the ex-dividend dates may be unrelated to taxes. In 
contrast, Graham et al (2002) compare ex-day returns before and after decimalization in the US 
s See Karpoff and Walkling (1988), Eades at al (1994) 
6 See Karpoff and Walkling (1990) 
7 See Booth and Johnston (1984) 
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and find results consistent with the tax hypothesis rather than the price discreteness or transaction 
costs effects documented by Bali and Hite (1998) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998). 
The majority of the studies found in the literature provide evidence from the US; with a limited 
number of studies using data from single countries around the world, 9 but to the best of my 
knowledge there is no study conducting a European comparative analysis of the ex-day price 
behaviour. I attempt to discriminate between the above contending hypotheses by examining the 
behaviour of share prices around the ex-dividend days that resulted from differences in 
institutional framework across European countries and the regulatory changes in these countries, 
which affected only the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains. I investigate the ex- 
dividend share price behaviour in the UK, Germany, France and Italy where the differential 
taxation of dividends and capital gains is lower than in the US. The uniqueness of the European 
taxation systems is due to the imputation taxation systems adopted in Europe, which provide 
investors with partial (UK) or full (Germany, France, Italy) tax credit on dividends but not on 
capital gains. 
Dividends experience a tax disadvantage when compared with capital gains, at least in the US. 1° 
The exact magnitude of the tax disadvantage associated with receiving dividends is difficult to 
measure, simply because different investors have different tax rates. For example, pension funds 
in the UK, do not pay any taxes therefore, they may not see any tax differences between dividends 
and capital gains, whereas individual investors may face different marginal tax rates on dividends 
and capital gains depending upon their wealth and income levels. Taxes are expected to affect the 
equilibrium share price behaviour when shares are first quoted ex-dividend. Several studies 
examine the share price behaviour around the ex-dividend day and compare the expected price 
drop relative to the dividend per share. The argument is that a simple way of estimating the tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains, at least to the marginal investor in a stock, is to 
look at the behaviour of stock prices on the ex-dividend day. 
8 Frank and Jagannathan (1998), Bali and lifte (1998) 
9 See for Canada Athanassakos (1996), Athanassakos and Fowler (1993), Booth and Johnson (1984), Bauer, Beveridge 
and Swakumar (2002); for China Milonas, Tan, Travlos and Xiao (2002); for Denmark Florentsent and Rydquvist 
(2002); for Finland Liljeblom, Lotlund and lledvall (2001); for Germany McDonald (2001), Yakov and Murgia (1997), 
Gugler and Yortoglu (2001); for Greece Milonas and Travlos (2001); for France Desbrieres (1988), Romon (2000); for 
Ilong Kong Kadapakkam (2000), Boyd and Jagannathan (1994); for Italy Michaely and Murgio (1995); for Japan 
llayashi and Jogannathan (1990), Kato and Loewenstein (1995); for New Zeland Bartholdy and Brown (2002); for 
Spain Gardecazabal and Reguley (2002); for Sweden Daunfeldt (2002), Green and Rydqvist (1999), DeRidder and 
Sodcrstern (1999); for the United Kingdom Ang, Blackwell and Megginson (1991), Lasfer (1995,1996), Chaui, Strong 
and Caddie (1992), Menyah (1993), Poterba and Summers (1984,1985), Bell and Jenkinson (2002). 
10 Due to the taxation systems imposing higher tax rates on dividends than on capital gains and also due to the double 
taxation of dividends (US and in the UK the system only provides for partial relief). Moreover, due to time difference, 
see Constandinides (1983,1984). See Chapter 2 for further details. 
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I lay the foundations to form my hypothesis firstly, on Lasfer's (1995) model indicating that 
overall tax burden on dividends and capital gains is a function the differential taxation of 
dividends and capital gains; secondly on the tax discrimination variable as it is defined by King 
(1977), i. e. the opportunity cost of retained earnings in terms of net dividend forgone; and thirdly, 
on the dividend taxation system differences in the UK, Germany, France and Italy as explored in 
Chapter 2. Essentially, I test the predictions of the tax effect hypothesis, that is whether in 
countries with higher tax discrimination variables, ex-dividend day share prices would drop by 
less than the amount of dividends and therefore, higher abnormal returns would occur, as 
compared to countries with lower tax discrimination variables. Further tests of my hypothesis 
would include the effects of changes in taxation codes in each country under consideration. 
Therefore, the uniqueness and originality of this part of my study stands in the facts that it is the 
first study to examine, analyse and compare the ex-dividend share price behaviour in the four 
European countries (UK, Germany, France and Italy) and; secondly, it is the first study to provide 
both intra- and inter-country comparisons between different taxation periods in Europe. 
I employ event study methodologies (Brown and Warner, 1985) to investigate the share price 
reaction around the ex-dividend day. Data was obtained from DataStream and Hydral1 to cover all 
listed companies on the UK, German, French and Italian Stock Exchanges for the period 1987 to 
2002. Results confirm that in countries were the differential between dividends and capital gains 
is high, ex-dividend day returns are also high. Tests before and after changes in the taxation codes 
show that returns are not homogeneous across the alternative tax regimes, as I find that in each of 
the four countries, changes in the tax systems that affect taxes on dividends and/or capital gains 
alter significantly ex-day returns. However, there is some indication that in countries, such as 
Germany, where short-term trading is allowed and when transaction costs are low, the pre- and 
post- ex-dividend day returns are significant suggesting that investors trade to capture dividends. 12 
For other countries the results provide further evidence on the tax effects on ex-dividend day 
returns. 
The rest of Chapter 3 is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 1 provide a full review of the 
literature in four categories: studies that support the taxation effect hypothesis, the short-term 
effect hypothesis, studies that find a microstructure effect on that day and finally, studies that 
investigate the effect of taxation regime changes on the ex-dividend day price behaviour. In 
Section 3.3 I present the motivation and hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.4 discusses the results 
and the conclusions are in Section 3.5. 
11 These are online databases available at Cass Business School, City University 
12 This is not in accordance with the efficient market hypothesis 
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As already mentioned in the introduction, literature studying the share price behaviour around the 
ex-dividend day can essentially be categorised into four groups, for which I provide in the next 
sections. Studies that test the non-US markets are included in each section according to their 
results. 
3.2.1 Tim, TAXATION EFFECT ON Tim EX-DIVIDEND DAY BEHAVIOUR 
Elton and Gruber (1970) expand the reasoning of Campbell and Beranek (1955) to estimate the 
marginal shareholder's tax rate on dividends from the average ex-dividend day price drop. They 
examine the ex-dividend day returns for a sample of NYSE stocks and find that the average price 
on ex-dividend day drops by less than the value of dividend and also that the price change-to- 
dividend ratio increases with the dividend yield on the security. They interpret the ex-dividend 
day behaviour of common stock prices as evidence that differential rates of taxation cause 
investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends relative to capital gains; and conclude 
that the price change to dividend ratios on the ex-dividend days reflect the tax rates of various 
investors who trade around such days. They argue that the marginal investor who wishes to sell 
near the ex-dividend day is indifferent between selling on the ex-dividend day and selling on the 
previous day. As a consequence, the ex-dividend day premium should reflect the differential 
taxation of dividends and capital gains of these long-term investors13 
Elton and Gruber (1970) consider that investors, who buy stocks at price P, at a particular period 
are interested in determining the conditions under which they should sell shares. The ex-dividend 
day is special in the sense that any stock purchase for a long-term buyer before this day, results in 
the inclusion of the dividend in current income while a buyer on or after the ex-dividend day has 
no such obligation. Similarly, a long-term seller after the ex-dividend day recognises the dividend 
as current income, while if he/she sells before he/she excludes the dividend from current income. 
Elton and Gruber assume that there are no restrictions on short sales and that investors are risk- 
neutral. 
The after tax cash flows to a seller on the cum- and ex-days can be derived as follows. Let P, be 
the purchase price, P,. the price at which the seller can sell on the cum-dividend day, Pe= the ex- 
dividend day price, and td the investors marginal tax rate on current income and tg the capital 
gains tax. If P,. >Pp and the seller has held the stock long enough for the sale to be classified as 
capital gains, then his/her after-tax cash flow from selling cum-dividend is equal to: 
13 This conclusion was consistent with the Tax-induced Dividend Clientele Hypothesis, which Miller and Modigliani (1961) had argued would characterise investor behaviour in an environment of differential taxation of dividends and 
capital gains. 
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Pp+ (P,, m- Pp)(1-tg) (1) 
On the other hand, if the seller waits until the ex-dividend day to sell at price Piz, cateris paribus, 
his/her after-tax valuation of the cash flows is equal to: 
Pp + (Pe1-Pp)(1-tg) +D (1-td) (2) 
Where D is the amount of dividend and td is the dividend taxation rate. Elton and Gruber (1970) 
show that in a risk-neutral world with preferential treatment of capital gains and no restrictions on 
short sales, shareholders are indifferent between buying or selling shares before or after the ex- 
day if these two days' after tax returns are equal. 14 Thus, at the equilibrium equating the two after- 
tax cash flows and rearranging we obtain: 
PM, 
-Pl==AP= 
(1 
- 
td) 1D orDORe: =Pcum -Pex - (1- td) (3) (1 
- 
t8) D (1-t8) 
Where, DORA= is the drop off ratio on the ex dividend day. If dividends and capital gains are 
taxed equally, the stock price should drop by about the same amount as the pound dividend on the 
ex-dividend day. To the degree that dividends are viewed as less attractive, because of tax 
differential, than capital gains, investors will settle for a smaller capital gain, in pre-tax terms, as 
the equivalent of a pound dividend. In other words, the price drop on the ex-dividend day will be 
smaller than the pound dividend, and the magnitude of the difference will reflect the tax 
differential. On the other hand, if capital gains are taxed more heavily than dividends, the price 
drop on the ex-dividend day will be greater than the pound dividend. 
Alternatively, the rate of return on the ex-dividend day, Rt=, can be computed from Equations (1) 
and (2) as follows: 
P«+D-P(, 
N =(1-DOR) 
D td 
- 
ta D (4) 
P. Pte,,,, 1-ti Pte,,, 
In many countries, such as the US, profits distributed as dividend payments are tax-disadvantaged 
relative to capital gains for many investors (i. e. td>tg). Dividends are taxed at ordinary rates 
14 In the original Elton and Gruber model the decision to hold or to sell shares before the ex-dividend day is for reasons 
unrelated to the dividend. The risks and transaction costs are fixed costs and, thus, irrelevant for determining 
equilibrium prices (e. g. Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986) 
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without tax credits, whereas effective capital gains taxes are low. Under the dividend tax 
discrimination, drop-off ratios are expected to be less than one or, alternatively, ex-day returns 
must be positive in order to compensate investors for the tax penalty. However, the tax 
environment in the UK is very different. Lasfer (1995) illustrates that under the UK imputation 
system, d is the dividend net of the tax credit deducted at firm level at rate s. For tax purposes, all 
investors are deemed to have received a tax credit, equal to sd / (1-s). Thus, d (1-s) represents the 
gross dividend to be taxed at rate m. Therefore the ex-day drop-off ratio, DORex and the yield to 
ex-day return, R,; are equal to: 
p 
-Pis 
- 
(1-m) 
DOR, 
== d (1- s)(1- 0 
(5) 
and 
ýr P+d- Pý 
=[1- 
(1 
- 
m) d (6) 
P. (1 
- 
s)(1 
- 
t, ) ) P. 
Barclay (1987) examines the ex-dividend day behaviour of common stock prices before the 
enactment of the federal income tax in the US. Evidence is consistent with the tax-effect 
hypothesis i. e. stock prices decrease by the full amount of the dividend on the ex-dividend days 
during the pre-tax period. The results show no evidence to support the view that investors appear 
to value a dollar of dividend less than a dollar of capital gains. The data provides evidence to 
support the two hypotheses, firstly that investors in the pre-tax period valued dividends and 
capital gains as perfect substitutes; and secondly, the differential taxation of dividends and capital 
gains has since caused investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends relative to capital 
gains. Generally the findings of the study are consistent with the hypothesis that the differential 
taxation of dividends and capital gains has a significant impact on the portfolio choices of 
individual investors. Results also support the view that dividend policy affects the market 
valuation of a firm's securities. 
Kaplanis (1986) uses data to cover fourteen companies on the UK Traded Options Market from 
1979-1984, and concludes that the average expected ex-day fall-off implicit in option prices is 
around 55-60 percent of the dividend and significantly different from it. The fall-off also varies 
inversely with the dividend yield and the estimates of the expected fall-off are not significantly 
different from the actual fall-off. Finally, results show that the usual assumption made in valuing 
options on dividend paying stocks, that the fall-off is equal to the dividend, would lead to 
downward-biased estimates of the option. He interprets the inverse relationship between the fall- 
off and dividend yield as being consistent with the tax clientele hypothesis. 
93 
Su John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 3 
Heath and Jarrow (1988) relax the assumption of risk neutrality and show that ex-day share prices 
are not likely to be set by any category of investors. They analyse the relation between the size of 
a stock price drop on the ex-dividend day and arbitrage opportunities. They reject the idea that in 
a frictionless economy where no transaction costs exist, there exist short-term trading strategies 
that make arbitrage profits if the stock price drop does not equal the dividend. They develop a 
theorem to show that the stock price drop can differ from the dividend, and yet there are no 
trading strategies that generate arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, the stock price drop on the ex- 
dividend date must necessarily reflect the equilibrium trading process involving different tax 
clienteles, one of which is the short-term trader, and a risk premium the size of which is small but 
positive. 
Lasfer (1996) examines the simultaneous effects on both corporation and personal income taxes 
on dividend payment adjustments and on the behaviour of share prices on the ex-dividend days in 
the UK. The paper models the link between the tax treatment of dividend at firm level and at 
individual level; and shows that the firm's dividend policy depends on the corporate and personal 
taxes. Additionally, evidence is provided to support that companies set their dividend policies to 
minimise their tax liability and to maximise the after-tax return of their shareholders. Overall, the 
results show that taxation affects both the payout policy of the firm and the ex-day returns. Tax 
exhaustion reduces the level of dividend paid by the firms, while a lower tax burden on dividends 
in the hands of shareholders appears to encourage firms to pay higher levels of dividends. 
Furthermore, results are consistent with the tax effects, ex-day returns, but there was no evidence 
of a tax-induced dividend clientele effect, which effectively supports the proposition that the 
firm's dividend policy is affected by its shareholder's tax position. 
McDonald (2001) attempts to assess the market valuation of the tax credit, using German's stock, 
futures and option prices to examine the effects of dividend payments on the ex-day behaviour. 
He notes that German dividends typically carry a tax credit, which makes the dividend worth 
42.86 percent more to a taxable German shareholder than to a tax-exempt or foreign shareholder. 
Accordingly, this results in a penalty for foreign investors who buy and hold German dividend 
paying stocks. The study documents that as a result of the credit, the ex-day drop exceeds the 
dividend by more than one-half of the tax credit, and shows that future and option prices embed 
more than one-half of the credit. The existence of credit, however, creates opportunities for cross- 
'S In Germany the tax system is designed to reduce the total tax burden on corporate income by fully compensating 
shareholders (through tax credits attached to dividend payouts) for tax already paid by the corporation. In October 2000 
a German Tax Reform eliminated the imputation system so that investors are reimbursed only part of the taxation 
suffered at company level. 
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border tax arbitrage, in which foreign holders of German stock transfer the dividend to German 
shareholders, and implies that it is tax efficient for foreign investors to hold derivatives rather than 
investing directly in German stocks. The study does not only consider the heterogeneity of 
investors in respect to tax rates but also the heterogeneity with respect to the pre-tax value of 
dividend because of the credit. To tackle this heterogeneity, McDonald adopts the costly arbitrage 
model of Kalay (1982) and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) and concludes that in the absence of tax 
restrictions against arbitrage, the marginal ex-day price drop should reflect the dividend plus 
credit16. Generally, results provide evidence that approximately one-half to two-thirds of the value 
of the dividend tax credit is reflected in prices of German stocks and equity derivatives. The 
evidence is consistent with the existence of tax-motivated trading occurring around the dividend 
date, and with German arbitrageurs facing tax risk associated with dividend capture transactions. 
In a more recent study, Elton, Gruber and Blake (2002) attempt to differentiate between taxation 
effects and microstructure effects" by examining the ex-dividend day effects on closed-end 
mutual funds. They are motivated by the fact that this sample contains a set of securities 
(municipal bond funds) for which the ex-dividend price drop should be greater than the dividend 
if taxes matter as well as a set of securities (taxable bond and domestic common stock funds) for 
which the drop should in general be less than the dividend. 18The study covers the period 1988 to 
2001 which also encompasses two major changes in the post-tax value of dividends relative to 
capital gains for funds with dividends subject to tax, and one major change for the value of tax- 
free dividends. These changes can provide further tests for testing the taxation hypothesis. By 
testing ex-dividend effects on a sample of funds where dividends are tax-advantaged, they find 
that taxes should and do cause the fund price to fall by more than the amount of dividends, which 
is consistent with tax effect hypothesis. Secondly, when they test the non-tax-advantaged closed- 
end funds, they find that the fall in the price on ex-dividend date is less than the dividend during 
periods when capital gain taxes are less than income taxes, which provides further evidence to 
support the tax hypothesis. In general, results show that the behaviour of price changes with 
respect to dividends on the ex-day conforms to the theory that taxes determine the relative value 
vis a vis capital gains. Results hold both for different types of closed-end funds and for the impact 
of changes in tax law within each type of fund. 
16 This is analogous to Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) result that the marginal price drop in the US should be one-for- 
one. 
" Literature on microstructure effects on the ex-date provided in Section 3.2.3 18 Green and Rydqvist (1999) study a different investment class, Swedish bonds, that should also have an ex-dividend 
day drop greater than the dividend. 
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3.2.2 TIFF. SIiORT-TERM TR %DING 
. 
FFECT ON TILE Ex-DIVIDEND DAY BFIIA VIOUR 
In contrast to the taxation effect hypothesis, some empirical studies, Kalay (1982), Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1986), Karpoff and Walking (1988), Eades et al (1984), Hess (1982), Fedenia 
and Grammatikos (1991), and Michaely (1991) amongst others, contest the ex-dividend day tax 
premium hypothesis, and they support that the ex-dividend prices are set by short-term traders 
who capture dividends by buying cum-dividend and selling ex-dividend. Additionally, the 
marginal investors are short-term traders, who generally prefer dividends to capital gains and they 
are active in dividend capture'9. This prediction is referred to as the "Short-Term Trading, 
Hypothesis". Generally short-term effects predict that pre-ex-day returns should be positive and 
post-ex-day returns should be negative. Significant price increases before the ex-day will be 
consistent with the buying pressure of the short-traders, while, in the post-ex-dividend date, a 
selling pressure by short term traders would reduce their holding risk and result in a price fall. 
Brooks and Edwards (1980), Kalay (1982), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Karpoff and 
Walking (1988) argue that the explanation of dividend-tax clienteles holds only if long-term 
investors are the equilibrium-price-determining investors. Short-term traders do not enjoy a 
preferential tax status between capital gains and dividend income. Therefore, they will arbitrage 
any differences between dividends and security price changes subject to their marginal transaction 
costs. According to Brooks and Edwards (1980) this arbitrage would drive the ex-day price- 
change-to-dividend ratio towards a value of one, but deviating from one because of the required 
coverage of transaction costs. This phenomenon holds for any price-change-to-dividend ratios 
sufficiently greater or less than one to enable coverage of transaction costs. Thus, the literature 
questions Elton and Gruber (1970) key assumptions. Kalay (1982) and Miller and Scholes (1982) 
point out, that transaction costs are not negligible when compared to the usual magnitude of cash 
dividends. Kalay (1982) also notes that it would be difficult to separate the transactions cost 
component and the differential tax component by looking at ex-day returns. However, Kalay 
ignores the possibility that transaction costs and the opportunity cost of capital depend on the 
stock as well as the market conditions prevailing at a point in time. 
Kalay (1982). points out that equilibrium prices around the ex-dividend day appear to be 
determined not only by the the long trading population" but also by the "short-term traders" 
and argues that short-term profit elimination around the ex-dividend day can make the estimation 
of investors' marginal tax rates from the behaviour of share prices in a particular period 
19 Dividend buying, also known as dividend capture. consists of a stock purchase by a taxable corporate investor prior to 
the stock's ex-dividend day, and sell the stock soon after the ex-dividend day. If the stock is held long enough to satisfy 
a minimum holding period stipulated in the Inland Revenue Code, dividends received qualify for a substantial federal 
income tax deduction, whereas any capital loss is fully deductible against capital gains. 
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impossible. He supports that when ex-day returns include the tax premium investors taxed at the 
same rate on dividends and capital gains, then the ex-day prices would fall by the full amount of 
the dividend. Moreover, in the same paper he presents the "Short-Term Traders" Hypothesis, 
according to which, the stock price drop should be equal to the entire dividend. Otherwise, short- 
term traders, who face no differential taxation on dividends versus capital gains, could make 
arbitrage profits by trading on this phenomenon. 
Eades, Hess and Kim (1984), follow Black and Scholes (1973) to examine the pricing behaviour 
for five days both before and after the ex-dividend day and under the hypothesis that failure to 
distinguish ex-dividend days from surrounding days would cast further doubt upon the tax 
interpretation of ex-dividend day pricing behaviour. Results either confine neither to the ex- 
dividend day, nor to taxable distributions by common stocks. All non-common stock samples 
showed abnormal return behaviour during the ex-dividend period providing inconsistency with 
the taxation effect hypothesis. Results are further tested for errors, seasonality, announcement 
effects, infrequent trading and non-normality, which provide no explanation of the ex-dividend 
period anomaly. They find positive excess returns before and including the ex-dividend day and 
abnormally negative returns following the ex-dividend day. In fact the abnormal returns on the ex- 
dividend day are smaller 0.142 (t =11.741) than the excess return on the last cum-dividend day, 
0.188 (t 
=15.647). The results show that the cumulative standardised excess return from day 
-5 to 
and including day 0 is 0.53 percent (significant at the 0.01 level), whereas the ex-dividend day 
excess return is only 0.142 percent (t = 11.741). The cumulative negative excess return from day 
+1 to day +5 is 
-0.29 percent. Eades et al note that the overall impression is that abnormal returns 
are not uniquely associated with the ex-day and this evidence suggests that the relative price drops 
on ex-dividend days cannot be used to measure differential tax rates between dividends and 
capital gains (page 21). Furthermore, they study the ex-date price behaviour of the NYSE taxable 
preferred stocks that have a higher dividend yield than common stocks, non-taxable cash 
distributions to common stocks and stock dividends and splits for the period 1962 to 1980. The 
ex-dividend day returns of preferred stocks suggest that preferred dividends are taxed at a lower 
rate than capital gains; non-taxable stock dividends and splits are priced on ex-dividend days as if 
they are fully taxable; and non-taxable cash distributions are priced as if investors receive a tax 
rebate with them. The ex-date excess returns are smaller for such stocks and sometimes even 
negative, suggesting that the tax effect is less for such stocks due to the presence of dividend 
captures trading around ex-dividend dates. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) confirm Eades et al 
(1984) results by finding than abnormal trading volume around the ex-dividend day was related to 
dividend yield. In a later paper Eades et al. (1994) examine the time series behaviour of ex- 
dividend period returns and positive results, which are not consistent with the traditional tax 
hypothesis. 
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Karpoff and Walking (1988) report on empirical tests of the proposition that short-term traders are 
the marginal investors in dividend-paying stocks and argue that dividend tax penalty and short- 
term trading explanations are not "competing but complementary". They prove that investors 
trading for reasons unrelated to the dividend have incentives to time their trades to maximise 
after-tax returns, as implied by the tax penalty explanation and they reach to the conclusion that 
for securities with active short-term trading, ex-day returns are positively related to transaction 
costs. Empirical results of the study prove that positive correlations between transaction costs and 
ex-day returns exist in high-yield stocks. 
Koski (1996) examines ex-dividend observations for ordinary cash dividends using marginal 
conditions that explicitly model trading at bid and ask quotations. These conditions distinguished 
between buying and selling, incorporated the bid-ask spread as marginal transaction cost, and 
minimised potential biases caused by bid-ask measurement error. She particularly examines the 
1984 and 1986 Tax Reform Acts and tests the trading strategies of long-term tax clientele traders. 
Results suggest that marginal price declines increased relative to the dividend amount from 1983 
to 1988, consistent with predictions based on the elimination of preferential tax treatment of 
capital gains. Consequently, that tax-neutral short-term traders cannot profit from ex-dividend day 
price declines if they incur the entire bit-ask spread as a marginal transaction cost. Taxable 
corporations that offset preferential tax treatment of inter-corporate dividend income against 
transaction costs also cannot profit beyond the spread. Overall, results found to be consistent with 
the hypothesis that dividend capture trading increased over the examined period. 
Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) investigate the ex-dividend day dividend capture activity in the US 
for the period 1962 to 1987. They develop an equilibrium model in which transaction costs play a 
key role and where three classes of investors exist: taxable individuals, dividend capturing-tax- 
advantaged corporations and tax-neutral arbitrageurs. They characterise the nature of equilibrium 
and the equilibrium relation between expected percentage price drop and dividend yield. The 
dividend capturing activity is a property of the equilibrium. The equilibrium theory predicted that 
for low dividend yield stocks, trading would generally take place between taxable individuals. 
Over some intermediate range of dividend yield, tax-neutral arbitrageurs would enter the market, 
buying from and selling to taxable individuals. For stocks with high dividend yields dividend 
capture would be desirable depending on other stock attributes besides yield. Each range of 
dividend yield is characterised by a different equilibrium pricing condition. Results show that the 
theoretically predicted relation between expected percentage price drop and dividend yield is a 
piecewise linear convex function that will, in general, be indexed by prevailing market conditions. 
This is proved to be true whether or not arbitrageurs enter the market. Overall, evidence is 
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provided to show that at the margin, percentage price drop is almost exactly equal to the dividend 
yield, which constitutes an empirical regularity (stylised fact), which is neither predicted by the 
theory nor inconsistent with it. They note that whatever the explanation, the results that one-for- 
one marginal price drop has been a gold rule of thumb, at least on average. 
Moreover, Michaely and Vila (1995) suggest that, in the presence of a perfect clientele, there 
should be no tax-related gains from trade among the investors around the ex-dividend day, 
because investors are confronted with the same relative after-tax valuation of dividends and 
capital gains. In the absence of disagreement on the relative valuation, there should be no profit 
opportunity and consequently, no abnormal volume around the ex-dividend day. Thus, if a perfect 
clientele exists, there should be a significant change in trading volume around the ex-dividend day 
after the 1986 US Tax Reform. To account for risk, for which Elton and Gruber (1970) did not, 
they propose an equilibrium model to explain trading volume and stock price behaviour around 
the ex-dividend day. They show that the ex-day price drop relative to the dividend amount is a 
function of the average relative tax rates of dividend versus capital gains across traders and the 
total risk in the economy. They also show that the trading volume around the ex-day is positively 
related to the heterogeneity of investors' income taxes and the dividend size and is negatively 
related to the variance of stock. 
Romon (2001) studies the stock price reaction, in France, around the dividend announcement and 
the ex-dividend day by introducing the dividend policy stability criterion in event studies, based 
on the dividend yield. In France, dividend and earnings announcements are generally made at the 
same moment. Romon uses a methodology, which enables him to distinguish stock price reactions 
due to earnings announcements from those due to dividend announcements. He compares the 
announced values to anticipated values. Results differ according to the event study carried out. 
The results show that the informational effect of dividend announcement appears different 
according to the firm dividend policy level. Romon draws attention to results around the ex- 
dividend day. He notes that when the market knows the firm dividend policy (low, medium or 
high) and when there is no surprise, the dividend yield clientele effect seems to be extremely 
limited. Results show a very low increase of Elton and Gruber DOR ((Pb-P, )/D) according to the 
dividend yields level; consequently this introduces doubts over the dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Michaely and Murgia (1995) investigate the effect of taxation on stock price and trading volume 
around the ex-dividend day on the Italian Stock Market, where dividends on two classes of stock 
are taxed differently. Data consists of all common and non-convertible, bearer-savings and 
dividend-saving stocks traded on the Milan Stock Exchange between 1981 and 1990. In Italy, 
savings on stock dividends, in 1995, were taxed at a fixed rate of 15 percent for all market 
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participants, whereas the tax rates on common stock dividends varied widely across market 
participants. They note that this differentiation in tax rate should induce an abnormally high 
volume of trade because there are positive gains to be made from traders. Evidence shows that 
the weighted average of investors' tax rates is reflected in the ex-day prices and the variance of 
the relative tax rate across investors is reflected in the volume of trades. They also find evidence 
that higher transaction costs result in higher ex-dividend day excess returns and lower abnormal 
volume, which is consistent with the "profit elimination" activity by institutions and corporations. 
3.2.3 TILE MICROSTRUCTURE FFFEcT ON THE EX-DIVIDEND DAY BEHAVIOUR 
A recent explanation to the ex-dividend price movements is based on microstructure arguments. 
Two articles have recognized the fact that prices fall by less than the dividend, but they have put 
forth explanations for this phenomenon, which are neither related to taxes nor to short-term 
trading around the event. The first of the microstructure argument is presented by Bali and Hite 
(1998) who state that the drop in the price less than the dividend is really due to discreteness in 
prices rather than taxes. The second is presented by Frank and Jaganathan (1998) who 
hypothesise that the collection and reinvestment of dividends is bothersome for individual 
investors but not for market makers; therefore, the latter tend to buy before a stock goes ex- 
dividend and then sell on the ex-date. They argue that the bid-ask bounce contributes to, if not 
totally explains a phenomenon others interpret as tax/short-term trading effects. 
Bali and Hite (1998) investigate the discreteness in trading prices on observed ex-dividend day 
stock price changes, for the period 1962 to 1994, based on the notion that since prices are 
constrained to discrete tick multiples while dividends are essentially continuous, ex-day price 
changes will not equal dividends. The price-drop-to-dividend firstly found to be less than one, 
secondly found to increase with dividends and thirdly, decline between tick multiples, giving a 
"sawtooth" pattern of data. In addition they estimate regressions of price changes on dividends 
and the distance from the tick below. The coefficient of the later found to be insignificantly 
different from one and the coefficient on the fractional part of the dividend found to be almost 
equal to one-half, which results in discontinuities at exact tick multiples. Finally, abnormal returns 
on the ex-dividend day found to be even smaller than the rounding error caused by discreteness 
and too small to generate arbitrage profits since trading was confined to tick multiples. Since 
dividends and dividend yields are highly correlated, discreteness will give the impression of tax- 
induced dividend clienteles even if there are none. Taxable cash dividends and non-taxable stock 
dividends found to exhibit similar ex-dividend day behaviour. Therefore, Bali and Hite conclude 
that at a minimum the tax-induced dividend clientele hypothesis is not the only hypothesis 
capable for explaining the behaviour of stocks during the ex-dividend day. 
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Frank and Jagannathan (1998) examine data from the Hong Kong stock market for the period 
1980-1993, where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed, therefore, anything than a one- 
for-one price drop on ex-dividend days cannot be driven by taxes. They develope a model of 
investor behaviour in which there were two prices in the market, the ask price and the bid price. In 
this non-Walrasian setting, they show that, under certain conditions, on the ex-dividend day the 
stock price would rise by a small amount relative to the magnitude of the bid-ask spread and the 
relative importance of traders. Evidence shows that in the Hong Kong Stock Market, where no 
relevant taxes are faced by the marginal trader, the ex-day share price adjustment is reflecting 
taxes as in the US and elsewhere. The authors account for the ex-day price drop by recognising 
that most traders tent to occur at the bid on the last cum dividend date, in order to avoid the 
nuisance of collecting the dividend; and at the ask on the ex-dividend date, therefore it is clear 
that stock prices rise on the average on ex-dividend days quite independent of the amount of 
taxation on dividend. 
Green and Rydqvist (1999) criticise the Frank and Jagannathan model because dividends are 
undervalued relative to capital gains due to the existence of "nuisance value" in their model. 
Green and Rydqvist examine the behaviour of Swedish bonds around the ex-dividend day; which 
carry tax-exempt coupon payments, but capital gains and losses are taxed as with other securities. 
Results show that the tax-induced preference for cash distribution, lead the bonds to trade at 
negative yields. The price of the bond was so high, reflecting the tax shelter it offered, that on a 
pre-tax basis the internal rate of return is negative. The price drop that occurs over the ex- 
distribution period is larger in periods when marginal tax rates were high and whenever the tax 
code allowed more generous use of the associated capital loss. However, Green and Rydqvist note 
that results do not give conclusive evidence that the ex-dividend behaviours in equity markets are 
entirely tax induced, rather than attributable to micro-structural or other market frictions. 
French, Varson and Moon (1999) propose the application of an option-pricing framework to the 
ex-dividend behaviour of common stocks. They assume that the total value of the firm decreases 
by an amount equal to the dividend, when a firm's financial structure contains a debt component, 
thus, the concept of option pricing applied to equity valuation leads to a situation in which the 
payment of a cash dividend results the ex-dividend day stock decline being less than the dividend. 
The difference between the fall in the value of the firm and the fall in stock value is equal to the 
decline in value absorbed by the debt. They note that in perfect capital market, arbitrage should 
occur such that the ex-dividend day behaviour of yields no abnormal returns (i. e. the decline will 
be equal to the dividend). They use a sample of 40,251 ex-dividend day observations, and they 
observe a decrease in stocks by an average of 77 percent of the dividend on the ex-day. They also 
categorise their sample into stocks with no long-term debt and those with positive long-term debt; 
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and they find that the former fall on average by 100 percent of the dividend while the latter fall 
only by 74 percent. Finally, they analyse in a regression model that considers other factors 
influencing the ex-dividend behaviour, and they find that the amount of firm debt has a significant 
and positive relationship with observed ex-dividend day price changes. Since their model controls 
for other variables that affect the ex-day returns (e. g. tick intervals, transaction costs, the tax status 
of the dividend and the dividend capture activity), they conclude that the option pricing 
framework provides a valid explanation for a portion of observed ex-dividend day behaviour. 
Graham Michaely and Roberts (2003) analyse20 the ex-day price and volume reactions to the 
dramatic reduction in price discreteness and bid-ask spreads that occurred as the pricing grid 
changed form 1/80' and 1/160' to decimals for stocks listed on NYSE. They also look at the 1997 
reduction in the capital gains tax rate from 28 percent to 20 percent. If the price discreteness21 
and/or the bid-ask bounceu are the dominant factors driving the ex-day activity, then ex day 
premia is expected to get closer to one and abnormal returns are expected to approach zero as the 
pricing grid becomes finer. They find evidence to support the opposite. They also find that same 
patterns when they base their analysis on mid-quotes i. e. there is no evidence to support that the 
price discreteness nor the bid-ask bounce explain the patterns in ex-day premiums and abnormal 
returns. Results are consistent with the notion that the decrease in spreads reduced the cost of 
transaction for small trades-but because liquidity fell at the same time as bid-ask spreads 
transaction costs for large trades did not fall. They also find that the premium is closest to one 
among stocks with the highest dividend yield and abnormal volume is also high for these stocks 
which is consistent with dividend capture or arbitrage activity forcing the premium to approach 
one for the high dividend yield stock. This is also consistent with price discreteness and bid-ask 
bounce explanations. However, they do not find a change in the association between dividend 
yield and premiums as price discreteness and bid-ask spreads falls across pricing eras, casting 
doubt on these microstructure explanations being the dominant cause of the positive relationship 
between yields and premiums. Generally results are consistent with the tax hypothesis that the ex- 
day premium is caused by preferential taxation of capital gains relative to dividend income. 
20 The purpose of their study is threefold: they firstly test the predictions of the microstructure theory, that is the decline 
in minimum tick size and associated reduction in bid-ask spread should increase the average ex-day premium, so that is 
closer to one; secondly; they test the tax hypothesis, that is the price drop is less than the dividend because high 
personal taxes on dividends (relative to capital gains) reduce the value of the dividend; and thirdly they focus on how 
the interaction of transaction costs, taxes and risk affects ex-day prices and volume behaviour. They find that the 
median effective ex-day bid-ask spread fell from 0.125 to 0.0625 to 0.020 in the one-eighth and one-sixteenth decimal 
eras respectively. The occurrence of large reduction in spreads is due to reduced coarseness in the pricing grid and 
permits a test of the transaction cost models. As transaction costs decrease, more arbitrage trades should take place and 
the average premium should increase, and become closer to one, especially for those stocks that experienced the greater 
reduction in spreads (i. e. trading volume, and large arbitrage trades should increase). 21 See Bali and Hite (1998) 22 See Frank and Jagannathan (1998) 
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3.2.4 Tim TAXATION REGIME CHANGE EFFECT ON TILE EX-DIVIDEND DAY BFIIAYIOU 
Poterba and Summers (1984), strengthen the tax hypothesis interpretation by finding predictable 
differences in ex-dividend-day share price reactions across three different tax regimes in the UK. 
They study the relationship between dividends and stock price movements during two major tax 
changes in the UK23 and document the importance of taxes in determining this relationship. Using 
both daily and monthly data on British Securities, they conclude that dividend taxation has a 
substantial effect on the premium which investors require to induce them to receive returns in the 
form of dividends. Their results confirm the view that the taxation of dividends reduces their 
relative valuation by investors; they find that taxes change equilibrium relationships between 
dividend yields and market returns. Moreover, findings suggest the importance of tax changes and 
the coefficients and their differences decline to magnitudes similar to those of the CAPM. The 
finding that dividend taxes are recognised by investors and affect ex-ante returns, which they 
demand, deepens the puzzle of why firms pay dividends. Davidson (1989) and Davidson and 
Mallin (1989) argue that the ex-date price change of shares in the UK is far more complicated that 
that proposed by Poterba and Summers (1984). Davidson and Mallin (1989) believe that drop-off 
ratios resulted from an interaction between arbitrage constraints and a weak dividend preference 
for higher yielding shares. They conclude that the tax differential hypothesis has little relevance to 
the long-term ex-dividend day behaviour of shares in the UK. 
The Poterba and Summer (1984) results are also in contrast with Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1983) who examine the effects of both the Tax-Clientele and Short-Term Trading Hypotheses on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange around the 1986 Reform Act and find evidence to support the short- 
term hypothesis. The results are inconsistent with the tax-clientele interpretation of ex-dividend 
day behaviour, since prices appear to fall by a significantly smaller amount after the tax reform 
relative to the dividends than before. The authors also note that the relative price drop was much 
smaller than reported in similar studies, which employed US data, despite the more favourable 
Canadian tax treatment of dividends relative to capital gains. They also note that the results 
should not be interpreted as evidence that stock prices are independent of personal taxes and 
dividend policy. They merely argue that the price behaviour on ex-dividend days should not be 
used to assess the relative valuation (by the average investor) of taxable dividends versus taxable 
capital gains or the existence of the so-called "clientele" effects. In a later study, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1986) show that there is abnormally high volume around the ex-dividend days for 
some stocks, which they interpreted as additional evidence of short-term trading. Booth and 
23 The major changes in British Corporate Income Taxation can safely be viewed as exogenous. Both occurred 
following changes in the political party in power. Firstly, in 1965, the newly elected Labour Government instituted 
Capital Gains Tax at a statutory rate of 30 percent. This reform should had increased shareholders' relative valuation of 
dividend income. Secondly, in 1973, the Conservative Government introduced an integrated Corporate Income Tax, 
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Johnson (1984) however, criticise Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983). The former argue that the 
low drop-off ratios observed by the latter, could be explained by their adjustment for small 
dividend payments. 
Michaely (1991) analyse the behaviour of stock prices around ex-dividend days after the 
implementation of the 1986 US Tax Reform Act and provide evidence that the 1986 tax change 
had no effect on the ex-dividend stock price behaviour. Results show that the premiums for the 
high-yield securities are consistently above one, which proves the significant role of corporate 
traders. They find that the tax reform does not change the incentives of short-term traders and has 
a very small impact on corporate traders' incentive to trade around the ex-dividend day. Finally, 
they conclude that the reduction in transaction costs and structural changes in the US financial 
markets may have resulted in the dominance of institutional traders in the trading around ex- 
dividend day and consequently, a change in the individual investor's tax rates had no significant 
effect on the ex-dividend day prices. 
Menyah (1993) attempts to fill the gaps left in earlier studies by applying the methods of both 
Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982) by investigating ex-dividend day pricing in the UK 
with a view to assessing the relevance of the contending hypothesis to the UK market. The 
investigation covers four major tax changes, which have altered the taxation of dividends and 
capital gains. He investigates the major hypothesis on ex-dividend day pricing for the UK equity 
market. The results hardly show any support for the tax-induced dividend clientele hypothesis. 
Investors were found to prefer capital gains to dividends and therefore, the tax effect concept was 
reinforced by the results. Moreover, some evidence is obtained that the short-term trading 
hypothesis may explain part of the puzzle in the pricing on ex-dividend days at least before the 
introduction of the Anti-avoidance Legislation of 197024. 
Lasfer (1995) studies the behaviour of share prices around the ex-days that resulted from the 
regulatory changes of the 1988 ICTA, which affected only the differential taxation of dividends 
and capital gains for the tax-exempt investors, in an attempt to isolate the impact of taxation on 
the ex-dividend days. He examines the ex-day abnormal returns of a large sample of UK listed 
companies and compares the distribution of ex-day abnormal returns in pre- and post-1988 ICTA. 
The tests are conducted under the hypothesis that taxation is the only force that drives ex-day 
share prices; therefore, pre-1988 ex-day returns are expected to be positive and significant in 
which effectively reduced the dividend tax rate on personal and corporate investors and actually provided a dividend 
subsidy to untaxed institutions. This resulted to a reduction of the tax rate applicable to dividend income. 24 Under the Anti-Avoidance Legislation, which introduced in 1970, the Revenue had the power to tax as a dealer, 
anyone who traded "too frequently". This implied that all profit from such trading, be dividends or capital gains, would be taxed at ordinary income tax rates. 
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order to reflect the tax differential between dividends and capital gains. As a consequence post- 
1988 ex-day returns are expected to be negative and insignificant to reflect the tax credit 
associated with the cash dividend. Results are consistent with the tax hypothesis, providing 
evidence that the significant shift between the two periods, pre- and post- 1988, is driven mainly 
by the highest dividend yield groups; while for the lowest quintile, ex-day share prices drop by 
the full amount of the dividend in both periods. Additionally, results show that ex-day returns are 
not affected by commonly used measures such as the bid-ask spread and trading volume, or by the 
day of the week, the month of the year, type of dividend distribution or a number of days to the 
actual receipt of the cash dividend. Lasfer (1995) specifically investigates the relevance of short- 
term trading to the UK and concludes that ex-day returns in the UK are not affected by short-term 
trading. This makes ex-dividend evidence from the UK particularly useful in testing the impact of 
dividend taxation. 
Bell and Jenkinson (2002) examine the impact of the July 1997 Tax Reform in the UK, which was 
structured in such a way that the immediate impact fell almost entirely on pension funds, the 
largest investor class in the UK by reducing their valuation of dividend income by 20 percent. 
They attempt to test whether pension funds in the UK are the marginal investors, and if so how 
taxes affect the valuation of dividend income, by estimating the extend of any change in the 
valuation of dividend income before and after the reform when considering the ex-dividend day 
share price behaviour. They also generally test for clientele effects in the UK by using a smoothed 
measure of dividend yield, in contrast with previous studies (for example, Lasfer, 1995 and 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1983). Before 1997, results show firstly, that the average drop-off 
ratios are ranging from 0.84 to 1.16 depending on the sample and measurement method and 
secondly, that strong clientele effects exist as drop-off ratios are positively related to dividend 
yields. These provide support for the hypothesis that effective rates of capital gains tax are 
considerably below statutory rates for many investors, and that pension funds are the effective 
marginal investors for high-yielding companies. After the FA1997, significant changes in drop- 
off ratios are found, especially for high-yielding companies. This provides further evidence for the 
tax-exempt investor being the marginal investor for high-yielding companies whose valuation of 
income after 1997 was reduced by 20 percent. In line with the theory, drop-off ratios are found to 
decrease on average by 13 to 18 percent depending on the company size. Overall, results provide 
evidence to support the clientele effect hypothesis as well as the notion that taxation significantly 
affects the valuation of dividend income. 
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Han (1994) argues that 1986 Tax Reform Act25 in the US constitutes a dramatic change, and 
offers a unique opportunity to examine investors' valuation of dividend relative to capital gains 
and to test the tax effect hypothesis as opposed to the short-term hypothesis. Data consists of 
stocks listed on NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX for the period 1983 to 199026. Results show that the 
ex-date returns on NASDAQ stocks significantly decrease after the 1986 TRA but this is not the 
case for NYSE/AMEX stocks. He also finds that while the ex-date return behaviour is more 
consistent with the tax premium hypothesis for NASDAQ stocks, for the NYSE/AMEX stocks the 
behaviour is more consistent with the short-term hypothesis. Thus although, both factors may 
affect ex-date returns, the ex-date returns of NASDAQ stocks are dominated by the tax premium, 
whereas those of NYSEIAMEX stocks are dominated by the short-term trading. Han argues that 
theses different dominant factors for the two groups contribute to the different results for the 1986 
TRA effect on ex day returns. 
3.3 MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESIS TO LE TESTEI) 
In summary, the effects of dividend taxation on the valuation of the firm have several 
fundamental implications. If, for example, dividend taxes do not influence share prices as 
suggested by Miller and Scholes (1978), then dividends impose a tax penalty on taxable 
shareholders. However, if share prices absorb the effects of dividend taxation, then corporations 
could distribute dividends without imposing a penalty on shareholders at the margin. That is 
dividend policy would be unaffected by dividend taxes, if dividend taxation is constant. In the 
case of unanticipated temporary changes in the dividend tax, payout decisions would be affected. 
Several researchers, King (1977), Auerbach (1979 a, b), and Bradford (1981), have suggested that 
if dividend taxes reduce the market value of retained-earnings equity, then it would reduce 
shareholders' required return on this source of financing below the required return on equity 
raised from external markets. Aside from the corporate financial implications, tax policymakers 
devote substantial attention to the potential share price effects of dividend taxes (Gentry and 
Hubbard, 1998). If dividend taxes reduce share prices, then a portion of the economic efficiency 
benefits of corporate tax integration or other fundamental income and consumption tax reform 
would be dissipated in windfall gains to current shareholders. 
Following the literature review, it seems reasonable to argue that, on balance, US evidence is 
mixed. The validity of the Elton and Gruber (1970) results could also be difficult to sustain in 
other capital markets. International evidence, (e. g. from the Toronto Stock Exchange in 
25 The 1986 Tax Reform Act abolished the tax differential on dividends and capital gains for ordinary investors. 261 le comments on two previous studies, Michaely (1991) and Robin (1991) which provide contradicting results. The 
former finds no evidence to support that the 1986 TRA affects the ex-date returns behaviour while the latter supports 
the opposite. Han (1994) argues that the differences in the results of these two studies might be due to different data sets 
106 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 3 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) and Booth and Johnson (1984) amongst other studies), 
indicate that marginal tax rates cannot be inferred from ex-dividend day price change to dividend 
ratios. The short-term hypothesis is also difficult to sustain since the price change to dividend 
ratios are very low relative to what could be expected in the presence of short-term arbitrage 
opportunities. For the UK, most of the studies including Lasfer (1995,1996), Brealey (1970), 
Poterba and Summers (1984,1985), Kaplanis (1986), Bell and Jenkinson (2001), find evidence to 
support the tax hypothesis. The inferences about the two contending hypotheses are essentially 
by-products of studies focused on related but different issues. 
Despite the long existing literature, the ex-dividend day stock price behaviour puzzle remains 
unsolved. The purpose of the present part of the study is to examine, compare and contrast the ex- 
dividend day behaviour of stock prices in the UK, Germany, France and Italy, in order to shed 
light in the challenging puzzle. In order to investigate and test the forces driving the ex-dividend 
share price behaviour, I am testing the Tax Effect Ilypothesis as opposed to other explanations of 
the ex-dividend day price behaviour in the literature, the main of which is the Short-term Trading 
Hypotheses, in order to investigate the relevance of the contending hypotheses to the four 
markets. Additionally, comparison of ex-dividend day stock returns before and after major tax 
system changes in each country will be useful in identifying the tax effects on the dividend policy 
of the firm. 
The study will follow the Elton and Gruber (1970) model to test whether there is any evidence of 
the "Clientele Effects", originally proposed by Miller and Modigliani. That is, if investors with 
high marginal tax brackets hold low dividend yield stocks, then those stocks should have 
,x 
Values, reflecting the tax bracket of their median shareholder. Elton and relatively small DOR, 
Gruber's (1970) controversial finding that on ex-dividend days share prices decline less than the 
value of their dividends, suggests that marginal investors may face higher tax rates on dividends 
than on capital gains. In order to test whether marginal investors in Europe face higher dividend 
taxes than capital gains taxes I calculated the tax discrimination variable in each country under 
consideration and I appoint an event-study methodology in the next section in order to observe the 
ex-dividend day behaviour of stock returns in each country. 
IIyroTitrsIs: If taxation effects drive the ex-dividend share price behaviour then in 
countries where dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, ex-dividend day 
returns will be higher. 
and methodologies used as well as to the fact that the above studies focus on stocks listed on different US stock 
exchanges. 
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Ex-dividend day returns are also expected to change with tax reforms that affect the tax 
discrimination variable. For example, before FA1997, tax-exempt investors were entitled to a full 
refund of the tax credits attached to dividends. This feature, which was uncommon among other 
countries operating imputation credits, resulted in tax-exempt investors having a strong preference 
for dividend distribu i6ns (with the associated tax credit) over retaining profits within the 
company (which enerated no tax credits for the shareholders). Considering that tax-exempt 
investors cons itute the largest investor class in the UK I would expect firstly, higher abnormal 
returns on the ex-dividend day in the UK before the reform; and secondly, in comparison with 
other countries abnormal returns are expected to be higher in the UK, before FA1997. If this 
hypothesis is correct, results are expected to be reversed after the 1997 FA in the UK. Similarly, 
the tax reforms in other countries reviewed in Chapter 2 are all expected to have significant 
impact on the ex-dividend day returns. These predictions are tested directly in the present chapter. 
The issues I investigate in this part of my study are of central importance to corporate finance and 
asset pricing. It is important to understand the degree to which investor taxes and transaction costs 
are impounded into share prices, which in turn can affect security returns, the cost of capital, 
capital structure, investment spending and governmental revenue collection. The long existing 
and contradictive theoretical and empirical evidence around the issue of dividend taxation that the 
literature has to offer, motivate this study. To the best of my knowledge the study will contribute 
to the literature because of its country- comparative nature and will provide an understanding of 
the dividend taxation systems in European countries. The study can be proved useful to both 
European investors (and International investors) and to policymakers (managers who set the 
dividend policy as well officials who consider taxation systems) as dividend taxation is a matter 
of considerable importance. Moreover, the simultaneous examination of different major taxation 
reforms in different countries has not been previously provided in the literature, and this would 
offer a further understanding of the dividend taxation and share price behaviour as predictions of 
the theories developed would be tested through time (before and after taxation systems). 
3 
.4 DATA AND 
METHODOLOGY 
Data for the purpose of testing my hypotheses is drawn from DataStream, an online Database to 
cover all listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE), the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(DAX), the Paris Stock Exchange (CAC) and the Milan Stock Exchange (MIBTEL) for the period 
August 1987 to August 2002. The database covers a longer period time-series data, however the 
period of my study has been limited due to a large number of missing observations before 1987 
especially for French and Italian companies. Changes through the years of study in the Listing of 
the companies are taken into consideration. Data obtained consists of dividend distributions, ex- 
dividend dates, share prices, and market indices. The sample selected had to meet three 
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requirements. Firstly, in order to avoid the problem of confounding effects of other various 
announcements firstly raised by Miller and Scholes (1982) any firms that had any other specific 
earnings, stock splits, or rights issues announcements, within a period of twenty days either before 
or after the ex-dividend day were excluded. Secondly, following Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1993) in order to avoid problems with "thinly" traded securities; events for which one or more 
prices were missing were omitted. Therefore, the companies with no continuous daily price 
quotation on the Stock Exchanges or with discontinuous accounting data were omitted. Thirdly, 
foreign companies and companies which do not have their major activities in the countries under 
consideration were also omitted in order to avoid non-linearity with the country Share Index as 
well as special treatment on dividends (which is beyond the scope of my study). My final sample 
contains a total of 10085 observations for the UK, 3516 for France, 2910 for Germany and 1237 
for Italy, a pooled sample of 17,748 observations. These observations are relatively evenly 
distributed across years and cover all industries and firm sizes. 
The study employs the Brown and Warner (1985) event study27 methodologies. I use the market 
model to compute the abnormal returns over the event window [-40, +40] days relative to the ex- 
dividend day. To obtain the market coefficients, security returns are regressed against the 
corresponding market index in each country over the period [-290, 
-41] trading days relative to 
the ex-dividend date. The market index is taken as the index that combines small as well as large 
firms. For example, I use the Financial Times All Share Index in the UK. A minimum of 40 non- 
missing observations is required for the market model. I test the robustness of my results using 
various alternative event study specifications. In particular, I use the Dimson (1979) model and 
Scholes and Williams (1977) specifications to account for non-synchronimous trading, and the 
adjusted market model (beta=l). I also obtain results based on the mean adjusted returns to 
overcome any potential problems that might arise from the market model. To test for the 
sensitivity of my results to the event study methodology, I compute the drop-off ratio and the raw 
returns. I also compute the adjusted drop-off ratio by multiplying the price cum-dividend by one 
plus the expected return, defined from the market model. 
To test for potential effects of short-term trading, I relate my computed ex-day returns to the 
corresponding bid-ask spreads. I use this measure as a proxy for transaction cost effects. 
DataStream provides the posted rather than the effective bid and ask prices. Patersen and 
Fialkowski (1994) argue that, on the NYSE, when trades are executed inside the posted bid-ask 
spread, the posted spread is not an accurate measure of transaction costs faced by investors. 
However, in the European markets posted spreads are likely to be closer to the effective spreads 
27 See Brown and Warner (1980,1985) and MacKinlay (1997) 
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because, unlike the NYSE, large trades are not negotiated upstairs but brought directly to the 
market makers and filled immediately. Moreover, market makers have to display firm bid and ask 
prices for no less than the minimum marketable quantity28 (MMQ) and, unlike, for example in the 
NASDAQ where market makers may "back away" from trading at posted prices, they are obliged 
to buy and sell up to that quantity at their quoted prices. Furthermore, unlike the retail oriented 
NASDAQ market, over 60 percent of the trading on European markets is done by institutions that 
demand immediacy. Empirical evidence shows that even in the UK transactions are commonly 
made in other markets such as the London Stock Exchange within the spread and that dealers 
offer systematic discounts from posted prices on medium to large trades (e. g. Schwartz, (1991) 
and Reiss and Warner, (1994)). Thus if trading activity increases around the ex-dividend day, the 
posted bid and ask prices are not likely to reflect the effective transaction costs but only data on 
the observed bid and ask prices is available. I, therefore, compute the bid-ask spread on the ex- 
day, BASCX,, rather than the average over a specified period, as in, e. g., Karpoff and Walking 
(1990) as follows: 
BASex = 
ASKCX 
- 
B1Dex 
(ASKCx + BIDex) /2 
(7) 
where, ASKex and BIDex are the ex-day bid and ask prices respectively. 29 1 expect short-term 
traders to capture dividends of high-yield-low-bid-ask spread shares. If short-term traders capture 
dividends of these shares, then their abnormal returns should be positive (negative) before (after) 
the ex-days. 
3.5 EMPIRICAL RES LTS 
3.5.1 COUNTRY ANALYSIS OF EX-DivTDFND DAY Mimi 
Table 3.1, Panel A reports the abnormal returns (ARs) based on the market model. On day zero 
the abnormal returns are all positive and significant suggesting that ex-dividend day prices 
decrease by less than the amount of the dividend in each country. The highest ex-day returns 
appear to be in France with 1.29 percent (t = 4.97), followed by Italy with 0.79 percent (t = 3.95) 
and UK 0.75 percent (t = 3.56) and, finally, Germany with 0.57 percent (t = 2.57). These results 
are consistent with previous studies. For example, Lasfer (1995) and Bell and Jenkinson 
(2002) show that ex-day prices decrease by significantly less than the amount of 
28 The minimum marketable quantity, referred to as the Normal Market Size (NMS), is a dealing size set by the 
exchange's council at about the median transaction size. 
29 An alternative measure for transaction costs is trading volume. Trading volume is shown to be negatively related to 
transaction costs (Loeb (1983)) and this proxy was widely used in past research (e. g. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) 
and Fedenia and Grammatikos (1991)). However, data on this variabe is not available for many companies and for other 
countries other than the UK. 
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dividend in the UK while Harris et al (1998) show that the imputation credit in Germany is 
capitalized in share prices. The results are also consistent with the US studies (e. g. Eades et al 
(1984)) and reject the hypothesis of non-excess returns on the ex-dividend dates and counter the 
argument that shareholders are indifferent to the differential taxation of dividends and capital 
gains (e. g. Miller and Scholes (1978)). Interestingly, in five days before and five days after the ex- 
dividend dates, none of the abnormal returns are statistically significant. 
In Table 3.1, Panel B, I test for robustness of these results using alternative event study 
methodologies. The results based on the raw returns, the adjusted market model (with beta equal 
to 1 and alpha equal to zero), the mean adjusted returns and the Scholls and Williams and Dimson 
specifications all show that ex-day returns are positive and significant. These results provide an 
early indication that the differential taxation between dividends and capital gains is the main 
driver of the ex-dividend day returns. 
Furthermore, I investigate the tax hypothesis by analyzing the behavior of share prices around the 
ex-dividend days. Figures 3.1 to Figure 3.4 report the abnormal returns and the cumulative 
abnormal returns over the period [-20, +20] days for each of the countries in my sample. As 
documented in Table 3.1, all the figures show positive abnormal returns on the ex-dividend dates. 
However, in all markets there seem to be a positive trend in share prices before the ex-dividend 
dates and a downward trend in the post-ex-dividend dates. Figure 3.1 reports the results for the 
UK market. There is no major change in returns before day 
-10, but then returns increase about 
0.4 percent up to day 
-1. In the post ex-dividend dates share prices appear to fall. I test whether 
this abnormal performance in the pre- and post- ex-dividend dates is significant by analyzing the 
CARs around the ex-dates. The results reported in Table 3.2 indicate that none of the CARs in the 
pre- and post- event dates is significant despite being mainly positive in the pre-event and 
negative in the post-event dates. For example, over the period [-40, 
-1] the CARs in the UK 
amount to 0.32 percent (t = 0.24) and in the post-event period [+1, +40] they are 
-1.398 percent (t 
= 
-1.05). These results are relatively the same across different cumulation periods and are 
consistent with previous UK evidence (e. g. Lasfer, 1995) but do not provide support to US studies 
(e. g. Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986, Michaely, 1991) where the significant abnormal returns 
are not solely confined to the ex-dividend dates. Therefore, the results suggest that ex-dividend 
day returns in the UK are likely to be driven by tax differentials between dividends and capital 
gains and not by short-term traders. 
In contrast, in Germany, ex-day returns in the pre- and post- event periods are not randomly 
distributed. Figure 3.2 shows a significant increase in the abnormal returns in the pre-event 
period and then a decrease in the post-event period. Table 3.2 reports the magnitude of the CARs 
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over different cumulating periods and their respective t-statistics. Over the periods [-20, 
-1] and [- 
5, 
-1] the CARs are not statistically significant. However, CARs. 40,., are positive and significant 
and in the post-event periods the CARs are all negative and significant. In particular, over the 
periods [-40, 
-1], and [+1, +40] the CARs are 3.30 percent (t = 2.37) and -2.75 percent (t = -1.981, 
respectively. These results indicate that in Germany dividend capture is predominant and that ex- 
day returns may not reflect solely the tax differential between dividends and capital gains. 
Moreover, these results, suggest that investors buy shares in the pre-event period and sell their 
shares after the ex-dividend day in order to capture the dividend. These investors are likely to be 
corporate and individual non-residents who transfer their shares to German residents who are 
entitled to the dividend and tax credits. 30 Since in Germany dividend stripping is legal, such 
transfer creates positive excess returns in the pre-event period and negative returns in the post- 
event period. The results are consistent with McDonald (2001) who finds evidence of tax 
motivated trading around the ex-dividend day. 
The results for the French market reported in Figure 3.3 mimic those of the UK (Figure 1). There 
is a slight increase in the abnormal returns over the period 
-10 to -1 and in the post-ex-dividend 
dates, the abnormal returns appear to drift down. However, Table 3.2 shows that none of the 
abnormal returns are significantly different from zero in the pre- and post-event dates. Over the 
period [-40, 
-1] share prices increase by 0.72 percent (t = 0.44) and fell by -1.84 percent (t =- 
1.12) over the period [+1, +40]. Thus, despite being a legal practice, dividend capture is not 
common in France and, thus, ex-day returns may only reflect the tax differential between 
dividends and capital gains. These results are consistent with Romon (2000) who shows that ex- 
prices in France decrease significantly by less than the amount of the dividend. 
Figure 3.4 reports the results for Italy. The abnormal returns appear to be non-random in the pre- 
and post- event period. They increase by about 0.6 percent in the period [-20, 
-1] and then 
decrease from about 1.2 percent on day +1 to 0,2 percent on day +20. However, Table 3.2 
indicates that the CARs are only statistically significant in the period [+1, +40]. To the extent that 
the negative abnormal performance in the post-event dates reflects the selling pressure of short- 
traders, or results provide support to Michaely and Murgia (1995) ex-dividend excess returns in 
Italy might be due to high transaction costs. However, this activity does not seem to dominate as 
the pre- and post-ex-day abnormal returns are not all significant despite the fact that dividend 
capture is allowed in Italy. Therefore, the results are likely to reflect the tax discrimination 
between dividends and capital gains and do not provide support to Michaely and Murgia (1995) 
30 See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2 for a full discussion on the treatment of dividends when investors are corporations or 
non-German residents. Moreover, Table 2.2 shows the shareholder structure in Europe and indicates that these two 
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who, despite finding some of the ex-day pricing is tax motivated, conclude that taxes do not 
explain fully the ex-dividend price drop. 
classes of investors hold an important share of the German market: corporations hold 39 percent and foreign investors 
hold 12 percent of the market. 
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Figure 3.2: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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Figure 3.3: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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3.5.2 COMPARATIVE, ANALYSIS OF EX-DIVIDFM) DAY RETURNS ACROSS 
.0 1NTRIIES 
In this section I compare the returns on the ex-dividend dates and around event dates across the 
countries in my sample. I test the hypothesis stipulated above that the differences in ex-day 
returns across countries are related to the differences across these countries in the tax 
discrimination variable. Table 3.3, duplicates results from Chapter 2, and provides a summary of 
the tax differential differences across the countries in my sample. On average, if ex-day returns 
are set by higher taxpayers, then ex-day returns should be higher in Germany and France to the 
remaining countries. In contrast, if ex-day share prices are set by tax exempt investors and/or 
basic taxpayers, then ex-day returns should be higher in Italy when share prices should fall by the 
amount of the dividend compared to other countries where share prices should fall by more than 
the amount of the dividend. 
Table 3.4 provides a comparison of the ex-dividend dates abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs_20, 
.1 and CARs+i, +20) between the four countries under consideration. 
The results provided in the first three columns of the Table show that ex-day returns in France are 
significantly higher than other countries. In particular, the ex-day abnormal returns in France are 
higher by 0.54 percent (t = 2.64) than the UK, 0.72 percent (t = 3.48) than Germany and 0.49 
percent (t = 2.29) in Italy. The ex-day returns in Italy are statistically the same (t = 0.42) as 
compared to the UK. Finally, results suggest that in Germany ex-day returns are low and they are 
likely to under-estimate the tax differential between dividends and capital gains. 
The remaining columns of Table 3.4 show the differences across countries in the pre- and post- 
event abnormal returns. The results show that Germany has statistically higher abnormal returns 
in the pre-event period and lower abnormal returns in the post-event period than the UK, France 
and Italy. For example, compared to the UK, the abnormal returns over the [-20, 
-1] period are 
0.91 percent (t = 5.25), but lower in the post event period [+1, +20] (difference in the means of 
1.225 percent, t=6.53). In the post-event period, the abnormal returns in the UK are also 
statistically lower than those in France and Italy, suggesting that the UK short-term traders are not 
likely to capture dividends. 
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TABLE 3.3: TII 
. 
TAX DISCRIMINATION VA IA LE 
The tax discrimination variable is the ratio of the after-income tax on dividends over the after-tax 
capital gains assuming that 1 unit of dividends generates 1 unit of capital gains if reinvested in the 
company. The standard rate of capital gains is assumed to be equal to the effective rate. 
DATES HIGHER 
TAX BASIC TAX 
PAYER PAYER 
TAX-EXEMIPT 
P ANEI, A: TIW T JK SYSTEM 
F 
6 Apr 88 
- 
31 Mar 94 1.333 1.333 1.333 
1 Apr 94 
-1 Jul 97 1.250 1.250 1.250 
2 Jul 97 
-5 Apr 99 1.250 1.250 1,000 
4 6Apr99- 31 Dec 02 1.125 1.000 1.000 
PA 
. 
i. B. 1: GERMAN SYST ý. M ASSETS QUALM y FOR QAPITAi. G AINS TAX I! XEb (Qý 
1 1 Jan 88 
- 
31 Dec 90 0.500 0.886 1.136 
2 1 Jan 91 
- 
31 Dec 93 0.508 0.875 1.080 
3 1 Jan 94 
-1 Oct 98 0.496 0.854 1.054 
4 1 Nov 98 
- 
31 Dec 02 0.548 0.864 1.167 
PANEL B. 2: GERMA N SYSTEM SH ORT 
- 
TE M IIOLI MI P' 1QI2 
1 1 Jan 88 
- 
31 Dec 90 1.136 1.136 1.136 
2 1 Jan 91 
- 
31 Dec 93 1.080 1.080 1.080 
3 1 Jan 94 
-1 Oct 98 1.055 1.055 1.054 
4 1 Nov 98 
- 
31 Dec 02 1.166 1.166 1.167 
1 
F 
1 Jan 88 
- 
31 Dec 92 
RENCH SYSTEM 
0.674 
(BASI 
.I AT ,. IS 35 
1.014 
%) 
1.250 
2 1 Jan 93 
-1 Oct 97 0.899 1.352 1.667 
3 1 Nov 97 
- 
31 Dec 98 0.957 1.352 1.667 
4 1 Jan 99 
- 
31 Dec 02 1.667 1.896 1.667 
PANEL D. ITAL 
HIGHER 
IAN SYSTEM 
BASIC (36%) LOWER TAX - 
Enmirr 
1 1 Jan 88 
- 
31 Mar 91 1.463 1.092 1.092 1.000 
2 1 Apr 91 
- 
30 Jun 95 0.956 0.976 1.311 1.000 
3 1 Jul 95 
- 
31 Jan 99 0.941 0.941 1.284 1.000 
4 1 Feb 99 
- 
31 Dec 02 1.407 1.275 1.563 1.000 
119 
M Ir 
u ö. 
mü 
<'d y° L 
.b 
cc 
'r5 
'4i 
ýý 
b 
im 
. ýo 
II 
u 
ö 
Gi 
üg 
b 
it 
aý u 
00 W) 
- 
öN Q O 
e3 VW »" 
00 
" 
ý ýN [V 
d 6z, ý" Q`' 
er 
ºM 
n 
4Q öý QQ 
0° "o M O R 
N 
W Q 
.ý 
N N 
N cV 't C-j 
N 
0 0
W Ö 
0 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 3 
3.5.3 IMPACT OF MAJOR TAXATION CHANGES ON Ex-DlvlnrNn DAYR 7TURNS 
The present part of the study analyses the behavior of share prices around the ex-dividend day 
both before and after major taxation reforms in each country under consideration in order to 
further test the impact of taxation on the share prices around the event day. The ratio of the ex- 
dividend day price drop to the amount of the dividend is expected to reflect the relative taxation of 
dividends and capital gains of the clientele investor. Support of this argument would require a 
rejection of the null hypothesis31 IIo: ARBTR ! 5ARATR in favor of the alternative III: 
ARBTR=ARATR whenever taxation reforms affect the investors' tax discrimination variable. 
Table 3.3 shows the changes on the investors' tax discrimination variable in each country under 
consideration both before and after major tax reforms. To examine the effect of taxation reforms 
on the ex-dividend day share price behavior the study period was divided into sub periods, before 
and after major tax reforms and the differences in the AR and CAR behavior between the sub- 
periods was derived. The t-statistics report the significance level of the mean differences between 
the pre- and post- tax reform periods around the ex-dividend days. 
Table 3.5 reports the distribution of the abnormal returns by tax period. For the UK the ex- 
dividend date abnormal returns are all positive and significant. However, their magnitude is not 
constant. They increase monotonically form 0.37 percent in the first period (1988 to March 1994), 
to 0.70 percent in the second period (April 1994 to July 1997). Then as the tax credit is eliminated 
to pension funds, ex-day returns increased to 0.95 percent and to 1.17 percent in the last period 
when the tax credit is eliminated to all investors. In Panel B, I report the t-statistics of the 
differences in means between the tax periods. The average abnormal returns in the first period are 
statistically lower than the ex-day returns in the remaining period. As shown in Table 3.3, the tax 
discrimination variable of all investors in the first period is higher than the remaining periods 
because of the high rate of the dividend tax credit. When the tax credit was cut in 1994 from 25 
percent to 20 percent, ex-day returns increased from 0.37 percent to 0.70 percent. They then 
increased to 0.95 percent when the tax credit was eliminated to pension funds in July 1997 and to 
1.169 percent when it was cut for the remaining investors to only 10 percent. However, the 
difference in the mean ex-day abnormal returns between the last two periods is not statistically 
significant, suggesting that the marginal investors that set the ex-day returns continue to be 
pension funds. These results suggest that the UK tax reforms that altered the tax differential 
between dividends and capital gains, had a significant impact on the ex-dividend day pricing. 
Table 3.5 also reports the behavior of share prices in the twenty days before and after the ex- 
dividend dates. I test the hypothesis that following the increase in the overall tax of dividends, ex 
121 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 3 
day returns will increase and this will attract short-term traders. The second and third columns of 
Table 3.5 show that over the different tax periods, the pre-ex-day returns and the post-ex-day 
returns are negative suggesting that investors may be buying shares before and selling them after 
the ex-dividend dates. Although the results indicate that the magnitude of the pre- and post-ex-day 
cumulative abnormal returns has increased over the 4 periods, none of the abnormal returns is 
significant to indicate that the buying and selling pressure affected the returns. 
In Germany, ex-day returns are not statistically significant in the first period (1988 to December 
1990) and they become positive and significant but remain relatively constant in the remaining 
periods. Panel B indicates that the abnormal returns in the first period are statistically lower than 
the remaining periods. The trend in the abnormal returns over the first three taxation periods is 
likely to be consistent with the impact of the tax changes on the tax discrimination variable 
described in Table 3.3. However, if taxation was the sole determinant of ex-dividend day returns, 
one would expect a decrease in the ex-day returns in the fourth period (November 1998 to August 
2002) as the tax discrimination increased for all investors. I also expect ex-dividend day returns in 
Germany to be significantly higher than those in the UK to reflect the tax discrimination 
differences reported in Table 3.3. For example, in the fourth period ex-day returns in the UK are 
1.17 percent compared to 0.74 percent in Germany (t = 2.69). However, these low abnormal 
returns in Germany are likely to be depressed by short-term traders. As reported in the fifth and 
sixth column of Table 3.5 CARs. 20, 
., 
are positive but not significant and the CARs+1, +20 are 
negative and most of them are significant. 
In France, ex-day returns have decreased significantly over the three periods form 2.61 percent (t 
= 
10.07) in 1988-1992 to 
-0.11 (t = -0.43) in the last period. These results reflect the increase in 
the tax discrimination variable documented in Table 3.3. For example, for high taxpayers, the tax 
discrimination variable increased from 0.67 percent in the first period (1988 to December 1992), 
to 1.67 percent in the last period implying that the tax cost of dividends has decreased. As a result, 
ex-day prices appear to fall by the amount of the dividend. Although the CARs are positive in the 
pre- and negative in the post-event period, they do not show strong evidence to support significant 
trading to capture dividends, particularly in the first two periods when ex-day returns are large. 
Finally, in Italy, ex-day returns increased from 0.35 percent in the first period (1988 to March 
1991) to 1.08 percent in the second period (April 1991 to June 1995). Afterwards, there is a 
decrease to 0.54 percent, in the third period (July 1995 to January 1999) before rising to 1.37 
percent in the final period (February 2000 to August 2002). 
31 Where ARB, R and ARATR are AR Before and After Taxation Reforms respectively 
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These results are not consistent with the changes in the tax discrimination variable in Table 3.3 
which predict that ex-day returns should be low in the first and last period and relatively the same 
in the remaining two periods in non-tax exempt investors determine ex-dividend day returns. The 
pre- and post-ex-day returns are not statistically significant, suggesting that short-term trading 
activity is not likely to prevail in Italy. 
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3.5.4 TIIF DISTRIBUTION OF EX-DAY RETURNS BY YIELD AND BID-Ash SPREA1 
Table 3.6 reports the distribution of ex-day returns by dividend yield and tax periods. The sample 
firms are first classified into their respective tax periods and then ranked according to their 
dividend yield computed as the ratio of the total dividend for the year over the price cum- 
dividends. In general, the dividend yield effect in the UK is clear and its absence in Germany also. 
This is strong evidence of different motivations in the two countries. Panel A shows the results 
for the UK. Ex-dividend day returns increase monotonically across the dividend yield quintiles in 
each tax period. In the first period, the ex-day returns are negative for the first four dividend yield 
quintiles. In the second two periods, ex-day returns are not statistically different from zero. I also 
note that for the first four dividend yield quintiles, the ex-day abnormal returns are increasing 
across the tax periods. In contrast, for the highest dividend yield quintile, ex-day returns have 
decreased from 4.95 percent (median 3.49 percent) in the first period to 1.47 percent (median 1.14 
percent) in the last period. 
Panel B reports the results for Germany. Ex-dividend day returns do not follow a homogeneous 
pattern of behaviour across tax periods. Abnormal returns in the first and third dividend yield 
quintiles increase monotonically across taxation periods. However, in the second and fourth 
dividend yield quintiles, abnormal returns increase in the first two taxation periods, decrease in 
period 3 and then increase again in the last taxation period. In the high-dividend yield quintile, 
abnormal returns increase across the first three taxation periods, while there is a decrease in 
period 4. Similarly, within dividend yield quintiles the ex-dividend abnormal returns do not 
appear to follow a homogeneous pattern of behaviour. In the first taxation period, ex-dividend day 
abnormal returns in the third dividend yield equal to 0.59 percent (t = 2.69), however, abnormal 
returns in any other dividend yield quintile are not significant. In the second taxation period, 
abnormal returns are significant and increase across dividend-yield quintiles. However, high 
dividend-yield abnormal returns decrease to 0.54 percent (t = 2.47) from 0.95 percent (t = 4.33) in 
the fourth quintile. In the third taxation period, there is evidence of taxation effect, as abnormal 
returns increase across the dividend yield quintiles. Finally, period 4, ex-day abnormal returns in 
the second dividend-yield quintile equal to 0.45 percent (t = 2.03), increase to 1.26 percent (t = 
5.73) in the fourth yield quintile, but decrease again to 0.53 percent (t = 2.39) in the high 
dividend-yield quintile. 
Panel C reports the results for France. Across all taxation periods, ex-dividend day abnormal 
returns in the low dividend yield quintile are negative and insignificant. In the other dividend 
yield quintiles abnormal returns are significantly negative, except in the high dividend yield 
quintile where there is a significantly positive ex-day share price reaction. In the first taxation 
period, abnormal returns follow a decreasing pattern of behaviour in the first four dividend yield 
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quintiles. In the high dividend yield quintile abnormal returns increase to 2.94 percent (t = 
9.83). In the remaining taxation periods, abnormal returns follow a homogeneous pattern of 
behaviour across the dividend yield quintiles. There is a decreasing patter of share price behaviour 
in the first three dividend yield quintiles. This behaviour is reversed thereafter, as in the fourth 
dividend yield quintile there is an increase in abnormal returns, while in the high dividend yield 
quintiles, abnormal returns are significantly positive. 
Panel D reports the results for Italy. Across taxation periods, abnormal returns do not follow a 
homogeneous behaviour. For example, in the low dividend yield quintile, abnormal returns 
increase in period 2 to 0.42 percent (t = 2.11), decrease in period 3 to 
-2.05 percent (t = -10.22) 
while in period 4 there is no significant ex-dividend day share price reaction. In the high dividend 
yield quintile, abnormal returns are not significant in period 1, increase to 0.70 percent (t = 3.30) 
in period 2, further increase to 1.81 percent (t = 9.04) in period 3, while in period 4 there is a 
decrease to 1.23 percent (t = 6.12). In the taxation periods I and 2, abnormal returns increase in 
the first three dividend yield quintiles, while in the fourth and high dividend yield quintiles there 
is decreasing share price behaviour. In taxation period 3, there is evidence of ex-dividend day 
taxation effects, as abnormal returns are positively related in the dividend yield. In taxation period 
4, abnormal returns decrease in the third dividend yield quintile, to 0.85 percent (t = 4.26), but 
follow an increasing patter of behaviour thereafter. High dividend yield companies experience 
significantly positive abnormal returns equal to 1.23 percent (t = 6.12). 
In Table 3.7 I test further the tax hypothesis by relating the ex-dividend day returns to commonly 
used measures of transaction costs. Following Karpoff and Walking (1996) and Lasfer (1995) I 
use bid-ask spread as a measure of transaction costs and expect short-term trading to occur mainly 
in high-yield low-bid-ask spread companies. For these companies abnormal returns are expected 
to be not significant on the ex-dividend day, significantly positive in the pre-event period and 
significantly negative in the post-event period. According to the short-term hypothesis, the buying 
(selling) pressure of short-term traders results in positive (negative) share price reaction in the 
pre- (post-) ex-day periods. For these companies, ex-day returns will not reflect the tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains bur rather the level of transaction costs incurred 
by short-term traders. 
In the UK there is no evidence to support any dividend capturing activity around the ex-dividend 
day. The low-yield-high-bid-ask spread companies' abnormal returns equal to 
-0.56 percent (t = 
2.67) on the ex-dividend day. However, the significance of the ex-day abnormal returns and the 
insignificantly positive (negative) share price behaviour in the pre- (post-) event do not provide 
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any support for the short-term hypothesis. Also in the second, third and fourth dividend yield 
quintiles, abnormal returns are significantly positive on the ex-dividend day, but insignificant in 
the days surrounding the event across all bid-ask spread quintiles. High-dividend yield companies 
earn significant ex-day returns, and insignificant returns in the periods surrounding the event 
which provide evidence inconsistent with the short-term trading activity. 
In Germany, results provide mixed evidence. Low-dividend-yield-high-bid-ask-spread companies 
earn significant abnormal returns on the ex-dividend day equal to 0.69 percent (t = 3.14), returns 
are not significant during the days 
-20 to -1, while during the days +1 to +20 abnormal returns 
equal to 
-1.97 percent (t = -2.00). In the second dividend yield quintile, abnormal returns for the 
high bid-ask spread companies equal to 0.53 percent (t = 2.41) on the event date, 2.16 percent (t = 
2.20) in the period [-20, 
-1] days and -2.06 percent (t = -2.09) in the period [+1, +20] days. In the 
third and fourth dividend yield quintile, abnormal returns appear to be positive and significant on 
the ex-dividend day, insignificant in the pre-event period, but negatively significant in the post- 
event period. Similarly, in the high dividend yield quintile, low bid-ask spread companies 
experience positive abnormal returns equal to 1.18 percent (t = 5.38) on the event day, but in the 
days surrounding the event abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero. Ex-dividend 
day abnormal returns for high bid-ask spread companies equal to 0.54 percent (t = 2.45), returns 
in the pre-event period equal to 1.38 percent but they are not statistically significant (t = 1.41) and 
in the post-event period abnormal returns are statistically negative (CARs+j. +zo equal to -2.68 
percent, t= 
-2.72). This behaviour might be attributed to the activity of the foreign investors (who 
are not entitled to any tax credit) to transfer their shares to German investors in order to observe 
the tax credit attached to their dividends. These results further support my earlier conclusions 
(Section 3.5.1) and McDonald (2001) who finds evidence of tax motivated trading around the ex- 
dividend day. 
In France, evidence is more consistent with the taxation effect hypothesis than the short-term 
trading hypothesis. Low-yield-low-bid-ask spread companies experience positive abnormal 
returns equal to 2.00 percent (t = 7.69) on the ex-dividend day, in the days 
-20 to -1 there is no 
significant share price reaction and in the days +1 to +20 cumulative abnormal returns equal to 
- 
3.27 percent (t = 
-2.82). Low-yield-high-bid-ask-spread companies do not experience any 
significant share price reaction either on, before or after the ex-dividend day. In the second, third 
and forth dividend yield quintiles, there is generally significantly positive share price reaction on 
the ex-dividend day. In the pre- (post-) event periods companies across all dividend-yield-bid-ask- 
spread quintiles experience insignificantly positive (negative) abnormal returns. High yield 
quintile, low bid-ask spread companies earn insignificantly positive abnormal returns (equal to 
0.19 percent, t=0.72) on the ex-dividend day and significantly positive returns during days 
-20 
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to 
-1 (equal to 2.75 percent, t=2.37), which indicates consistency with the dividend 
capturing activity and the buying pressure of short-term traders. However, the insignificantly 
negative abnormal returns in the post-event period do not allow any support for the short-term 
trading activity hypothesis. This conclusion is further reinforced by the significance of the ex- 
dividend day abnormal returns, and the insignificant pre- and post- event share price reaction in 
the high-dividend-yield-high-bid-ask-spread quintiles. 
In Italy, the share price behavior around the ex-dividend day also provides evidence for the 
taxation effect hypothesis. Low-dividend-yield-high-bid-ask spread companies earn significantly 
negative abnormal returns on the ex-dividend day as well as in the pre- and post-event periods. 
High bid-ask spread companies earn insignificantly positive abnormal ex-dividend day returns. 
Returns in the days before and after the event are also insignificant. The ex-dividend day share 
price behavior in all the other dividend yield quintiles is positive and significant. In the high 
dividend yield quintile, low bid-ask spread companies experience positive abnormal returns on 
the ex-dividend day, equal to 0.54 percent (t = 2.69) and the pre-event period (ARs equal to 1.49 
percent, t=1.66) but in the post-event period abnormal returns do not appear to be statistically 
different from zero. High-high-dividend-yield-low-bid-ask-spread companies earn significantly 
positive abnormal returns in the days 
-20 to -1 equal to 1.81 percent (t = 2.02) and negative 
abnormal returns during the days +1 to +20 equal to 
-2.16 percent (t = 2.42). However, the 
significance of the ex-dividend day abnormal returns (0.96 percent, t=4.79) do not provide 
support for the short-term hypothesis in Italy. 
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The abnormal returns are based on the Market Model with the coefficients calculated by regressing the security returns against the main index of in each country using . 290 
to 
-41 trading days relative to the ex-day. The Dividend Yield (DY) is calculated as the [Annual DPS/Po ] where DPS is the Dividend Per Share, on the Ex-Dividend Day 
ARs and CARs. Taxation periods reflect the periods before and after major taxation changes; In the UK, Period 1: April 1988 to March 1994 (N= 3540), Period 2: I April 
1994 to 6 July 1997 (N= 2321), Period 3: 7 July 1997 to 5 April 1999 (N = 1448), and Period 4: 6 April 1999 to August 2002 (N = 2776); In Germany, Period I: January 
1988 to December 1990 (N = 351), Period 2: January 1991 to December 1993 (N = 592), Period 3: January 1994 to October 1998 (N = 964), and Period 4: November 1998 
to August 2002 (N = 1002); In France, Period 1: January1988 to December 1992 (N = 469), Period 2: January 1993 to October 1997 (N = 1297), Period 3: November 1997 
to December 1998 (N = 353), and Period 4: January 1999 to August 2002 (N = 1397); In Italy Period 1: January 1988 to March 1991 (N = 211), Period 2: April 1991 to 
June 1995 (N = 314), Period 3: July 1995 to January 1999 (N = 270), and Period 4: February 1999 to August 2002 (N = 441). The firms in the sample are split into equal 
number of observations to form the dividend yield quintiles. T-statistics is reported in the parenthesis; '** ", * Significant at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
DY QUINTILES PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 PH RIoD 3 PERIOD 4
PANEL A. UK 
-1.198""" -0.210 -0.130 0.789""" 1- Low (-5.70) (-1.00) (-0.62) (3.75) 
-0.660 0.371 0.856 1.491 2 (-3.14) (1.77) (4.07) (7.10) 
-0.810""" 0.442"" 0.852""" 0.940"'" 3 (-3.85) (2.10) (4.05) (4.47) 
-0.440 0.542 0.952 1.156- 4 (-2.09) (2.58) (4.53) (5.50) 
... 4.947 2.361" 2.217" 1.470" 
5- High (23.54) (11.24) (10.55) (7.00) 
PANEL B. GERMANY 
1- Low -0.496"" -0.249 0.092 0.565""' (-2.25) (-1.13) (0.419) 2. 
0.279 0.656""" 0.319 0.447"" 2 (1.27) (2.98) (1.46) (2.03) 
0.592"" 3 0.665""" 0.703'"" 1.090""" (2.69) (3.02) 1 (4.96) 
4 0.172 0.951*** 0.887""` 1.259"'" 0.78 (4.33) (4.03) 
5- High 0.252 0.543""' 0.819""" 0.527'"" (1.14) (2.47) (3.72) (2.39) 
PANEL C. FRANCE 
1- Low 0.186 -0.207 0.064 -0.290 (0.72) (-0.80) (0.25) (-1.12) 
524"" 
-0 -0.378 -0 635"" -0.683""" 2 . (-2.02) (-1.46) . (-2.44) (-2.63) 
-1.118""" 3 -1.292""" -1.439""" -2.129""" (-4.30) (-4.97) (-5.54) 
-1.581""" 4 -1.286""" -1.018**' -1.554"'" (-6.08) 
-4.95 (-3.92) 
2.944""" 5-High 3.284"'" 4.059""" 4.336""" (9.83) (5.13) (5.12) (6.69) 
PANEL D. ITALY 
1- Low 0.331" 0.422'" -2.046""" 0.141 (1.65) (2.105) 
-10.22 (0.70) 
2 1.626""" 0.938""" 0.649""" 1.299""" (8.12) (4.68) (3.24) (6.48) 
3 1.739""" 2.261""" 0.913'"" 0.854""" (8.68) (11.29) (4.56) (4.26) 
4 1.231'"" 0.949""" 1.477'" 0.941"'" (6.15) (4.74) (4.69) 
5-High 0.212 0.669 1.810" 1.227`"' (1.06) 3.30 (9.04) 6.12 
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3.5.5 RmRFissioN RF-SLUM 
Table 3.8 Panel A reports the regression results of ex-day abnormal returns against dividend 
yield (DY), size [ln(MV)] and bid-ask spread (bid-ask). If ex-day prices are affected by taxes, 
then ex-day returns should be related to dividend yield weighted by the tax differential of 
dividends to capital gains. If, on the other hand, short-term traders capture dividends, then ex-day 
returns should reflect the level of transaction costs incurred by these traders. Transaction costs 
data is not available in machine-readable form. I use two proxy variables for the level of 
transaction costs. First, Stoll and Whaley (1983) argue that transaction costs are inversely related 
to firm size as measured by its market value. Following Karpoff and Walking (1988), I use the 
firm's market value as a proxy for transaction costs. Secondly, I use the bid-ask spread. As argued 
above, the bid-ask spread is the posted not the actual. Thus, this variable may not be a direct 
measure of transaction costs. 
The strong and positive relationship between ex-day returns and dividend yield observed in Table 
3.8 for all countries provides support for the taxation hypothesis. In particular, the significant 
coefficient of dividend yield variable of 0.96 (t = 66.57) for the UK reflects the differential 
taxation of dividend and capital gains [(m-z)/(1-z)] reported in Table 3.3. Similarly, in the other 
three countries the dividend yield variable coefficient is positive and significant. In Germany it is 
equal to 0.06 (t = 4.56), in France to 0.35 (t = 13.85) and in Italy to 0.22 (t = 5.76). Therefore, as 
predicted by the taxation effect hypothesis, results show a positive relation between dividend 
yield and ex-day abnormal returns. According to the short-term trading hypothesis, there should 
be a negative relation between the market value of the firm (proxy for transaction costs) and the 
ex-dividend day abnormal returns. However, the significantly positive coefficients of the market 
value variable provide further support for the taxation effect hypothesis in all the countries under 
consideration. A second measure of transaction costs is the bid-ask spread. The coefficients of this 
variable do not appear to be statistically significant in the UK, Germany or France, thus evidence 
in these countries is not consistent with the dividend capturing activity. However, in Italy the bid- 
ask spread variable coefficient of 0.02 is significant (t = 5.04) indicating trends short-term trading 
activity. I also use the dummy variable technique to test the effect of the taxation regimes on the 
ex-dividend day share price behaviour. In all the countries but in Italy, the coefficients of the 
taxation periods appear to be significant providing for the taxation effect hypothesis. 
In addition I perform the regressions with market value and bid-ask spread variables removed in 
order to test whether ex-dividend day abnormal returns can still be explained by the taxation 
variables. In all the countries the dividend yield coefficients are significantly positive as expected. 
Also the ex-day taxation effects are further supported by the significance of the taxation periods 
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(Italy is an exception). Results remain the same upon the removal of the dividend yield and the 
market value variables. Now, the bid-ask spread coefficients are not statistically different from 
zero. Finally, I remove the dividend yield and bid-ask variables. The market value coefficient is 
not significant in the UK, in Germany equals to 
-0.001 (t = -1.79), in France equals to 0.005 (t = 
7.58) and in Italy equals to 0.001 (t = 1.83). These results further reinforce the ex-dividend day 
taxation effect hypothesis in European countries. 
Table 3.8 Panel B reports the results of the drop off ratio regressed against the dividend yield, 
bid-ask spread and the taxation periods. The dividend yield coefficient in the UK is equal to 0.31 
(t 
= 
27.70), in Germany is equal to 0.65 (t = 25.24), in France is equal to 0.04 (t = 1.65) and in 
Italy is equal to 0.70 (t = 17.40). Therefore, results are in line with the taxation effect hypothesis, 
as there is a positive and significant relationship between the drop-off-ratio and the dividend yield 
variable. 
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3.6 CoNcixsioN AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OF TIIE ST 1DY 
In this Chapter of my thesis, I analyse the behaviour of ex-day returns in four major European 
countries: the UK, Germany, France and Italy. The study was motivated by the long existing 
controversy in the literature as to what drives the ex-dividend share prices as well as by the 
differences in the European taxation systems (as analysed in Chapter 2). I provide a literature 
review on the theories provided. The taxation effect hypothesis (Elton and Gruber, 1970, 
Kaplanis, 1986, Lasfer, 1996, Elton, Gruber and Blake, 2002); the short-term hypothesis (Kalay, 
1982, Eades, Hess and Kim, 1984, Koski, 1996, Boyd and Jagannathan, 1994); and the 
microstructure effect hypothesis (Bali and Hite, 1998, Frank and Jagannathan, 1998). Also 
another part of the literature (Poterba and Summer, 1984, Menyah, 1993, Lasfer, 1995, Bell and 
Jenkinson, 2002) considers the taxation regime change effect on the ex-dividend day behaviour. 
In order to test whether marginal investors in Europe face higher taxes on dividends than on 
capital gains, I use event study methodologies (Brown and Warner, 1985) in order to observe the 
ex-dividend day behaviour of stock returns and relate each country's tax discrimination variable 
to the ex-dividend day returns. If taxation effects drive the ex-dividend share price behaviour then 
in countries where dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, ex-dividend day returns 
are expected to be higher. 
Data was obtained from DataStream to cover the period 1987 to 2002. My final sample includes a 
total of 10,085 ex-dividend day events for the UK, 2,910 for Germany, 3,516 for France and 
1,237 for Italy. Results reported are based on the market model, over the event window [-40, +40] 
trading days relative to the ex-dividend date. The robustness of my results has been checked using 
alternative models for example the market adjusted model and the Dimson (1979) model. To test 
for potential effects of short-term trading, I analyse the ex-dividend day returns by bid-ask spreads 
(Karpoff and Walking, 1990). 
I find that, on average, ex-day returns are positive in all the countries in my sample, suggesting 
that ex-day prices decrease by less than the amount of the dividend. Results confirm that in 
countries where the differential between dividends and capital gains is high, ex-day returns are 
also high. Moreover, I show that ex-day returns are not homogeneous across my sample periods. I 
find that in each of the four countries under consideration, changes in the tax systems that affect 
taxes on dividend and/or capital gains alter significantly ex-day returns. The study adds to the 
literature by providing further evidence on the taxation effects on ex-dividend day returns in 
European countries. However, I show that some countries are subject to heavy short-term trading 
and their ex-day returns are lower to reflect the tax differential between dividends and capital 
gains. Further tests of the ex-dividend day abnormal returns provide further evidence to support 
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the taxation effect hypothesis in the UK. In Germany, results are consistent with McDonald 
(2001) who finds evidence of tax motivated trading around the ex-dividend day. In France and 
Italy results support the taxation effect hypothesis but evidence is not strong enough to completely 
rule out the short-term trading hypothesis. 
A major limitation of the study is the fact that data on the share ownership structure is not 
available. After considerable research, I was able to obtain an indication of the ownership 
structures in the four countries under consideration, but unfortunately data is not disaggregated 
enough to show what percentage of the equity capital each class of taxpayer owns, in order to 
draw clear conclusions on the marginal investor driving the market on the ex-dividend day. 
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CHAPTER 4" TILE INFORMATION CONTENT OF DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENTS IN THE I1K 
G ROMANY, FRANCE AND ITALY: A COMPARATIVE. ST TDY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), propose that in capital markets where there are no imperfections such 
as taxes, transaction costs, agency conflicts or asymmetric information, the dividend policy of the 
company is irrelevant to the market value of its shares. However, they hint that the information 
content of dividends can explain the observed share price reaction to changes in dividends. They 
argue that when a firm follows a stable dividend policy, investors interpret a change in the dividend 
payout rate as a change in the management's view of the firm's future profitability (page 430). This 
view partly reconciles the traditional posture regarding company dividend policy, which considers 
that the market value of shares increases when managers opt for a high target payout ratio (for 
example, Gordon, 1956). 
The theory of dividend signaling argues that there exists an informational asymmetry about the firm's 
future prospects. A common theme of the signaling models is that in the presence of asymmetric 
information between managers (insiders) and shareholders (outsiders), dividends may be used as a 
signaling mechanism by managers to communicate to the market their assessment of the firm's 
current performance and future prospects. Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and 
Williams (1985) attempt to explain how and why dividend changes signal information to the market. 
In general, dividend models posit that dividend announcements transmit information about the firm's 
future and/or current earnings (prospects of the company) and consequently the changes in the value 
of the firm around dividend announcements should be proportionate to the changes in dividend 
policy. Therefore, when a firm unexpectedly increases (decreases) dividends, it signals managements' 
future optimistic (pessimistic) outlook. Outside investors are expected to revise their expectations 
about the firm's future value on the basis of this information. 
There are essentially three implications of the information-signaling hypothesis, which have been 
empirically tested. The first implication is that dividend changes should be positively associated with 
subsequent earnings changes. If this condition is not met, then it may be concluded that dividends do 
not even have the potential to transmit information, let alone the signal. Unfortunately, the overall 
accumulated evidence (Watts, 1973, Gonedes, 1978, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler, 1997) grants 
only weak support to the assertion that dividend changes convey information about future changes in 
earnings, unless extreme dividend changes are considered (Healy and Palepu, 1988). The second 
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implication is that unexpected dividend changes should be positively associated to stock price 
changes. ' There is a substantial amount of empirical evidence that documents a positive association 
between dividend changes and excess returns on the announcement day (Pettit, 1972, Asquith and 
Mullins, 1983, Aharony and Swary, 1980, Brickley, 1983, Kalay and Lowenstein, 1985, Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack, 1995). However, the available empirical evidence also indicates that 
unfavourable dividend changes elicit market reactions that are much greater in magnitude than 
favourable dividend changes (De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1990,1992,1996, Healy and 
Palepu, 1988). In a more recent study, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) show that dividend 
increases are followed by price increases, because they signal that firms enter the maturity stage of 
the business cycle, and therefore their risk is decreasing. Thirdly studies empirically test the 
implications of the information-signaling hypothesis and assert that unexpected changes in dividends 
should be followed by revisions in the market's expectations of future earnings changes in the same 
direction as the dividend (Ofer and Siegel, 1987). 
The purpose of this part of my thesis is twofold. 2 Firstly, I test the share price reaction on the dividend 
announcement day and; secondly, I consider the predictions of the dividend signaling hypothesis in 
the UK, Germany, France and Italy by examining the share price reaction on the announcement day 
according to the direction of the dividend and earnings changes announced. This is to observe 
whether evidence obtained in the US also applies in European Countries. 3 Beer (1993) and Sheifert 
(1997) make the point that there has been relatively little empirical research on signaling using data 
from the European markets to analyse the dividend changes and test the signaling hypothesis. The 
recent development of European data now enables the testing of dividend theory predictions in 
countries outside the US. Additionally, an imperative motivation for the study of share price reaction 
around the dividend announcement day in Europe is the existence of institutional, financial and 
corporate governance differences between countries. These differences result in different country- 
level information asymmetries between insiders (managers) and outsiders (shareholders) of the 
companies. The main argument of this part of my thesis, is that if dividends are used as a signaling 
I Note that a positive association between announcement of dividend changes and stock price movements is also consistent 
with the free cash flow/overinvestment explanation of why firms pay dividends (Jensen, 1986). A firm with substantial free 
cash flow will have a tendency to overinvest by accepting investment projects with negative NPV. If managers are 
overinvesting an increase in dividends will, other things equal, reduce the extent of overinvestment and increase the market 
value of the firm; a decrease in dividends will have the opposite results. This hypothesis was empirically tested by Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989.1 test the hypothesis in the next chapter of my thesis. 
2 An analysis of the share price reaction to dividend announcements would also set the grounds for testing the predictions of 
the agency conflict hypothesis in the next chapter. 3 My analysis is in line with Rajan and Zingales (1995) who investigate the capital structure theories using international 
data and note that to the extent which other countries are similar to the US, they provide an independent sample to test the 
theory and evidence developed, whereas differences would increase the ability to discriminate among alternative theories. 
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mechanism to mitigate information asymmetries, then in countries where there is a higher level of 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, abnormal returns on the dividend 
announcement days are expected to be higher than in countries where investors are better informed 
about the future (and current) prospects of the company. Assuming that the corporate governance 
system and the institutional characteristics of the firm affect the level of information asymmetry, I 
would expect the abnormal returns on the dividend announcement day in bank-based countries such 
as Germany, France and Italy where companies are generally more closely held, 4 to be lower than in 
market-based countries, i. e. UK. 
Data for the purpose of testing my hypothesis is collected from DataStream and Hydra, online 
databases, to cover all listed companies on the London, German, French and Italian Stock Exchanges 
for the period 1987 to 2002. The final sample consists of 10,717 dividend announcements in the UK, 
1,019 in Germany, 982 in France and 633 in Italy. I employ event study methodologies (Brown and 
Warner, 1985) to calculate the abnormal returns around the dividend announcement dates. I analyse 
the share price reaction around the event according to the dividend change announcements (i. e. 
dividend increases, decreases, no changes, initiations and omissions) as well as according to the 
earnings announcements. 
Results show that in the UK investors perceive dividend increases (decreases) as good (bad) news for 
the future of the company. However, in all three bank-based countries studied, where information 
asymmetry is lower than in market-based countries, investors perceive dividend increases/initiations 
negatively, while dividend decreases result in positive abnormal returns. The positive abnormal 
returns obtained as a result of dividend decrease/omission announcements might lead to the 
conclusion that companies in bank-based countries decrease dividends in order to use the less costly 
internal funds to take positive net present value opportunities. Investors in these countries are 
informed about the prospects of the companies, therefore they would not penalise dividend- 
decreasing firms and consequently managers do not fear a negative market reaction following such 
announcements. At the same time, the negative market reaction to dividend increases/initiations could 
indicate that companies are running out of good investment opportunities. Results of examining both 
the earnings and dividend signals, show that when both signals are in accord and the dividend 
evidence is corroborated by earnings news, the stock market reacts more positively than when the 
dividend-change groups are tested as a whole. 
4 See Franks and Mayer (1994), La Porta, Silanes and Shleifer (1999) 
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, I provide a literature review of the 
studies that analyse the share price reaction around dividend announcement day, the studies that 
provide evidence to support/reject the information content of dividend hypothesis, and studies that 
consider the effect of firm specific characteristics on the signalling power of dividends as well as 
international studies. In Section 4.3, I identify the institutional, financial and corporate governance 
differences between the countries under consideration that are expected to result in different levels of 
information asymmetry, I put forward the motivation of this part of my thesis and I set the hypotheses 
to be tested. In Section 4.4, I describe the data and methodology used to test my hypotheses. Finally, 
in Section 4.5, I analyse the results, providing inter- and infra- country comparisons. The conclusions 
are discussed in Section 4.6. 
4 
.2 
LIT ATURE REVIEW: THE SIGNALLING EFFECT HYPOTHESIS AND THE SHARE PRICE 
BEHAVIOUR AROUND THE DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT IIAY 
Various studies have set forth to explain the relationship between dividends and firm value. The 
information content of dividend hypothesis is based on the assumption that managers possess more 
information about the prospects of the firm than individuals outside the firms. The hypothesis asserts 
that dividend changes convey managers' inside information to outsiders and has its roots in Lintner's 
(1956) classic study on dividend policy. One of Lintner's primary findings in the interviews of a 
sample of corporate managers is that a high proportion of managers attempt to maintain a stable 
regular dividend and that firms increase their dividends only when management is relatively confident 
that higher payments can be maintained. 5 Additional support to Lintner's argument is provided by 
Darling (1957), Fama and Babiak (1968), De Angelo and De Angelo (1989), Pogue (1970), Higgins 
(1972), MacCabe (1979), Peterson and Benesh (1983), Fama (1974). Lintner's model however, 
cannot explain a firm's increase (decrease) of dividend payments when its current earnings decrease 
(increase), because in his model decreases (increases) in current earnings are gradually translated into 
decreases (increases) in current dividends in order to maintain stable dividend payments. 
4.2.1 TTIFORFTTCAT, MODELS 
If managers change regular dividends only when the earnings potentials of the firm have changed, 
changes in regular dividends are likely to provide some information to the market about the firm's 
prospects. The first to formally model the notion of the information content of dividends are 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985). Firstly, Bhattacharya 
s In Untner's words, managers demonstrate a "reluctance" (common to all companies) to reduce regular rates once 
established and a consequent conservatism in raising regular payouts (Lintner, 1956). 
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(1979) develops a theoretical model to explain that dividends are used as a costly means of removing 
information asymmetries in the market concerning the firm's value. In his model, signaling costs are a 
function of the differential tax treatment of dividends versus capital gains income of investors and of 
the financing costs of raising unanticipated funds to fulfil dividend obligations. He argues that if the 
market has imperfect information then equilibrium can emerge in which dividends are a signal of 
expected cash flows. The equilibrium firm value is a positive function of expected cash flows and the 
equilibrium dividend level, and a negative function of signaling costs and the rate of interest. 
John and Williams (1985) identify a dividend-signaling model motivated by the effect of dividends 
on shareholders' wealth, as a signal of firm profitability. An assumption of the model is that firms 
have more information about their expected future earnings than outsiders, and this assumption leads 
firms with insufficient internal funds to differentiate themselves from lower quality firms. By design 
the model provides an extremely adverse environment for signalling with dividends; taxes are paid 
only on dividends; no transaction costs are incurred when issuing, retiring or trading shares, and; all 
sources and uses of firms' funds are fully observed by outsiders through costless public audits. 
Nevertheless, there exists a signalling equilibrium with dissipative dividends where corporate insiders 
distribute taxable dividends if and only if the demand for cash by both their firm and its current 
shareholders exceeds the supply of internal funds. Thus, some firms pay dividends, while others do 
not. Of those firms that pay dividends, many simultaneously sell new shares to outside investors. 
Still, other firms pay dividends, sell no new shares, and, instead support their share prices and thereby 
benefit current claimants who sell outstanding shares to new investors. John and Williams argue that 
their signalling equilibrium exists because the marginal benefit to insiders of distributing dividends 
differs across firms. For firms with more valuable inside information, the premium paid in the market 
for stocks with marginally larger dividends, and thereby the reduction in dilution for current 
shareholders, just compensates stockholders for the incremental personal taxes on dividends. By 
contrast, for firms with less favourable inside information, the dissipative costs of the same dividend 
exceed at the margin the gains from reducing dilution. Consequently, there exists in the market a 
pricing function for stock, which separates firms with more favourable inside information from those 
with less. In the resulting signalling equilibrium, firms with more favourable inside information 
optimally pay higher dividends; other things equal, and receive appropriately higher prices for their 
stock. 
Miller and Rock (1985) develop a financial signaling model founded on the concept of "net 
dividends". This is the first theory that explicitly combines dividends and external financing to show 
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that they are merely two sides of the same coin. They show that the earnings, dividend and financing 
announcements are closely related. The earnings surprise and the net dividend surprise can convey the 
same information. The financing announcement effect is merely the dividend announcement effect, 
but with the sign reversed. Therefore, an unexpected increase in dividends indicates a better prospect 
for the firm's future cash flows and will increase shareholder's wealth. In addition, an unexpected 
issue of new equity or debt will be interpreted as bad news about the future prospects of the firm and 
will decrease the firm's value. 
Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) construct an efficient signaling equilibrium with dividends and 
investments or, equivalently, dividends and net new issues of stock. The equilibrium's properties are 
also identified. Because corporate insiders can exploit multiple signals, the efficient mix must 
minimise dissipative costs. In equilibrium, many firms both distribute dividends and deviate from the 
optimal investment. Also, the impact of dividends on share prices is positive. By contrast, the 
announcement effect of new share issuance is negative for firms with private information primarily 
about assets in place and positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to 
invest. Kumar (1988) develops a model of the firm in which insiders possess private information 
about the firm's prospects, and investment is endogenous. He shows that there exists a coarse 
dividend signaling equilibria: dividends partition the space of possible prospects of the firm, and 
changes in dividends reflect "broad", or nonincremental, changes in these prospects. Dividend 
changes have nontrivial information effects; however dividends are smoothed and therefore are poor 
predictors of future earnings. 
The above theoretical predictions are tested from different perspectives. In this section, I summarise 
the main results based on different methodologies. 
MARKFT REACTION To DIVIDEND CIIANGF. S 
A number of studies test the signalling hypotheses by investigating the share price reaction to 
dividend announcements. Pettit (1972) finds that significant share price increases (decreases) follow 
announcements of dividend increases (decreases). In his study, firms are cross-classified according to 
the estimated dividend and earnings information conveyed to the market. Earnings information is 
classified into two groups (positive or negative) according to whether actual reported quarterly 
earnings exceeded or fell short of expected earnings. Expected earnings are formed from estimates of 
the relationship that exists between the firms' (growth adjusted) earnings and market earnings. 
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Dividend classes are made up of. omissions, reductions, no-changes, less than 10 percent increases, 
10 to less than 25 percent increases, 25 percent increases and greater, and initial payments. The 
objective is to provide reasonably homogeneous dividend information groups as a basis for testing the 
hypothesis that dividends convey information. For each of these earnings-dividend classes the 
abnormal performance index is calculated. The conclusion that a significant level of new information 
is conveyed to the market by dividend announcements is based on two findings. First, the 
performance indices are highest for the initial dividend payment group and decline as dividend 
performance becomes worse within the earnings classes. Second, for all but the "no-change" group 
the dividend announcement seems to dominate earnings announcement. That is when dividends are 
changed; the impact of earnings announcements seems negligible. 
Aharony and Swary (1980) attempt to observe whether quarterly dividend announcements convey 
useful information beyond that provided by quarterly earnings. They only examine quarterly dividend 
and earnings announcements made public on different dates within a given quarter, therefore, they are 
able to distinguish earnings announcements that proceed or follow from those that accompany 
dividend announcements. They demonstrate that a simple dividend forecasting model can 
successfully predict abnormal stock performance. The model forecasts no-change in dividends from 
one quarter to the next: D*q=Dy_1, where D*q equals the ordinary dividend per share in the qth quarter 
and the asterisk denotes an expectation operator. The model is consistent with the hypothesis that 
managers are reluctant to change dividends in either direction unless they believe that the prospects of 
the firm have significantly improved or deteriorated. The model is ultimately validated by evidence 
that stock performance was above normal following positive dividend announcements and below 
normal for negative announcements. Moreover, they find that changes in quarterly cash dividends 
provide useful information beyond that provided by corresponding quarterly earnings. In addition, 
their results support the semi-strong form of the efficient capital market hypothesis, that is, on 
average the stock market adjusts in an efficient manner to new quarterly dividend information. 
Theobald, Balachandran and Cadle (1996) analyse the price reactions to dividend cuts and omissions 
in the UK (where dividends and earnings are announced simultaneously) and also investigate the 
signalling power of interim dividend cuts/omissions within a dividends-earnings framework 
following Watts (1973) and DeAngelo et al (1992). They use a logit analysis to investigate the 
variables that determine whether a firm will cut or omit its interim dividend. Their sample consists of 
243 interim cuts or omissions. Consistent with signalling theories/ information content of dividends, 
they find a negative price reaction to interim dividend cuts and omissions. The price reaction is found 
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to be generally stronger (i. e. more negative) where the interim cut or omission occurs for firms that 
have not reduced their dividends in the previous three-year period. They also find evidence consistent 
with Christie (1994) that the magnitude of the price reaction is a U-Shaped function of the size of the 
dividend reduction. The predictive power of interim dividend cuts and omissions for future earnings 
variables is established in cross-section. Interim dividends are found to have incremental predictive 
ability over and above earnings variables for both the year in which the cut/omission was made and 
for the subsequent year's change in earnings. Moreover, they find that gearing, company size (market 
value) and interim earnings change variables have explanatory power in distinguishing between 
whether a firm cuts or omits its interim dividend level. Overall, in all three approaches adopted 
(return generating process, price reaction investigation and earnings/dividends relationship) results 
show that interim dividend cuts and omissions have the power to communicate information to the 
market about future earnings. 
Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) investigate the stock market response to interactive 
dividend and earnings announcements by a sample of 620 UK companies over the period January to 
June 1991. They firstly, examine the possibility that the response to a dividend announcement may be 
influenced by whether the dividend is being increased, decreased or left unchanged. US studies 
suggest that this may indeed be the case and acknowledge the role of the dividend as a signal to 
investors; dividend increases tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns, and dividend 
decreases tend to be associated with negative abnormal returns around the time of the dividend 
announcement. Secondly, they recognize that identifying a unique dividend information 
announcement effect is particularly difficult in the UK because UK dividends are almost invariably 
announced simultaneously with information about corporate earnings. They address this problem by 
focusing on those occasions when the signals associated with these announcements conflict with one 
another 
- 
where dividends are increased and earnings decrease or vice versa. The influence of 
combinations of dividend and earnings news is found to be important in explaining the share price 
reaction on the announcement day. 
Healy and Palepu (1988) examine dividend initiations and dividend omissions over an eleven-year 
period and find that share price increases (decreases) upon the initiation (omission) of dividend 
announcements. They show that the information conveyed by extreme dividend changes (including 
initiations and omissions), is related to earnings changes following the announcement of these 
dividend policy changes. They state that firms have earnings increases on the year of, and two years 
following the dividend initiation (i. e. the increases appear to be permanent). However, in contrast, to 
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the dividend signaling theory, for the sample of dividend omissions, they conclude that the earnings 
decline experienced by these firms before and after the omission announcement appeared to be 
temporary. That is, the decline in earnings before dividend omissions is reversed in subsequent years. 
Christie (1994) examines dividend omissions, and shows that despite the fact dividend omissions 
trigger a substantial decline in share value, those losses are much smaller in magnitude than cases 
where reduction of dividends was less than 100 percent. Results show that for less than 20 percent 
reductions in dividends, prices fall around 5 percent; while for those exceeding 60 percent the fall is 
around 8.8 percent. However, if dividends are omitted entirely, the average two-day risk adjusted 
return is just 
-6.9 percent (the differences between these groups are statistically significant). Christie 
derives a U-Shaped empirical relation between risk-adjusted excess returns and the magnitude of 
dividend reductions. He determines that "omitting" firms distribute subsequent dividends at values, 
which approach their pre-announcement value faster than firms that had reduced dividends. The U- 
Shape may arise from the market anticipating higher future growth rates in dividends from omitting 
firms. However, Christie notes that a conclusive economic explanation is not apparent. 
Garrett and Priestley (2000) analyse the dividend behaviour of the aggregate stock market and 
propose a model, which assumes that managers minimise the costs of adjustment associated with 
being away from their target dividend payout. They exhibit significant evidence of dividend 
smoothing and dividends conveying information regarding unexpected positive changes in current 
permanent earnings. They note that dividends may respond to both past prices which following Marsh 
and Merton (1987), act as forecasts of current and future permanent earnings, and to unexpected 
current permanent earnings; and find that, at least at the aggregate level, information about expected 
future permanent earnings is captured by lagged stock prices. Therefore, dividends do not signal the 
future level of earnings of the firm. However, they prove that dividends convey information about 
current unexpected permanent earnings. One of the three contributions of the paper is to deal with 
signaling and find very strong evidence that dividends convey information about positive shocks to 
current permanent earnings; additionally the authors support the hypothesis that information about 
expected changes in permanent earnings is already captured in lagged stock price changes and 
therefore, no support was found that dividends signal future permanent earnings. 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990) test for firm-size effect and find that price reactions to dividend changes are 
greater for small firms than for large firms, which indicates that dividend announcements for smaller 
firms are more informative. They note that some of the information provided by the dividend 
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announcement to investors in small firms is available to investors in large firms from other sources. 
Generally, they support the hypothesis that dividends provide information about future cash flows of 
the firm. On the other hand, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) and Rao and White (1994) find no evidence 
to support that a firm size affects dividend payouts. Mozes and Rapaccioli (1995) investigate the role 
dividend announcements play in explaining the inverse relation between the magnitude of the market 
reaction to earnings announcements and firm size. They find that size-effects do not exist in the case 
where dividends are announced before the earnings announcements, while such an effect exists for a 
sample of firms that either do not pay dividends or announce dividends after announcing earnings. 
DIVIDENDS AND FUTURE EARNINGS 
Watts (1973) was among the first to examine the relation between dividends and future earnings. He 
uses a sample of 310 firms during the period 1946 to 1967 and he regresses future earnings changes 
on current unexpected dividend changes. While the average regression coefficients of dividend 
changes across firms are positive, the average t-statistics are very low. He attempts to measure the 
importance of dividends in two separate ways. Firstly, he estimates the relation between annual 
earnings in the future (in period t+1) and annual dividends in t-1 and t. Secondly, he measures the 
relation between unexpected changes in share price and unexpected changes in annual dividends, 
which are meant to serve as the conveyer of the information. The second method is interesting since 
unexpected changes in share price incorporate all unexpected changes in future anticipated earnings 
and not just earnings one period into the future. Watts classifies fiscal firm years into positive and 
negative dividend categories according to the sign of the difference between actual dividend changes 
and expected dividend changes 6 Abnormal returns for the two groups were calculated and results 
show no significant difference in abnormal performance between the two groups. Based on these 
findings, Watts concludes that dividends do not convey information. 
Gonedes (1978) investigates the extend to which income, dividend and extraordinary income items 
reflect information relevant to assessing firm's equilibrium values. He finds that income can be used 
in making inferences about predictive distributions of attributes of firm's decisions and supports that 
dividend reflect information relevant to those inferences because of a connection with income. This 
argument is based on the idea that dividend-change announcements (which include announcements of 
no-change) reflect information available to managers (and perhaps other insiders), but not to investors 
in general. 
6 Expected dividend changes for each firm are formed from coefficients estimated from the time series expression: AD, =D; 
D,., =ß1Dt_1+p2E, +ß3E, 
_i+c, , where 
D is dividends per share and E is earnings per share. 
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Penman (1983) compares the properties of dividend announcements and management earnings 
forecasts as predictors of earnings and the firm value. He provides evidence that both dividend 
announcements and management's earnings forecasts possess information about managements' 
expectations. However, he argues that not all information in earnings forecasts is available in 
dividend announcements. For firms whose dividend announcement implied a relatively high earnings 
prediction, the information conveyed by their dividend is similar to that conveyed by their earnings 
forecasts. He also shows that many firms did not adjust their dividends to the level of earnings 
implied by the earnings forecasts and so, for these firms with a relatively low adjustment of dividends 
the dividend announcement did not predict firms' values as well as the earnings forecasts. Therefore, 
Penman supports that there is not much information conveyed by dividend changes themselves, after 
adjusting for management's future earnings forecasts. 
As with any other explanation of dividend policy empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive; so is 
the case with the dividend signaling. Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) are motivated by Miller 
(1987) who notes that dividends are better described as lagging earnings than as leading earnings. 
They criticise Watts (1973) and Healy and Palepu (1988) results that they both rely on a small 
number of data, and that the latter only considers the extreme cases of initiations and omissions, 
which could be special. Benartzi et al (1997) utilise a large number of firms and events and control 
for other factors that could create spurious relationship between dividends and subsequent earnings 
changes, such as the timing of the dividend change. Results are consistent with Watts (1973) since no 
evidence to support the view that changes in dividends have information content about future 
earnings changes is found; that is the predictive value of changes in dividends is found to be minimal. 
The only strong predictive power found is that dividend cuts reliably signal an increase in future 
earnings and that dividend-increasing firms are less likely to have subsequent earnings decreases than 
firms that do not change their dividend policy despite similar earnings growth. In this sense, changes 
in dividends are considered to signal something about the present, that is, the current increase in 
earnings is permanent. Instead, a strong past and concurrent link between earnings and dividend 
changes is obtained which implied that if there is any information content in dividend 
announcements, it is that the concurrent change in earnings is permanent rather than transitory. 
Overall, results indicate that dividend changes provide information about current and past levels of 
earnings rather than future earnings. 
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A different explanation to the dividend-signaling hypothesis is approached in a series of papers by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1990,19927) who are based on Lintner's observation that net 
income is the key characteristic in determining dividend changes. They use a sample of "unhealthy" 
firms and they observe that an annual loss is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a firm's 
dividend reduction. In their sample of 167 firms (DeAngelo et al, 1990), 50.9 percent reduced 
dividends whereas for those firms without losses, only 1 percent reduced dividends. They conclude 
that firms reduce dividends less often when their loss includes unusual income items, which would 
indicate transitory earnings problems. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) employ a variety of model specifications and definitions of 
favourable dividend actions to assess the empirical importance of dividend signaling in order to 
examine the signaling content of managers' dividend decisions for firms whose annual earnings 
declined after nine or more consecutive years of growth. Evidence to reject the dividend-signaling 
hypothesis is obtained, as results provide no indication that managers' dividend decisions in the year 
of the earnings decrease (Year 0) are useful signals of future earnings prospects. They also investigate 
and reject the separating equilibrium hypothesis, where dividend decisions conform to a separating 
equilibrium. That is managers of firms with relatively good prospects use dividend increases to 
differentiate their companies from other firms in seemingly similar situations that have comparatively 
poor prospects. DeAngelo et al provide evidence to suggest that three factors namely managerial 
over-optimism, modest resource commitments and to a lesser extent managerial mistakes help to 
explain why favourable dividend actions of the firms in their sample, failed to provide any 
informative signals about the future prospects of the firms. 
Jensen and Johnson (1995) attempt to provide evidence regarding the motivation for decreasing 
dividends, the information conveyed by a drop and managerial actions taken both before and after a 
drop. Results show a drop in earnings before the dividend is reduced and increase in earnings 
thereafter. Stock prices are observed to follow a similar pattern, however the rebound in stock prices 
following the dividend decrease is not found to be significant. They note that the stock market 
reaction suggests that investors in spite of the ensuing earnings rebound view dividend drops 
negatively. They also examine 19 variables in addition to earnings and share prices, to provide a more 
complete picture of the firm behaviour before and after a dividend reduction and find that dividend 
reductions are the consequence of reduced earnings and deteriorating liquidity positions as well as 
7 In this paper DeAngelo et al extend their sample size of NYSE firms to 167 firms with losses between 1980 and 1985, 
included 440 firms without losses and extend their analysis to transitory losses. 
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debt levels. They conclude that a dividend drop generally occurs at the low point of a firm's financial 
decline and marks the beginning of firm restructuring activities. 
Elfakhani (1995) presents a signaling system that accounts for the interaction between financial 
statements and dividend announcement in order to test whether changes in financial statements and 
dividends can together provide a better information transmittal system to deliver missing private 
information of the firm. The testing methodology considers balance sheet information followed by 
dividend change signal as to resolve most of the uncertainty about the firm's future. The dividend 
signal is considered as having three components. Firstly the content of favourableness, good or bad; 
secondly the sign of dividend change, positive or negative; and, thirdly, the role of dividend signal, 
confirmatory, clarificatory or unclear. Results reveal that the classification of dividend signal by the 
three components improves the understanding of the firm's value. In particular, the more the market 
understands (with certainty) about the firm's sources and uses of funds before the dividend 
announcement, the clarifying role of dividend becomes minimal. Under these conditions, dividends 
are less efficient and have little value to the market. On the other hand, the less the market knows, the 
more eager it is to receive dividend signal and to assess its contents (as carrying good or bad news). 
Thus, confirmatory signal induces less market reaction in returns than those of the clarificatory or 
unclear signals. Results also suggest that dividend signal sending good news to cause larger price 
movements than those involving bad news. This suggests that bad news may be discounted long 
before the dividend announcement; so the dividend may carry little information. Furthermore, 
Elfakhani suggests that market reaction is more dependent on the expected content of favourableness, 
than in the sign of dividend change; therefore, he concludes that neither all dividend decreases carry 
bad news nor all dividend increases carry good news. 
In a recent study, Nissim and Ziv (2001) were motivated by the contradiction between the signaling 
theories (for example, Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Petit (1972)) on the 
one hand and the predictions of DeAngelo et al (1996), Benarzi et al (1997) on the other. In order to 
investigate whether dividend changes convey information about the future profitability they follow 
previous studies and estimate expected profitability. They modify the regression model to address two 
issues related to the estimation of unexpected earnings namely measurement error and omitted 
correlated variables. They extend the analysis and examine the relation between dividend changes and 
the level of future profitability, controlling for profits in the dividend change year and for the 
expected profits based on information available before the dividend change. For this purpose they use 
both earnings and abnormal earnings as two alternative measures of profits. With both measures of 
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profitability, they find that dividend increases are positively related to profits in each of the four 
subsequent years, but dividend decreases are not found to be related to future profits. The lack of 
association between dividend decreases and future profitability is allocated to accounting 
conservatism. Results for abnormal earnings are found to be stronger, suggesting that accounting for 
the required return more than offsets the error in measuring abnormal returns. Moreover dividend 
changes are found to be positively related to the level of future profitability, after controlling for book 
value, past and current profitability, market expectations of future profitability as reflected in price 
prior to the dividend change, past earnings and dividend changes, and, consensus analysts' earnings 
forecasts. Overall, this provides strong evidence in support to the information content of dividend 
hypothesis. 
Kao and Wu (1994) attempt to test the information effects on dividends and to understand the factors, 
which influence the dividend policy of the firm. Based on the Lintner (1956) model, they derive an 
extension of the Marsh-Merton Model, a rational signaling model that provides a direct test on the 
relation between unexpected dividend and earnings changes. The factors incorporated in Kao and Wu 
model include firm size, leverage of the firm, short-term adjustments due to volatility of earnings, 
long-term changes in earnings and systematic and unsystematic risk. Most of these factors arc found 
to affect the management's decision to choose the optimal dividend policy and to use dividends as a 
signaling device. Results indicate that dividend changes reflect both internal partial adjustment 
operation and changes in the firm's future earnings conditions. Dividends are observed to convey 
information for about two years after the dividend announcement. Overall, results support the 
hypothesis that managers have superior information to form more precise estimates of permanent 
earnings and that they adjust dividends in response to changes in permanent earnings. 
Chen and Wu (1999) examine the predictive relations between corporate dividends, earnings and 
prices and the implications of these relations for dividend signaling and smoothing. They find that 
dynamic relations exist among dividends, earnings and prices; that dividend changes are driven by 
both signaling and smoothing motives; and that information about unexpected changes in future 
earnings can be provided by dividend changes. Chen and Wu conduct additional tests in order to 
differentiate between the dividend smoothing and signaling models by imposing restrictions on the 
dynamic behaviour of the dividend and earning variables and information signaling. They observe 
that dividend often signal unexpected changes in the firm's future earnings conditions. Additionally, 
they provide evidence that dividend and earnings series exhibit a dynamic relation when firms use 
dividends to signal future earnings. 
151 
6L 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 4 
The relationship between dividends and earnings is also found to be a function of firms' size. 
Bhushan (1989) suggests that information acquisition is less costly for investors of large firms than 
for investors of small firms. That is, the amount of information available before the earnings 
announcement is an increasing function of firm size. If more information is available about a firm, it 
is less likely to be motivated to release a signal to investors. Therefore, larger firms tend to pay a 
smaller dividend than smaller firms and vice versa. A number of other studies however, Chang and 
Rhee (1990), Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Holder, Langrehr and 11exter (1998) 
to name a few, discover a positive relationship between dividends and firm size which indicates that 
the larger a firm, the higher the dividend payments. Eddy and Seifert (1988) document an association 
between firm size and abnormal returns from the announcement of large dividend increases. Dividend 
announcements are only examined in cases where no contemporaneous earnings announcements were 
made. They control for both the payout ratio of firms and size of the dividend increase and, they use 
means tests and analysis of variances. They show that abnormal stock price reaction to a dividend 
increase is greater for small firms. 
CONI'A 
. 
ION EFFECTS 
Several studies report significant positive intra-industry information transfers. For example, Foster 
(1981) finds that an earnings release by a firm that has a positive (negative) impact on its own stock 
price also has a positive (negative) impact on the stock prices of its industry rivals. Similar results are 
obtained by Baginski (1987), Slovin, Sushka, and Bendeck (1991), Lang and Stulz (1992). In 
contrast, a number of studies document insignificant intra 
-industry announcement effects, for 
example Slovin, Shushka and Polonchek (1992), Hertzel (1991). Third, the signalling theories of 
Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973) imply that rivals' stock prices will react in a direction opposite to 
that of the announcing firm. Investors who are initially unable to distinguish between low- and high- 
quality firms will price shares by averaging values across all firms. Once a firm announces a dividend 
initiation, the market will react favourably to the positive information about this "good" firm, and the 
rest of the firms in the industry will be identified as "lemons" and should exhibit negative price 
reactions. 8 
Lang and Stulz (1992) call this phenomenon a competitive intra-industry effect, because the reactions reflect new 
information about the competitive balance within the industry. 
152 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 4 
Firth (1996) was amongst the first to examine9 whether the information revealed by a dividend 
change announcement affects the valuations and earnings forecasts of other companies in the same 
industry as the announcement firm. The study links the dividend signalling and information transfer 
(or contagion effects) to test whether the dividend change of one firm is associated with the stock 
price performance of other companies in the same industry. The results indicate that there are 
information transfers from dividend change announcing firms to other companies in the same 
industries. Specifically, an unexpected dividend increase (decrease) for one firm led to increased 
(decreased) stock returns for nonreporters. The abnormal stock returns of both the dividend 
announcers and the non-announcers were positively associated with both changes in analysts' 
earnings forecasts of the other companies and actual changes in future profits and dividends. The 
magnitude of the information transfer is found to be related to the magnitude of the dividend change, 
the correlation of stock returns between the announcer and non-announcer, and the immediately prior 
dividend change history of the other company. 
Laux, Starks and Yoon (1998) find that large revisions in dividends are accompanied by stock price 
reactions for industry rivals of the announcing firm and show that firm characteristics can influence 
whether rival firms have a contagion or a competitive reaction. They imply that regardless of how 
refined the industry definition is there may still be cross-sectional differences in information transfer. 
They observe that for rivals without extensive market power or growth options relative to the 
announcer, dividend increases elicit to no reaction and dividend decreases elicit a negative reaction. 
Conversely, rivals with relatively more market power and growth options experience positive 
reactions to dividend increases and no reaction to dividend decreases. Overall, Laux ct al conclude 
that the intra-industry effects of dividend revisions are apparent only when the industry information 
implicit in an announcement is not offset by the effects of competitive realignments that become more 
likely with the announcement. 
However, Howe and Shen (1998) examine the intra-industry information effects of announcements of 
dividend initiations and find no contagion effects. Results indicate that the share prices of industry 
competitors do not react to dividend initiations. Further, analysts do not revise their earnings forecasts 
for non-announcing rival firms. They conclude that the information conveyed to the market by the 
decision to initiate dividends contains no industry-wide component. They also note that dividend 
initiation appears to be a firm-specific event. 
9 Boim (1977) was the first study to examine the information transfer as a result of dividend changes but her study was 
limited to the dividend omission announcement of only one firm. 
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DIVIDENDS AND BANK MONITORING 
Low, Glorfeld, Hearth and Rimbey (2001) establish a new link between the theories of banking and 
dividend policy in an examination of how bank monitoring and firm dividend signals complement 
one another to resolve information asymmetries. They investigate the relationship between the market 
reaction to dividend omission announcements and bank debt, using a sample of firms that omitted 
their dividends between 1978 and 1996. They use daily stock price returns for each firm in the sample 
along with various measures of bank debt (for example, the firm's bank debt in current and long-term 
liabilities). In order to control for size, the sample is further divided into sub-samples consisting of 
large and small firms. Results indicate that in the presence of a bank lending relationship, 
announcements of dividend omission by small firms are interpreted differently than similar 
announcements made by large firms. In the case of small firms, the signal associated with the firm's 
banking relationship provides a framework for interpretation of the firm's dividend decision. 
Evidence indicates that the presence of banks as monitors is observed to be of greater informational 
value to investors than the presence of private non-bank lenders. In contrast, when examined large 
firms, results indicate that investors do not value the role of bank monitoring, and tend to react more 
negatively to announcements of dividend omission in the presence of high level of bank debt. This 
response was observed to be driven by concerns over the firm's ability to meet its financial 
obligations, rather than any third-party review of these better-known firms. Overall, the importance of 
the paper is the evidence provided that banks serve as an important signaling role in influencing 
investors' assessment of the dividend decisions of small firms. 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
Overall, empirical evidence provided in the literature is mixed. Therefore, there exist a need for 
further testing of the predictions of the hypothesis in countries outside the US where the institutional, 
financial and corporate governance systems differ. These differences between the European countries 
under consideration constitute the main motivation of this part of my thesis; as to the best of my 
knowledge a study of this nature has not been previously conducted. In the this section I set a review 
of the international evidence found in the literature around the share price behaviour on the dividend 
announcement date, while in the next section, I firstly put forward the motivation and, secondly, I set 
the hypothesis to be tested. 
Dewenter and Warther (1998) compare the dividend policies of U. S. and Japanese firms, partitioning 
the Japanese data into keiretsu, independent and hybrid firms. They draw on the differences between 
the U. S. and Japanese corporate governance systems and examine the correlation between dividend 
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changes and share returns, and the reluctance of managers to change dividends. They argue that close 
ties between managers and investors in Japanese firms, and especially in keiretsu firms, substantially 
reduce information asymmetries and agency conflicts relative to their US counterparts. Consistent 
with the predictions of the signaling hypothesis, they find that Japanese managers need not fear 
adjusting dividends in response to earnings changes. They conduct an event study of dividend 
omissions and initiations and find that the Japanese announcements are met with smaller share price 
reactions than the concurrent U. S. announcements. Moreover, they find that US stock price reactions 
are significantly tied to the magnitude of the change in the firm's dividend yield in contrast with 
Japanese10 reactions. Japanese keiretsu firms are also found to cut dividends more often and respond 
to poor performance by cutting dividends more quickly than either U. S. or independent Japanese 
firms. 
Seifert (1997) examines whether there are significant market adjusted earnings changes associated 
with large dividend changes in the US, Canada, France, Germany, Australia and the UK for the 
period 1984 to 1993. Results show significant adjusted earnings changes right around the time of 
dividend changes. This evidence is supportive of the idea that when firms increase or decrease their 
dividends significantly, or initiate or omit their dividends, there are similar earnings changes right 
around the time of the dividend changes (defined as the period from 1 year before, to 1 year after the 
annual dividend change). He finds only weak support for Lintner's contention that significant 
permanent earnings changes take place before firms change their dividend. On the other hand, almost 
no support is found for the information/signaling notion that dividend changes foreshadow continual 
significant earnings changes. Interestingly, Seifert finds that the pattern of adjusted earnings changes 
is similar in all the countries under consideration especially in the period right around dividend 
changes, despite the fact that the dividend behaviour in the US differs from the one in the other 
countries. 
Amihud and Murgia (1997) investigate the tax-based signaling models, which propose that higher 
dividend taxation is a necessary condition to make them informative about companies' values. 
According to these models, dividends in Germany should not be informative because dividends are 
not tax disadvantaged but are in fact taxed lower for most investor classes. They conduct an event 
study examining the reaction of share prices to announcements of dividend changes for the period 
1988 to 1992. Results show that dividend increases induce a significant positive reaction in share 
10 Estimates of the Lintner (1956) speed of adjustment coefficient indicate that Japanese keiretsu-member firms adjust their 
dividends more quickly than do US firms or Japanese independent firms. 
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prices equal to 0.965 percent (t = 6.97) while dividend decreases induce a reduction in share prices 
equal to 
-1.73 percent (t = 4.46). The share price reaction to dividend changes and to earnings 
changes for the same year is also examined, and results provide evidence that dividends contain 
information beyond that contained in earnings despite of the earlier announcements of estimated and 
actual earnings dividend news. Amihud and Murgia conclude that the positive price reaction to 
dividend changes may simply support Black's (1976) statement that investors care about dividends 
directly. 
Romon (2000) examines both the ex-dividend day and dividend announcement day share price 
reactions in France for the period 1991 to 1995 by introducing the dividend policy stability criterion 
in event studies. The sample consists of 203 companies quoted on the Parisian Stock Exchange, and is 
divided according to the firm dividend policies. He uses the dividend yield variable as a proxy for 
dividend stability and distinguishes between three groups of firms characterised by stable dividend 
policies (low, medium or high). Results obtained on both the global sample and the stable dividend 
yield firm sample and confirm previous research results and validate the dividend announcement 
informational effect hypothesis. However, he observes disparities in cumulative average abnormal 
returns according to the firm group stable dividend yield. The cumulative average abnormal returns 
calculated on the global sample, prove to be the result of a sum of different cumulative average 
abnormal returns. Overall, results show that the informational effect of dividends appears to be 
different according to the firm dividend yield policy (low, medium or high). 
Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2001) compare the dividend behaviour of firms operating in different 
institutional regimes. The sample consists of companies in eight developing countries on the one hand 
and of ninety-nine US companies for the period 1980 to 1990 on the other. They consider the US as a 
market-oriented country, whereas all eight developing countries are classified as bank-oriented 
countries. This classification is found to be important for the role of dividends both as a signal and as 
a pre-commitment device. Firstly, they apply the Lintner (1956) model and find that dividends tend to 
be more sensitive to current earnings and less sensitive to prior dividend payments in bank-oriented 
countries than in the US; which implies that developing countries move more quickly to their target 
level. As a result, in developing countries dividends are less likely to be used as a signal for future 
earnings. Secondly, cross sectional regressions are conducted using the dividend yield as the 
dependent variable, and business risk, debt ratio, tangibility, logarithm of sales, return on equity and 
market to book as the independent variables. Cross-sectional results proved difficult to find good 
empirical proxies for the informational asymmetries. Overall, the results show that the heavy reliance 
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on bank financing and the relative small emphasis placed on external capital markets as a source of 
finance in developing economies, relative to developed ones, alleviates informational asymmetry 
problems and reduces the signaling value associated with dividends. As a result, dividends appear to 
be less sticky in the less developed capital markets. 
4.3 ST 1DY MOTIVATION: INSTITUTIONAL. FINANCIAL AND 
. 
Ol PO1ZATi? i: OVF. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. INFORMATION ASY1INETjý ANI) 
JIYPOTIIES 
.S To BF TESTED. 
The main motivation of my thesis is to test whether theories developed in the US can also be applied 
to European countries. I show that differences in the institutional structure as well as the financial and 
corporate governance systems (for example, differences in the ownership structure and concentration, 
differences in the bank involvement amongst others) between countries, are likely to result in 
different levels of information asymmetry and I test whether the level of information asymmetry 
across countries is reflected in the share price reaction to dividend announcements. To the extent that 
dividends signal the future (and/or current) prospects of the company, then in countries characterised 
by low information asymmetries the share price reaction to announcements of dividend changes 
would be expected to be lower than in countries where investors are less informed about the 
management's actions. It seems reasonable to assume that the market reaction depends upon the 
quality and quantity of information available to the market at the moment of the announcement. " 
The information quality of the firm is often referred to as financial transparency. Financial 
transparency'2 is defined as the ability of market participants to form accurate assessments regarding 
the firm's current state and future prospects. The degree of transparency depends on both the 
willingness and ability of management to rectify any informational discrepancies with market 
participants. 13 The overall level of transparency is probably a function of several components, " which 
can be both country and firm specific. Individual firm transparency (or information disclosure) is 
important because differences in transparency may arise from individual firm characteristics such as 
size, growth prospects, profitability" or analysts following the firm. Investors in firms with low levels 
of transparency may seek improved information, which might be achieved through dividend 
ý1 ßajaj and Vijh, (1990), Elfakhani (1995) ýý Henceforth, transparency 
13 See Ang and Ciccone (2001) provide a full discussion on financial transparency and examine the components of financial 
transparency using an international sample of firms. 
14 For example, Lowenstein (1996) mentions the accounting disclosure standards; Atiase (1995), Freeman (1987), Bhushan 
(1989) mention firm-specific characteristics such as size; Benesh and Peterson (1986), Brown (1998) mention profitability 
and poor/good performance. 
15 Profitability is an important factor because firms may disclose more information in good times than in bad times. 
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announcements. 16 Therefore, firms with low levels of transparency are expected to display a greater 
positive (negative) market reaction to a dividend increase/initiation (decrease/omission) 
announcement as the market perceives dividends as substituting for the scarcity of quality 
information. 17 
A potential component of information asymmetry between countries is related to corporate 
governance structures, the legal environment and ownership structure. According to Aivazian, Booth 
and Cleary (2001) much of the financial theory on which dividend policy is based comes from a 
capital market perspective. This perspective assumes an arms length financing and generates dividend 
policy implications from models of signaling and information asymmetries. Perhaps the initial cause 
of information differences is the firm's country of origin. As countries vary in history, development 
and culture, so they vary in corporate governance structures. Certain pressures originating from the 
governance structures may induce a firm to disclose less or more information. Views on the financial 
system overlap each other to a large extent but they all discuss the differences between at least two 
types, insider systems and outsider systems" (Franks and Mayer, 1997). Detailed expositions 
regarding the different types of systems can be found in Prowse (1992,1996), Row (1993) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) amongst others. Generally, the Anglo-American system is labelled as an 
outsider system where the number of listed companies is large, the process of acquiring control (not 
only participate in equity return) is effectively market oriented (i. e. there is a liquid capital market 
with frequently traded ownership and control rights) and there are a few corporate holdings or 
interlocked patterns of ownership. In such countries information asymmetry (and agency costs) 
problems are high. Thus companies need to signal to the market their private information. In insider 
systems (or bank-based systems), such as Japan and Continental Europe, ownership is typically 
concentrated in a few hands holding large block shares of corporate equity and control rests with 
corporate insiders. These shareholders may be individuals, family holdings, financial institutions, 
management, bloc alliances, and conglomerates or cross shareholdings. In such markets, information 
16 Ang and Ciccone (2001) note that since dividends are paid from retained earnings, a minimum amount of earnings must 
be earned to perpetuate a dividend policy, transmitting a strong, informative signal to the market participants regarding 
future earnings. 
17 Measurement of financial transparency is beyond the scope of my thesis at this stage, however, it constitutes an interesting 
theme for future research and further development of the study. 
18 Studies have also distinguished between financial systems using alternative terminology, for example Zysman (1983) and 
Dosi (1990) distinguished between capital market based systems and credit based systems, Berglof (1990) distinguished 
between market oriented and bank oriented systems, Berglof and Sjogren (1995) distinguished between Arm's length 
financing and control oriented financing systems, Rajan and Zingales (1990) distinguished between Arm's length systems 
(also used the term market based system) and relationship-based systems. 
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asymmetries are low; therefore companies are not likely to recur to dividend payments to signal their 
private information. 19 
Based on the above brief description of the corporate governance systems, on numerous studies 
mentioned as well as the discussion in the Introduction of my thesis, I assume that the UK system is a 
market-based system while Germany, France and Italy operate under a bank-based system. This is 
partly due to lower ownership concentration in the UK as compared to the other three countries, 20 
which would be expected to result in higher information asymmetry in the UK. Gadhoum (2000) 
argue that ownership concentration creates a stronger link between managers and shareholders, 
decreases the information asymmetry and the need to signal the firm's prospects though frequent 
changes in dividends. He notes that the theories of dividend policy assume the widely dispersion of 
equity ownership and he investigates whether the traditional theoretical approaches (both signaling 
theory and agency theory) towards understanding dividend policy remain valid if one takes into 
account the ownership structure. Essentially, Gadhoum's objective was to find out if the integration 
of concentration as an independent variable in the dividend model can improve the explanatory power 
and the signification parameters of the model. He studies the Canadian market and concludes that 
ownership concentration plays an important role in dividend decisions. 
Despite of the relative paucity of data on shareholding structure, some striking features emerge from a 
simple cross-country comparison. For example, Table 1.1 Panel D21 highlights the major differences 
in ownership concentration between the UK, Germany, France and Italy based on 1998 figures. The 
table presents the total ownership concentration of the total shareholding and of the largest 
shareholder. Ownership data captures both direct and indirect (ultimate) shareholdings: all voting 
rights controlled directly and indirectly possibly via a cascade of intermediate holdings are added 
(alliances based on share stakes are taken into account). The companies in these studies are listed and 
exclude financial institutions. In Germany, France and Italy all large (disclosing) shareholders 
combined own more than 60 percent (France 52 percent) of the equity capital, in contrast with the UK 
where they control only about 40 percent of the voting rights. The differences in voting rights held by 
the largest shareholder are even more remarkable: the largest owners in the median UK listed 
company holds a stake of 10.9 percent in contrast with the largest shareholder in Germany (52.1 
percent), France (20 percent) and Italy (54.5 percent). About 85 percent of the listed non-financial 
19 Indeed, Dewenter and Warther (1999) found that Japanese keiretsu firms change their dividend policy more and have less 
market reaction to the change than non-keiretsu firms. Dividends of keiretsu firms arc probably less informative; there is 
less of a need to signal as these firms are not dependent on the capital markets. 
20 See Crama, Leruth, Lenneboog and Urbain (1998), Barca and Becht (2000). 
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companies in Germany, France and Italy have a large shareholder who holds at least a blocking 
minority (25 percent) and in about half the companies one shareholder owns an absolute majority. 22 
Additionally, Franks and Mayer (1997) find that almost 80 percent of the 155 French companies 
studied have at least one shareholder with more than 25 percent ownership. Moreover, LaPorta, 
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) examine the ownership structure of the 20 largest firms in 27 countries 
around the world and reported that all 20 firms in the UK fit the widely held definition 23 (90 percent) 
while Germany, France and Italy are closely held (scored 35,30 and 15 percent respectively). 
Therefore, in Germany, France and Italy ownership tends to be more concentrated than in the UK and 
this is expected to mitigate the information asymmetry problem. This would lower the importance of 
dividends as a signaling mechanism and consequently share price response to dividend 
announcements would be expected to be lower in countries where ownership is more concentrated. 
Another classification of the corporate governance in the four countries under consideration is based 
on the extent to which the market and legal system protect minority shareholders. LaPorta, Silanes 
and Sheifer (1998) examine legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, 
the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. They classify the UK as 
a Common Law country with high legal protection and the other European countries as Civil Law 
systems with low protection. The classification is based on an index of antidirector's rights 
. 
24 and 
stresses the importance of the shareholders' voting system and their right to call an Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM). Results showed that Common Law Countries (UK) have the highest 
average antidirector rights score (4.00) of all legal families. French Civil-Law countries (France and 
Italy) as well as the German Civil-Law countries (Germany) afford the worst legal protections to 
shareholders (average score 2.33). Moreover, LaPorta, Silanes and Sheifer (1998) argue that 
companies in countries with poor investor protection have more concentrated ownership of their 
shares than countries with high investor protection. They analyse the 10 largest (by market 
capitalisation), non-financial, domestic, totally private (i. e. no government ownership), public traded 
companies in 49 different countries. They find that in the UK the mean ownership by the three largest 
shareholders is equal to 0.19, in Germany 0.48, in France 0.34 and in Italy 0.58. LaPorta, Silanes and 
21 See Chapter 1: Introduction 
22 See Crama, Leruth, Renneboog and Urbain (1998) for discussion. 
23 A firm in the sample is widely held if there is no controlling shareholder. To measure control they combined the 
shareholder's direct and indirect voting rights in the firm. The shareholder has control if the sum of his/her direct and 
indirect voting rights exceeds an arbitrary cut off value (20 or 10 percent). 
24 Antidirector rights depend on six criteria: the possibility of shareholders to mail their proxy votes, shareholders are not 
required to deposit their shares prior to the annual general meeting, the cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities on the board of directors is allowed, an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, the minimum percentage of 
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Sheifer (1998) conclude that ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal protection, 
because only large shareholders can cope to receive a return on their investment. Furthermore, good 
accounting standards and shareholder protection measures are associated with a lower concentration 
of ownership indicating that concentration is indeed a response to poor investor protection. Ang and 
Ciccone (2001) compare the determinants of information asymmetry in different countries and find 
that the legal environment appears to have little effect on information availability; but when used the 
ownership dispersion as a measure of information asymmetry they concluded that information 
asymmetry is higher in countries with good legal environments than in countries with poor 
investment protection. Therefore, evidence indicates that in Germany, France and Italy the poor legal 
protection results in higher ownership concentration and consequently information asymmetry is 
expected to be lower than in the UK. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a signaling model that emphasises asymmetric information as a 
primary reason to explain the existence of financial intermediaries. They argue that financial 
intermediaries can signal the proprietary information of many borrowers at a cost that is lower than 
that of each individual borrower attempting to signal one. Information based theories of financial 
intermediation suggest that banks provide a unique information production and monitoring service in 
an information-asymmetric capital market. 25 A number of studies26 provide evidence that the presence 
of bank lending relationship disseminates information about the firm that influences the market's 
assessment of major corporate decisions. More precisely, the theoretical basis and empirical evidence 
provided in the literature suggests that bank debt serves as an important signal of firm quality and 
contributes to reducing information asymmetries. Research also suggests that the benefits of banks as 
information specialists and monitors of corporate activity may have the greatest effect on small firms 
(Fama, 1985; Slovin, Johnson and Glascock, 1992). Whereas much information may be available 
about large firms, providing them easier access to capital markets, small firms are less well known. 
Hence their ability to obtain credit from banks may serve as a signal of value. It is in this context that 
I assume that bank involvement mitigates the information asymmetry in firms and consequently, 
lessens the signaling power of dividends. Powerful banks can more effectively induce firms to reveal 
information and pay debts than markets, which rely on accounting and legal systems. 2' Baums (1998) 
details the sources of private information that banks have on firms and their use to ameliorate agency 
costs and information asymmetry. Bank influenced firms should enjoy increase access to capital 
share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an EGM is less than or equal to 10 percent, and finally when shareholders 
have pre-emptive rights that can only be waved by shareholders meeting. 23 See Diamond (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986) 
26 See Hirschey, Slovin, Zaima (1990); James (1987); James and Wier (1990); Slovin, Sushka and Iludson (1998,1990) 
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through easier access to bank debt or preferential terms on loans. In addition, bank involvement with 
a firm serves as a signal to outside investors and causes a certification effect, which makes it easier 
for firms to attract additional equity. 28 
Banks debt is an important source of funds in Germany, Italy and to a lesser extend in France. UK 
companies are even less dependent on banks for external funding, and consequently banks have less 
monitoring activity and less access to information in the UK than in the other three countries. 
Particularly in the UK, banks limit their involvement in the companies to which they provide finance 
and typically they neither subscribe for shares in the customers nor seek to exercise a control function 
via board representation. 29 In contrast, in Germany, for example; banks play a prominent role in 
financing and controlling of the companies, as banks have traditionally viewed their relationship with 
clients as a long-term one and they are often willing to step in to help a company to avoid bankruptcy. 
This has been reinforced by the ownership of shares by banks and by representation on company's 
supervisory boards. The control of equity voting rights in large companies by German banks, and the 
bank's associated representation on the supervisory boards of such companies, has been argued to 
permit them to constrain the managements of large German companies, to act more closely in 
accordance with shareholders' wishes and hence reduce the agency costs involved in the owner- 
manager relationship for large firms. However, the major source of bank's voting power at 
shareholders' meetings comes not from their own holdings of equity, but from the proxy votes they 
exercise on behalf of shareholders who place their shares with a bank for custody and administration. 
Because German shares are unregistered bearer ones, the bank's securities deposit service is widely 
used for shares. Banks, which hold shares for depositors can exercise the voting rights, attached to 
these shares under the direction of depositors. 3° Based on the role of German banks in the firms' 
corporate governance both as managerial monitors and information providers the information 
asymmetry problem is expected to be lower in Germany than in the UK. LaPorta, Silanes and Shleifer 
(1999) characterise France as a "strong bank" country where banks are allowed to both own majority 
stakes in industrial firms and invest more than 60 percent of their capital in such firms. '' The rivalling 
financial holdings, bank participations ("Banques D'affaires") and state ownership have been 
predominant form of finance32 in French companies. Moreover, companies have tended to be family- 
27 See Levine (2000) 
2$ See Agarwal and Elston (2000) 
29 Sec Edwards and Fischer (1994). Charkham (1994) 
30 Edwards and Fischer (1994) provide a detailed description of the role of banks in Germany as controlling agents and 
providers of information to outsiders. Also see Wenger and Kaserer (1997), Government Commission: German Corporate 
Governance Code: www. ecgi. org 
31 The results are based on data obtained from the Institute of International Bankers (1997) 
32 See also Government Commission: French Corporate Governance Code 
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oriented, growing through debt financing than risking loss of control by opting for equity finance33. In 
family-oriented markets information asymmetry problem is assumed to be less severe as members of 
the family often hold high positions in the management of the company34. In Italy, since 1936 and 
until 1993 the possibility for banks with demand or short-term deposits of acquiring significant 
shareholdings in non-financial companies was precluded by the policy of the Bank of Italy, which 
was in favour of separating banks from manufacturing firms. Such policy did not cover banks with 
no-short-term liabilities such as the Mediobanca, 35 which was the only one having a central role in 
Italian corporate governance. In Italy the company ownership structure can basically be characterised 
by family control, financial holding companies, cross-share holdings and state ownership. Particularly 
powerful families (such as the Agnelli's) and multinational industrial groups have control over nearly 
all listed companies. 36 The Italian government has traditionally maintained a dominant role in the 
economy and financial markets, however, the state's control participation in the economy is not 
always direct, and control is often exercised through a series of industrial holding companies. " In 
Italy (as well as in Germany38) a large number of companies are organised as pyramidal groups 
. 
39 
Pyramidal groups are organisations, where a number of companies are controlled by the same 
entrepreneur (a parent company, a controlling shareholder or coalition) through a chain of ownership 
relations. Public held companies are very few40 and the stock exchanges are comparatively 
underdeveloped, ownership and control structures are rather closed which is expected to result in 
lower information asymmetry compared to market-oriented countries. 
The discussion above indicates that in the UK investors are better protected by the legal system, 
however, the German, French and Italian weakness in legal investor protection and less developed 
financial markets may be compensated by reduced informational asymmetry due to large 
shareholdings (i. e. concentrated shareholding structure") and the role of banks, pyramidal groups and 
family holdings. However, it is difficult to generalise on the information asymmetry in different 
countries as it depends both on the country's corporate governance system and the firm's institutional 
33 International Corporate Governance: Who Holds the Reins (1995) 
34 See LaPorta, Silanes and Shleifer (1999) 
35 See Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques (1997) 
36 See Volpin (2002) 
37 See Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques (1997) 
38 See Koke (1999) 
39 See Bianco, Casavola and Ferrando (1997) for a full discussion of the role of pyramidal groups in Italy 
40 According to the Borsa Italiana Statistics only 223 companies were listed in 1998,247 companies in 1999,242 companies 
in 2000 and 237 companies in 2001 
41 Berglof (1990), Franks and Mayer (1994) found that a major institutional difference across G-7 countries is the level of 
ownership concentration and the working of the market for corporate control. Several studies reveal significant 
concentration of ownership in Germany (Edwards and Fisher, 1994; Franks and Mayer, 1994; Gordon and Schmid, 1996), in 
France (Bloch, Kremp, 1998) and in Italy (Barca, 1995; Bianchi, Bianco, Enriques, 1998). 
163 
IL 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 4 
characteristics. Several studies42 have used different approaches to measure information asymmetries. 
Due to time constrains I have not provided a measure of information asymmetry in my thesis; 
however, this constitutes an interesting future and further development of the study. 
To summarise, the motivation for conducting this study arises from: firstly, from the importance of 
dividend policy theory in the area of finance; secondly, the contradictive results found in the literature 
as to the share price reaction around the dividend announcement days and the non-controversially 
accepted evidence on dividend changes or when considering the relation between announced dividend 
changes and earnings found in the literature; thirdly, the lack of international studies, in particular 
European countries comparative studies in the area and the development of international data; 
fourthly, the differences in the level of information asymmetry between market-based (UK) and bank- 
based (Germany, France and Italy) arising from institutional, financial and corporate governance 
characteristics. In the light of these, I therefore form the hypothesis to be tested next. 
As I have already mentioned, the purpose is to investigate the share price reaction around dividend 
announcements in European countries, and then to provide an analysis in relation to the dividend and 
earnings changes in Europe in order to conclude on the information content of dividends hypothesis. 
I assume that differences between the countries under consideration (for example, corporate 
governance, financial and institutional characteristics detailed above) result to different levels of 
information asymmetry. Therefore, I would expect that: 
1IYPOTIIESIS: The Market Reaction to Dividend Changes in Bank-Based Countries (Germany, 
France and Italy) is Expected to be Lower than in Market-Based Countries (UK) If Dividends 
Mitigate the Information Asymmetries Between Managers (Insiders) and Shareholders 
(Outsiders). 
42 Dierkens (1991) use the volatility in abnormal returns around earnings announcements as a measure of information 
asymmetry about each firm; Mitra and Owers (1995) use the number of institutions holding the firm's equity, the percentage 
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4.4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data for the purpose of testing my hypotheses is collected from online databases, DataStream and 
Hydra, to cover all listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE), the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange (DAX), the Paris Stock Exchange (CAC) and the Milan Stock Exchange (MIBTEL), for 
the period from August 1987 to August 2002. Daily Share Prices and Market Indices and Earnings 
Per Share (EPS) for the four countries under consideration, are extracted from DataStream. However, 
Dividend announcement days were constructed from Hydra, as DataStream only provides the "Load 
Day". 43 Moreover, Dividend Per Share (DPS) was also obtained from Hydra as DataStream only 
provides the total yearly DPS; therefore a problem arises where companies (especially in the UK) pay 
dividends more than once per year. 
The data included in the sample had to meet three requirements. Firstly, events for which one or more 
prices were missing were excluded. Secondly, in order to avoid the problem of confounding effects of 
various announcements" firms that had any other specific earnings, stock splits, right issues 
announcements or other than cash dividend announcements within a period of twenty days either 
before or after the announcement day were also excluded. Finally, in an attempt to avoid non-linearity 
with the country Share Index, only companies registered as opposed to traded in those countries are 
included that is, foreign companies trading in my sample countries are excluded. The final sample 
consists of a total 10,717 dividend announcement events in the UK, 1,019 both in Germany, 982 in 
France and 633 in Italy, resulting in 13,351 pooled total number of observations. 
I employ the event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) for the purpose of analysing the 
share price reaction to dividend announcements in the four countries under consideration; country 
comparisons are also conducted for testing my hypothesis. Tile abnormal returns occurring in an 
interval before the event can show whether the market has anticipated the information (or implied 
inside information) contained in the event, while the abnormal returns in an interval after the event 
would be informative as to whether the market over-or-under reacts to the announcement of the event. 
The announcement effect exists only if abnormal returns are significant. Results reported are derived 
using the market model over the event window [-40, +40] days relative to the announcement day. To 
obtain the market coefficients, security returns are regressed against the corresponding market index 
of institutional equity holding, and the number of analysts following. 
43 Romon (2000) checks a random sample of 40 French companies and notes that the "Load Day" provided by DataStream 
is a day after the announcement day. However, this does not seem to be the case, as in a number of occasions the "Load 
Day" is the exactly the same for a number of years; while in some other cases, the year "Load Day" provided is after the 
nay-day corresponding to the particular dividend payment. 
See Miller and Scholes (1982) 
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in each country over the period [-290, 
-41] trading days relative to the announcement day. Further, I 
test the robustness of my results using various alternative event study specifications: the Dimson 
(1979) model, the Scholes and Williams (1977) specifications to account for non-synchronimous 
trading, the Adjusted Market Model (beta=1 and alpha=0), the Mean Adjusted Returns to overcome 
any potential problems arising from the market model, and the raw returns. 
In the light of the information-content hypothesis prophecy I further analyse the announcement day 
share price reaction according to dividends and earnings changes. Theory predicts that the shares of 
those companies which, announce dividend increases (decreases) should on average earn positive 
(negative) abnormal returns (ARs), while the shares of the remaining companies, which do not alter 
their dividend, should, on average earn only normal returns. Usually, studies consider dividend 
increases and/or decreases, or dividend initiations and/or omissions but not both. I firstly categorise 
the sample announcements into five mutually exclusive classes on the basis of the dividend change. 
Following Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), I define a dividend change as the difference 
between period t dividend (D1, t) and t-1 dividend (D1, i. 1). `5 The dividend change is given by equation: 
ODiv = 
DPS,,, 
- 
DPS,., 
_, 
DPS,,, 
_, 
Where, ADivi, t is the dividend change of firm i in period t; while DPSi, 1 and DPS1,,., is the firm amount 
of dividend per share in the in periods t and t-1 respectively. The categories considered are: dividend 
increase, dividend decrease, dividend initiation, dividend omission and no-dividend change. Dividend 
initiation category is to be constructed by identifying those firms whose annual dividends moved 
from zero to a positive number and dividend omission category are those companies which moved 
from a positive to zero dividend. 4' The purpose of this classification is twofold: firstly, I observe the 
share price variation around dividend announcements in relation to the type of the dividend change 
announcement in each country and secondly, that enables me to observe the group differences 
between the countries under consideration. 
,s Data on expected dividends and/or earnings would have been ideal but such data is scarce, particularly for continental 
countries. 
46 1 do not require that dividend change occur after a set number of years of stable dividend policy (for example, I lealy and 
Palepu (1988) required that a firm paid dividends for ten years to be included in their omission sample). 
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In order to distinguish the separate effect of a dividend announcement on a security performance it is 
necessary to hold constant other types of information that may be related to dividend changes. 4' 
Lintner (1956) has shown that the variable that contributes the most in explaining dividend changes 
was current earnings. In a cross-country comparative study, it is important to isolate the impact of 
dividend announcements because of different timing in dividend and earnings announcements in each 
country. For example, in the UK and France dividends and earnings are generally announced at the 
same time, while German and Italian companies usually do not announce their earnings and dividends 
at the same time (earnings announcements precede dividend announcements). 48 This means that in 
Germany and Italy, investors are better informed about the performance of the company when 
dividends are announced therefore abnormal returns on the dividend announcement day should be 
lower. Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) argue that dividends could corroborate the information in 
earnings. However, earnings can be "manipulated" by clever accounting practices, and so may be 
interpreted with scepticism by investors. 49 Also, it might be the case that investors perceive dividends 
as realised income in contrast with earnings, which is only an accounting figure in the hands of the 
managers. Aharony and Swary (1980) provide evidence that the significant abnormal returns realised 
at the time of the announcements of dividend changes do not reflect diffusion or leakage of the 
information conveyed by earnings, but rather, additional information generated by the dividend 
announcements. Moreover, Eddy and Sheifer (1992) provide evidence to support that earnings and 
dividend announcements are not perfect substitutes and that dividends provide information beyond of 
what is provided by earnings. 
I estimate the share price reaction to dividend changes and to earnings changes in each country by 
dividing the total sample into groups according to both earnings and dividend changes. The earnings 
change (AEPS1, t) is to be calculated as the difference between the firm current year earnings per share 
(EPSj,, ) and previous year (EPS;,,. i) divided by EPSi t. i: 
EPS1,, 
- 
EPSi, 
r_1 DEPS1 
r= 
(2) 
EPS;, 1_, 
The groups considered are presented in Table 4.1: 
"Pettit (1972), Lonie, Abeyratna. Sinclair (1996), Marsh (1993), Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) 
48 See Amihud and Murgia (1997) for Germany and Doing Business in Italy (2000) 
49 See Kaplan and Roll (1972) 
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TABLE 4.1: SIIARR PRICE REACTION To DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS A_ 
_ 
ou CE j's 
Table shows the sample groups considered according to dividend change announcements in relation to earnings 
announcements. Notation: INC=Increase, NC=No-change, DEC=Decrease, INI=Initiation, OMI=Omission, 
DPS=Dividend Per Share, EPS=Earnings Per Share. According to Aharony and Swary (1980), Eddy and 
Sheifer (1992) dividend announcements should provide information beyond of what is provided by earnings 
announcements. Cases where DPS and EPS changes contradict (e. g., INC. DPS-DEC. EPS, DEC. DPS-INC. EPS 
etcl should he of special interest. 
DIVIDENDS PER SIIAIRE 
ANNOUNCEMENT INCREASE/ No-CIIANGE DECREASE. /
INITIATION OMISSION 
INC. EPS 
- INCREASE INC. EPS-INC. DPS INC. EPS 
- 
NC. DPS DEC DPS EARNINGS . 
PEIL NO-CIIANGE NC. EPS 
-INC. DPS NC. EPS - NC. DPS NC. EPS - DEC. DPS 
SIIARE DEC. EPS 
- 
DEC. EPS 
- DECREASE INC. DPS DEC. EPS - NC. DPS DEC. DPS 
The rationale of separating the firms according to the earnings change and dividend change is to 
isolate the impact of dividend change announcements on the share price behaviour and investigate 
whether dividends provide information beyond of that provided by earnings announcements. In this 
case when considering the explanatory variables of the abnormal returns on the event day, the 
dividend change coefficient should be significantly higher than the earnings change coefficient. 
Therefore, abnormal returns on the dividend announcement day should be attributed to the 
information content of dividends. It should be noted that the situation in which earnings news and 
dividend news appear to conflict (for example, INC. DPS-DEC. EPS, DEC. DPS-INC. EPS etc) should be 
of special interest. For example, Woolridge and Ghosh (1985) noted that a dividend cut, if combined 
with an earnings increase, may signal good news to the market, in contrast with the prediction of the 
information content hypothesis. Therefore, in the case when dividend and earnings changes are of 
opposite sign, the stock market reaction should enable us to determine which of the two news items 
appears to exert the stronger influence on share prices. 
In the next section I present the empirical results of this part of my thesis. Firstly, I present the share 
price reaction on the dividend announcement days and secondly, the share price reaction to dividend 
and earnings changes before the chapter concludes. 
4.5 ES 1 
. 
TS 
In this section I provide the results on the share price reaction on the dividend announcement day 
firstly according to dividend changes (ODPS) and secondly according to earnings changes (iEPS). 
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The purpose is threefold: firstly, I observe whether share prices on the dividend announcement day 
react according to the signalling hypothesis, s° i. e. whether firms that increase or initiate (decrease or 
omit) dividends earn positive (negative) abnormal returns on the announcement day; secondly, I 
distinguish between the dividend and earnings announcement effects on share prices, and; thirdly, I 
provide comparisons between the ODPS and REPS groups identified in each country as well as 
comparisons between the countries under consideration. 
Table 4.2 shows the frequency of dividend changes. Panel A reports the percentage of events in each 
of the five dividend change groups. In the UK managers are more likely to increase dividends 
(dividend increases equal to 47 percent) and more reluctant to dividend decreases (6.1 percent). No- 
changes is the second biggest dividend change group and constitute 43 percent of the sample, while 
dividend omissions and initiations are less popular, only 1.8 percent of the sample. However, in bank- 
based countries managers do not change dividends frequently: in Germany and Italy 53.9 percent of 
the announcements contain no-change in dividends while in France no-changes amount to 47.6 
percent of the sample. Similarly, the remaining dividend change groups in the bank-based countries 
follow a likewise trend. In Germany (increases equal to 30 percent, decreases equal to 7 percent), 
France (increases equal to 32 percent, decreases equal to 13 percent) and Italy (increases equal to 23 
percent, decreases equal to 12 percent). In all three bank-based countries dividend omissions 
constitute around 4 percent of the data, while dividend initiations are equal to 5 percent, 3 percent and 
7 percent in Germany, France and Italy respectively. 
Table 4.2, Panel B shows the t-statistics of the differences in means in the frequency of dividend 
change. I test the hypothesis that in the UK managers increase (decrease) their dividends more (less) 
frequently than in the other three countries because in the UK dividends are more important in their 
role to mitigate information asymmetries. The t-statistics of the differences in the frequency of 
dividend changes in the market-based countries (UK) compared bank-based countries (Germany, 
France and Italy) are all significant, indicating that in the UK managers announce dividend increases 
more frequently than in any other country while no-changes, decreases, initiations and omissions are 
less frequent. This could be interpreted as an indication that in the UK where there is higher level of 
information asymmetry than in any other country, managers use dividends to signal the prospects of 
the company to the outsiders. On the other hand, in bank-based countries where outsiders are better 
informed about the prospects of the company, the managers are less "concerned" when announcing 
so See Charest (1978), Aharony and Swary (1980), Brickley (1983), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Ilcaly and Palepu (1988), 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990). 
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dividend changes. The rest of the table provides comparisons between the bank-based countries. The 
frequency differences between Germany and France are not generally statistically significant except 
that in Germany managers announce no dividend changes or initiations more frequently than in 
France. Comparisons between Germany and Italy show that the dividend increase group in Germany 
is statistically larger than in Italy in contrast with the dividend decreases group. The t-statistics of the 
differences between France and Italy show that in France managers increase dividends more 
frequently, however no-changes and initiation groups are statistically lower than in Italy. 
TABLE 4.2 FREQUENCY QEDIVIDEND 
__ 
CHANGESIN IIIF XUt; YdAA4 C-IUN121TAI. Y 
Table shows the number of companies in my sample that announce dividend changes during the period August 1987 to 
August 2002. The sample is divided in companies that announce dividend Increases (INC), Decreases (DEC), No- 
changes (NC), Initiations (INI), and Omissions (OMI). The percentage of events in each dividend-change-group 
is shown in Panel A. Panel B shows the T-Statistics of the differences in means of proportions of companies in dividend 
change groups between the four countries under consideration. T-Statistics ***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant 
at 0.05 level and *Significant at 0.10 level 
PANEL A: TILE PROPORTION OF COMPANIES IN EACH DIVIDEND CHANGE GROUT' 
N INCREASES DECREASES No CHANGE INITIATIONS OMISSIONS 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 10717 47.3 6.1 43.1 1.8 1.8 
GERMANY 1019 30.1 7.5 53.9 4.8 3.7 
FRANCE 982 31.9 13.4 47.6 3.4 3.8 
ITALY 633 23.1 11.7 53.9 7.4 3.9 
lký 
PANEL B: TILE T-STATISTICS OF TIIE DIFFERENCES IN MEANS OF PROPORTIONS OF COMPANIES IN TIIE DIVIDEND 
CHANGE GROUPS 
INCREASE DECREASE CHANGE 
INITIATION OMISSION 
T uK. cirt tmANY 
4*6 14.0 
-1.74 -3.08*** 4.04 -2.83 
T. m NcE 
T3 
-5.49 -1.66 -0600 . 2.66 
T LrK. rr ALy 16.56 000 -3.63 -2.26 -5.06 -2.45 
T rERMANy 
. 
mNcF 
-0.11 -0.97 3.47 1.85 0.17 
T rF. 3.18 -2.69 0.18 -2.05 -0.19 
T FRANCF 
-ITALY 
3.28 0.73 
-2.85 -3.52 -0.33 
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4.5.1 TIIF. SHARE PRICE REACTION TO DIVIDEND ANNUMCEMENTS AKOLINi1 TJIE ILME D 
ANNOUNCEMENT DAY IN TIIF. UK. GERMANY, FRANCE AND ITALY 
Table 4.3 shows the daily share price behaviour for 10 days before and after the dividend 
announcement day in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. The results are shown according to the 
dividend change announced. Panel A shows the results in the UK. Surprisingly, for dividend 
increases and decreases only day 0 results are statistically significant; however, when the dividend 
announcement contains an initiation or omission results are significant on the announcement day as 
well as in the pre- and post-announcement period. However, in the pre- and post- event periods 
abnormal returns are not all significant and with correct sign to conclude that the announcements are 
expected and that the market is over- or under- reacting to such events. Results appear to be 
consistent with the information content of dividends explanation, that is, managers use dividend 
increases (decreases) announcements in order to signal the good (bad) prospects of the company. The 
results show that shareholders earn a positive return of 0.57 percent (t = 4.39) when dividend 
increases are announced, but returns are negative, 
-1.33 percent (t = -10.24) when dividends are 
decreased. The empirical support to the information content hypothesis is further reinforced by my 
results, as the share price reaction to dividend no-change announcements does not appear to be 
statistically different from zero (returns are equal to 0.16, t=1.23). Moreover, as expected 
shareholders' returns on the announcement day of dividend initiations are positive, equal to 1.58 
percent (t = 12.15); in contrast returns on the announcement of dividend omissions are negative, (- 
0.55 percent) and significant (t = 
-4.22). My results are consistent with previous evidence (e. g. 
Aharony and Swary, 1980, Lonie et al, 1996) and suggest that the information content of dividends is 
priced in the market. 
In contrast, Panel B shows that in Germany, returns on the dividend increase announcement day are 
negative (-0.03 percent) and insignificant (t = 
-0.20). This is also the case when dividend initiations 
are announced, (abnormal returns equal to 
-0.03 percent, t= -0.21). Dividend decrease and omission 
announcements result to positive and significant abnormal returns of 0.44 percent (t = 2.59) and 1.17 
percent (t = 6.91), respectively. These results are consistent with the importance and monitoring role 
of banks in Germany. As mentioned in Section 5.3 banks debt is an important source of funds in 
Germany. Thus, the results suggest that an increase in dividends would decrease internal available 
funds and that would lead to higher credit risk as well as longer repayment period. However, in 
Germany shareholders possess an important amount of insight information, i. e. there is limited 
information asymmetry (at least, lower than in the UK) due to the fact that German banks own 
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an important share of the market, 5' play a prominent role in the control of the company through 
representation on the supervisory board of the company, exercise voting rights and have the right to 
voting rights proxy. Therefore, banks are not likely to allow companies to pay dividends at the 
expense of their returns. Thus, an alternative explanation of these results is that in Germany 
shareholders interpret a dividend increase/initiation as the company being in deficiency of any 
positive net present values opportunities. In contrast, shareholders reward dividend 
decreases/omissions because they are interpreted as the less costly source of funding profitable 
opportunities. 
According to the results set out in Panel C, France abnormal returns on the dividend announcement 
dates are not significantly different from zero but in general they appear to be statistically significant 
in the pre- and post- announcement periods (further analysed below). Dividend-increasing 
announcements result in returns equal to 0.15 (1 = 0.85) while abnormal returns earned by dividend- 
decreasing companies equal to 
-0.03 (t = -0.17). The results of no-change companies appear to be 
insignificantly positive; equal to 0.18 (t = 1.02). Results of the remaining two dividend change groups 
are similar to the results obtained in Germany and equal to 
-0.10 (t = -0.58) for dividend initiations 
and 0.28 (t = 1.59) for dividend omissions. The insignificant announcement day share price reaction 
may be attributed to the low level of information asymmetry in France, as companies tend to be 
family companies, government or bank owned. Evidence obtained in my tests is similar to Romon 
(2000) who also obtains statistically insignificant share price reaction around the dividend 
announcement dates. 
Panel D illustrates the share price reaction around the dividend announcement dates in Italy. As 
expected, results are similar to the other two bank-based countries. Dividend-increasing firms appear 
to experience a negative reaction equal to 
-0.36 (t = -2.79) while the market appears to react 
positively but insignificantly to dividend decreases, (ARs = 0.05 percent, t=0.38). As in Germany 
and France, returns on the dividend initiation announcements are negative but not significant (ARs = 
-0.02 percent, t= -0.19), while the abnormal returns of companies that decrease their dividends are 
positive and significant (ARs = 0.98 percent, t=7.62). These results are not consistent with the US 
and UK evidence and suggest that in Italy dividends do not provide consistent information to the 
market. 
51 According to the Capital Structure shown in Table 4.2, Chapter 4 banks own 14 percent of the market. 
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RFArTrnN Aunºnvn Tarr. Drvrnr 
Table shows the abnormal returns around the dividend announcement day in the UK, Germany France and Italy. Results are 
reported according to the five dividend change groups being the dividend Increase (INC), Decrease (DEC), No-change 
(NC), Initiation (INI), and Omission (OMI). Results reported are calculated using the Market Model. The robustness of the 
results has been checked using alternative models. T-Statistics ***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level and 
*Significant at 0.10 level. 
PANEL A: UNITED KINGDOM 
D INC T-STAT DEC T-STAT NC T-STAT INI T-STAT OMI T-STAT 
5 
0.055 
-0.42 -0.036 -0.28 -0.039 -0.30 0.106 0.81 -0.244 -1.88 
0.014 
, -0.11 -0.051 -0.39 0.037 0.29 -0.119 . 0.92 -0.236 -1.81 
.8 4024 
-0.18 -0.012 -0.10 0.027 0.21 -0.017 . 0.13 0.123 0.95 
-7 0.018 0.14 -0.051 -0.39 0.018 0.14 0.106 0.81 -0.096 -0.74 
.6 0.033 0.26 -0.302 -2.32 0.048 0.37 0.144 1.11 0.103 0.80 
-5 0.027 0.20 0.031 0.24 0.046 0.35 -0.258 -1.98 -0.002 -0.01 
.4 0.092 0.71 -0.022 -0.17 0.018 0.14 0.244 1.88 -0.034 -0.26 
.3 0.099 0.76 0.014 0.11 0.013 0.10 0.208 1.60 0.269 2,07- 
.2 0.144 1.11 0.011 0.08 -0.007 -0.05 0.106 0.82 0.097 0.74 
-1 0.133 1.02 0.000 0.00 0.008 0.06 0.302 2.32 -0.144 -1.11 
0 0.571 4.39 
-1.331 -10.24 0.160 1.23 1.580 12.15 -0.549 -4.22' 
1 0.125 0.96 0.297 2.28 0.081 0.62 0.415 3.20 0.136 1.05 
2 0.027 0.21 0.087 0.67 0.005 0.04 0.121 0.93 
-0.446 -3.43 
3 0.026 0.20 0.072 0.56 
-0.008 -0.06 -0.048 -0.37 -0.197 -1.51 
4 
-0.040 -0.31 0.139 1.07 -0.055 -0.43 -0.221 -1.70 -0.109 -0.84 
5 
-0.064 -0.50 0.056 0.43 -0.066 -0.51 -0.366 -2.81 0.161 1.24 
6 
-0.002 -0.01 0.095 0.73 -0.014 -0.11 0.102 0.79 -0.214 -1.65 
7 
-0.083 -0.64 0.085 0.65 -0.063 -0.49 -0.283 -2.18'* -0.225 -1.73 
8 
-0.128 -0.99 -0.069 -0.53 -0.056 -0.43 -0.102 -0.79 0.252 1.94' 
9 
-0.061 -0.47 0.150 1.16 -0.054 -0.41 0.089 0.69 0.257 1.98 
10 
-0.105 -0.81 0.166 1.28 -0.045 -0.34 -0.023 -0.18 -0.099 -0.76 
PANE L B: GERMANY 
DAY INC T-STAT DEC T-STAT NC T-STAT INI T-STAT 
- 
Oh11 T-STAT 
. 
10 0.034 0.20 0.031 0.18 
-0.088 -0.52 0.525 3.09 orr 0.647 3.81 
.9 0.086 0.50 0.384 2.26 0.150 0.89 0.007 0.04 0.402 2.37 
.8 -0.028 -0.16 0.111 0.65 0,059 0.35 0.326 1.92 -0.188 -1.11 
-7 0.318 1.87' 0.081 0.47 0.032 0.19 0.133 0.78 0.222 1.31 
.6 -0.067 -0.39 0.276 1.62 0.085 0.50 -0.307 -1.81' -0.316 - 1.86 
.5 -0.085 -0.50 -0.133 -0.78 0.147 0.87 0.066 0.39 0.171 1.01 
-4 0.066 0.39 0.476 2.80 -1.212 -7.14 0.153 0,90 0.204 1.20 
-3 -0.055 -0.33 -0.133 -0.78 1.165 6.86 0.658 3.87 0.675 3.97 
$ 
-2 0.166 0.98 0.390 2.30 0.016 0.09 0.613 3.61 -0.268 . 1.57 
.1 0.138 0.81 -0.022 -0.13 0.227 1.34 -0.657 -3.87 -0.308 -1.81 
0 
-0.035 -0.20 0.439 2.59 . 1.040 -6.12 -0.035 . 0.21 1.173 6.91 go. 
1 
-0.020 -0.12 0.590 3.48 1.324 7.80 0.292 1.72 -0.274 -1.61 
2 0.000 0.00 
-0.340 -2.00 0.018 0.10 -0.200 -1.18 1.350 7.95www 
3 
-0.004 -0.03 -0.170 -1.00 -0.074 -0.44 0.725 4.27 qqw- 0.471 2.78 
4 0.103 0.61 0.105 0.62 0.045 0.26 
-0.242 -1.43 -0.678 -3.99 
5 0.000 0.00 0.006 0.04 
-0.054 -0.32 -0.161 -0.95 0.156 0.92 
6 0.153 0.90 0.265 1.56 0.066 0.39 
-0.301 -1.77 -1.189 
7 0.110 0.65 0.007 0.04 
-0.059 -0.35 -0.138 -0.81 0.248 1.46 
8 0.101 0.59 
-0.307 -1.81' -0.068 -0.40 0.117 0.69 -0.671 -3.95 
9 
-0.099 -0.59 -0.436 -2.57 0.084 0.50 0.552 3.25 -0.188 -1.11 
10 
-0.249 -1.47 0.071 0.42 0.030 0.18 -0.083 -0.49 0.162 0.96 
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PANEL. C: FRANCE. 
DAY INC T-STAT DEC T-STAT NC T-STAT INI T-STAT OMI T-STAT 
-10 -0.146 -0.82 0.063 0.35 -0.155 -0.87 -1.279 -7.15"' 0.743 4.16"' 
.9 -0.202 -1.13 0.268 1.50 0.189 1.06 2.180 12.19"' 0.207 1.16 
-8 -0.023 -0.13 0.854 4.78**" 0.215 1.20 -0.678 -3.79"' -0.610 -3.41 
-7 0.075 0.42 -0.113 -0.63 0.280 1.56 0.430 2.41 "' 1.166 6.52"' 
-6 -0.300 -1.68' 0.011 0.06 -0.188 -1.05 -0.310 -1.73" -0.428 -2.39" 
.5 -0.095 -0.53 0.319 1.78' 0.016 0.09 -0.467 -2.61"** -0.020 -0.11 
.4 0.140 0.78 0.248 1.39 0.026 0.15 -0.173 -0.97 -1.194 -6.67"' 
.3 -0.211 -1.18 -0.516 -2.88"' 0.126 0.70 -0.141 -0.79 0.694 3.88"' 
-2 0.284 1.59 0.237 1.32 0.120 0.67 -0.459 -2.57"' -0.242 -1.35 
-1 0.028 0.15 -0.521 -2.91"' 0.156 0.87 -0.046 -0.26 0.553 3.09"' 
0 0.151 0.85 
-0.031 -0.17 0.183 1.02 -0.103 . 0.58 0.284 1.59 
1 0.213 1.19 0.458 2.56'** 
-0.121 -0.68 -0.397 -2.22" 0.899 5.02"' 
2 
-0.074 -0.42 0.148 0.82 -0.208 -1.16 -0.487 -2.72"' 0.388 2.17" 
3 0.177 0.99 
-0.486 -2.72"' 0.090 0.50 -0.289 -1.62 -0.720 -4.02"** 
4 0.239 1.34 0.009 0.05 0.003 0.02 
-0.394 -2.20" 0.943 5.27"' 
5 
-0.218 -1.22 -0.015 -0.09 -0.161 -0.90 -0.499 -2.79" 0.262 1.47 
6 
-0.094 -0.52 -0.307 -1.72' -0.011 -0.06 0.281 1.57 -1.230 -6.88"** 
7 0.032 0.18 
-0.362 -2.03" -0.074 -0.41 -0.130 -0.73 0.457 2.56"' 
8 
-0.053 -0.30 0.136 0.76 -0.347 -1.94 0.451 2.52" 0.497 2.78"' 
9 
-0.170 -0.95 -0.205 -1.15 -0.024 -0.13 -0.736 -4.12"' 0.467 2.61"$* 
10 
-0.322 -1.80' -0.028 -0.16 -0.122 -0.68 -0.237 -1.32 -0.058 -0.32 
PA NF. 1. D: ITA LY 
DAY INC T-STAT DEC T-STAT NC T-STAT INI T-STAT OMI T-STAT 
-10 -0.302 -2.33" -0.263 -2.04" -0.050 -0.38 0.006 0.04 0.648 5.01 
-9 0.047 0.36 -0.122 -0.94 0.001 0.01 -0.113 -0.88 -0.186 -1.44 
-8 -0.064 -0.49 -0.062 -0.48 0.013 0.10 -0.066 -0.51 -0.409 -3.16"' 
.7 0.105 0.81 0.211 1.64' 0.277 2.15" -0.207 -1.60 -0.200 -1.55 
-6 0.058 0.45 0.077 0.60 0.092 0.71 -0.174 -1.35 0.295 2.28'' 
-5 -0.002 -0.01 -0.042 -0.33 -0.128 -0.99 0.174 1.35 -0.676 -5.23"** 
.4 -0.175 -1.35 0.082 0.64 0.328 2.54"' 0.143 1.10 1.062 8.22"' 
-3 -0.069 -0.53 -0.008 -0.06 -0.133 -1.03 0.705 5.46"' -0.141 . 1.09 
-2 0.183 1.42 -0.027 -0.21 0.330 2.55"' -0.102 -0.79 0.323 2.50"' 
-1 0.148 1.15 0.196 1.52 -0.083 -0.64 -0.353 -2.73"' -0.851 -6.59"' 
0 
. 
0.360 
-2.79' 0.049 0.38 -0.151 . 1.17 -0.024 . 0.19 0.984 7.62"' 
1 
-0.138 -1.07 -0.219 -1.70' -0.123 -0.95 -0.026 -0.20 0.627 4.85"' 
2 
-0.201 -1.55 0.289 2.24" -0.206 -1.59 -0.769 -5.95"' -0.229 -1.77" 
3 
-0.309 -2.39"' 0.254 1.97" -0.163 -1.26 0.361 2.80"' 0.212 1.64' 
4 0.010 0.08 
-0.049 -0.38 -0.157 -1.21 0.645 5.00"' 0.480 3.71*0" 
5 0.164 1.27 0.069 0.54 0.047 0.36 
-0.262 -2.03"' -0.119 -0.92 
6 
-0.046 -0.36 -0.112 -0.87 0.026 0.20 -0.232 -1.80"' 0.133 1.03 
7 0.226 1.75' 0.092 0.71 0.093 0.72 0.003 0.02 0.196 1.52 
8 
-0.049 -0.38 0.121 0.93 -0.308 -2.39"' -0.021 -0.16 -0.059 -0.46 
9 0.003 0.02 
-0.384 -2.97"' -0.096 -0.75 -0.511 -3.9600' 0.324 2.51 *0* 
10 
-0.175 -1.35 0.444 3.44"' 0.089 0.69 0.476 3.69"' -0.296 -2.29"' 
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Table 4.4 shows the cumulative abnormal returns during and in the pre- and post-event periods. UK 
results are hosing in Part (1). Dividend-increasing firms experience positive and significant returns in 
the days surrounding the event [-1, +1] equal to 0.83 percent (t = 3.68). In the pre-event period, [-20, 
- 
2) the cumulative abnormal returns of 0.36 percent are not statistically significant. In the post-event 
period cumulative abnormal returns are 0.76 percent (t = 1.33). Dividend-decreasing firms earn 
significantly negative abnormal returns, 
-1.33 percent (t = -10.24) in the days surrounding the event [- 
1, +1]. The pre- and post-event period returns are not statistically significant (-0.20 percent, t= -0.35 
and 0.95 percent, t=1.68 respectively). The market reaction to no-change announcements equal to 
0.24 percent is not statistically significant (t = 1.10) as no news is being signalled to the market. 
Dividend initiations result to a positive market reaction. Around the announcement returns equal to 
0.30 percent (t = 10.20), and in the post-event period equal to 1.21 percent (t = 2.13). In the pre-event 
period however, returns are negative but insignificant (-0.12 percent, t= -0.21). On the other hand, 
dividend omission announcements result to negative returns equal to 
-0.56 (t = -2.47) during days [-1, 
+1] as well as in the post-event period [+2, +20]. 
Returns on the German market are shown in Part (2). The cumulative abnormal returns over the 
period [-1, + 1] of dividend increasing firms result in positive 0.08 percent, but insignificant (t = 
0.28). In the pre-event period, [-20, 
-2] returns are positive and insignificant (0.79 percent, t=1.07), 
and in the post-event period returns are negative, (-0.36 percent) but insignificant (t = -0.49). The 
abnormal returns over [-1, +1] of dividend decrease announcements of 1 percent are significant (t 
3.42); but insignificant in the pre-event period (0.69 percent, t=0.93) as well as in the post-event 
period (-0.52 percent, t= 
-0.70). Dividend no-change announcements' market reaction is again only 
significant during the days surrounding the event, [-1, +1]; returns are equal to 0.51 percent (t = 1.74) 
and insignificant in the post- and pre-event periods. The German market reaction to dividend 
initiation announcements appears to be significant only during days [-20, 
-2], returns equal to 1.75 
percent (t = 2.36) but insignificant in all other periods studied. Dividend omission announcements 
result in a positive market reaction around the event period, days 
-1 to +1, returns equal to 0.59 
percent (t = 2.01), but there is no significant reaction either in the pre- or post-event periods. 
The cumulative abnormal returns on the French market are shown in Part (3). Dividend increase 
announcements result in positive returns of 0.39 percent but insignificant (t = 1.27). Returns in the 
pre-event period are insignificant (-0.39 percent, t= 
-0.50), but significant in the post-event 
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period (ARs = 
-1.42 percent, t= -1.82). On days -1 to +1 dividend decreasing firms earn 
insignificantly negative abnormal returns. In the pre-event period cumulative abnormal returns are 
insignificantly positive and in the post-event period returns equal to 
-1.67 percent (t = -2.14). 
Dividend no-change announcements result in significantly not different from zero returns but 
dividend initiations and omissions returns are significant during the event dates, [-1, +11, as well as in 
the pre-and post-event periods. 
The market reaction to dividend announcements in Italy is shown in Part (4). In the pre-event period 
(days 
-20 to -2) dividend increasing firms earn positive and significant abnormal returns equal to 1.29 
(t = 10.00), but in the post-event period returns are significantly negative (-0.61 percent, t= 
-4.71). 
During the days of dividend increase announcements returns equal to 
-0.35 percent (t = -2.71). 
Cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of dividend decreases, i. e. days 
-1 to +1, are 
insignificant. In the pre-event period, days 
-20 to -2, cumulative abnormal returns equal to 0.54 
percent (t = 4.17) and in the post-event period, days +2 to +20 returns equal to 1.54 percent (t = 
11.92). Dividend no-change announcements result in a negative significant market reaction. The 
significant positive returns during the days 
-20 to -2 are reversed on days -1 to +1 (returns equal to- 
0.36, t= 
-2.77) and this negative reaction is continued through days +2 to +20 (returns equal to -0.76, 
t= 
-5.86). Dividend initiating firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns during all 
three announcement periods studied. However, shareholders reward dividend omitting firms which 
earn 0.76 percent (t = 5.88) but the share price behaviour is reversed on days +2 to +20 
- 
returns 
equal to 
-2.19 (t = -16.98). 
Table 4.4 Panel B provides intra-country comparisons of the returns on and around the dividend 
announcement dates. Comparisons are conducted between dividend-change groups in each country. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the t-statistics of the differences in means on the dividend announcement 
dates, i. e. on Day 0 and [-1, +11 respectively. Columns 2 and 3 show the comparisons in the pre- and 
post-event market reaction. Comparative results between the UK dividend change groups are shown 
in Part (1). The t-statistics of the differences are found to be statistically significant on days 
surrounding the event (Day 0 and Days 
-1 to +1) but not in the pre- or post-event periods. Dividend- 
increasing firms earn statistically higher returns than dividend-decreasing, dividend-omitting or 
dividend no-change firms. However, dividend initiating firms experience significantly higher share 
price reaction than firms announcing any other type of dividend changes. On days 0 and 
-1 to +1 
dividend decreasing firms earn statistically lower returns than dividend no-change firms or dividend 
omitting firms. Moreover, shareholders reward dividend initiations but not dividend omissions. 
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Part (2) shows the t-statistics of the differences in Germany. On Day 0 and days 
-1 to +1 dividend 
increasing firms experience lower returns than dividend decreasing firms but the difference does not 
appear to be statistically significant. Statistically different abnormal returns are found between 
dividend-increasing and omitting firms, as well as dividend-decreasing and dividend no change firms. 
Announcement of dividend omissions result in higher abnormal returns than dividend no change or 
dividend initiation announcements, but the difference significant only on Day 0. Generally 
differences do not appear to be statistically significant. 
Part (3) provides comparisons of the returns between the dividend change groups in France. The 
market reaction in France does not appear to significantly differ according to the type of the dividend 
change announcement. However, on Day 0 dividend increase announcements result in higher returns 
than dividend decrease and initiation announcements. In the pre-event period, the highest difference 
occurs between dividend increase and no change announcements; however the t-statistics of the 
difference in means is not significant. In the post-event period dividend-increasing firms earn 
statistically higher abnormal returns than dividend initiating firms but statistically lower returns than 
dividend no change firms. 
Part (4) shows the t-statistics of the dividend announcement returns differences in means in Italy. 
Results show that on Day 0 dividend increases result in lower abnormal returns than dividend 
decreases, initiations, omissions, and no changes. Significant differences occur between the market 
reaction to dividend omissions, initiations or no changes. In Days [-1 to +11 cumulative abnormal 
returns differences between the dividend change groups appear to be statistically not different from 
zero, however dividend increases appear to be higher than dividend no changes and omissions. The 
significant differences between dividend omissions, no changes and initiations appear to be 
confounded only on day 0. As in the other two bank-based countries, neither the pre-event period nor 
the post-event period abnormal returns differences of the means between the dividend groups appear 
to be statistically significant. 
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TABLE 4-4* TIIF IMPACT OF DIVIDEND CHANCES ANNO uNCEll jj'S ON DII )r)CKE jjLFVF WINDOW 
Table shows, in Panel A, the dividend cumulative abnormal returns in the UK, Germany, France and Italy around different event windows. 
The event windows considered are Day 0, Days 
-1 to +1, the pre-event period Days -20 to -2 and the post-event period +2 to +20. Results 
are reported according to the dividend change announcements. Five groups are considered being Increase (INC), Decrease (DEC), No- 
change (NC), Initiation (INI), and Omission (OMI). Panel B shows the t-statistics of the difference in means between the dividend change 
ouns. T-Statistics ***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level and *Significant at 0.10 level 
PANEL A: ARS AND CARS IN DIFFERENT EVENT WINDOWS 
1 UNITED KINGDOM (2) GERMANY 
DI's DAY 0 CAR. CAR. CAR DAY 0 CAlt. CAR 
.,. 
CAR 
INC 
0.571*** 
(4.39) 
0.829"y 
(3.68) 
0.363 
(0.64) 
0.756 
(1.33) 
-0.035 
-0.20) 
0.082 
(0.28) 
0.790 
(1.07) 
-0.360 
(-0.49) 
DEC -1.331"'" (-10.24) -1.034 (-4.59) 
-0.200 (-0.35) 
0.950 
(1.68) 
0.439 " 
(2.59 
1.007 
(3.42) 
0.691 
(0.93) 
-0.515 
-0.70 
NC 
0.160 
1.23 
0.248 
1.10 
0.383 
(0.68) 
-0.325 
-0.57 
-1.040 
(-6.12) 
0.511 
(1.74) 
0.697 
(0.94) 
0.002 
(0.01 
I 
1.580 
(12.15) 
2.297 
(10.20) 
-0.115 
(-0.20) 
1.209 
(2.13) 
-0.035 
(-0.21) 
-0.400 
(-1.36) 
1.746 
(2.36) 
0.638 
(0.86) 
OMI -0.549*** (-4.22) 
-0.557 
(-2.47) 
0.440 
(0.78) 
-0.392 
(-0.69) 
1.173 
(6.91) 
0.591 
(2.01) 
1.207 
(1.63) 
-1.160 
(-1.57) 
(3) FRANCE (4) I TALY 
INC 
0.151 
(0.85) 
0.392 
(1.27) -0.390 
-0.50 
-1.418 
0.82 
-0.360 
-2.79 
-0.350 (-2.71) 
1.291 
10.00 
-0.609 eve 
-4.711 
DEC -0.031 
-0.17 
-0.093 
-0.30 
1.026 
(1.32) 
-1.667 (-2.14) 
0.049 
(0.38) 
0.026 
0.20 
0.539 
4.17 
_ 1.540 
11.92 
NC 0.183 0.02) 
0.218 
(0.70) 
0.469 
0.60 
-1.088 (-1.40) -0.151 (-1.17) -0.358 
-2.77 
0.991 
7.67 
-0: 775--8"r- 
-5.86 
INI -0.103 
-0.58 
-0.547 (-1.76) 
1.534 
1.97 
-5.391 (-6.91) -0.024 
-0.19 
-0.403 
-3.12) 
-1.230 
-9.52) 
-0.983 
0.61 
Ontl 
0.284 
(1.59) 
1.735 
(5.60) -2.434 (-3.12) -2.164 (-2.78) 
0.984 
(7.62) 
0.760 
5.88) -0.846 (-6.55) -2.194 
-16.98) 
PANEL B: COMPARISON OFTIIE RETURNS (BETWEEN TIlE GROUPS 
(1) UNITED KINGDOM (2) GERMANY 
DAY 0 CAR. CAR 
.,. 
CAR, igm I)AY0 CAR. 1,1 CAR CAR 
T 
-T 5.82 4.51 1.41 -1.39 -0.69 -1.63 0.09 0.14 
TlNc 
-T 3.79 4.18 -0.11 -1.39 1.19 -1.41 0.16 -0.62 
T 
-TINI -1.95 -2.42 0.58 0.56 0.00 0.75 -0.72 -0.68 
T 
-T 2.13 1.95 -0.08 -1.11 -1.74 -0.50 -0.23 0.25 
T 
-T -4.55 -3.10 -1.45 1.52 1.66 0.88 -0.01 -0.49 
T 
-T -4.84 -4.63 -0.09 1.29 0.99 1.76' -0.65 -0.67 
T 
-T -1.28 -0.59 -0.64 0.49 -0.98 0.37 -0.25 0.20 
T 
-T -2.75 -3.38 0.60 1.08 -1.10 1.42 -0.82 -0.44 
TT 1.35 1.13 
-0.06 -0.69 -2.05 -0.08 -0.29 0.37 
TINI-Toml 2.92 3.09 
-0.45 -1.22 -1.56 -0.85 0.25 0.53 
(3) FRANCE. (4) I TALY 
TIN 
-TDF 0.57 0.73 -1.08 0.23 -1.24 -0.72 0.58 -1.70 
T Nc-TNC -0.15 0.51 -1.22 -0.50 -1.04 0.02 0.32 0.20 
TINC-TINI 0.62 1.63 
-0.59 1.98 -0.85 0.08 1.68' 0.25 
TINC-TOM( 
-0.10 
-1.15 0.74 0.23 -2.44 -1.53 0.94 0.82 
TDec-TNC 
-0.71 -0.48 0.43 -0.53 0.64 0.81 -0.41 1.97 
TDFC-TINI 0.16 0.57 
-0.15 1.70 0.16 0.56 1.10 1.43 
TDFC-ToMI 
-0.23 -1.41 1.17 0.15 -1.56 
- 
-0.91 0.59 1.76 
T c-TINI 0.73 1.35 -0.33 
04 2.15 
-0.33 0.07 1.67' 0.16 
TNc-ToMI 
-0.07 -1.30 1.06 0.34 -2.10 -1.61 0.84 0.77 
TINI-TOM( 
-0.28 -1.82' -0.90 -0.87 -1.57 -1.27 -0.16 0.53 
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Table 4.5 provides comparisons of the share price behaviour on and around the dividend 
announcement dates between the market-based countries (UK) and bank-based countries (Germany, 
France and Italy). Results obtained are consistent with my hypothesis and provide evidence to support 
that dividend announcements result in higher abnormal returns in market-based countries due to 
higher information asymmetry. On Day 0 dividend increases (decreases) in the UK result in 
significantly higher (lower) abnormal returns than in any other country under consideration. 
Dividend no changes differences in means between the countries do not appear to be statistically 
significance except for the case of Italy (t = 
-1.91). Dividend initiations and omissions also cause a 
significantly higher reaction in the UK market than in German, French or Italian markets. The 
situation remains pretty much the same when examining the cumulative abnormal returns on days 
-1 
to +1. Dividend increases and decreases cause a higher market reaction in the UK than in the other 
three countries. In the pre-event period there is no significant market reaction difference between the 
four countries while in the post-event period dividend-decreasing firms suffer greater losses in the 
UK than in the other three countries. Generally, the post-event market reaction to dividend 
announcements does not appear to differ significantly between the countries. 
TABLE 4.5 COMPARISONS of Tim, ABNORMAL. Rf? T 1RNS Alin[1M) Tlll? )IV 1)I? N 
AN1VnTT1Vr1 v%TrTIATTQRFTWFFNTTivITIC ri, 'DAIA%IV IiI1AA1/`C AUIºITAIV 
Table compares the dividend announcement share price behaviour in market-based countries (UK) and bank- 
based countries (Germany, France and Italy). Five groups are considered being Increase (INC), Decrease 
(DEC), No-change (NC), Initiation (INI), and Omission (OMI). T-Statistics ***Significant at 0.01 level, 
**Significant at 0.05 level and *Significant at 0.10 level. 
DAY 0 CAR 
. UK 
AGAINST 
GERMANY FRANCE ITALY GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
TiNc 4.14 2.27 5.27 3.14 1.64 4.09 
T- 
-3.99 -3.11 -3.22 -3.10 -3.10 -1.77 
T 1.43 
-0.15 -1.91 -1.12 0.12 3.06 
TINI 2.57 2.66 2.5G 3.18 --TV-- 3.60 3.13 
T 
-2.01 -0.57 -2.07 -0.94 -1.71 -1.35 
CAR-20,2 CAR 
UK 
AGAINST 
GERMANY FRANCE ITALY GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
T 
-0.86 1.43 -1.11 -0.82 1.30 -0.23 
DF, c 
-0.80 -0.97 -0.69 1.32 2.37 -0.49 
T 1.68' 
-0.17 -1.27 -0.88 1.65' 1.01 
T 
-1.25 -0.49 -0.80 -1.15 1.98 -0.14 
T 
-0.39 1.01 0.55 0.47 0.77 1.24 
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4.5.2 Tiim. SHARE PRucE REACTION To DIVIDEND AND Fjmmcs jSNoi ICjZU,,, bTs ARQjýY12 
THE DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT DAY IN TIlE UK. (ERMANY. FRANCE An ITALY 
Following Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) I continue my analysis to consider the share price 
reaction to dividend announcements according to the earnings and dividend changes. I group dividend 
increases and initiations together in one group because not enough dividend initiations were observed 
to allow me to group them separately. Similarly, I group dividend decreases and omissions in one 
group. Table 4.6 shows the results. In Panel AI show the number of events in each of the nine 
earnings-dividend groups identified, and in Panel B and CI show the abnormal returns of each group 
in different event windows. I consider 4 event windows, Day 0, Day 
-1 to +1, the pre-event period 
Days 
-20 to -2 and the post event period Days +2 to +20. 
As shown in Panel A, in the UK, 5260 companies announced an increase in earnings during the 
period of my study. Out of these companies, 3484 (66 percent) announced a dividend increase or 
initiation, 301 (6 percent) announced a dividend decrease or omission and 1475 (28 percent) 
announced no dividend changes. 52 Companies that experienced earnings decreases total to 4462; 
followed a more "conservative" dividend policy, as only 1721 announced dividend increases (39 
percent), 526 companies announced dividend decreases (12 percent) and 2215 (50 percent) 
announced no change in dividends. Finally, UK companies with no changes in earnings amount to 
996; with 54 dividend-increasing companies, 18 dividend-decreasing companies and 924 no dividend 
change companies. In Germany, 412 companies are found to announce earnings increases, out of 
which, 169 (41 percent) announced a dividend increase, 42 announced a dividend decrease (10 
percent) and the remaining 201 (49 percent) announced no dividend changes. Out of 468 companies 
with earnings decreases, 177 (38 percent) increased their dividends, 67 (14 percent) decreased their 
dividends and the remaining 224 (48 percent) never announced any changes. Companies with no 
changes in their earnings (996 companies) hardly announced any dividend changes. In France, 410 
companies fall into the earnings increase group, 172 of which announced dividend increases, 62 
dividend decreases and 176 no dividend changes. Secondly, earnings-decrease group in France 
announced 169 (39 percent) dividend decreases, 102 (23 percent) dividend decreases and 165 (38 
percent) dividend no changes. No earnings change companies amount to 136, which announced 5 (4 
percent) dividend increases and decreases while 93 percent announced dividend no changes. In Italy 
earnings increase companies announced 104 dividend increases, 27 dividend decreases and 121 
dividend no changes; earnings decrease companies announced 86 dividend increases, 71 dividend 
decreases and the remaining 145 announced dividend no changes. Dividend increases in the earnings 
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decrease Italian companies amount to 86, dividend decreases amount to 71 and dividend no change 
companies equal to 145. Finally, Italian companies that experienced no earnings changes amount to 
79 out of which 3 announced dividend increases, 1 and 75 announced dividend decreases and no 
changes respectively. 
Panel B shows the day 0 and days 
-1 to +1 share price reaction to earnings and dividend 
announcements in the four countries under consideration. During Day 
-1 to +1, UK companies that 
increased their earnings and dividends experienced a positive share price reaction equal to 1.06 
percent (t = 4.71). Dividend decreasing companies also experience a positive, but not significant, 
share price reaction, returns equal to 0.13 percent (t = 0.56) and, dividend no change companies 
announcement returns equal to 0.53 percent (t = 2.37). In the earnings decrease UK group, dividend- 
increasing companies earn 0.55 percent (t = 2.44), dividend-decreasing companies experience a 
significantly negative share price reaction, equal to 
-1.51 percent (t = -6.68) while abnormal returns 
of the dividend no change companies do not appear to be statistically significant. Companies that 
announced no change in their earnings, and increased their dividends do not experience a significant 
share price reaction, while dividend-decreasing firms earn negative abnormal returns equal to 
-1.81 
percent (t = 
-3.19). No dividend change companies' returns equal to 0.49 percent (t = 2.17). 
Generally, results show that dividend announcements provide information beyond of what is provided 
by earnings announcements. For example, on the announcement of dividend increases, companies 
that also increase their earnings experience higher abnormal returns than companies with earnings 
decreases. Another indication that dividend announcements dominate earnings announcements is that 
companies that increase their earnings earn significantly negative abnormal returns on the 
announcement of dividend decreases. 
In Germany, companies with earnings increases, experience a positive share price reaction to 
dividend changes. On the announcement of dividend increases abnormal returns are positive but 
insignificant. Significant abnormal returns are obtained on the announcement of dividend decreases 
(0.91 percent, t=5.37) and on the announcement of no changes (0.73 percent, t=2.49). Earnings- 
decreasing companies only experience positive abnormal returns when they announce dividend 
decreases while companies that have no changes in earnings earn negative abnormal returns on 
dividend announcements. Significantly negative share price behaviour is obtained around dividend 
announcements (regardless of the direction of the dividend change) when companies announce no 
changes in their earnings. 
52 Hereafter, I use dividend increase (decrease) to also mean dividend initiations (omissions). 
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In France, earnings increasing companies earn significantly positive abnormal returns, equal to 0.76 
percent (t = 2.59) when they increase their dividends, as well as when they decrease their dividends, 
returns equal to 0.66 (t = 2.23). Positive abnormal returns of the dividend no change group in this 
category equal to 0.73 (t = 1.71) but are confined solely on Day 0. Secondly, earnings decreasing 
companies earn statistically insignificant abnormal returns when announcing dividends. Dividend- 
decreasing companies experience a significantly negative market reaction, returns equal to 
-0.29 (t = 
-1.73) but this is confined solely on day 0. The market response to dividend decreases and dividend 
no changes announced by earnings decreasing companies does not appear to be statistically 
significant. Thirdly, the market rewards earnings no change news accompanied by dividend increases 
as investors earn 1.28 percent (t = 4.33) in the period [-1, +11. The negative market reaction to 
dividend-decreasing firms, equal to 
-0.22 percent (t = -1.32) is reversed when examining days -1 to 
+1 as returns equal to 1.11 percent (t = 3.77). Positive share price reaction equal to 0.57 percent (t = 
1.94) is also obtained when considering the earnings and dividend-no change companies. 
In Italy, earnings- and dividend-increasing companies recorded negative abnormal returns on day 0 
equal to 
-0.37 percent (t = -2.17) as well as in period [-1, +1]; in contrast, dividend-decreasing 
companies earn positive abnormal returns on day 0 equal to 0.68 percent (t = 3.97) but returns are not 
statistically significant on days 
-1 to +1. News of increase in earnings accompanied by dividend no 
changes are followed by significantly negative share price behaviour on day 
-1 to +1 equal to -0.48 
percent (t = 
-1.64). Secondly, the market reaction on the dividend announcement days by earnings- 
decreasing companies does not appear to be significantly different from zero regardless of the 
direction of dividend change announced. Companies that announce earnings and dividend changes of 
opposite directions however appear to earn negative abnormal returns, but earnings decreases 
accompanied by dividend decrease seem to be rewarded by 0.31 percent (t = 1.07) on days 
-1 to +1. 
Finally, highly negative share price reaction to dividend change announcements by companies that 
experience no change in their earnings is obtained. Dividend increase announcement returns on days 
[-1, +1] equal to 
-1.62 (t = -5.51). Even more negative market reaction to dividend decrease 
announcements was obtained, abnormal returns equal to 
-8.59 percent (t =-29.19). However, this 
behaviour might not be representative, because of the limited number of events found in these groups. 
Dividend no changes announced by earnings-no change companies result to returns equal to 
-0.43 
percent but the behaviour has not been obtained to be statistically significant (t = 
-1.45). 
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Panel C shows the share price reaction to the announcements of earnings and dividend changes in the 
four countries under consideration around the pre-event period, [-20, 
-21, and the post-event period, 
[+2, +20]. In the UK, the market reaction to dividend announcements does not seem to be statistically 
significant neither in the post- nor in the pre-event periods. Earnings-increasing companies experience 
a positive reaction to dividend-increase announcements both in the pre- and post- event periods. The 
market reacts negatively to dividend decrease announcements in the pre-event period, returns equal to 
-0.42 percent (t = -0.74) and in the post-event period, returns equal to -0.62 percent (t = -1.09). In 
contrast, dividend no changing companies experience positive returns equal to 0.11 percent (t = 0.19) 
in the pre-event period and negative in the post-event period equal to 
-0.47 percent (t = 0.83). 
Earnings decreases followed by dividend increase announcements result in positive but insignificant 
abnormal returns equal to 0.24 percent (t = 0.41) in days 
-20 to -2, while in days +2 to +20 
cumulative abnormal returns equal to 
-0.45 percent (t = -0.78). Dividend decrease announcements by 
earning-decreasing companies result in positive returns both in the pre-event period (returns equal to 
0.30 percent, t=0.52) and in the post-event period (returns equal to 1.04 percent (t = 1.84). No 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns preceded or proceeded dividend no change 
announcements accompanied by earnings decreases. Finally, when UK companies announced no 
changes in their earnings, dividend-increasing announcements were followed by negative cumulative 
abnormal returns equal to 
-1.57 percent (t = -2.77) while in the period before the announcements 
investors had no information as to the content of the announcement (i. e. no significant abnormal 
behaviour was obtained in the pre-event period). However, investors seem to be better informed when 
companies with no changes in their earnings announce dividend decreases. Cumulative abnormal 
returns in the pre- and post-event periods appear to be significant, equal to 
-0.57 percent (t = -4.38) 
and 
-1.40 percent (t = -6.22) respectively. No change earnings and dividends announce, however, 
have not been obtained to cause a significant market reaction. 
In Germany, cumulative abnormal returns in days 
-20 to -2 are not statistically significant, partly due 
to the fact that investors are informed about the companies' activities (through banks, board 
representations etc) and secondly, because dividends and earnings announcements are not 
contemporaneous (earnings are announced a few days before dividends therefore by the time 
dividends are announced investors are already inform of the results of the company for the particular 
year). Dividend-increases following earnings increases cause an insignificant abnormal market 
reaction equal to 1.04 percent (t = 1.40) in the pre-event period and 0.16 percent (t = 0.22) in the post 
event period. Earnings increases followed by dividend decreases result in negative abnormal returns 
183 
kL 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 4 
in the pre-event period equal to 
-0.43 percent (t = -0.58) while in the post-event period returns equal 
to 0.58 percent (t = 0.79). In the post-event period dividend no changes result in cumulative abnormal 
returns equal to 
-0.58 percent (t = -0.78). Earnings decreases followed by dividend increases result in 
statistically positive abnormal behaviour in days 
-20 to -2, which is reversed in the post-event period. 
Earnings and dividend decreases cause the market to react negatively as in the pre-event period 
returns equal to 
-1.22 percent (t = -1.64) and in the post-event period equal to -1.28 percent (t =- 
1.73). No significant share price reaction was obtained before or after dividend no changes that 
followed earnings decreases. Finally, in the last group of earnings no change companies, dividend- 
increasing companies appear to earn positive abnormal returns both in the pre-and post-event periods 
while the market reacts negatively after dividend decrease announcements. Finally, when the 
announcements of earnings and dividend include no changes, investors earn a positive return in the 
pre-event period equal to 1.42 percent (t = 1.92) but the positive return of 0.18 percent in the post- 
event period is not significantly different from zero (t = 0.25). 
In France, earnings increases followed by announcement of dividend changes in the same direction, 
result in a positive market reaction equal to 0.17 percent (t = 0.22) in the pre-event period and equal 
to 0.21 percent (t = 2.79) in the post-event periods. Cumulative abnormal returns following dividend- 
decrease announcements equal to 0.58 percent (t = 0.78) in days 
-20 to -2, while results are reversed 
to equal 
-2.07 percent (t = -2.80) in days +2 to +20. The reaction to dividend no-change is similar to 
dividend-decrease announcements, i. e. 0.57 percent (t = 0.77) in the pre-event period and 
-1.56 
percent (t = 
-2.10) in the post-event period. Earning decreases result in negative cumulative abnormal 
behaviour both before and after the dividend change announcements regardless of the direction of the 
dividend change. I should note that the results of NC. EPS-INC. DPS and NC. EPS-DEC. DPS groups 
are based only on a limited number of events. Finally, earnings no-change announcements 
accompanied by dividend increases result abnormal returns equal to 4.14 percent (t = 5.59) in the pre- 
event period and equal to 
-0.35 percent (t = -0.48) in the post-event period. Dividend decreases result 
in significantly negative abnormal behaviour both before and after the announcement, while the 
reaction to dividend no change announcements is not found to be statistically significant. 
In Italy, earnings increases accompanied by dividend increasing and no changing announcements 
result in insignificantly negative abnormal returns around the event. Dividend decreases cause a 
negative market reaction in the pre-event period when returns equal to 
-2.24 percent (t = -3.02) 
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but this behaviour is reversed in the post-event period when returns equal to 2.49 percent (t = 3.36). 
Secondly, companies that announce earnings decreases, experience a positive market reaction in the 
period preceding the announcement but cumulative returns are found to be negative after the 
announcement regardless of the direction of dividend change. Finally, Italian companies that 
announce no changes in their earnings accompanied by dividend increases or decreases earn 
significantly positive returns both in the pre- and post-event periods. However, earnings no-changes 
accompanied by dividend changes of the same direction do not cause a significant market reaction 
neither in the pre- or post-event periods. 
TABLE 4.6 TILE IMPACT OF DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS C1 Grs ON OE TILL DIYIll1. ND 
ANNOUNCEMENT DAY ARS AND CARS IN THE I GI RNIANY. Xjm j)JL 
Table considers the share price behaviour on the dividend announcement day according to earnings (EPS) and dividend 
(DPS) change announcements in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Sample is grouped into three subsamples according to 
the earnings changes (EPS: INC=Increase, DEC=Decrease and NC=No-change) and then into further three subsamples 
being dividend INC=Increase/Initiation, NC=No-change, DEC=DecreaselOmission. Panel A shows the number of 
observations (N) in each group. Panel B shows the dividend announcement day 0 abnormal returns (ARs) and the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-1, +1] for each dividend and earnings change group. Panel C shows CARs in 
the pre-event period, [-20, 
-2], and the post-event period, [+2, +20], for all the groups under consideration. T"statistics are 
renorted in the narenthesis: *Sienificant at 0.01 level. **Sianificant at 0.05 level and ***Sienificant at 0.10 level 
PANEL A: NUMBER OF DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT EVENTS IN DIVIIwND CIIANCE G ROUI'S 
U K GER MANY FRANCE ITALY 
AEPS ADPS N % N % N Flo N % 
INC/INI 3484 66.2 169 41.0 172 42.0 104 41.3 
DEC/OMI 301 5.7 42 10.2 62 15.1 27 10.7 
INC NC 1475 28.0 201 48.8 176 42.9 121 48.0 
TOTAL 5260 100 412 100 410 100 252 100.0 
INC/INI 1721 38.6 177 37.8 169 38.8 86 28.5 
DEC/OMI 526 11.8 67 14.3 102 23.4 71 23.5 
DEC NC 2215 49.6 224 47.9 165 37.8 145 48.0 
TOTAL 4462 100 468 100 436 100 302 100.0 
INC/INI 54 5.4 10 7.2 5 3.7 3 3.8 
NC DEC/OMI 18 1.8 5 3.6 5 3.7 1 1.3 
NC 924 92.8 124 89.2 126 92.6 75 91.9 
TOTAL 996 100 139 100 136 100 79 100 
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PANEL B: ABNORMAL RETURNS ON THE DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT DAY (DAY 0) AND DAY 
-1 TO +1 
ACCORDING TO DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS CHANGES 
UK GERMANY FRANCE ITALY 
DAY 0 CARL +i DAY 0 CAP I ,1 DAY 0 CAR. 1 ,I DAY 0 CAR. 1 ,1 AEPS ADPS T-STAY , (T-STAT) (T-STAT) , T-STAY (T-sTAT) , T-ETAT T-STAY , T"STAT 
0.734 1.061 0.042 38 0.0 0.530 0.763 
69 
-0.369 -0.288 INC/INI (5.64) (4.71) 0.25 0.13 3.12 2.59 
-2.17 (-0.98) 
'0.251 -0.126 0.913 0.608 0.370 0.658 0.675 0.267 INC DEC/OMI 
-1.93 -0.56 (5.37) (2.07) 2.18 (2.23) (3.97) (0.91) 
0.522 0.533 0.052 0.732 0.291 
-0.100 -0.233 -0.482' F NC (4.02) (2.37) (0.31) (2.49) (1.71) -0.34 (-1.37) (-1.64) 
0.371 0.550 
-0.058 0.080 -0.294 -0.194 -0.149 -0.410 INC/INI 2.85 2.44 (-0.34) (0.27) (-1.73) 
-0.66 (-0.87) -1.39 
-1.686 -1.505 0.608 1.274 -0.151 0.055 0.188 0.314 DEC DEC/OMI 
-12.97 (-6.68) (3.58) (4.33) (-0.89) (0.19) 1.11 (1.07) 
-0.182 -0.041 0.241 0.209 0.010 0.286 -0.036 -0.218 NC (-1.40) (-0.18) 1.42) 0.71 (0.06) (0.97) 
-0.21 -0.74 
0.125 0.080 
-0.575 -0.982 N/A N/A N/A N/A INC/INI 0.96 0.35 (-3.39) 
-3.34 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-4.305 -1.811 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
NC DEC/OMI 
-7.60) (-3.19) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
0.401 0.488 0.086 0.699 wv. 0.258 0.571 
-0.243 -0.427 NC (3.09) (2.17) (0.51) (2.38) 1.52 (194) 
-1.43) -1.45 
PANEL C: CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS IN TILE PRE- AND POST- EVENT PERIODS ACCORDING TO 
EARNINGS AND DIVIDEND CHANGES 
U K GER MANY FRANCE ITALY 
EPS DPS CARZO,. 2 CAR, 2,, 2o CAR2o,. 2 CAR, i,. =o CAR20,. 3 CAR. 2., 2o CAR2o,. 3 CAR, 3,, 30 T-STAY T-STAY T-STAY T-STAY T-STAY T-STAY T-STAY T-STAY 
0.401 0.923 1.039 0.163 0.166 2.063 
-0.212 -0.211 INC/INI 0.71 (1.63) (1.40) (0.22) (0.22) 2.79 
-0.29 -0.28 
-0.417 0.618 -0.433 0.583 0.575 -2.072 -2.236 489 2 INC DEC/OMI 
-0.74 (1.09) (-0.58) (0.79) (0.78) -2.80 -3.02 
. 3.36 
0.109 
-0.472 1.026 -0.581 0.573 -1.558 0.781 065 -1 NC (0.19) (-0.83) (1.39) (-0.78) 0.77 (-2.10) 1.05 . 
. 
1.44 
0.235 
-0.445 0.493 -0.527 -0.714 -1.568 1.468 -1.461 INCANI (0.41) 
-0.78 (0.67) -0.71 (-0.96) -2.12 1.98 -1.97 
0.297 1.042 
-1.217 -1.279 0.158 -1.580 1.038 -0.206 DEC DEC/OMI 0.52 (1.84) 
-1.64 -1.73 (0.21) (-2.13) 1.40 
-0.28 
0.426 
-0.170 0.001 0.425 -0.117 -0.851 1.440 -0.862 NC 0.75 
-0.30) 0.01) 0.57 (-0.16) (-1.15) (1.94) 
-1.16 
0.290 
-1.569 5.782 3.574 N/A N/A N/A N/A INC/INI 0.51 (-2.77) (7.81) (4.83) N/A N/A N/A N/A 
-0.570 -1.402 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NC DEC/OMI 
-4.38 (-6.22) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
0.719 
-0.463 1.424' 0.183 1.091 -0.743 0.463 -0.058 F NC (1.27) (-0.82) (1.92) (0.25) 1.47 
-1.00) 0.62) -0.08) 
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4.6 CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS of TIIF. CIIAI'TFR 
In this part of my thesis I test the information content of dividend announcements in the UK, 
Germany, France and Italy. Miller and Modigliani (1961) hint that information content of dividends 
can explain the observed share price reaction to dividend changes. Theoretical models have been 
developed, for example Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985), 
supporting that there exist an information asymmetry between the company insiders (managers) and 
outsiders (shareholders); therefore managers use dividends as a signalling mechanism to 
communicate to the market their assessment of the firm's current performance and future prospects. 
Three implications of the information-signalling hypothesis have been empirically tested: firstly, if 
dividend changes are positively associated with subsequent earnings changes, then dividends do not 
have the potential to transmit information (for example, Watts, 1973, Gonedes, 1978, Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler, 1997, Healy and Palepu, 1988); secondly, studies (for example, Pettit, 1972, 
Asquith and Mullins (1983), Aharony and Swary, 1980) empirically test the share price reaction to 
dividend change announcements and document that there should be a positive association between 
dividend changes and excess returns on the announcement day; thirdly, studies (for example, Ofer 
and Siegel, 1987) note that unexpected changes in dividends should be followed by market revisions 
of future earnings changes in the same direction as the dividend. However, evidence found in the 
literature is contradictive and mixed. 
The purpose of this part of my thesis is to distinguish between the contradictive results in the 
dividend information signalling literature by testing, analysing and comparing the share price reaction 
to dividend announcements in European countries. Following, Franks and Mayer (1994), LaPorta, 
Silanes and Shleifer (1999) amongst others, I consider the countries in my sample as market-based 
countries (UK) and bank-based countries (Germany, France and Italy). Institutional, financial and 
corporate finance differences have been identified between market- and bank- based countries, which 
are expected to result in different information asymmetry levels in each country. For example, in 
bank-based countries investors should be better informed of the current performance and future 
prospects of their companies than in market-based countries due to more concentrated shareholding 
structure, the existence of more family or government held companies, the more powerful role of 
banks in Germany, France and Italy as compared to the UK. Considering the differences between the 
four countries under consideration I test the hypothesis whether the market reaction to dividend 
changes in bank-based countries is lower than in market-based countries because of lower 
information asymmetry in bank-based countries. 
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Data was obtained from DataStream and Hydra to cover the period 1987 to 2002. My final sample 
includes a total of 12,577 dividend announcements in the UK, 1412 both in Germany and France and 
873 in Italy. I employ the Brown and Warner (1985) event study methodology for the purpose of 
testing my hypothesis. Results reported are based on the market model over the event window [-40, 
+401 days relative to the announcement day. The robustness of my results has been checked using 
alternative models, for example the Dimson (1979) model and the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
model. Following Benartzi, Michaely and Thaller (1997) I separate abnormal returns around the 
dividend announcement dates according to the direction of dividend change. I identify five separate 
dividend change groups in each country being dividend increases, dividend decreases, dividend no 
changes, dividend initiations and dividend omissions. The purpose is to observe whether investors 
interpret dividend increases (decreases) as good (bad) signals about the company send by 
management. I analyse my results by providing both inter- and intra-country comparisons. Thereafter, 
I analyse the market behaviour around the dividend announcement dates in my sample countries 
according to both earnings and dividend change announcements. The purpose is firstly to test whether 
dividend change announcements contain information beyond of what is contained in earnings 
announcements, secondly to distinguish between the dividend announcement and the earnings 
announcement impacts on share prices especially in countries where dividends and earnings are 
announced contemporaneously. 
Results provide evidence to support my hypothesis, as statistically higher abnormal returns have been 
obtained in the UK as compared to any of the other countries under consideration. The t-statistics of 
the differences in means reported on Table 4.4 show that on the event windows studied (day 0, [-1, 
+1], [-20, 
-2], [+20, +2]) the market reaction to dividend change announcements is higher in the UK 
than in Germany, France or Italy reflecting the higher level of information asymmetry in market- 
based countries as opposed to bank-based countries. Generally, results lead to the conclusions that in 
the UK where information asymmetry is high managers use dividends as a mechanism to mitigate 
information asymmetries. Therefore, positive (negative) abnormal return behaviour following 
dividend increases/initiations (decreases/omissions) indicates that investors perceive dividend 
increases (decreases) as good (bad) signals for the prospects of the company. However, the analysis 
of the results in bank-based countries leads to the conclusion that in these countries where 
shareholders are better informed about the current performance and future prospects of the 
companies, an increase in dividends is perceived as lack of investing opportunities while a decrease in 
dividends is thought to be a way to raise costless sufficient funding for investing in positive net 
present value opportunities. This can be derived from the fact that dividend cuts/omissions are 
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rewarded in bank-based markets. The information content of dividend hypothesis is further reinforced 
by the analysis and comparisons of the abnormal returns around the announcement dates according to 
the direction of dividend and earnings changes. It is shown that dividends provide information beyond 
of what is provided by earnings announcements. For example, in the UK companies earn higher 
abnormal returns when dividends and earnings are of the same sign. 
These conclusions lead to the need of further research in the area in order to test, for example, 
whether companies that announce earnings increases accompanied with dividend decreases do so in 
order to finance new investment opportunities with internal funding which is the less costly source of 
funds. In this case the capital expenditure should increase in the following years. Moreover, the 
significant positive abnormal returns following dividend decreases/omissions stimulate the need for 
further research in order to test whether other announcements near the time of dividend 
announcements drive the positive reaction to the announcement of dividend decreases/omissions. 
The results could also be checked for sample firm consistencies across countries. It could be that 
firms in the UK are not directly comparable to those in Continental Europe because of their level of 
information asymmetries as reflected, for example, by their size. Therefore, the control firm 
procedure will overcome this potential bias. It could also be of interest to see whether the results for 
Continental European companies that trade in the UK/US stock exchanges or those owned by foreign 
investors behave in the same way as their UK/US counterparts. Unfortunately, the full data necessary 
to explore these issues is not available and the extent to which those factors will alter the conclusions 
is a subject of further research. 
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I 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), explicitly or implicitly assume an ideal economy characterised by 
symmetric information, perfect complete markets (with no taxes) and rational behavior, and 
argued that given the firm's investment policy is constant, dividend payout policy is irrelevant to 
the value of the firm and consequently has no effect on shareholders' return. In this chapter I will 
focus on the violation of the rational behavior assumption as an added component to the 
information asymmetries analysed in the previous chapter. The purpose is to investigate the link 
between dividend policy and agency conflicts. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) hint at agency considerations when they argue that differential 
valuation of distinct payout stocks could occur if there is a systematic tendency for external funds 
to be used more productively than internal funds (page 432). They rule out this behavior, which is 
consistent with the existence of conflicts of interest between managers and the providers of 
financing, because of the assumption of complete contracting possibilities and full information 
rules. When relaxing the assumption of complete (and fully enforceable) contracts, a firm is more 
than just a black box. ' More recently, and especially after the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
seminal paper on conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, dividend policy has 
also been analysed in the framework of the agency theory (e. g. Easterbrook, 1984, Jensen, 1986, 
Fluck, 1998,1999, Mayers, 1998, Gomes, 2000). The agency perspective of dividend policy 
questions two particular assumptions of Miller and Modigliani (1961); firstly the assumption of 
independence between dividend policy and the investment decisions of the firm and secondly, the 
assumption that managers' interests are aligned with those of shareholders so that any profits are 
distributed pro-rata to all shareholders. Based on the first assumption, the agency conflict 
addresses the possibility that the payment of dividends may have a positive impact on the 
efficiency of marginal investments; while on the second aspect, it considers that managerial 
interests may clash with those of shareholders so that a diversion of assets may occur to the 
benefit of insiders (managers) and at the expense of outsiders (shareholders). 
With the separation of ownership and control, a principal (shareholder)-agent (management) 
problem occurs. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) an agency relationship exists 
whenever there is an employment relationship in which one person's welfare depends on the 
actions of another. This reflects the possibility that managers pursue their own goals at the 
See Black (1976), for a detailed discussion see Allen and Michaely (1995,2001) 
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expense of shareholders' interests. Consequently, agency costs are incurred by shareholders to 
insure that the managers act in the best interests of shareholders who are not actively involved in 
the management of the firm. There are many ways of reducing agency costs2. Dividends have 
been proposed as a mechanism to mitigate agency problems between the company's management 
and shareholders and to serve as one means of monitoring or bonding management performance. 
The agency perspective of dividend policy asserts that cash payments to shareholders may reduce 
agency problems by increasing the frequency of external capital raising, ' and associated 
monitoring by investment bankers and investors. For example, banks will require a careful 
analysis of the creditworthiness of the firm, and market will require prospectus filings for the new 
equity issues. Thus outside suppliers of capital help to monitor the owner-manager on behalf of 
outside equity owners. 
According to Jensen (1986), dividends reduce agency conflicts by eliminating free cash flow in 
the possession of the management. The starting point of the problem refers to the managers 
investing free cash flow in negative net present value4 projects instead of paying it out to the 
shareholders in order for the former to pursue their own personal benefits at the expense of the 
latter. Jensen argues that managers have incentives to expand their firm beyond the optimal size 
because of several reasons. Firstly, cash retentions give managers autonomy that they would lose 
if they had to go frequently to the market to raise new capital. Secondly, increased firms size 
enhances corporate prestige and managers' salaries, and finally, the tendency of companies to 
reward middle managers through promotions rather than bonuses creates a bias towards growth. 
The agency costs that result from this overinvestment decrease the value of the firm. Like the 
signaling hypothesis, the free cash flow argument suggests there should be a positive relationship 
between the direction of dividend policy change and the share price reaction. 
However, the free cash flow argument differentiates itself from the signaling hypothesis, with 
respect to the level of growth opportunities faced by the firm. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
investigate the informational content of dividends in the framework of the principal-agent 
conflict. If managers are overinvesting, an increase in dividends will reduce the overinvestmcnt 
and increase the market value of the firm. Similarly, a dividend decrease signals that more 
negative net present value projects will be undertaken. They distinguish between overinvesting 
and value maximising firms on the basis of Tobin's Q and find that the announcements of sizable 
dividend changes have a significant impact on the stock price of the firm with average Tobin's Q 
I For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examines five mechanisms to control agency conflicts being the 
shareholdings of insiders, institutional and large blockholders, outside directors, debt policy, managerial labour market 
and market for corporate control. 
3 Rozzeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984) 
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less than one (overinvesting firms), but no impact for firms with average Q's greater than unity 
(value maximising firms). This evidence is consistent with both the overinvestment and cash flow 
signaling hypothesis. 5 Further tests of returns according to the direction of dividend change 
provide evidence to support the free cash flow hypothesis over the signaling hypothesis. 
The importance of dividends as a monitoring mechanism varies as a function of the level of 
agency conflicts, which in turn vary as a function of the corporate governance system. Corporate 
governance has been defined6 as the system in which business corporations are directed and 
controlled by shareholders and other stakeholders. Monitoring of managers and the monitoring 
entities vary as a function of the ownership structure, the structure of corporations, the role of the 
banking system in the economy, business circumstances, the efficient functioning of capital 
markets, the level of product and capital market competition both domestically and internationally 
and legal system. ' All these institutional, financial and corporate governance characteristics differ 
between various countries. 8 Differences between countries have also been observed in respect to 
the level of growth opportunities. 9 Therefore, a country comparative study would prove an ideal 
environment to analyse the role of dividends as a management control device. 
In this part of my study I argue that in countries where the corporate governance system provides 
better management control mechanisms as well as in countries where the interests of the 
management and the shareholders are more compatible, the monitoring role of dividends is less 
important. The disparity of growth opportunities in various countries would also result in agency 
conflict differences. This would affect the dividend policy of the firm as in countries where there 
exist better growth opportunities, all else equal, managers are less likely to invest in negative net 
present value projects and vice versa. According to the agency conflict explanation of dividends 
agency conflicts are reflected in the share price behavior around dividend change announcements. 
Therefore, in countries with lower agency conflicts and/or higher growth opportunities, abnormal 
4More precisely, Free Cash Flow is defined as the cash remaining after all positive net present value projects have been 
undertaken 
s If managers have information about future and/or current cash flows that investors do not have, investors interpret a 
dividend increase (decrease) as a signal that management anticipates higher (lower) cash flows. See (Lintncr (1958), 
Fama and Babiak (1968), Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Ambarish, John and 
Williams (1987). 
6OECD (1999), also consistent with the Cadbury Committee (1992) definition. 
La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) discuss differences in the legal systems around the world. Halpern 
(1999) provides a comparative discussion on agency conflicts in market- and bank- oriented corporate governance 
systems. Jovanovic (2001) summarises findings of a number of empirical studies and gives a view of current thinking 
on association between legal rules and financial systems characterised by ownership patterns, nature of equity, 
governance structure, finance behavior and capital structure. 
See Franks and Mayer (1997), Berglof (1990), Rajan and Zingales (1990), Zysman (1983), Dosi (1990), Shlcifcr and 
Vishny (1997), Halpern (1999) amongst others. 
9 La Porta and Silanes (1998), report the average annual percent growth per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for the 
period 1970-1993 in different countries around the world. See Chapter 1, Table 1.1. 
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returns around the dividend announcement day are expected to be lower as compared to countries 
with higher agency conflicts and/or lower growth opportunities. 
The motivation for this part of my study is threefold. First, linkages between the level of free cash 
flow, dividend policy and country specific factors such as market size and capital structure could 
enable shareholders 
, 
financial analysts and others, to better assess financial performance, and 
thus make more informed investment decisions. Second, the level of free cash flow could affect 
prices, corporate investment, as well as prospects for future growth, so my results could be of 
interest to policymakers, managers and shareholders. For example, insights into the cash 
management activities of companies in different countries could assist government policymakers 
in determining whether regulations governing the use of free cash flows should be introduced to 
protect consumers, shareholders and others. Third, despite the importance of cash management 
and dividend policies, I believe that this comparative study is the first of its kind to be conducted 
in Europe and especially in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. Therefore, the results may not 
only provide a comparative basis against which prior empirical studies carried out in the US can 
be evaluated, but also help simulate further tests of the dividend policy in European markets. 
To the best of my knowledge no European cross-country study has been previously conducted in 
order to test the free cash flow hypothesis. For the purpose of testing my hypothesis I use the 
abnormal returns around the dividend announcement dates as calculated in Chapter 4.10. I use the 
market-to-book ratio, as a proxy for growth opportunities in order to distinguish between value 
maximising (high market-to-book) and overinvesting (low market-to-book) companies According 
to the cash flow overinvesting hypothesis, low market-to-book companies should earn higher 
abnormal returns on the announcement of dividend changes. In order to distinguish between the 
predictions of the cash flow overinvestment and signalling hypotheses, I follow Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) and I analyse the abnormal returns according to the direction of the 
announced dividend change. My study differs from their work not only in the sense that it is a 
European comparative study, but also in the sense that I use a larger sample and a longer study 
period. Moreover, I extend Lang and Litzenberger (1989) in order to include not just the 
announcement of dividend increases and decreases but also dividend initiations, omissions and 
the cases where companies announce no dividend payout change. 
In all the countries under consideration results are generally in line with the agency conflict and 
the signalling hypotheses. Cross country comparisons show that the share price response to 
dividend announcements in the UK is significantly higher than in any other country under 
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consideration. This is might be attributed the higher level of agency conflicts and/or information 
asymmetries in the UK. Further support for the hypothesis is provided by the fact that the 
announcement day abnormal returns for bank-based countries do not differ significantly. I 
attribute this to the existence of equal levels of agency conflicts and/or information asymmetries 
in bank-based countries. 
The rest of my study is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, I provide the literature review around 
the monitoring role of dividends and the cash flow hypothesis. In Section 5.3, I describe the 
corporate governance characteristics in each country that are expected to affect the level of 
agency conflicts and I form my hypothesis. In Section 5.4, I describe the data and methodology 
used to test my hypothesis. In Section 5.5, I discuss the empirical results. Finally, in Section 5.6, I 
set the conclusions of the study and I make recommendations for further developments. 
LA KN: V1r: W uF 11It LdILKA1UKl I11151V U IIUK1[Vl. Ku1.1: III, ' llVlul NI)ti ANj1_jlll''lll 1 
C'ASII FLOW HYPOTIIESIS 
Literature on the agency perspective of dividend policy can essentially be catcgorised into five 
types. Firstly, studies concerned with dividend policy in the context of conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers and shareholders and debtholders; " secondly, those which 
have attempted to measure the relationship between dividends and the overinvestment hypothesis 
of Jensen (1986); thirdly, tests of the agency-transaction costs trade-off model of dividend policy 
firstly proposed by Rozeff (1982); fourthly, tests of Easterbrook's (1984) capital market 
monitoring hypothesis; and finally, studies analysing interactions between dividend policy and 
other monitoring mechanisms. 
5,2 1 THEORETICAL RELATIONSIIIP BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AM) AGi NCY 
_OM I TS 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) detail two types of agency conflict namely the agency conflicts of 
equity and debt. When the management and ownership of the firm are not separated, the manager- 
owner will make operating decisions that maximise his/her profits. The agency costs arise when 
owner-managers sell portions of their shareholding to the so-called outside equity owners. In the 
case where management and ownership of the firm are separated, agency issues are created 
because managerial and shareholder interests differ. The owner-manager will only incur a portion 
of the costs of various (managerial) perquisites that he/she obtains. Utility is derived from 
pecuniary returns and also comes from consumption of various perquisites. Therefore, the 
10 Dividend announcement day returns in Chapter 4 are calculated using the event study methodology (Brown and 
Warner, 1995) for the period 1987-2002. 
11 Studies investigating the dividend policy in the context of bondholders and shareholders conflict include Kalay 
(1982). John and Kalay (1982). Also see Lease, John, Kalay, Loewenstein and Sarig (1999) for a discussion. 
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shareholders must incur costs to monitor the manager. These monitoring costs will be negatively 
reflected in the share price. This is known as the agency cost of equity. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also argue that creditors would not let the debt level of a firm reach 
or approach a level of 100 percent; despite the fact that according to the capital structure theory, 
Miller and Modigliani (1958,1963), high debt levels are optimal in perfect capital markets with 
tax shields. At such a high level of debt, the manager might have strong incentive to invest in 
projects with the promise of extremely high payoffs if successful, even if such projects have a 
very low chance of success. If such investments are successful, the manager and shareholders 
receive the gains. On the other hand, if the investments fail, the creditors bear the costs. 
Bondholders can include various covenants in the bond agreement to limit the behavior of 
managers. The costs associated with covenants are known as monitoring costs. Because the 
monitoring costs are imposed on the managers through the bond covenants it is the managers' 
interest to see that the monitoring is made in the least costly way. 12 Therefore, the monitoring cost 
is part of the agency cost of debt. 
Managers simultaneously select three financial policy variables, the capital budgeting projects, the 
firm's external debt (and consequently the capital structure), and the dividend payout. These 
decisions are taken in such a way so as to reduce the sum of the agency costs, minimise cost of 
capital and maximise the firm value. For example, the agency cost of equity is lowered when a 
manager owns a higher proportion of common shares, thus aligning his/her interests with those of 
the common shareholders. This is known as the convergence-of-interest hypothesis according to 
which the firm market value increases with management ownership. In other words, the 
hypothesis suggests a uniformly positive relationship. Debt issuances can also reduce the agency 
cost of equity, assuming that the managers hold a sizable proportion of shares in the firm. The 
issuance of debt lessens the need for outside equity, which thus increases the manager's 
proportion of firm ownership. This lowers the cost of equity, although it increases the agency cost 
of debt, as debt issuances require monitoring. Consequently, according to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), this involves a trade-off. 
In a theoretical study Easterbrook (1984) criticises the bird-in-the-hand fallacy, the signalling 
hypothesis and the clientele hypothesis. He particularly argue that the signalling hypothesis is 
ambiguous as to what dividends signal, how they do so and why dividends are better than other 
12 For example, it may be cheaper for the managers to provide various reports than to have an independent auditor come 
in. In addition, eliminating the need for an independent auditor lowers the monitoring cost of bondholders. I lowever, in 
the publicly traded firm this is not an option. 
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cheaper methods; 13 while the clientele hypothesis was criticised because of its failure to explain 
why the current dividend structure exists. Easterbrook builds on the dividend puzzle theme and 
offers an agency cost explanation of dividends. He rephrases the dividend puzzle question and 
instead of asking what is the effect of a change in cash dividends paid, given the firm's capital 
budgeting and borrowing decision, he considers the effect of a consistent policy of paying 
dividends. He identifies two major sources of agency costs namely the cost of monitoring 
managers and the cost of risk aversion on the part of managers; 14 and attempts to answer whether 
dividends are a method of aligning managers' interests with those of investors. '5 Eastcrbrook 
argues that the less discretionary cash the management has, the harder it is for them to invest in 
Negative Net Present Value projects. One method of accomplishing this is to increase the level of 
dividend payments. He concludes that dividends may keep firms in the capital market, where 
monitoring of managers is available at lower cost and may be useful in adjusting the level of risk 
taken by mangers and the different classes of investors. 
The desirability of dividends in the principal-agent framework is also examined by Jensen (1986). 
His starting point16 is that managers cannot be perfectly monitored, which means that managers 
can choose actions that best serve their interests rather than those of the shareholders. Jensen 
argues that cash is the asset that managers can misuse more easily and develops the Free Cash 
Flow Theory, which describes the agency problem of managers and shareholders over the 
distribution of free cash flows generated by the firm. He notes that managers have incentives to 
cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size because firstly, growth increases managers' 
power by increasing the resources under their control and secondly, large firms generate more 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits for managers than smaller firms. He argues that activities 
generating substantial economic rents (returns in excess of the opportunity cost of the resources to 
the activity) or quasi rents (returns in excess of the short-run opportunity cost of the resources to 
the activity) generate substantial amounts of free cash flow. Free cash flow is cash flow in excess 
of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the 
relevant cost of capital. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout 
policies are especially severe when the organisation generates substantial free cash now and the 
problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge cash rather than investing at below the cost of 
capital or wasting it on organisational inefficiencies. Managers maximising shareholder wealth 
13 fie particularly argued that unless the cost of issuing dividends is uniformly lower for prosperous firms, no signal is 
Possible. 
Managers tend to be risk averse as they try to minimise the firm's risk in order to minimise their personal risk 
exposure. However, shareholders benefit from increasing the risk of existing debt securities and one way of achieving 
this is to increase the firm's leverage. For full discussion see Lease, John, Kalay, Lowenstein and Sarig (1999) 
's Easterbrook (1984) recognised that Rozeff (1982) found a "meeting place" of the managers' and shareholders' 
interests, however, Rozeff failed to provide any mechanism by which dividends and the consequent raising of capital 
control agency costs. 
16 Similar to Easterbrook (1984) 
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pay out free cash flow. Shareholders ideally want to leave little discretionary cash in 
management's hands and would prefer managers to turn to capital markets to fund investments. 
According to Jensen, debt counters this by taking away free cash flow. He also contends that 
takeovers and mergers take place when either the acquirer has large quantum of free cash flow or 
when the acquired has large free cash flow, which has not been paid out to stakeholders. Although 
Jensen has not dealt with the issue of dividends directly, empirical researchers have often used 
Jensen's free cash flow theory for motivating tests of the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend 
policy. 
52.2 EMPIRi A EVID 
. 
NCF. 
The above theoretical predictions are tested from different perspectives. In this section I 
summarise the main results based on different methodologies. 
DIVID ýp PAYOUTS AND FRFF 
. 
ASII FLOW 
One of the best-known attempts to find an empirical relationship between agency costs and 
dividend policy is made by Rozeff (1982). He rationalises an optimal dividend payout by 
appealing two market imperfections, the agency costs of external financing and the transaction 
costs associated with issuing external finance. Rozeff argues that increased dividends relative to 
earnings lower agency costs but raise the transaction costs of external financing. The sum of these 
two opposing costs determines an optimal dividend payout. He uses a sample of 1000 non- 
financial and unregulated f irms from 64 different industries for the period 1974-1980; and 
develops a model, that regresses the average payout ratio against the percentage of stock owned 
by insiders, the average growth of revenues, the value line's forecast of growth rate of revenues, 
the beta coefficient estimated by value line and the natural logarithm of the number of common 
shareholders. The model is able to explain 48 percent of the cross-sectional variability in dividend 
payouts across individual firms and its estimated coefficients are all statistically significant. 
Particularly, he finds that if a firm has a high percentage of insider stock ownership, it will pay a 
small dividend (a lower optimal dividend payout ratio) to reduce agency costs. He observes a 
relation between firm's transaction and agency costs. If the firm pays higher amount of dividends, 
the firm's agency cost is reduced as well as firm's needs to raise external funds for investment, 
which raises firm's transaction costs. The hypothesis is that as outside equity holders own a larger 
share of the equity, they will demand a higher dividend as part of the optimum monitoring 
package. Rozeff (1982) incorporates one variable as the percentage of stock held by insiders. The 
prediction is that the dividend payout is negatively related to the percentage of stock held by 
insiders. The fraction of stock held by outsiders may not be the only determinant of dividend 
demand. If fewer shareholders held this fraction, their ownership will be more concentrated and 
may more easily influence insider behavior, thereby reducing agency costs and leading to lower 
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optimal dividend payout. Hence, dispersion of ownership among outsider shareholders may 
influence the dividend decision, with more dispersion leading to higher dividends. Ile uses the 
number of common shareholders to measure ownership dispersion. The prediction is that the 
dividend payout is positively related to the number of common shareholders in the firm. To 
correct for scale effects, the variable taken by Rozeff as the natural log of the number of common 
shareholders. He finds a significant positive function of the firm's number of common 
shareholders and concludes that higher dividend payments reduce agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. 
Rozeff's original findings were later supported by a number of studies. Jahera, Lloyd, Modani 
(1986), re-estimate Rozeff's model with the addition of size as an explanatory variable, and by 
substituting insider ownership with ownership control dummies; however this model has lower 
explanatory power. Dempsey and Laber (1992) estimate Rozeff's model in a different time period 
when market conditions are different (i. e. lower inflation, stronger economic growth and lower 
taxes); and find that Rozeff's model is structurally stable over time. Moh'd 
, 
Perry, Rimbcy 
(1995), apply a time-series cross-sectional analysis to estimate Rozeff s model and conclude that 
the model holds not just across firms but also through time as firms adjust their payouts in 
response to dynamic shifts in the agency and transaction cost structure. Other studies that test 
Rozeff's model include Hasen, Kumar, Shome (1994) and Rao and White (1994). Holder, 
Langrehr, Hexter (1998) investigate the relationship between dividend policy decisions and 
investment decisions of 477 NYSE listed companies and find a strong influence of agency costs 
on dividend decision of the firm. Saxena (1999) investigates the determinants of dividend policy 
of 235 unregulated and 98 regulated NYSE firms and find a strong support of Rozeff's (1982) 
results. Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994) employ an international study to 
investigate the dividend payouts of newly privatised firms and found that companies tent to 
double the mean dividend payouts after privatisation; this result is consistent with Rozeff (1982) 
supporting that the creation of agency costs by means of a dispersion of ownership requires the 
initialisation of, or increase in dividend payout policy. 
Collins, Saxena and Wansley (1996) explicitly recognise the potential differences in dividend 
policy between regulated and unregulated firms and focused on agency-cost and monitoring 
explanations for the relevance of dividends. Their purpose is to examine the role of insiders in 
determining dividend policy for unregulated firms, utilities and financial-service firms. Since 
utilities, and to some extent, financial-service firms, have regulators who serve as low cost 
informants to market participants, insiders play a reduced role in determining dividend policy 
compared to unregulated firms. They develop a regression model to address whether the role of 
regulators and insiders are substitutes or complements for utilities and financial-services. Results 
198 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 5 
show that fundamental differences exist in the relationship between insider holdings and dividend 
policy for unregulated firms and utilities. However, results suggest that the regulatory 
environment enhanced, rather than mitigated, the importance of the insiders' role for utilities. For 
financial service firms, the results do not support the hypothesis that increased equity risk through 
fixed rate deposit insurance enhances the role of insiders when determining dividend policy. 
Alli, Khan and Ramirez (1993) explain that as the number of shareholders increases, the agency 
problem becomes more severe and the need of monitoring managerial actions also increases. If 
dividend can alleviate this problem, a positive relation is expected between the number of 
common shareholders and dividend payout ratio. However, they also explain that higher insider 
ownership leads to lower agency problem and lower dividend payout, so a negative relationship is 
expected between stock held by insiders and dividend payout ratio. They find a significant 
positive relationship between the number of common shareholders and dividend payout ratio and 
a significant negative relationship between insider ownership and dividend payout ratio. Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992) investigate the simultaneous determination of dividend policy, 
participation in the firm's capital of internal shareholders and the level of financial leverage and 
found ways to control agency relations within a corporation. They employ a three stage least 
squares technique" and use data from 1982 to 1987. They obtain empirical evidence that the 
dividends paid by the company are negatively related to its financial leverage and to the 
participation of internal shareholders in its capital. In other words, firms with high insider 
ownership prefer low levels of debt and dividends. Their results are consistent with the 
explanation of the dividend policy of companies proposed in the hypothesis Jensen's (1986) free 
cash flow hypothesis. Bathala, Bowlin and Rao (1995) proposed a substitutability hypothesis, 
which states that debt structure, insider ownership, and dividend policy serve as substitutes in 
reducing the total agency cost of a firm (however, they do not measure these agency costs). 
Sorlberg and Zorn (1992) employ a three-stage least square technique, in a study with a sample of 
182 firms for the period 1984 to 1986. Differing from Jensen at al (1992) they find that debt ratio, 
insider ownership and dividend payout are all negatively related to each other which provides 
support for their substitutability hypothesis. 
Christie and Nanda (1994) take a different approach and consider the effects of 1936 Tax Reform, 
which unexpectedly imposed taxes on undistributed corporate profits, and consequently there was 
an unexpected decrease in free cash flow available to corporate managers. They attempt to both 
identify the investors' reaction to the free cash flow decrease and to evaluate the relative 
importance of agency costs as a partial determinant of dividend policy. Results indicate that 
" See Zellner and Theil (1992) for a discussion 
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despite the direct costs of the tax, its announcement produced a positive revaluation of corporate 
equities and particularly among lower-payout firms. This is interpreted as evidence of a 
divergence between managerial and shareholder preferences regarding dividend payout policies, 
consistent with the presence of agency costs. They also observe that despite the incentives created 
by the tax, the actual growth in dividends after the reform was lower amongst firms judged more 
likely to be subject to higher agency costs after controlling for liquidity, debt and the growth in 
earnings. Consequently, results provided strong support for Jensen's (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
f RowTII OPPORTUNITIES. CiHAN(: ES IN DIVIDENDS AND MARKT? T (' A 1ýlY 7l 1VLLN12 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Unfortunately, neither Easterbrook (1984) nor Jensen (1986) model their theoretical conclusions 
or put forward a plausible, qualitative argument. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) follows Jensen 
(1986) and argues that the management of firms with substantial free cash flows will have a 
tendency to overinvest in negative net present value projects and if they arc overinvesting then 
dividend increases would, ceteris paribus, reduce the extent of such overinvestment and thus 
increase the value of the firm. In contrast, a dividend decrease would produce the opposite result. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) prove the appropriateness of the Tobin's Q ratio to separate 
overinvesting firms from other companies and show that value maximising firms have a Tobin's 
Q ratio greater than unity'8 while a Tobin's Q ratio of less than unity indicates overinvestmcnt. 
They examine 429 dividend change announcements from 1979 to 1984. Results show that average 
returns around sizable dividend change announcements for firms with average Q's <1 is equal to 
0.011 which are more than three times as large as that for firms with average Q's >1 (0.003) with 
the difference (0.008) being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This evidence is 
consistent both with the free cash flow/overinvestment hypothesis and the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis. '9 Secondly, Lang and Litzenberger argue that daily returns are influenced by 
information other than dividend announcement, and in order to reduce this impact, they examine 
intra day returns of 76 dividend change announcements (according to data availability). Results 
show that the average return for firms with average Q<1 is equal to 0.0178 and significantly 
higher than for firms with average Q>1 (-0.0001). Therefore, they conclude that sizable dividend 
changes have a significant impact on the share price of the firm with average Q<1 but no impact 
for firms with average QA- 
18 Because the market value reflects the investment (the book value) plus the net present value of the investment 
19 Note that the difference between the cash flow signaling hypothesis and the FCF hypothesis is based on the fact that 
the former predicts that dividend change provides information about current and/or future cash flows while under the 
FCF hypothesis, the dividend change provides information about changes in the managers' misuse of cash flows. 
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Thirdly, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) identify the need to distinguish between dividend increase 
and decrease announcements of both Q<1 and Q>1 firms in order to distinguish between the free 
cash flow and cash flow signaling hypothesis. They note that under the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis, for firms with average Q>1 the predicted impacts on returns of announcements of 
dividend changes is larger in absolute value for dividend decreases than for dividend increases. 
On the other hand the free cash flow hypothesis predicts a symmetrical impact. For firms with 
average Q<1, both hypotheses predict a significant impact on return in both dividend increase and 
decrease cases. Results for Q>1 firms indicate significant returns for dividend increases (0.003 
and p-value 0.016) and insignificant for dividend decreases (-0.003 and p-value 0.371). However, 
the absolute value of the average returns associated with dividend increase and decrease 
announcements are similar in magnitude and not significantly different from each other, which 
provides evidence to reject the cash flow signaling hypothesis. Further support for the free cash 
flow hypothesis over the cash flow signaling hypothesis is provided by the fact that the average 
returns for firms with Q<1 are significant for both dividend increases (0.008 and p-value 0.00) 
and decreases (-0.027 and p-value 0.00) but in either dividend increase or decrease the absolute 
value of the average return is significantly larger for Q<1 firms than for Q>l firms. Finally, tests 
based on revisions in analysts earning forecasts fail to reject the free cash flow/overinvest merit 
hypothesis in favour of the conditional cash flow signaling hypothesis. 
Yoon and Starks (1995) consider 3748 dividend increase and 431 dividend decrease 
announcements of all NYSE stocks for the period 1969 to 1988; and test whether the information 
revealed by dividend change announcements is more consistent with the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis or the Lang and Litzenberger (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. They find that the 
stock price reaction to large (at least 10 percent) dividend change announcements is generally 
consistent with the predictions of the cash flow signaling hypothesis. Although they find that for 
dividend increases, the abnormal return for low Q firms is significantly larger than that of high Q 
firms this differential reaction does not persist after controlling for dividend change, dividend 
yield and firm size. Due to the relationship between the three control variables and the investment 
opportunity set, they take an alternative approach to discriminate between the cash flow signaling 
and the free cash flow hypothesis as explanations of the wealth effects surrounding the dividend 
change announcements. They find that dividend increase (decrease) firms experience significant 
increases (decreases) in capital expenditures over the three years following the dividend change, 
and also provide significant evidence that announcements of dividend increases and decreases 
cause analysts to revise their current earnings forecasts in a manner generally consistent with the 
cash flow signaling hypothesis. In addition they find that analysts tend to lower their long-term 
earnings growth forecasts following dividend decrease announcements, but not following 
dividend increase announcements which explains why dividend decreases cause a larger stock 
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price reaction than do dividend increases. Yoon and Starks conclude that although results indicate 
that the free cash flow hypothesis does not explain the information effects of dividend change 
announcements, the hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out as it explains the observed cross- 
sectional differences in dividend policy. The fact that low Q firms have higher dividend yield and 
larger dividend change that high Q firms is consistent with the implications of the free cash flow 
hypothesis. 
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) integrate the cash flow signaling, ovcrinvestment and clientele 
hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive, into a single testing framework in order to address 
the conflicting evidence regarding the relative importance of each explanation. They use a sample 
of 6,777 large dividend changes for the period 1962 to 1988 and they simultaneously control for 
the standardised dividend change, dividend yield and Tobin's Q. Results indicate that 
announcement period excess returns are positively related to the magnitude of the standardised 
dividend change and to dividend yield but unrelated to Tobin's Q. This provides support for the 
cash flow signaling and dividend clientele hypotheses but failed to provide support for the 
overinvestment hypothesis. 20 Denis et al also provide evidence on the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis by examining revisions in analysts' earnings forecasts and changes in capital 
expenditures following dividend change announcements and find that analysts significantly revise 
their earnings forecasts following dividend changes. Consistently with the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis they observe a negative relation between the magnitude of the dividend change and 
Tobin's Q with the earnings revisions being larger for Q<1 firms than for Q> 1 firms. They also 
find a positive relation between dividend yield and announcement period excess returns, 
consistent with the clientele hypothesis advanced by Bajaj and Vijh (1990). Finally, they observe 
evidence contrary to the predictions of the overinvestment hypothesis; that is Q<1 firms increase 
(decrease) their capital expenditures following dividend increases (decreases). The results 
however, cannot completely rule out the overinvestment hypothesis. 
Howe, He and Kao (1992) attempt to provide an extension of Lang and Litzenbergcr (1989) 
dividend results to a broader set of cash transactions in which the cash distribution is not expected 
to be repeated. The transactions chosen are tender offer share repurchases and specially designed 
dividends. They analyse the effect of infrequent or one-time cash distributions to determine 
whether Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis explains the market's reaction to an expanded set of 
transactions. Their results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in two-day 
abnormal returns between high Q and low Q firms announcing tender offer repurchases or 
specially designed dividends. Their interest in these results stems from its contrast with the 
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findings of Lang and Litzenberger (1989), which generally support Jensen's free cash flow theory. 
Howe et al reject the free cash flow hypothesis in favour of the information-signaling hypothesis 
and interpret their results as an empirical puzzle. However, Perfect, Peterson and Peterson (1995) 
criticise Howe et al (1992) on the notion that long-run measures of Tobin's Q provide support for 
the Lang and Litzenberger (1989) original findings and find no evidence to reject the free cash 
flow hypothesis. 
F'URTIIFR E. MPIRI 
. 
AL EVID. N 
.. 
Akhigbe and Madura (1996) measure the long-term valuation effects following dividend 
initiations and omissions and find that firms initiating dividends experience favourable long-term 
share price performance. Conversely, firms omitting dividends experience unfavourable long-term 
share price performance. The long-term valuation effects resulting from dividend initiations are 
more favourable for firms that are smaller, that overinvest, and that had relatively poor 
performance prior to the initiations. The long-term effects resulting from dividend omissions are 
more unfavourable for large firms and for firms experiencing relatively large dividend omissions. 
Moreover, dividend initiations can reduce agency costs because they reduce free cash flow 
available to managers. The potential for reduced agency costs should be greater for those firms 
that tend to use funds inefficiently. Given that previous performance serves as a proxy for 
efficiency in allocating funds, the relatively poor performance have more potential to reduce 
agency costs because they enlarge the free cash flow available to managers. However, the 
financial condition of firms at the time of a dividend omission may limit the degree to which 
agency costs can rise. Since many firms only omit dividends after experiencing financial 
problems, the funds retained rather than distributed as dividends should be closely monitored. 
Agency costs are more likely to increase following a dividend omission if the firm's previous 
performance has not triggered closer monitoring of managers. That is, relatively poor 
performance prior to the dividend omission should automatically enhance monitoring of the 
firm's managers, while relatively strong performance prior to the dividend omission enlargers free 
cash flow without necessary triggering closer monitoring of the firm's managers. 
Kallapur (1994) test Jensen's free cash flow theory that managers overinvest related earnings by 
undertaking negative net present value projects. Particularly, he examines whether the earnings 
response coefficients depend positively on dividend payout ratios and developed this assertion 
from the Fama and Miller (1972) model, which expresses stock price as a function of accounting 
earnings, the payout ratio and the expected rate of return. The model is based on the free cash 
now theory prediction that managers may overinvest retained earnings by undertaking negative 
20 Furthermore, the results of a more refined test of the overinvestment hypothesis using the interaction of Tobin's Q 
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net present value projects, therefore the rate of return on reinvested earnings (R, r) would be lower 
than the market's required rate of return (Rr). Kallapur provides evidence to support that the 
capitalisation rate of a pound of earnings, which is equivalent to the earnings response coefficient, 
is independent of the payout ratio if Rrm=Rre and depends positively on the payout ratio if R,,,, <R,., 
which thing is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) also find evidence to support the free cash flow 
hypothesis as they observe a declining return on assets, cash levels and capital expenditures in the 
years after large dividend increases, and suggested that firms that anticipate a declining 
investment opportunity set are the ones that are likely to increase dividends. Moreover, Lie (2000) 
investigates the relationship between excess funds and firms' payout policies and finds that 
dividend increasing or (repurchase) firms have cash in excess of peer firms in their industry. lie 
also documents that the market reaction to the announcement of special dividends is positively 
related to the firm's investment opportunity set, measured by Tobin's Q. 
Lasfer (1997) investigates the factors behind the decision to offer scrip dividends in the UK. Scrip 
dividends are an option offered to shareholders allowing them to choose between cash dividends 
or the equivalent amount in the form of shares in the company and this scrip option in the UK is 
tax advantaged over cash dividends. Lasfer finds however, that there is no different tax exposure 
between scrip and non-scrip offering companies. He also tests the agency cost hypothesis that the 
scrip option can worsen the free cash flow problem because it enables companies to retain cash 
and by-pass primary capital market monitoring, overcoming the inflexibility in dividend policy. 
Results found to be consistent with this hypothesis as he documents that larger firms with low 
growth opportunities are more likely to issue scrip dividends. 
On the other hand, Douglas (1990) contributes to the free cash flow theory and dividend 
controversy by providing a new explanation for the dividend puzzle arguing that neither debt nor 
retained earnings can substitute for dividends. He considers two types of asymmetric information 
problems inherent in the relationship between shareholders (as principles) and managers (as 
shareholders' agents), and therefore the payment scheme between them would be designed to 
mitigate these problems. The board of directors would design managerial compensation 
schedules, which would be dependent upon a committed payment out of the firm. He argues that 
greater flexibility allowed by a compensation scheme based on dividends instead of debts would 
lead to a preference for dividends in alleviating agency problems. Douglas concludes that 
with a measure of undistributed cash flow also failed to support the overinvestmcnt hypothesis. 
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dividends have an advantage over debt in alleviating the free cash flow type problems and that the 
legal force associated with debt may not be required. 
Smith and Watts (1992) investigate the reasons behind the cross-sectional variations of corporate 
financing, dividend and compensation policy choices at the industry level and find that the 
contracting theories are more important than other theories in explaining the observed cross- 
sectional variation. They use the availability of growth options and firm size as proxies for the 
firm's investment opportunities and observe that they are related to the firm's financing, dividend 
and executive compensation policies. A negative relationship is observed both between dividend 
yield and the use of bonus and stock option plans; and between growth options and dividend 
yields. Their results provide support for the substitute hypothesis, that is dividend policy as well 
as other monitoring or agency costs can be used equivalently as mechanisms for reducing agency 
costs. Similar results are observed by Gaver and Gaver (1993) who conduct the analysis at the 
firm rather than the industry level, using alternative proxies for investment opportunities. 
Agrawall and Jayarman (1994) take a different approach to examine the hypothesis that dividends 
reduce the opportunity for managers to use free cash flow in a self-serving manner. Since both 
interest payments and dividends reduce the pool of excess cash that managers can misuse, they 
examine the free cash flow motive for dividend payments. They compare, on the one hand the 
dividend policy of companies in debt and of companies not in debt and; on the other hand, the 
dividend policy of companies with high degree of participation of shareholders in their capital 
(where presumably the interests of shareholders and of managers are more in line) and of 
companies with low participation. They report that the dividend payout ratios of all-equity firms 
are significantly higher than the dividend payout ratios of leveraged firms. They also report that 
firms with high managerial share holdings have lower payouts than firms with low share holdings. 
Overall, results suggest that dividends do serve as a means to reduce the conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders regarding the use of free cash flows. 
Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) argue that if dividend payments play a monitoring role, then 
dividend and financing decisions should be interrelated in such a way as to cause dividend and 
capital structure decisions to be made simultaneously. Moreover, they argue that the validity of 
the monitoring rational for dividends is contingent on the non-existence of other mechanisms for 
controlling agency costs and the growth opportunities of the firm. Eckbo and Verma (1994) find 
evidence consistent with the dividend monitoring rationale and the existence of an 
interrelationship between dividend policy and other monitoring mechanisms. Results show that 
cash dividends tend to decrease when the voting power-managers increase while when owner- 
managers have absolute control of the firm, cash dividends tend to disappear. 
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Born and Rimbey (1993) offer some empirical evidence on Easterbrook's (1984) hypothesis. 
They examine the relationship between the size of the capital market's response to an 
unanticipated dividend increase and the volume of prior financing announcements by the same 
firm. Their evidence is somewhat mixed. They find a smaller price reaction, on average, to 
dividend announcements by firms who have engaged in prior financings than for firms who have 
not borrowed in the public market or form bank lenders. This result is inconsistent with 
Easterbrook (1984) hypothesis that the fundamental role of dividends is to stimulate monitoring 
by requiring more trips to the debt market. Born and Rimbey (1993) do find however, that 
financing firms enjoy higher return per unit of dividend yield than non-financing firms and that 
the amount of financing preceding the dividend announcement is positively related to the 
abnormal return; which provides evidence in support for Easterbrook's (1984) hypothesis. 
Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999) follow Born and Rimbey (1993) and examine the hypothesis that 
agency costs are a primary factor motivating dividend payments. They hypothesise that the 
presence of bank regulators as monitors may reduce agency costs to sufficiently small levels, that 
third party monitoring by capital market institutions yields minimal benefits. They argue that 
when some other mechanisms have, by assumption, largely attenuated agency costs, then the 
capital market mechanism has less of a role to play, and in the extreme, no role at all. In particular 
they examine the Easterbrook (1984) hypothesis related to dividend payments and agency costs in 
a sample of bank holding companies. In contrast to Born and Rimbey (1993) they argue that the 
abnormal returns associated with dividend announcements by bank holding companies will not be 
related to external financing activity because the monitoring efforts of capital market institutions 
are largely redundant in the presence of bank regulators. 
PAYOOT POLICY AND INVESTOR PROTECTION 
Recently, La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) attempt to identify some of the basic 
elements of the agency approach to dividends and examine the relationship between investors' 
protection and dividend policy across 33 countries based on the notion that the ability to monitor 
and the rights of outside shareholders differ across countries; therefore the potential severity of 
conflicts of interests would differ too. They test two alternative agency models of dividends: 
Firstly, the "outcome model" according to which dividends are paid because minority 
shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash, therefore stronger minority shareholder 
rights would be associated with higher dividend payouts. Shareholders who feel protected would 
accept low dividend payouts, and high reinvestment rates, from a company with good 
opportunities because they know that when this company's investments pay off, they could 
extract dividends. In contrast, a mature company with poor investment opportunities would not be 
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allowed to invest unprofitably. As a consequence, according to La Porta, Silanes, Shlcifcr and 
Vishny (2000), in countries where shareholders are highly protected, high growth companies 
should have significantly lower dividend payouts than low growth companies; in contrast, in 
countries where shareholder protection is poor shareholders would demand higher dividend 
payouts. This relationship is illustrated in the Figure 5.1. 
Dividends/ Earnings Source: La Porta et al (2000) 
High Protection 
1 
Low Protection 
Investment Opportunities 
Secondly, an opposite model was tested, the "substitute model" where insiders interested in 
issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of 
minority shareholders. La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny argue that a reputation for good 
treatment of shareholders is worth more in countries with weak legal protection of minority 
shareholders, who have little else to rely on; therefore, all else equal, in these countries dividend 
payouts should be higher than in countries with good legal protection. Moreover, the need for 
establishing good reputation is greater in firms with better growth prospects because of the 
necessity of external funding; however the relationship between growth prospects and dividend 
policy could be ambiguous as high growth prospect firms also have a better current uses of funds. 
La Porta et al illustrate the implications of the substitute model as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Dividends/ Earnings 
Low Protection 
High Protcction 
Source: La Porta et al (2000) 
Investment Opportunities 
Their data consists of 1,135 firms from civil law countries and 2,968 firms from common law 
countries where according to La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) investors are better 
protected. 2' La Porta et al (2000) report that for all measures (dividend to earnings, dividend to 
cash flow and dividend to sales) common law countries have higher dividend payouts than civil 
law countries, while firms in civil law countries have been perceived to grow one percent faster 
than firms in common law countries. Particularly, evidence supports the outcome model of 
dividends. Moreover, in common law countries, fast growth firms pay lower dividends than slow 
growth firms, consistent with the idea that legally protected shareholders are willing to wait for 
their dividends when investment opportunities are good. On the other hand, in civil law countries, 
poorly protected shareholders seem to take whatever dividends they can get, regardless of 
investment opportunities. This apparent misallocation of investment was interpreted as part of the 
agency cost of poor legal protection. La Porta et al (2000) find no conclusive evidence on the 
effect of taxes on dividend policies and limited relevance of dividend signaling. Nevertheless, La 
Porta et al (2000) conclude that firms appear to pay out cash to investors because the 
opportunities to steal or misinvest it are in part limited by law, and because minority shareholders 
have enough power to extract it. In this respect, the quality of legal protection of investors is 
found to be important for dividend policies as it is for other key corporate decisions. 
La Porta et al (2000) results provide support for the agency model of dividends, according to 
which better shareholder protection leads to higher dividend payouts. Firms are observed to pay 
out cash to investors because the opportunities to steal or invest in negative net present value 
21 The z-statistic on the difference in the median civil law and common law shareholder protection is 3.97 
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projects are in part limited by law, and because minority shareholders have enough powcr to 
extract it. However, La Porta et al have not considered the impact of dividend change 
announcements on share prices under different legal protection systems or under different 
corporate governance systems. Therefore, I further examine the agency conflict explanation of 
dividends in the UK, Germany, France and Italy to particularly examine whether differences in 
corporate governance systems result in higher/lower abnormal returns around the dividend change 
announcements as well as to test in whether the share price reaction is consistent with the 
predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) or the free cash now 
signaling hypothesis. 
5 
.3 CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS IN I' uBUI'LAN_CU[INTIZIES 
EXPECTED Tn AFFECT TILE LEVEL OF AGENCY CONFLICT ANI) IIYPUTItI? Sl? S TO itl: TF. STI? ll 
The review of the literature indicates that there is support for the existence of links between 
variables related to corporate governance structures and dividend policy, which arc able to explain 
variations in dividend policies across countries and across firms. These include the level of legal 
protection of shareholders, the ownership concentration, insider ownership and the amount of 
leverage. All these appear to affect the level of conflicts between managers and shareholders. The 
existence of wide cross-sectional variations in dividend payouts across firms, industries and 
countries is in accordance with optimal dividend policies derived by Rozeff (1982) trade-off 
model, and with varying degrees of agency problems across countries due to both different 
governance and legal structures. 
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled; 
and provides the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance. Pulling together various dimensions of 
financial markets and corporate governance, some researchers22 attempt to develop broad 
classifications of systems. Generally studies have identified two major corporate governance 
systems- market-oriented and bank-oriented countries. The UK is classified as a market-oriented 
country while Germany, France and Italy have been more or less classified as bank-based 
systems. 23 
Franks and Mayer (1994) distinguished between outsider and insider systems. 24 The 
distinguishing features of the UK outsider model are dispersed equity ownership with large 
institutional holdings, the recognised primacy of shareholder interests in the company law, a 
22 Mayers (1994,1997), Zysman (1983) and Dosi (1990), Berglof (1990, Berglof and Sjogrcn (1995), Rujan and 
Zingales (1990). 
23 See Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), Halpern (1999) 
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strong emphasis on the protection of minority investors in securities law and regulation, relatively 
strong requirements for disclosure. The outsider system can be also characterised as a market- 
based system, inasmuch as it relies heavily on the capital market as a means of influencing 
behavior. The system is also characterised by a legal and regulatory approach that favours use of 
the capital markets and is designed to build confidence among non-controlling investors. In 
countries with outsider systems, the legal framework supports clearly the right of shareholders to 
control the company and makes the board and management explicitly accountable to the 
shareholders. 25 
By contrast, the German, French and Italian corporate governance systems tend to be 
characterised as bank-based systems. As compared to the UK ownership is less dispersed, 2° with 
extensive individual or family, bank and inter-corporate holdings27. In such a case, there is a less 
active equities market and less of a market in corporate control. Governance and monitoring of 
the firm's performance take on more of an insider form, with representatives of families and/or 
banks and/or other firms sitting on the company's board. Ownership and control are relatively 
held by identifiable and cohesive groups of "insiders" who have longer-term stable relationships 
with the company. Insider groups usually are relatively small, their members are known to each 
other and they have some connection to the company other than their financial investment, such 
as banks or suppliers. Groups of insiders typically include some combination of family interests, 
allied industrial concerns, banks and holding companies. Frequently, the insiders can 
communicate among themselves with relative ease to act in concert to monitor corporate 
management, which acts under close control. Furthermore, the legal and regulatory system is 
more tolerant of groups of insiders who act together to control management while excluding 
minority investors. Hence, the agency problem, which characterises the outsider system, is of 
much less importance. 28 An important ingredient in all corporate governance system is monitoring 
of managerial activity by various elements of the system. Monitoring can be undertaken by the 
Board of Directors, individual shareholders, concentrated holdings of shares such as mutual funds 
and pension funds, bondholders, banks or workers. 
Alli, Khan and Ramirez (1993) explain that as the number of shareholders increases, the agency 
problem becomes more severe. Differences in ownership concentration are shown in Table 1.2 
Panel D. Lower ownership concentration in the UK than in Germany, France and Italy is 
24 Also see OECD (1996), Nestor and Thompson (1999) 
25 See La Porta et al (1997) 
26 See Chapter 1, Table 1.2 Panel D, LaPorta, Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Franks and Maycr (1994). Dhcrmcnt- 
Ferere, Köke and Renneboog (2001) 
27 Clarke and Bostock (1997) report that equity ownership by non-financial firms is much lower in the UK (3.1 percent) 
as compared with Germany (39 percent), France (55 percent) and Italy (23 percent). 
28 See Neston and Thompson (1999), Halpern (1999) 
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expected to result in higher agency conflicts as according to Rozeff (1982) higher ownership 
dispersion leads might lead to higher dividends, which reduce agency conflicts. The UK system is 
characterised by high dispersion of voting and cash flow rights29 and called the "Weak owners- 
Strong Managers t930 A single small shareholder only benefits from performance improvements in 
direct proportion to the cash flow rights, he or she may not find it profitable to monitor 
management while a large shareholder will necessarily feel differently and will have greater 
incentives to monitor management. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that banks have a role as producers of information (Ramakrislma 
and Thakor, 1982 and Allen, 1990) or as delegated monitors (Diamond, 1994). Banks are 
supposed to perform an important function in screening and monitoring firms. Low, Glorfeld, 
Hearth and Rimbey (2001) established a link between bank monitoring and corporate dividend 
policy, that is, they concluded that investors interpret the dividend decision as a function of bank 
monitoring3' and the dividend signals taken together. Studies of various managerial actions have 
concluded that the existence and level of bank debt influences market perceptions; and generally, 
it has been shown that the market uses the banking relationship as a mechanism to certify the 
firm's actions. 32 In effect, market participants may be reassured by the bank's presence as a third- 
party monitor. The role of banks as management monitors differs across Europe as lower levels of 
debt have been observed in the UK (21.85 percent) than in Germany (52.24 percent), France 
(31.15 percent) and Italy (71.18 percent). 33 Moreover, the limited monitoring role of banks in the 
UK is reinforced by low bank equity holdings34 (1.7 percent) and by the fact that banks limit their 
involvement in the companies to which they provide finance. 35 In contrast, in Germany banks 
hold a significant share (13.6 percent) of the equity market. This has been argued to permit banks 
to constrain the managements of large German companies to act more closely in accordance with 
shareholders' wishes and hence reduce the agency costs involved in the owner-management 
relationship. 36 This has been reinforced by the ownership of shares by banks and by 
representation on companies' supervisory boards. 
" Moreover, banks often act as proxies for 
shareholders (votes by mail is prohibited by law) and indeed are required by statute to provide 
_' See La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2001); Crama. Leruth, Renneboog and Urbain (1998) rind striking 
differences in ownership concentration between insider and outsider systems. 
30 See Roe (1994) 
31 Also see Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993,1999) 
32 For example, Hirschey, Slovin and Zaima (1990) find significant positive returns around corporate selloff 
announcements by companies with high bank debt and little market reaction to announcements by companies with little 
or no bank debt. 
33 Sources of Funds, EVCA Yearbook (2000). See Table 1.2 Panel B. 
34 See Carlin and Mayer (1998) for Bank Equity Holdings Data 
;s International Capital Markets Group (1995) 
36 See Edwards and Fischer (1994), Baums (2002), 
37 While individual banks often have one member on a board, a board may have representatives from several banks. Sec 
International Capital Markets Group (1995) 
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such a service. 38 In France and Italy, companies have tended to be family oriented, growing 
through bank debt rather than equity finance. 39 Especially in Italy since 1936 until 1993, the 
possibility for banks with demand or short-term deposits of acquiring significant shareholdings in 
non-financial companies was precluded by the Bank of Italy's policy in favour of separating 
banks from manufacturing firms. 40 Such policy did not cover banks with no short term liabilities 
such as the Mediobanca which according to Bianchi et al (1998) had a central role in the Italian 
Corporate Governance both by providing debt financing and monitoring the performance of 
companies. After 1993, banks in Italy are allowed to invest up to 50 percent of their capital in 
non-financial firms. 
The agency theory's focus on board structure is on the extent to which top management's (the 
agents) versus shareholders' (the legitimate owners) interests are represented in corporate decision 
making. The key mechanism through which this is mediated is the degree of board independence 
from management's interests and, hence, the impartiality of the board in monitoring and 
controlling management. 4' The monitoring board of a public company serves as a disciplinary 
mechanism by advising and monitoring the top management team and by replacing it when 
necessary. According to Fama and Jensen (1983) such boards have the power to hire, fire and 
compensate the top-level decision managers and to ratify and monitor important decisions. 
Companies of which non-executive directors dominate the board should spend, on average, more 
dividends than companies with insider-dominated boards. The more insiders have a board seat, 
the more they can put pressure on the other board members to keep cash dividends low. Dehaene 
and Ooghe (1998) examined cross-sectional differences in the composition of the board of 
directors and the impact of this composition on the corporate performance and dividend policy. 
They found no evidence to support that both the board size and relative importance of outside 
directors affects corporate performance; however, the way the board of directors is composed was 
found to affect dividend policy. The position and composition of the board differs considerably, 
however, from country to country. 
The board of directors in the UK comprises two distinct types of directors, inside executive 
managers and outside experts. Outside board members often are respected leaders from other 
corporations or institutions and have an incentive to build up reputation as experts in decision 
control. The UK type of board is of the so-called one-tier type, since managing executives are also 
38 Shareholders usually grant banks a proxy voting authority for 15 months (but it can be revoked at any time by the 
shareholder). The bank must inform its customer of the meeting, give written explanations of the proposed resolutions, 
and make written voting proposals explaining how the bank would exercise its vote. If the shareholder gives no 
direction on which way to vote, the bank must vote as already intimidated to the shareholder. 
39 See International Markets Group (1995); Corporate Governance Market Principles: France, Corporate Library 
40 See Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques (1997) 
4t See Cook and Deakin (1999) 
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represented on the board. All directors, executives as well as non-executives, are appointed by the 
controlling shareholders and must answer to the annual meeting. The rights and obligations of the 
board are indivisible and unalienable. The Companies Act does not require directors to be 
managers, but directors are required to see that the business is properly managed. The Cadbury 
Commission (1992) recommended that company boards of directors needed to include more 
external members, who would act as monitors rather than management advocates. The effect of 
the Cadbury Code is to make non-executive directors mandatory, which supports the line taken by 
the Institutional Shareholders' Committee in 1991, in the Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders in the UK. In contrast to the UK system where the board should operate effectively 
as an entity, 42 the legal requirement in Germany to a two-tier board system, " comprising a 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a management board (Vorstand), provides a complete 
separation between management and the supervision of management. The management board, 
which is usually smaller than the supervisory board is responsible for the management of the 
company and its operations and is not bound to accept instructions from the supervisory board or 
the general meeting. It develops the company's strategy and must report at least quarterly to the 
supervisory board on planned activities and on the profitability and progress of the company. The 
strategy presented by the management board may be subject to challenge by the supervisory 
board, but the latter does not generally have the power to change the strategy. The supervisory 
board has a legal duty to appoint, to remunerate and to monitor the competence of the 
management board, to approve the annual accounts and to propose to the shareholders' meeting 
the amount of the dividend and the appointment of the auditors. In the traditional French System 
for Societ6s Anonymes (SA 
- 
the equivalent of public companies in the UK) the board consists of 
two main components. The President Directeur Gdndral (PDG) is elected by the board, which in 
turn is appointed by the shareholders. The reality may be the reverse of this; that is the PDG picks 
the board. His authority is wider and greater than that of the CEO in the UK. He may if he 
chooses create a management board as a type of executive committee. The second component, 
which may be well elected by a PDG, is the Conseil d'Administration (the Board) but usually is 
elected by the shareholders in the annual general meeting. How loud the shareholders' voice is 
depends on their relative strength. If they are powerful, their support will be essential so they will 
be consulted beforehand. A second system was introduced in 1966, which provided the French 
companies with an alternative structure of the board. That is a supervisory system, where 
management is in the hands of a directorate which has two to five members supervised by the 
supervisory board. One member of the directorate is designed as President de directoire and is 
appointed by other members but the approval of the shareholders at the general meeting is 
required. In Italy a S. p. A. (public company) is managed by a board of directors (the size specified 
42 Cadbury Report (1995), International Capital Markets Group (1995) 
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by the shareholders) or by a sole director, and the powers of both are determined by the 
company's articles. The management of the company may be delegated by the board or by the 
sole director to general managers, managers, and other executives. In Italy the board of directors 
play a key determinant role in the internal mechanisms of corporate governance of the company, 
as the external mechanisms are weak. A number of factors however, indicate that the 
independence of the board of directors in Italy is limited. First although the board directors have 
fiduciary duties with respect to all shareholders, they mainly represent the interests of the 
controlling shareholders, minority shareholders being typically not well represented. A survey 
conducted in 1994 (Crisci and Tarizzo, 1995)4 on the Boards of Directors of 500 Italian 
companies provides a clear picture. To the question "Who do you represent, in the board? " 83 
percent of the directors answered "the controlling shareholders" and only 12 percent "the minority 
shareholders". Moreover, in 1995, in all the op twenty Italian firms by stock market capitalisation 
a member of the controlling family is on the board as Chairman, CEO of the firm controlled by 
that family (La Porta et al, 1999). 
In the presence, or absence, of growth opportunities, the ownership and control structure play an 
important role in reducing agency problems within firms. Although the mechanisms of corporate 
governance can reduce the interest conflict in both situations, its role could be more important 
when there are no growth opportunities since undertaking unprofitable projects or perquisite 
consumption might exacerbate agency problems. Firm value, financial structure, corporate 
governance, growth opportunities and dividend policy then become more closely related. 
Differences in the European corporate governance systems are expected to affect the level of 
conflicts between shareholders and management of the companies. Moreover, agency conflicts are 
expected to be more severe in countries where there are lower growth opportunities because low 
growth opportunities would result to higher free cash flow in the hands of the management and 
would increase the possibility of investing in negative net present value projects. The purpose is 
to provide both infra and inter European country comparisons in order to test the free cash flow 
hypothesis as described by Jensen (1986) in countries outside the US where levels of agency 
conflicts are assumed to differ. Firstly, at a county level I test: 
HYPOTIWSIS: Abnormal returns on the dividend announcement day in market-based 
countries such as the UK are expected to be higher than in bank-based countries. 
In the literature, it has been argued that low levels of growth opportunities result in higher agency 
conflicts as the probability of investing in negative net present value projects is increasing. I use 
43 See Charkham (1994); Kaplan (1994) 
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the market to book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities in order to test the free cash flow 
hypothesis in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. " In each country I will distinguish between 
overinvesting firms (Low Market-to-Book) and value maximising firms (High Market-to-Book) 
and test whether: 
JIyroTi rwsls: The market reaction to dividend changes of ovcrinvestment firms (low NITII) 
in market-based countries, such as the UK, will be higher than that In bank-based countries. 
JIYrnT ESIS: The market reaction to dividend changes of value maximizing firms (high 
MTB) in market-based countries, such as the UK, will be higher than In bank-based 
countries. 
According to the predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis, in the first case, where managers 
are overinvesting, dividend increases will, all else being equal, reduce ovcrinvestment, and 
increase the market value of the firm. A decrease in the dividend will, however, have the opposite 
result, as more cash would be available in the discretion of the management. Therefore, on the 
dividend announcement day the share price reaction is expected to be positively related to 
dividend changes (i. e. dividend increases would result in positive abnormal returns while dividend 
decreases would result in negative abnormal returns). This share price behavior is however 
consistent with both the free cash flow hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. The signaling 
hypothesis would be rejected over the free cash flow hypothesis if both of the following 
hypotheses hold: 
hIYPOTIIESIS: In market-based countries the market reaction to dividend increases of 
overinvesting firms (high MTB), is higher than to dividend decreases. 
I, [YroTttrsts: In market-based and bank-based countries the market reaction to dividend 
cutstomissions of value maximising firms (high MMTB) Is not significant. 
" Discussed in Brunello, Graziano, Parigi (1999) 
's Perfect and Wiles (1994) show that Tobin's Q and the market-to-book ratio are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is about 0.96). 
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-9.4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
For the purpose of testing my hypothesis in this part of my thesis I use the abnormal returns on 
the dividend announcement dates in the UK, Germany, France and Italy as calculated in Chapter 
4. Abnormal returns are calculated using the event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) 
for the period 1987 to 2002. A full description of the data and methodology is provided in 
Chapter 4 Section 4.4. Further, data for the purpose of calculating the market-to-book values was 
obtained from DataStream. Data includes the year-end market value of equity and the book value 
of assets. 
In this chapter I follow Lang and Litzenberger (1989), who use estimates of Tobin's Q ratio to 
distinguish between overinvesting and value maximising firms, in an attempt to distinguish 
between the predictions of the information signalling and the free cash now hypothesis. Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) follow Miller and Modigliani (1966) limited growth model, to describe the 
overinvestment hypothesis and the rationale for using Tobin's Q ratio as an indicator of the 
expected profitability of future investments. They prove that an average Q ratio greater than unity 
(Q>1) is a necessary condition for a firm to be at the value-maximising level of investment while 
an average Q ratio less than unity (Q<1) is the sufficient condition for a firm to be overinvesting. 
However, average Q estimates are subject to criticism as they might cause potential problems. " 
Because of this reason and because of data unavailability to calculate the Tobin's Q ratio, I use 
the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for the company investment opportunities. Perfect and Wiles 
(1994) show that Tobin's Q and the market-to-book ratio are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is about 0.96). Adam and Goyal (2003) evaluate the performance of a number of proxy 
variables for a firm's investment opportunity set and they do not distinguish between the Tobin's 
Q and the market-to-book ratio. Also Beiner (2001) and Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) use the 
market-to-book ratio as a proxy for investment opportunities. 
The market-to-book ratio is defined as the firm's year-end market value divided by the book value 
of the firm. The year-end market value is equal to the share price multiplied by the year-end 
number of shares. In order to distinguish between value maximising firms and overinvesting firms 
I calculate the market-to-book median in each country. Companies with market-to-book value 
greater than the median are classified as value maximising firms and companies with market-to- 
book value less than the median are classified as overinvesting firms. Marginal value maximising 
companies (i. e. companies with the market-to-book ratio equal to the median) are included into 
the value maximising group. 
"See Lang and Litzenberger (1989), page 185 
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To test the hypothesised difference in abnormal returns around the dividend announcement 
changes in each of the four countries, companies are firstly grouped in two categories according 
to the market-to-book ratio. The agency costs hypothesis predicts that the abnormal returns of 
companies with market-to-book less than the median should be statistically higher than for 
companies with market-to-book greater than the median. Comparisons between the groups are 
conducted using the t-test statistics. 
Further, I analyse the share price behaviour around the dividend announcement days according to 
the direction of the dividend change announced. I look at dividend increases and decreases which 
are defined as positive or negative changes in the annual dividends. According to Dewcntcr and 
Warther (1998), the strongest, most consistent evidence that dividends contain information comes 
from event studies of dividend initiation and omission announcements. Michacly, Thaler and 
Womack (1995) describe dividend initiations and omissions as extremely visible, qualitative 
changes in corporate policy. Therefore, I extend Lang and Litzenberger's (1989) study by further 
analysing the share price behaviour of value maximising and overinvcsting firms on the 
announcement of dividend omissions and initiations. These subsamples are constructed by 
identifying those firms whose annual dividends move from a positive number to zero (omissions) 
and from zero to a positive number (initiations). Due to the restricted time frame of the data, as 
well as to the limited number of dividend omitting and initiating events, i follow Dewcnter and 
Warther (1998) who do not require that a dividend change occur after a set of years of stable 
dividend policy. 47 The fifth, subsample includes companies that announce no dividend changes, 
Therefore, in each country under consideration firms are grouped into two categories according to 
their market-to-book ratios, and then I further distinguish firms according to the type of dividend 
announcement change. Table 5.1 presents the groups of my sample. 
47 For example, Ilealy and Palepu (1988) require that a firm pay dividends for ten years to be included in their omission 
sample. 
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TAB 
.. 
5.1 DIVIDEND CHANG r ANNOUNCEMENTS AS COMPAI rI) TO TB1 G jtQj TII 
OPPORTUNITII? S 
Table shows the company groups considered in the study. The sample is firstly divided according to the firms' growth 
opportunities. Value maximising firms' market-to-book ratio is higher than the median value, while for overinvcsting 
firms the market-to-book ratio is lower than the median value. Secondly, firms in each market-to-book group are 
grouped according to the direction of the dividend change announced. Notation: INC =Increase, NC =No Change, 
DEC=Decrease, INI =Initiation, OMI =Omission, Div. =Dividend, MT131i =11igh market-to-book and MTf1, " Low 
market-to-book. 
INCREASE DECREASE No CIIANGI: INITIATIONS OMISSIONS 
VALUE MTB11- MAXIMISING MTBt1- MTB11- MTB11- IITB11- GROWTII 
' ' 
INC. DIV. FIRMS-MTß DEC. DIV NC. DIV. INI. DIV. OM11. I)IV. 
ORTUNITIES I OI OVERINVESTING MTBL- ý MTBL- MTBL- MTIIL* NIT13i, 
- FIRMS- MTß 
, 
INC. DIV..... DEC. DIV. NC. DIV. INI. DIV. ONII. DIV. 
Generally, the announcement of dividend increases/initiations should be met with positive 
abnormal returns, and negative abnormal returns should follow announcement of dividend 
decreases/omissions. However, this prediction is consistent with both the signalling and the 
overinvesting hypothesis. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) suggest that dividend change 
announcements by overinvesting firms convey information regarding the firm's level of 
investment. A dividend increase suggests to the market that the firm will invest less in the future 
than what it was expected to do. For overinvesting firms, this is good news because the firm was 
expected to invest wastefully, i. e. in negative net present value projects. Similarly, a dividend 
decrease by an overinvesting firm increases the market's assessment of the amount that will be 
wastefully invested, leading to a decrease in firm value. Under the ovcrinvcstment hypothesis, 
only overinvesting firms are expected to experience abnormal share price changes following 
dividend change announcements. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) note that due to Tobin's Q 
measures a firm's marginal Q with error, may still observe abnormal share price changes for value 
maximising firms. Nevertheless, if measures of Tobin's Q are directly related to the true marginal 
Q, the overinvestment hypothesis predicts that the absolute abnormal share price changes 
associated with dividend change announcements will be greater, on average, for ovcrinvcsting 
firms than for value maximising firms. In the next section I present the results. 
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5.5 RESULTS: 
5.5 
.1 
TIIF IMPACT OF DIVIDEND CHANCES ANNOUNCED ON TIEF iIIARF PJuc U'A' CTIQy 
Table 5.2 presents the results. In Panel A, I show the number of dividend increases, decreases, no 
changes, initiations and omissions announced by value maximising and overinvesting firms. In all 
the countries under consideration both value maximising and overinvesting firms announce more 
increases than decreases. In the bank-based countries (Germany, France and Italy) the majority of 
the announcements contain no dividend changes, while in market-based countries (UK) the 
majority of the announcements contain dividend increases. 
In Panel B, I present the day 0 abnormal returns in the UK (1), Germany (2), France (3), and Italy 
(4) on the dividend announcement day; while in Panel CI show the results for a three day 
window (Day 
-1 to +1) around the announcement day. For each country the first two rows show 
the abnormal returns according to the direction of dividend change announced, for value 
maximising (MTB-HIGti) and overinvestment (MTB-LOW) firms respectively. In the third row I 
show returns differences between value maximising and overinvesting firms. In the final two rows 
I provide comparisons for value maximising and overinvesting firms, between the abnormal 
returns according to the dividend changes (for example, I consider whether dividend increases 
result in significantly higher returns than dividend decreases, etc). 
Panel B shows the results on the dividend announcement day. In the UK both value maximising 
and overinvesting firms earn significantly positive (negative) abnormal returns on the 
announcement of dividend increases/initiations (decreases/omissions). On the announcement of 
dividend no changes high market-to-book companies earn insignificant returns equal to 0.05 
percent (t = 0.37) while low market-to-book companies earn positive abnormal returns of 0.24 
percent, significant at the 10% level (t = 1.82). The comparison of the abnormal returns between 
value maximising and overinvesting firms is shown in the third row. Results show that there is no 
significant difference between the returns for low-and high-market-to book firms. However, on 
the announcement of dividend initiations low market-to-book firms appear to earn 1.95 percent (t 
= 
2.70) higher returns than high market-to-book firms. Finally I show t-statistics of the 
differences in absolute values for the dividend change groups. Value maximising firms appear to 
earn statistically higher returns on the announcement of dividend increases than on the 
announcement of any other dividend changes. Similarly, overinvesting firms, earn higher returns 
(t = 3.66) on the announcement of dividend increases than decreases. This evidence contradicts 
the predictions of the free cash flow overinvestment hypothesis. Therefore, in the UK the market 
does not appear to distinguish between companies that pay dividends, to mitigate the free cash 
now problems and growth companies that need cash for reinvestment. 
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In Germany, value maximising firms do not experience any significant abnormal returns on the 
announcement day of dividend increases or dividend decreases. Negative abnormal returns equal 
to 
-2.33 percent (t = -13.69) are also obtained on the announcement of dividend no changes. On 
the announcement of dividend increases overinvesting firms earn significantly positive abnormal 
returns equal to 0.68 percent (t = 4.02) while on the announcement of dividend decreases the 
returns are not significant (-0.07 percent, t= 
-0.42). Moreover, negative abnormal returns equal to 
-0.32 percent (t = -1.97) are experienced by overinvesting firms when they announce dividend 
initiations, while the announcement of dividend omissions result in abnormal returns of 1.89 
percent (t = 11.15). These results reinforce the conclusion in Chapter 4 that investors in bank- 
based countries perceive a dividend increase as lack of investment opportunities and a dividend 
decrease as good news probably to avoid the issue costs of external financing, to finance new 
investment opportunities. 
In Germany, differences in abnormal returns between value maximising and overinvesting firms 
prove to be insignificant irrespective of the direction of the dividend change. This provides 
evidence in support of the signalling hypothesis. Moreover, under the cash flow signalling 
hypothesis, for value maximising firms the predicted impacts of announcement of dividend 
changes is larger in absolute value for dividend decreases than for dividend increases. Indeed, the 
t-statistics of the difference in abnormal returns between dividend increases and dividend 
decreases by value maximising firms equals to 
-1.75. All other tests of the differences in 
abnormal returns between the dividend change groups do not provide strong evidence to reject the 
signalling hypothesis over the overinvestment hypothesis. 
In France with the exception of dividend omissions, none of the abnormal returns of high and low 
market-to-book groups are significant. Dividend omissions result in negative abnormal returns of 
-1.79 percent (t-stat= -10.01) for high market-to-book firms and 1.86 percent (t = 10.42) for low 
market-to-book firms. However, none of the differences between the abnormal returns of high and 
low market-to-book groups across all the dividend change groups is significant. These results do 
not provide support for the overinvestment hypothesis. 
Similarly, in Italy, results do not provide evidence to support the overinvestment hypothesis. 
Value maximising firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns on the announcement 
of dividend increases equal to -0.26 percent (t = -2.01) while on the announcement of dividend 
decreases returns equal to 0.25 percent (t = 1.94). Similar behaviour is obtained when 
companies announce dividend initiations and omissions. Overinvesting companies experience 
negative abnormal returns on the announcement of dividend increases and decreases equal 
to 
-0.44 percent (t = -3.44) and -0.18 percent (t = -1.66) respectively. Announcement of no 
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changes in dividends do not cause any significant share price reaction, in contrast to the share 
price reaction on the announcement of dividend initiations and omissions. The results of the 
comparisons between value maximising and overinvesting firms are also presented. On the 
announcement of dividend increases and decreases value maximising firms earn higher abnormal 
returns than overinvestment firms, but the differences do not prove to be statistically different 
form zero. However, on the announcement of dividend no changes by overinvesting firms, returns 
are 0.41 percent (t = 1.64) higher than the returns for value maximising firms. On the 
announcement of dividend initiations overinvesting firms earn statistically higher abnormal 
returns than value maximising firms; the difference is equal to 1.15 percent (t = 1.73). The 
differences in absolute values according to the direction of dividend change are also examined for 
value maximising and overinvesting firms. The results do not provide any clear evidence in 
support of the hypothesis. 
In Panel CI examine the share price behavior to the announcement of dividend changes by value 
maximising and overinvesting firms in a three-day event window (Day -I to +1). In the UK there 
is a positive relation between the share price reaction and the direction of dividend changes. More 
precisely, on the announcement of dividend increases value maximising firms earn significant 
abnormal returns equal to 0.89 percent (t = 3.94) while the share price reaction around the 
announcement of dividend decreases equals to -1.24 percent (t = -5.52). Announcement of no 
changes in dividends do not cause any significant share price reaction. Around the announcement 
of dividend initiations abnormal returns equal to 3.66 percent (t = 16.25); while dividend 
decreases cause a negative share price reaction equal to 
-0.78 percent (t = -3.48). Similar 
behavior is obtained when examining the abnormal returns around the announcement of dividend 
changes by overinvesting firms. Dividend increases/ initiations (decreases/omissions) result in 
positive (negative) abnormal returns on days -1 to +1, while the share price reaction to the 
announcement of no changes in dividends does not prove to be statistically significant (t = 1.35). 
Comparisons of the abnormal returns between value maximising and overinvesting firms around 
the dividend announcement changes do not reveal any significant differences. Furthermore, the 
difference in absolute values for dividend increases and dividend decreases appear to be 
significant both in the case of overinvesting and value maximising firms. This is in contrast with 
the results of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) who find that the difference in absolute values of 
increases and decreases is significant for overinvesting firms but insignificant for value 
maximising firms. Therefore, results fail to reject the signalling hypothesis in favour of the 
overinvesting hypothesis. 
In Germany, value maximising firms earn positive but insignificant abnormal returns around the 
announcement of dividend increases, decreases and no changes. Announcements of a 100 percent 
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change in either direction result in a negative share price behavior. Overinvesting firms cam 
positive but insignificant abnormal returns around the announcement of dividend increases; while, 
around the announcement of dividend decrease abnormal returns equal to 1.50 percent (t = 5.10). 
Dividend no changes by overinvesting firms result in significantly positive abnormal returns equal 
to 0.92 percent (t = 3.14). Negative abnormal returns equal to 0.54 percent (t = 
-1.85) is observed 
around the announcement of dividend initiations. In contrast, abnormal returns around the 
announcement of dividend omissions equal to 1.82 percent (t = 6.19). T-statistics of the abnormal 
returns differences between value maximising and overinvesting firms are statistically 
insignificant irrespective of the dividend change direction. 
Similarly, in France a positive but insignificant share price behavior is obtained around the 
announcement of dividend increases, decreases and no changes. Dividend initiations result in 
negative abnormal returns equal to -0.54 percent (t = -1.76) and dividend omissions result in 
positive abnormal returns equal to 1.66 percent (t = 5.37). Around the dividend change 
announcements by overinvesting firms, dividend increases result in positive abnormal returns 
equal to 0.59 percent (t = 1.90) and dividend decreases result in negative abnormal returns equal 
to 
-0.56 percent (t = -1.81). Dividend no changes and initiating firms experience positive 
abnormal returns equal to 0.73 percent (t = 2.35) and 1.79 percent (t = 5.78) respectively. These 
results are consistent with both the signalling and the overinvesting hypotheses; however the tests 
of the differences in abnormal returns between value maximising and overinvcsting firms do not 
provide evidence to reject the signalling hypothesis over the overinvesting hypothesis. 
As in the other countries in Italy, the results do not provide support in favour of the 
overinvestment hypothesis. Value maximising firms earn negative abnormal returns around the 
announcement of dividend increases and decreases, equal to 
-0.58 percent (t = -2.60) and -0.22 
percent (t = 
-1.00). Around the announcement of no changes in dividends and initiations value 
maximising firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns. In contrast, around the 
announcement of dividend omissions results appear to be positive and significant. Moreover, no 
significance is obtained from the comparisons between the value maximising and ovcrinvesting 
firms. 
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Table shows the share price reaction to dividend change announcements over the period 1987 to 2002. Companies are 
firstly divided into two groups: value maximising firms (high market-to-book value, i. e. higher than the median) and 
overinvesting firms (low market-to-book value, i. e. lower than the median). Secondly, companies in each group arc 
further categorised into five groups according to the direction of dividend change: INC=Increase, NC=No Change. 
DEC=Decrease, INI=Initiation, OMI=Omission. Panel A shows the number of companies in each of the 10 groups. 
Panel B shows the abnormal returns on the day of the announcement (Day 0) and Panel C shows the abnormal returns 
on days 
-1 to +1. T-Statistics reported in the parenthesis: ***Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level and 
*Significant at 0.10 level 
PANEL A: PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS IN EACH GROUP 
TOTAL INCREASES DECREASES Av INITIATIONS OMISSIONS 
NumBER CII NGRS 
FIRMs % % % % gib 
MTB-IIIGII 4569 47 6 42 2 2 UK MTB-Low 4543 46 6 44 I 2 
MTB-IIIGII 511 32 9 52 4 3 
GERMANY 
MTB-Low 508 28 6 56 5 4 
MTB-HIIGII 491 32 14 47 3 3 FRANCE MTB-Low 492 31 13 48 4 4 
MTB-IIIGII 315 21 12 53 9 4 ITALY MTB-Low 318 25 11 54 6 4 
PANEL, B : ABNORMA L RETURNS ON I)AY 0 
INCREASES DECREASES No CHANGES INITIATIONS MISSION!; 
0.543 
-1.618*** 0.048 0.458 -0.742 416 MTB-IIIGII (4.18) 
-12.44 0.37 3.52) -5.71) UK 0.608 
-0.984 0.237 2.409 -0.543"' 
(1) 
MTB-Low (4.67) (-7.57) (1.82) (18.52) 
-4.18 (MTB-LOW) 
- 
0.065 0.634 0.189 1.951 0.199 
(MTB-IIIGII) (0.38) (0.98) (1.08) (1.70) (0.17) 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INT INCOMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DECOMI NC-INI NCOMi INI-OMI 
MTB-HIGH 4.29 2.80 2.97'" 1.62 3.30 5.13 0.90 0.22 0.93 3.03 
MTB-Low 3.66 2.25 0.15 1.67' 2.80. ' 1.37 0.47 3.76- 0 
. 
93 0.79 
INCREASES DECREASES AN INITIATIONS OMISSIONS CH GES 
MTB-IIIGII -0.129 0.086 -2.326 0.283 0.185 
GERMANY (-1.76) (1.64) -13.69 (2.67) 2.09 
MTB-Low 0.683 -0.072 0.151 -0.317' 1.893 (2) (1.02) (-0.42) (0.89) 
-1.87 11.1 S 
(MTB-Low) 
- 
0.812 
-0.158 2.477 
-0.6 1.708 (MTB-II IGII) (0.98) 0.43 1.42 (-0.98) 1.24) 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INI INC OMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DECOMI NC-INI NC OMI 1\l-OMI 
MTB-IIIGII 1.75' 1.26 0.67 0.29 1.68' 0.55 0.44 1.42 1.24 0.081 
MTB-Low 0.03 0.35 0.80 2.0 1 0.14 0.64 1.83 0.98 1.94' 2.22 
INCREASES DECREASES A INITIATIONS OMISSIONS CH NGES 
MTB-IIIGII 0.118 0.062 0.211 -0.165 -1.791 
FRANCE (0.66) (0.35) (1.18) (-0.92) 
-10.01 
MTB-LOW 0.185 -0.136 0.162 -0.020 1.865 (3) 1.04 (-0.76) (0.91) (-0.11) 10.42 
(MTB-Low) 
- 
0.067 
-0.198 -0.049 0.145 3.656 (MTB-IIIGII) (-0.19) 
-0.36) 0.19 (-0.545) 
. 
40) 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INI INC OMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DErnMI NC-INI NCOMI INI-0%11 
MTB-IIIGII 0.14 0.34 0.21 1.0902 0.39 0.12 1.05 0.37 1.15 0.96 
MTB-14ow 0.63 0.08 0.63 0.85 0.63 0.44 1.03 0.63 0.87 1.01 
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INCREASES DECREASES INITIATIONS OMISSIONS CHANGES 
-0.260 0.251 -0.361 -0.463 0.749 MTB-IIIGII 
01 
-2 (1 94) (-2 79) -3 59 79 5 ITALY . . . . . 
-0.444 -0.176 0.052 0.684 1.201 (4) MTB-Low (-3.44) (-1.66) 0.404 (5.29) (9.30) 
(MTB-Low) 
- -0.184 -0.427 0.413 1.147 0.452 (MTB-11 IGII) (-0.56) 
-0.74 1.64 (1.73) 0.42) 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-IM INC OMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DECOMi NC-INI 
- 
NCOIS11 1N1-OMI 
MTB-111GII 1.02 0.31 1.92' 2.03 1.34 0.74 1.20 2.34ttv 2.26 0.66 
MTB-Low 0.62 1.97 0.034 1.36 0.54 0.45 0.99 0.95 0.80 1.21 
PANEL C: ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR THE PERIOD 
-I T0+1 
INCREASES DECREASES 
AN 
INITIATIONS OMISSIONS (7FS CII 
0.887 " 
-1.243 0.226 3.661 -0.783 MTB-IIIGII (3.94) (-5.52) (1.00) (16.25) (-3.48) 
0.880 
-0.637 0.303 0.423 -0.395' UK MTB-Low (3.90) 
-2.83 (1.35) (1.88) 
-1.75 (1) (MTB-Low) 
- -0.007 0.606 0.077 -3.238 1 0.388 (MTB-IIIGh) 
-0.03 0.70 0.35 (-1.39) (1.25) 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INI INC ON11 DEC-NC DEC-INI DE. CON11 NC"INI NCOMI INI-OMI 
MTB-IIIGII 3.50 2.93 3.76"' 1.28 2.42 5.29"' 0.33 4.67"' 0.81 3.13 
MTB-I. OW 2.36 2.74 0.40 1.27 1.46 0.81 0.21 0.10 0 
. 
70 0.54 
0.014 0.291 0.065 
-0.238 -1.100 MTB-IIIGtt (0.05) (0.99) 0.22 
-0.81 
' 
-3.74 
'- 0.160 1.501 0.924 
-0.544 1.820 
GERMANY MTB-Low (0.54) (5.10) 3.14 
-1.85 6.19 (2) (MTB-Low) 
- 
0.174 1.210 0.859 
-0.306 2.290 (MTB-IIIGII) (0.33) (-1.20) 2.04 (-0.25) 1.59 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INI INC OMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DECOMI NC-INI NCOMI IN14)S11 
MTB-IIIGII 1.85 0.13 0.24 1. 01 1.81 1.38 2.01 0.29 1.07 0.59 
MTB-Low 0.18 1.64 0.89 1. 08 0.84 0.85 0.93 1.86 0 
. 
58 1.42 
0.201 0.322 0.284 
-0.545 1.664 " MTB-IIIGII (0.65) 1.04 (0.92) 
-1.76 (5.37) 
0.587 
-0.561 0.729 -0.548' 1.790 
FRANCE MTB-Low (1.90) (-1.81) 2.35 
-1.77 5.78 (3) (MTB-Low) 
- 
0.386 
-0.883 0.445 -0.003 0.126 (MTB-IIIGII) (-0.75) (0.70) (-2.22) (0.50) 
-0.05 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INI INCOMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DECOMI NC-INI NCOMI INI. OMI 
MTB-IIIGII 1.01 0.27 1.32 0.78 1.13 0.01 1.28 1.48 0.69 1.38 
MTB-Low 0.16 1.08 1.01 0.79 0.86 0.94 0.69 0.37 1.06 1.14 
-0.580 
-0.223 
-0.637 446 -0.934'** 1.746 MTB-IIIGII (-2.60) 
-1.00 (-2.84) -4.17 7.80 
-0.153 0.302 -0.087 0.452 -0.150 
ITALY MTB-LOw (-0.68) (1.65) 
-0.39 (2.02) -0.67 (4) (MTB-Low) 
- 
0.427 0.525 0.550 1.386 
-1.896 (MTB-IIIGII) 0.78 0.59) 1 1.66 (1.02) 
-1.45) 
T T T T T T T T T T 
INCDEC INC-NC INC-INI INCOMI DEC-NC DEC-INI DECOMI NC-INI NCOMI INI. O'111 
MTB-VIGIL 047 0.11 0.83 0.38 0.61 0.51 0.06 0.91 0.46 0.39 
MTB-Low 0.63 0.16 0.50 0.02 0.58 1.31 1.41 1.15 2.19 2.51 
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Literature provides two explanations for the share price reaction around the announcement of 
dividend changes, namely the overinvestment hypothesis and the signalling hypothesis. However 
the majority of the studies have been unable to provide strong evidence that completely rules out 
the cash flow signalling hypothesis. For example, Dewenter and Warther (1998) compare the 
share price reactions around the announcement of dividend changes in the US (market-based 
country) and Japan (bank-based country). They do not find evidence to distinguish between the 
two hypotheses. Yoon and Starks (1995) find evidence to support the signalling hypothesis rather 
than the overinvestment hypothesis. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) find evidence to support the 
signalling and clientele hypotheses rather than the overinvestment hypothesis. My results provide 
further evidence to support the signalling hypothesis over the overinvestment hypothesis. In the 
next section, I provide cross-country comparisons of the share price reaction to dividend change 
announcements. 
5.5.2 COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
In this chapter, I argue that in market-based countries (UK) there exists a higher level of agency 
conflict (and information asymmetry) than in bank-based countries (Germany, France and Italy). 
This is due to lower ownership dispersion in bank-based countries, the more effective role of 
banks as monitors of the managers and/or as information providers (especially in Germany) and to 
a number of other reasons described in Section 5.3. Consequently, if dividends are used as a 
mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts and/or information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders, abnormal returns should be higher in the UK as compared to the other countries in 
my sample. Similarly, in bank-based countries, where there are similar corporate governance 
systems abnormal returns should not be statistically significant. These predictions are consistent 
with the signalling and the overinvesting hypotheses. A necessary condition for the 
overinvestment hypothesis to hold over the signalling hypothesis is that comparisons of the 
abnormal returns for value maximising firms between the sample countries should not reveal any 
statistically significant differences. However, the abnormal returns differences for overinvesting 
firms between the sample countries should be substantial. The results of the comparisons are 
presented next. 
Table 5.3 shows the t-statistics of the abnormal returns differences between the UK, Germany. 
France and Italy. Panel A shows the t-statistics of the differences in abnormal returns on day 0; 
and Panel B considers a three day window around the event (Day 
-1 to +1). Generally, as 
expected abnormal returns in the UK appear to be statistically higher as compared to any other 
country in my sample. Abnormal returns differences between the bank-based countries do not 
appear to be statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with both the signalling and 
overinvestment hypotheses. Further, cross-country comparisons in relation to the direction of 
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dividend change and to the market-to-book ratio, would enable us to distinguish between the two 
predictions. 
Firstly, I compare the announcement day returns for the UK firms to the returns for German firms. 
On day 0, overinvesting and value maximising UK firms that announce dividend increases earn 
statistically higher abnormal returns than their German counterparts. Statistically lower abnormal 
returns are generated in the UK as compared to Germany on the announcement of dividend 
decreases. There is no significant difference between the UK and Germany abnormal returns on 
the announcement of dividend changes. On the announcement of dividend initiations, UK value 
maximising firms earn statistically higher abnormal returns than German value maximising firms; 
however, the difference between the returns for overinvesting firms does not appear to be 
statistically significant. On the announcement of dividend omissions, overinvesting German firms 
experience statistically higher abnormal returns than their UK counterparts. This could be 
attributed to lower agency conflicts in Germany; however the evidence obtained is not strong 
enough to reject the signalling hypothesis over the overinvesting hypothesis. 
The results of the comparisons between UK-France, and UK-Italy follow a similar pattern. In 
France and Italy, both value maximising and overinvesting firms experience statistically lower 
abnormal returns on the announcement of dividend increases; however, on the announcement of 
dividend decreases, French and Italian companies experience lower abnormal returns. Abnormal 
returns on the announcements of dividend no changes do not appear to differ significantly 
between the compared countries. As compared to France and Italy, value maximising firms in the 
UK experience statistically higher share price reaction on the announcement of dividend 
initiations. However, comparisons of the share price reaction for overinvesting firms do not reveal 
any significant differences. In the last three rows of Panel AI provide the comparisons between 
the bank-based countries. Results do not show any statistical differences either for overinvesting 
or value maximising firms. 
In Panel BI present the t-statistics of the differences in abnormal returns for a three-day window 
around the announcement of dividend changes. Results do not appear to differ substantially from 
the results shown in Panel A. Both value maximising and overinvesting firms in the UK earn 
significantly higher abnormal returns around the announcement of dividend increases as 
compared to their counterparts in bank-based countries. Around the announcement of dividend 
decreases the only significant difference obtained is between the UK and German value 
maximising firms. Comparisons between the countries around the announcement of dividend no 
changes do not allow us to draw any clear conclusions. Value maximising firms in the UK cam 
statistically higher abnormal returns around the announcement of dividend initiations, but the 
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differences between the returns for overinvesting firms do not differ significantly. As in Panel A, 
the country comparisons between overinvesting firms that announce dividend omissions reveal 
significantly lower abnormal returns in the UK than in any other country. This is in line with the 
overinvesting hypothesis (i. e. dividend omissions generate more free cash flow in the hands of the 
managers which will be invested in negative present value projects. Because of higher agency 
conflicts in the UK the share price reaction to such announcements is more significant than in 
countries with lower agency conflicts). 
TABLE, 5 
.3 
COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF TIIE SIIAI 1ý 1'ILiýj; [ ýIQ ýIY1121: b1i 
ANNOUNCEMENTS BY IIICII-AND-LOW MARKTT Tn L 00KJ WIQS 
Table shows the t-statistics of the differences in means between countries. Panel A provides comparisons of the 
abnormal returns on the day of the announcement and Panel B provides comparisons of the abnormal returns for the 
period 
-1 to +1 days. Comparisons are conducted firstly, between value maximising (high market-to-book) firms and 
secondly, between overinvesting (low market-to-book) firms in each country. T-Statistics: ***Significant at 0.01 level, 
**Significant at 0.05 level and *Significant at 0.10 level 
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5.6 CON 
. , 
USION 
In the present part of my study I investigate the dividend policy in the UK, Germany, France and 
Italy by testing the agency conflict hypothesis. I particularly concentrate on the shareholder- 
management conflict and examine Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. This hypothesis has 
its roots to the problem arising from the separation of management and ownership. Managers' 
goal is to pursue their own personal interests which conflict with the interests of the shareholders 
(i. e. wealth maximisation). Managers have tendency to invest in negative net present value 
projects instead of paying the free cash flow to the shareholders. Jensen (1986) hypothesizes that 
free cash flow may be used to fund negative net present value projects. Managers may use 
internally generated cash (free cash flow) to avoid the monitoring associated with raising capital 
from the markets. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) suggest that a dividend change may convey 
information regarding a firm's future investments. According to this ovcrinvcstmcnt hypothesis, a 
dividend increase by a firm with free cash flow problems will reduce the market's estimate of the 
amount of cash that will be wastefully invested, thereby increasing firm value. Similarly, a 
dividend decrease by such a firm will signal that more negative net present value projects will be 
undertaken causing a decrease in firm value. These predictions however, are consistent both with 
the signalling hypothesis and the overinvesting hypothesis. Lang and Litzcnberger (1989) propose 
the Tobin's Q ratio in order to distinguish between the two hypotheses. They find evidence 
consistent with the overinvesting hypothesis, since overinvesting firms have greater price 
reactions, on average to dividend changes than value maximising firms do. 
This study compares the dividend policies of UK, German, French and Italian companies for the 
period 1987 to 2002. For the purpose of testing my hypothesis I use an event study methodology 
(Brown and Warner, 1985) to examine the share price reaction to the announcement of dividend 
changes in European countries. I calculate abnormal returns during different event windows (Day 
0, 
-1 to +1). Lang and Litzenberger (1989) use the Tobin's Q ratio to distinguish between value 
maximising (Tobin's Q>l) and overinvesting (Tobin's Q<1) firms. Because of data unavailability 
to calculate the Tobin's Q ratio I use the market-to-book ratio as an alternative proxy for growth 
opportunities. Perfect and Wiles (1994) show that Tobin's Q and the market-to-book ratio are 
highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is about 0.96). For the two groups of companies, I 
analyse and compare the share price reaction to the announcement of dividend increases, 
decreases, no changes, initiations and omissions. To the best of my knowledge this is the first 
European study to simultaneously examine the share price reaction to dividend announcement 
changes of magnitude equal and less than 100 percent in either direction. Moreover, no 
comparative European study was found in the literature that compares the returns of overinvesting 
and value maximising firms. 
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According to Lang and Litzenberger (1989) announcements of sizable dividend changes have 
significant impact on the share price behavior of overinvesting firms, but no impact for value 
maximising firms. This prediction is consistent with both the signalling and the ovcrinvestment 
hypotheses. They distinguish between the two hypotheses by analysing the behavior of share 
prices for overinvesting and value maximising firms, in relation to the direction of dividend 
changes announced. Consistent with the cash flow theory, they find that the return is significantly 
higher for overinvesting firms announcing dividend increases than for value maximising firms. 
The greater market reaction to cash distributions by overinvesting firms is evidence of the more 
sever agency problems facing these firms, alleviated via disgorging cash. Evidence obtained from 
European countries contradicts with these results. Particularly, my results do not show any 
significant differences in the share price reaction for value maximising and overinvesting firms. 
Results show that on the announcement of dividend increases/initiations in the UK, value 
maximising and overinvesting firms generate highly positive abnormal returns; while on the 
announcement of dividend decreases/omissions firms generate negative abnormal returns. 
Comparisons of the returns between value maximising and overinvcsting firms do not reveal 
significant differences. Therefore, in the UK there is no strong evidence to reject the signalling 
hypothesis over the cash flow/overinvesting hypothesis. 
In Germany, value maximising firms earn significantly negative abnormal returns on the 
announcement of dividend increases and no changes; and on the announcement of dividend 
decreases and omissions, these firms experience positive abnormal returns. This indicates that 
investors perceive a dividend increase as lack of investment opportunities while a dividend 
decrease is perceived as a way of raising costless funding for investment. On the other hand, 
overinvesting firms experience positive but insignificant returns, on the announcement of 
dividend increases and negative (insignificant) returns on the announcement of dividend 
decreases. This provides support for the overinvestment hypothesis. However, the abnormal 
returns differences between value maximising and overinvesting firms do not appear to be 
statistically significant. Consequently, results do not provide strong evidence to reject the 
signalling hypothesis over the overinvestment hypothesis. 
In France, there is no significant share price reaction to dividend change announcements. The 
only exception being on the announcement of dividend omissions. Value maximising firms earn 
significantly negative abnormal returns equal to -1.80 percent (t = -10.01), while overinvcsting 
firms earn significantly positive abnormal returns equal to 1.87 percent (t = 10.42). The abnormal 
returns differences in means between value maximising firms and overinvesting firms do not 
prove to be statistically significant. 
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Similarly, in Italy both value maximising and overinvesting firms earn statistically negative 
abnormal returns on the announcement of dividend increases and positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement of dividend decreases. However, the differences between the two market-to-book 
value groups do not appear to be statistically significant. Moreover, no statistical differences arc 
obtained from the comparisons of the share price reaction between the dividend change groups. 
It is established that the corporate governance system in market-based countries result in higher 
agency conflicts and/or information asymmetries as compared to bank-based countries. If 
dividends are used as a mechanism to alleviate agency conflicts and/or information asymmetries, 
then the share price reaction to dividend change announcements should be higher in market-based 
countries. Indeed results show that the share price reaction to dividend changes is significantly 
higher in the UK than in any other country under consideration. Moreover, the differences in 
abnormal returns between the bank-based countries do not appear to be statistically significant. 
This provides evidence consistent with the overinvesting and signalling hypotheses. Further tests 
of the share price reaction to dividend change announcements for value maximising and 
overinvesting firms between the sample countries provide evidence of the signalling hypothesis. 
My study contributes to the literature by using European data to test the dividend theories 
developed in the US. However, I believe that there is room for further research in the area. Tests 
of the agency conflict hypothesis as well further attempts to distinguish between the free cash 
flow and the cash flow signaling hypotheses, could be expanded. A first possible way is to 
consider the analysts' earnings forecasts. According to Lang and Litzenberger (1989) the cash 
flow signaling hypothesis predicts that announcements of dividend changes by firms with Tobin's 
Q<1 will cause investors to revise their cash flow expectations in the same direction, whereas the 
overinvestment hypothesis predicts no impact on current cash flow expectations. For firms with 
Tobin's Q>1, both hypotheses predict that announcements of large dividend increases will have 
little or no impact on investors' current cash flow expectations. For such firms announcing 
dividend decreases, however, the conditional cash flow signaling hypothesis predicts downward 
revisions in cash flow expectations whereas the free cash flow hypothesis predicts no impact. The 
standard change in the median of analysts' forecasts surrounding each dividend change 
announcements (both for Q>1 and Q<1 firms) could be calculated as: 48 { [(Fi-F. i)x l00j/[Poj ); 
where F., is the median analysts' forecast for current annual EPS in the month prior to the 
dividend change announcement month, F, is the median analysts' forecast of current annual EPS 
48 Formula as used in Denis, Denis and Sann (1994) 
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in the month following the dividend change announcement month and Po is the market price of 
the firm's equity two days prior to the dividend change announcement. 
Another way to expand the current study is to investigate the firm's capital expenditure in the 
post-announcement period. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that overinvesting firms 
would experience positive abnormal returns following dividend increase announcements because 
the increase reduces the market's expectations of the amount of cash that will be invested in 
negative net present value projects. Under this hypothesis, capital expenditures of overinvesting 
firms would be less than previously expected following dividend increases and greater than 
previously expected following dividend decreases. However, the overinvestment hypothesis 
makes no clear predictions regarding the future investment level of value maximising firms. For 
example, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) study the changes in capital expenditure in the post- 
announcement period. They focus on capital expenditures in the first full fiscal year following the 
year in which the dividend change announcement is made. It would also be interesting to test 
whether in the absence of dividend changes; year 1 capital expenditure equals year -1 capital 
expenditures. Data for the expanding this European study towards these two directions is 
available by online databases. At present, time constrains do not allow me to further examine the 
agency conflict hypothesis in European countries; however, this is an interesting theme for further 
investigation in the near future. 
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The thesis has revisited the dividend puzzle in an attempt to fit the pieces of the puzzle 
together. The purpose was to investigate empirically the dividend policy of companies in 
Europe, focussing mainly on the UK, Germany, France and Italy for the period 1987 to 2002. 
The attractiveness of the issue lies in the fact that the dividend decision is controversial 
despite being one of the three major categories of corporate long-term financial decisions that 
the firm's management face. ' The conflicting views relate to whether managers should pay at 
all dividends. In case they have to, how much should they distribute and how much should 
they retain for future investments, what form of dividend payment should they adopt, and can 
their dividend decision affect shareholders' wealth in the short- and long-term. 
My interest in this topic arose not only from the importance of dividend policy in the area of 
finance managers, shareholders, policy decision-makers, but from the fact that explaining 
dividend policy has been one of the most difficult challenges facing financial economists. 
Despite decades of study, theoretical and empirical literature has yet to completely understand 
the factors that influence dividend policy and the manner in which these factors interact. Two 
decades ago Black (1976) notes that "The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it 
seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don't fit together" (page 5). In assessing the 
contributions provided by researchers, Felstein and Green (1983) echo Black's sentiments by 
stating, "The nearly universal policy of paying substantial dividends is the primary puzzle in 
the economics of corporate finance". Miller (1986) also recognises that the observed 
preference for cash dividends is one of the "soft spots in the current body of theory". The 
situation is pretty much the same today. In a recent survey of dividend policy, Allen and 
Michaely (1995) conclude, "Much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of 
dividends is required before a consensus can be reached" (page 833); while Brealey, Myers 
(2003) list dividends as one of the ten important unsolved problems in finance. 
The Finance literature offers different views as to whether dividends affect the value of the 
firm. Three theories have been developed. Firstly, the rightist2 support that dividends have a 
positive effect on the value of the company, because share prices are highly volatile, thus 
risky, and dividends represent a more reliable form of return than capital gains. ' Secondly, the 
radical left4 believes that dividends affect the value of the firm negatively. Whenever 
dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, firms should pay low cash dividends and 
' See Miller and Modigliani (1961), Allen and Michaely (1995,2001), Copeland and Weston (1992), Brealcy and 
Mayers (2001). Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) 
Z See Graham and Dodd (1934). 
3 This is also known as the Bird-in-the-hand fallacy; See Gordon (1963) and Lintncr (1962), 
4 See Miller and Scholes (1978,1982). 
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retain earnings in order to provide returns to their shareholders in less costly ways (e. g. share 
price increases, share repurchases). Thirdly, Miller and Modigliani (1961) theoretically prove 
that under the assumption of perfect capital markets and when the firm's investment policy is 
fixed and known to investors the dividend policy is irrelevant to the firm value. 5 Miller and 
Modigliani study is a starting point of one of the longest and most intractable controversies in 
the literature of finance. Allen and Michaely (1995) argue that the most important 
contribution of the Miller and Modigliani paper was the careful and detailed description of the 
conditions under which dividend policy is relevant. 
Researchers responded to Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend policy irrelevance 
conclusion by offering many competing hypotheses about why companies pay dividends and 
why investors pay attention to dividends. The profusion of theories led Ang (1987) to observe 
that literature has moved from a position of not enough good reasons to explain why 
dividends are paid to one of too many. Studies that relaxed the Miller and Modigliani 
assumptions find that the firm's dividend policy is relevant to its valuation. For example, 
Allen and Michaely (1995) strengthen the importance of dividends as they note that theories 
of asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions and capital budgeting all rely on a 
view of how and why dividends are paid. The different theories developed in the literature 
that attempt to provide an answer to the dividend puzzle can be categorised into three major 
areas. 
Firstly, under the Taxation Effect Hypothesis' investors receive higher before-tax risk- 
adjusted returns on stocks with higher anticipated yields in order to compensate for the 
historically higher taxation of dividend income relative to capital gains8. The positive 
relationship between monthly stock returns and dividend yield is consistent with this 
prediction. An alternative method of deducing the tax effect is from the analysis of the 
behaviour of share prices when shares are quoted ex-dividend. Elton and Gruber (1970) find 
that share prices drop by less than the amount of dividends on the ex-dividend day, implying 
that, for a marginal investor, dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. Under the 
UK imputation system the overall tax burden is a function of corporation tax, the dividend 
payout ratio and the tax differential between dividends and capital gains (Lasfer, 1995)°. King 
I See Miller and Modigliani (1961) the Residual Theory of the firm. 
6 An additional view is the behavioural reason (Shefrin and Stateman, 1984). 1 do not consider this theory in my 
study as it is not directly testable. 
Firstly proposed by Brenan (1970) using a version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Also see Miler 
and Scholes (1978,1982), Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981). 
s For example under the US classical taxation system dividends are subject to double taxation, firstly at the 
company level and secondly in the hands of the shareholders. Moreover, there is timing difference as capital gains 
are only taxed on realisation (See Constantinides, 1983,1984). 
9 The imputation system (mainly adopted in European Countries) provides incentives for the payment of dividends 
as shareholders receive a tax credit on dividends but not on capital gains. 
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(1977) provides a formal definition of the extent to which the tax system discriminates against 
dividends in terms of the tax discrimination variable. 10 According to the taxation effect 
hypothesis if the tax discrimination variable is high (low) then, ex-day share prices should 
drop by less (more) than the amount of dividends, resulting in positive (negative) ex-day 
abnormal returns. However, positive ex-day returns can also be consistent with the Short- 
Term Effect Hypothesis. " Kalay (1982) argues that ex-day share prices are driven by short- 
term traders who enter the market in response to arbitrage opportunities; and that the ex-day 
share price drop by less than the amount of dividends reflects the transaction costs of these 
traders exercising dividend capturing activity. 
Secondly, the proponents of the Information Signalling IIypotl, esis12 argue that within a 
framework of asymmetric information, insiders (managers) use dividends as a mechanism to 
reveal their incentives and private information to outsiders (shareholders). These signalling 
arguments consider dividends as informative because of dissipative costs either in the form of 
higher dividend taxation as compared to capital gains, 13 or in the form of cost of raising 
external capital, 14 or in the form of reduced investments. 's The information content of 
dividends has been empirically tested by analysing the share price behaviour around dividend 
announcement. 16 Generally, a dividend increase (decrease) has been observed to provide 
"good news" ("bad news") to the market about the future prospects of the company and this 
has been observed to be reflected in the share price behaviour on the announcement day 
(positive relationship has been obtained between excessive returns and the direction of 
dividend change). These beliefs are not, however, homogeneously shared amongst researchers 
as dividends are considered to be too small to constitute a reliable signal and it is not clear 
whether companies change their dividends in response to changes in their earnings or to 
signal future prospects. " 
The third explanation relates to the free cash flow arguments. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that with the separation of ownership and control, the interests of the managers (agents) 
deviate from those of the shareholders (the principals) and as a result managers do not always 
act to the best interests of the shareholders, but they pursue their own personal benefits at the 
10 The tax discrimination variable can be defined as the opportunity cost of retained earnings in term of net 
dividends forgone. If dividends and capital gains are taxed equally the tax discrimination variable is equal to unity; 
tax discrimination variable is lower (higher) than unity if dividends are taxed more (less) heavily than capital 
wins. 
See Kalay (1982), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Koski (1996), Karpoff and Walking (1988). 
12 Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987). 
13 See Bhattacharya (1979). 
14 See John and Williams (1985), Ambarish, John and Williams (1987), Williams (1988). 
15 See Heinkel (1978), Miller and Rock (1985). 
16 See Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Healy and Palepu (1988), Christie (1994), Watts (1973). 
17 Benartzi, Michaely and Thaller (1997), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), Jensen and Johnson (1995). 
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expense of the shareholders. '8 Under the Agency Conflict Hypothesis dividends serve as a 
mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts and a way of reducing the monitoring costs. This is 
achieved by forcing managers to pay dividends and to seek additional financing in the capital 
markets where monitoring is more effective. '9 This strategy aims at reducing the free cash 
flow in the hands of the managers. 20 Similar to the signalling theory, the agency theory is 
empirically tested on the dividend change announcement day and also predicts a positive 
relationship between the share price reaction and the direction of dividend change. Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) use Tobin's Q as a proxy for growth opportunities. They distinguish 
between the two hypotheses and provide evidence to support the overinvesting hypothesis 
over the signalling hypothesis. Other studies21 support the signalling hypothesis, however 
evidence does not completely rule out Jensen's (1986) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. 
A problem with most existing theories is that they fail to consider the potentially complex 
interactions among the various imperfections. 22 The problem is that each theory typically 
takes an approach that tries to generalise the findings. Fankfurter and Wood (1997, page 31) 
conclude that dividend policy cannot be modelled mathematically and uniformly for all firms 
at all times. Because various imperfections affect firms differently, dividend policy may vary 
substantially from one firm to another, from one market to another, from one country to 
another. Although researchers typically focus on each market imperfection in isolation, 
complex interactions may exist among these frictions. If the imperfections are insignificant or 
offsetting, the Miller and Modigliani conclusion about dividend irrelevance may hold. 
Otherwise, these market imperfections may be relevant to the dividend setting process and to 
the value of the firm. 
Another problem identified in the literature is that the majority of the studies concentrate on 
the US market and to a lesser extend the UK. Country comparative studies are very limited, 
and usually compare the US and Japan. 23 To the best of my knowledge there is no other study 
that simultaneously investigates the three hypotheses and provides comparisons of the 
dividend policy across Europe. My thesis fills in this gap in the literature. I have analysed and 
compared the dividend policies in four major European countries: UK, Germany, France and 
Italy. These markets are amongst the most important markets in Europe (and the rest of the 
world). Previous studies have proposed that dividend policy is significantly related to the 
18 Either through perquisites or investment in negative Net Present Value Projects. 
19 Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984). 
20 See Jensen (1986). Managers are more likely to overinvest (invest in negative net present value projects) when 
growth opportunities are low. 
' For example, Yoon and Starks (1995), Denis, Denis and Sann (1994) that followed Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989). 
22 See Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) for a detailed discussion 
23 For example Dewenter and Wether (1998). 
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market, financial, organisational, institutional and legal characteristics of the firm. ' The 
taxation systems, corporate governance systems, financial and institutional characteristics 
differences between UK, Germany, France and Italy constitute the second major motivation 
for this cross-country comparative study. In terms of the dividend taxation systems, some 
adopt the partial (UK) while others (Germany, France and Italy) the full imputation systems. 
In terms of corporate governance systems, these countries can be dividend into market- 
oriented countries (UK) and bank-oriented countries (Germany, France and Italy). 25 
The thesis has tested whether dividend policy theories can be applied in markets outside the 
US, as well as to observe and compare the differences of theory predictions under different 
market and financial environments. 26The thesis contributes to the literature not only because 
it provides a comparative basis against which prior empirical research carried out in the US 
can be tested/verified; but also stimulates further tests of the dividend policy in European 
markets. Country comparative studies of dividend policy are not only important for the 
managers who take decisions about the firm, but also to the shareholders. Thus, my thesis 
provides useful information to both international and domestic investors; and is also helpful to 
improve international portfolio management. Further, it is believed to provide an 
understanding of how countries' regulatory, financial and economic environments affect the 
corporate dividend policy, so it could prove important to policymakers who determine the 
laws and rules of the market. 
Data for the purposes of my thesis was collected from DataStream and Hydra, online 
databases available at Cass Business School. I considered all actively listed companies on the 
London Stock Exchange (FTSE), the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (DAX), the Paris Stock 
Exchange (CAC and the Milan Stock Exchange (MIBTEL), for the period August 1987 to 
August 2002. Data obtained consists of daily share prices and market indices, dividend 
distributions (i. e. dividend per share, DPS), earnings per share (EPS), year-end market values 
of equity, asset book values, ex-dividend dates and dividend announcement dates. 
In Chapter 2I analysed and compared between the classical (US) and imputation (UK, 
Germany, France and Italy) taxation systems, I analysed the taxation burden on dividends and 
2' For example La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000), consider the legal protection of minority 
shareholders in an attempt to explain the dividend policy around the world. 
ZS See Berglof (1990), Zysman (1983); alternative terminology used is insider and outsider systems (Franks and 
Mayer 1994,1997). 
26 Rajan and Zingales (1995), investigate the Capital Structure using international data and note that to the extent 
which other countries are similar to the US, they provide an independent sample to test the theory and evidence 
developed, whereas differences would increase the ability to discriminate among alternative theories. 
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capital gains under both systems, 27 I illustrated the imputation system influence on the 
preference of the shareholders and consequently the dividend policy of the firm, I provided 
the theory behind the tax discrimination variable, 28 I described the dividend taxation systems 
in the UK, Germany, France and Italy both in the corporation level and the shareholders' level 
and I calculated the tax discrimination variables in the European countries under 
consideration in an attempt to identify the differences on the dividend taxation burden 
between the countries. Furthermore, the major taxation reforms in each country are also 
analysed in order to perceive the effects of taxation changes on the dividend payout policy as 
well as on the preferences of shareholders between dividends and capital gains; and 
consequently their effects on the tax discrimination variable. 
The study is the first to build on the advantage of the differences between the US taxation 
systems (where the majority of the theoretical and empirical evidence is based) and the 
European taxation systems29 in order to further investigate the effect of taxation on the 
dividend policy of the firm. Still, there are many differences30 on the treatment of dividends 
between the European tax systems under consideration. 
Results revealed substantial differences in the European taxation systems which result in 
variant payout policies, as well as, in variant investor preferences across Europe. The analysis 
provided evidence that in the UK investors would either be indifferent or would prefer 
dividends over capital gains. The analysis is based on the standard taxation rates. With the 
effective tax rates, the preference of dividends over capital gains may, however be altered 
because while the standard income tax rates are likely to be the same as the effective rates, the 
effective tax rates on capital gains are likely to be lower than the standard rates because of 
allowances and deferrals of capital gains. This preference was tested by analysing the 
behaviour of share prices on the ex-dividend dates in Chapter 3. 
27 Lasfer (1996) models the dividend and capital gains taxation burden under the UK imputation system. Following 
Lasfer (1995) I modelled the dividend and capital gains taxation burden under the German, French and Italian 
partial imputation systems. 2e Defined by King (1977) as the opportunity cost of retained earnings in terms of net dividends foregone. The tax 
discrimination variable equals to unity if cash in the hands of the company and cash in the hands of the shareholder 
can be interchanged without attracting an additional tax burden (or credit). If the tax discrimination is lower 
(higher) than unity, dividends (capital gains) are taxed more heavily than capital gains (dividends). 
29 For example, the US classical system discourages companies to distribute profits in the form of dividends as 
they carry higher taxation as compared to capital gains. On the other hand, European systems provide tax 
incentives for dividends as shareholders are entitled to tax reimbursements for the taxation suffered at the 
corporate level (no tax credits are reimbursed to the shareholders when profits are received in the form of capital 
gains). Moreover, according to OECD data the US has the second highest top tax rate on dividends, when 
considering both the corporate and individual taxes. 
30 For example, differences between the partial (UK) and full (Germany, France and Italy) imputation systems, 
differences in the taxation rates. 
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In Germany, I calculate the tax discrimination variables assuming long-term capital gains' 
and short-term capital gains. Results show that in the case where capital gains carry no tax 
liabilities, higher and basic tax payers have a preference for capital gains, in contrast to the 
tax-exempt investors who suffer higher taxation on capital gains than on dividends. On the 
other hand, all classes of shareholders suffer less taxation if profits are distributed rather than 
realised through capital gains in the short-term. The analysis based on standard rates 
suggested that the French tax system has always favoured dividends received by basic tax 
payers and tax-exempt investors. The higher tax brackets are expected to prefer dividends 
over capital gains only in recent years. Unlike in the other countries, the tax discrimination in 
Italy is much smaller for basic and higher tax payers indicating a lower preference for 
dividends. Tax-exempt investors are indifferent between dividends and capital gains 
throughout the sample period. 
This evidence is contradictive with the Miller and Modigliani prediction, than dividend policy 
is irrelevant as it is simply a transfer of money from the company to the shareholders. If the 
shareholder is in the immediate need of liquidity, will suffer higher taxes on capital gains than 
on dividends; in the opposite case where profits are distributed as dividends, shareholders 
with excess cash can reinvest the money in the company. 
In Chapter 3I tested the taxation effect hypothesis by analysing and comparing the ex- 
dividend share price reaction in the UK, Germany, France and Italy. On the ex-dividend day 
share prices drop by less than the amount of dividend and according to the taxation effect 
hypothesis this is due to the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains. 32 On the other 
hand, studies propose the short-term hypothesis, according to which the ex-dividend share 
price drop less than the dividend per share provides profit opportunities for the short term 
traders" who capture dividends and eliminate any excess returns on the ex-dividend day. 
Other studies overcome the problem of ex-dividend day pricing and analyse the changes in 
the tax regime that affected dividend and capital gains taxation burden. 34 To the best of my 
knowledge, the thesis is the first to simultaneously test all three parts of the literature in 
Europe. 
I analysed the ex-dividend share price behaviour in European countries for the period 1987- 
2002. My sample consisted of 17,748 event dates. The observations were relatively evenly 
31 Long-term capital gains are generated when investors hold the assets for longer than six months, one year as of 
1999. In this case capital gains carry no tax liabilities. 
32 See for example, Elton and Gruber (1970), Heath and Jarrow (1988), Kaplanis (1986) 
33 These are investors who are not subject to differential taxation of dividends and capital gains 
34 See for example, Lasfer (1995), Bell and Jenkinson (2001), Michaely (1991) 
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distributed across years and covered all industries and firm sizes. I employed an event study 
methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985) to compute the abnormal returns around the ex- 
dividend day. Results provided evidence to support the taxation effect hypothesis. On day 
zero the abnormal returns were all positive and significant suggesting that ex-dividend day 
prices decrease by less than the amount of the dividend in each country. The highest ex-day 
returns appear to be in France with 1.29 percent (t = 4.97), followed by Italy 0.79 percent (t = 
3.95), and the UK 0.75 percent (t = 3.56) and finally, Germany with 0.57 percent (t = 2.57). 
These results are consistent with previous studies. " Further tests of the share price reaction in 
the pre- and post-event period [-20, +20 days] showed that in the UK the abnormal behaviour 
is confined solely on the ex-dividend day. 36 In Germany, ex-day returns in the pre- and post- 
event periods are not randomly distributed. This indicates that in Germany dividend capture is 
predominant and that ex-day returns may not reflect solely the tax differential between 
dividends and capital gains. The results for the French market mimic those of the UK. 37 In 
Italy, results are likely to reflect the tax discrimination between dividends and capital gains. 38 
The study also provided a comparative analysis of the ex-dividend day returns across 
countries. On average, if ex-day returns are set by higher taxpayers, then ex-day returns 
should be higher in Germany and France to the remaining countries. In contrast, if ex-day 
share prices are set by tax exempt investors and/or basic taxpayers, then ex-day returns should 
be higher in Italy where share prices should fall by the amount of the dividend compared to 
other countries where share prices should fall by more than the amount of dividends. The ex- 
day abnormal returns in France were found to be higher by 0.54 percent (t = 2.64) than the 
UK, 0.72 percent (t = 3.48) than Germany, and 0.49 percent (t = 2.29) in Italy. The cx-day 
returns in Italy were statistically the same as compared to the UK. Finally, results suggested 
that in Germany ex-day returns are low and they were likely to underestimate the tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains. 
Further tests of the share price behaviour around the ex-dividend day included the analysis of 
the abnormal returns according to the dividend yield and the bid-ask spread. Also, regressions 
of the abnormal returns against the dividend yield, market value, the bid-ask spread and the 
35 For example Lasfer (1995) and Bell and Jenkinson (2002) show that ex-day prices decrease significatnly less 
than the amount of dividend in the UK, while Harris et al (1998) show that the imputation credit in Germany is 
capitalised in share prices. 
36 Lasfer (1995) also finds that abnormal returns are confined solely on the ex-dividend day. The results are in 
contrast with Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Michaely (1991) who find abnormal share price behaviour on the 
ex-dividend date as well as the days surrounding the event. 
37 These results are consistent with Romon (2000). 
38 These results do not provide support to Michaely and Murgia (1995) who, despite finding some of the ex. 
dividend day pricing is tax motivated, conclude that taxes do not explain fully the ex-dividend price drop. 
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taxation periods39 were conducted. The coefficients of the dividend yield variable appeared to 
be positive and significant in all the countries. Evidence was not consistent with the short- 
term hypothesis as the market value coefficients were found to be positive and insignificant. 
The bid-ask spread coefficients were not found to be significant. Evidence consistent with the 
taxation effect hypothesis was observed, as the coefficients of the taxation periods significant 
in all the countries under consideration. 
In general, results confirmed that in countries where the differential between dividends and 
capital gains is high, the ex-date returns are also high. Moreover, I show that ex-day returns 
are not homogeneous across my sample periods. I find that in each of the four countries under 
consideration, changes in the tax systems that affect taxes on dividend and/or capital gains 
alter significantly ex-date returns. The uniqueness of this part of my study is based on its 
European character. The study adds to the literature because testing the ex-dividend day 
pricing offers a unique opportunity to compare capital gains (i. e. price drop) to ordinary 
income (i. e. the dividend). Additionally, comparing the value of investors ascribe to returns in 
these two forms is important because each is taxed differently. Moreover, the way differential 
taxation influences the share price has financial consequences for corporations and 
governments that design tax codes and relay on tax revenues. In sum, the study adds to the 
literature by providing further evidence on the taxation effects on the ex-dividend day returns. 
However, I show that some countries are subject to short-term trading and their cx-day returns 
are lower to reflect the tax differential between dividends and capital gains. 
In Chapter 4I considered the signalling information content of dividends hypothesis, 
according to which dividends are used as a signalling mechanism to alleviate informational 
asymmetry between manager (insiders) and shareholders (outsiders). 40 In general, dividend 
models posit that dividend announcements transmit information about the future and/or 
current earnings (prospects of the company) and consequently the changes in the value of the 
firm around dividend announcements should be proportionate to the changes in dividend 
policy. The purpose was twofold. I firstly used the event study methodology (Brown and 
Warner, 1985) to test whether the share price reaction on the dividend announcement day in 
the UK, Germany, France and Italy for the period 1987 to 2002 is related to the direction of 
the dividend change announced; and secondly, I distinguished between the effect of dividends 
and earnings announcements in an attempt to isolate the impact of dividend announcement on 
the share price reaction and to investigate whether dividends provide information beyond that 
39 The dummy variable technique was used in order to assess the impact of taxation regimes on the abnormal 
returns. 
41 See Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985). 
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provided by earnings announcements. To the best of my knowledge this is the first European 
study to simultaneously analyse and compare the share price reaction to the announcements of 
dividend increases, decreases, no changes, omissions and initiations. 
An imperative motivation for the study of the share price reaction around the dividend 
announcement day in Europe is the existence of institutional, financial and corporate 
governance differences between the countries. These differences may result in different 
country-level information asymmetries between managers (insiders) and the shareholders 
(outsiders). European countries were categorised according to their corporate governance 
systems41 into market-based countries (UK) and bank-based countries (Germany, France and 
Italy). 42 Generally, in the Anglo-Saxon system the number of listed companies is large, the 
process of acquiring control is effectively market oriented and there are a few corporate 
holding or interlocked patterns of ownership. In such countries information asymmetry 
problems are high. On the other hand, in Continental European systems, ownership is 
typically concentrated in a few hands holding large block shares of corporate equity and 
control rests with corporate insiders. These shareholders may be individuals, family holdings, 
financial institutions, management, bloc alliances, and conglomerates or cross shareholdings. 
In such markets information asymmetries are expected to be low. The main argument of this 
part of my thesis was that if dividends are used as a signalling mechanism to mitigate 
information asymmetries, then in countries where there is a higher level of information 
asymmetry between managers (insiders) and shareholders (outsiders), abnormal returns on the 
announcement dates are expected to be higher than in countries where investors are better 
informed about the future (and current) prospects of the company. 
The results showed that UK managers were more likely to increase dividends (47.3 percent of 
the sample) and more reluctant to dividend decreases (6.1 percent of the sample). In bank- 
based countries, managers did not change dividends frequently: in Germany and Italy 53.9 
percent of the announcements contained no dividend change and in France no changes 
amounted to 47.6 percent of the sample. The share price reaction to dividend announcement 
changes indicated that in the UK investors perceive dividend increases (decreases) as good 
(bad) news for the future of the company. However, in all three bank-based countries studied, 
where information asymmetry is lower than in market-based countries, investors perceive 
dividend increases/initiations as excess internal funding returned to the shareholders because 
of scarcity of positive net present value investment opportunities. Consequently, there was a 
41 Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2001) argue that much of the financial theory on which the dividend policy is 
based, comes from a capital market perspective. This perspective assumes an arms length financing and generates 
dividend policy implications from models of signalling and information asymmetries. 
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negative share price reaction around the announcement of dividend increases and initiations. 
On the other hand, the market reacts positively on the dividend decreases/omissions 
announcements. This might lead to the conclusion that companies in bank-based countries 
decrease their dividends in order to use the less costly internal funds to take positive net 
present value opportunities. Investors in these countries are informed about the prospects of 
the companies, therefore they would not penalise dividend-decreasing firms and consequently 
managers do not fear a negative market reaction following such announcements. 
Finally, I examined the share price reaction on the dividend announcement dates in relation to 
dividend and earnings changes. 3 In each country under consideration, the sample companies 
were first grouped according to the content of earnings announcement (increase, decrease, no 
change) and secondly, within each group I distinguished between dividend 
increasing/initiating, decreasing/omitting and no change companies. Results showed that 
dividend announcements provide information beyond of what is provided by earnings 
announcements. For example, in the UK dividend increasing firms earned statistically higher 
abnormal returns when the increase in dividends was accompanied by earnings increases. 
Similarly, the negative share price reaction to dividend decreases was even lower when the 
dividend decreases were accompanied by earnings decreases. Companies that announced 
dividend no changes accompanied by earnings increases earned statistically positive abnormal 
returns; in contrast with earnings decreasing companies that experience negative abnormal 
returns on the announcement of dividend no changes. 
In sum, results provided evidence consistent with the information signalling hypothesis. Also 
the share price reaction to dividend changes differs between market-based countries and bank- 
based countries. The differences lead to the need for further research in the area in order to 
test whether for example companies that announce earnings increases accompanied by 
dividend decreases, increase their capital expenditure in the years following such 
announcements. In this case, the dividend decrease would be attributed solely to the need for 
costless funds in order to finance new positive net present value investment opportunities. 
In Chapter 5I investigated the agency conflict hypothesis by analysing the share price 
behaviour around the dividend announcement day in the UK, Germany, France and Italy for 
42 See Frank and Mayers (1994,1997), Zysman (1983), Berglof (1988,1990) 
43 In a cross-country comparative study, it is important to isolate the impact of dividend announcements because of 
different timing in dividend and earnings announcements in each country. For example, in the UK and France 
dividends and earnings are generally announced simultaneously, while in Germany and Italy earnings 
announcements precede dividend announcements. This means that in Germany and Italy, investors arc already 
informed about the performance of the company when dividends are announced therefore, the share price reaction 
may be lower. 
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the period 1987 to 2002. This hypothesis, questions two of the Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
assumptions. Firstly, the assumption of independence between dividend policy and 
investment decisions of the firm; and secondly, the assumption that managers' interests are 
aligned with those of shareholders so that any profits are distributed pro-rata to all 
shareholders. With the separation of ownership and control, a principal (shareholder)-agent 
(manager) problem occurs which, reflects the possibility that managers pursue their own 
goals (mainly, through investing in negative net present value projects) at the expense of the 
shareholders. According to the agency conflict hypothesis dividends reduce agency conflicts 
by eliminating free cash flow in the possession of the management and therefore eliminating 
the possibility of managers pursuing their own goals 43 In line with the information signalling 
hypothesis, the agency conflict hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between the 
dividend announcement day share price reaction and the direction of dividend change. 46 Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989) distinguish between the two hypotheses with respect to the level of 
growth opportunities faced by the firm. They use the Tobin's Q ratio to distinguish between 
overinvesting (Tobin's Q<1) and value maximising (Tobin's Q>I) firms. They find that the 
announcements of sizable dividend changes have a significant impact on the stock price of 
overinvesting firms, but no impact for value maximising firms. 
In respect to the levels of agency conflicts the sample countries were grouped into market- 
based countries (UK) and bank-based countries (Germany, France and Italy). The level of 
agency conflicts in the UK companies was perceived to be higher than in their German, 
French and Italian counterparts. This is due to the distinguishing features of the UK outsider 
model which are the dispersed equity ownership with large institutional holdings and 
extensive dependence on the capital markets. On the other hand, in bank-based countries 
agency conflicts are lower due to higher ownership concentration with extensive individual or 
family, bank and inter-corporate holdings. In such a case there is a less active equities market 
and less of a market corporate control. Governance and monitoring of the firm's performance 
take on more of an insider form, with representatives banks (for example, in Germany) and/or 
of families (for example, the Angeli's in Italy) and/or other firms sitting on the company's 
board (for example, in France). Differences between countries have also been observed in 
respect to the level of growth opportunities. La Porta and Silanes (1998), report the average 
annual percent growth per capital gross domestic product (GDP) for the period 1970-1993 in 
different countries around the world. They show that in the UK growth opportunities are 
lower than in the other sample countries. Managers in countries with low opportunities are 
See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a detailed discussion on the agency conflict resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
45 Theoretical evidence provided by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1984) 
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more likely to invest in negative net present value projects. Therefore, agency conflicts in the 
UK are expected to be higher than in Germany, France and Italy. 
The purpose was to test whether the relationship between the market reaction to dividend 
changes and firm growth opportunities is stronger in market-based countries. I followed Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989) for the purpose of testing my hypothesis and to distinguish between 
the predictions of the signalling and overinvestment hypotheses. My study extents Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) not only because of its European comparative character, but also because 
I consider in addition to dividend increase and decrease announcements, the announcements 
of no changes, initiations and omissions. I deviate from Lang and Litzenberger and I use the 
market-to-book ratio in order to distinguish between overinvestment (low market-to-book) 
and value maximising (high market-to-book) firms. 
I used the abnormal returns around the dividend change announcements as calculated in 
Chapter 4. In each country I considered all five dividend change groups (i. e. increases, 
decreases, no changes, initiations and omissions) and I further distinguished between value 
maximising and overinvesting firms. I investigated the share price reaction to dividend 
change announcements on the event day 0 as well as on days 
-1 to +1. Results provided not 
enough evidence to accept the overinvestment over the signalling hypothesis. In the UK, 
abnormal returns on the announcement of dividend increases/initiations (decreases/omissions) 
for value maximising and overinvestment firms are significantly positive (negative). In 
Germany, value maximising firms earned negative (positive) abnormal returns on the 
announcement of dividend increases (decreases); while, overinvesting firms earned positive 
(negative) abnormal returns on the announcement of dividend increases (decreases). In 
France, value maximising firms experienced positive returns on the announcement of 
dividend increases and decreases; while overinvestment firms experienced positive (negative) 
returns on the announcement of dividend increases (decreases). However, in all the countries 
under consideration the abnormal returns difference between value maximising and 
overinvesting firms did not appear to be statistically different from zero. Moreover, the 
abnormal return differences between the dividend change groups were not significant. 
In order to observe the differences in abnormal returns between European countries, I also 
provided cross-country comparisons. Results provided were interesting. In the UK both value 
maximising and overinvesting firms experienced significantly higher abnormal returns on and 
around the dividend change announcements, as compared to their counterparts in bank-based 
46 See for example, Rozeff (1982) 
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countries. The differences between bank-based countries did not prove to be statistically 
different from zero. 
Evidence in this part of my study provided results consistent with both the information 
signalling and agency conflict hypotheses. Further tests of the share price reaction on and 
around the dividend announcement changes do not provide evidence strong enough to accept 
the agency conflict hypothesis over the signalling hypothesis. However, further research in 
the area is required in order to derive concrete conclusions. 
STUDY i IMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH IN Tim, ARTS 
The results of the study are based on a sample period from August 1987 to August 2002. 
Maybe companies have different dividend policy behaviour in other periods. Also, due to 
time constrains, I limit my study to the analysis of cash dividends. A future development of 
the study could be to analyse other forms of dividend payouts, such as share rcpurchascs or 
stock dividends. 
A major limitation of the study is the fact that data on the share ownership structure is not 
available. After considerable research, I was able to obtain an indication of the ownership 
structures in the four countries under consideration, but unfortunately data is not 
disaggregated enough to show what percentage of the equity capital each class of investor 
owns. For example, managerial ownership would provide a good indication of the 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Moreover, data indicating the percentage of 
equity capital each taxpayer owns would prove useful to distinguish between high, basic and 
low tax bracket investors when analysing the ex-dividend share price behaviour. In the future 
it would be interesting to focus more on the UK pension funds before and after 1997, for 
example. However, there is no data on machine readable form for each individual company 
listing (i. e. companies with pension funds and companies with no pension funds). 
In the calculation of the tax discrimination variable I used the basic taxation rates. A more 
accurate calculation of the tax discrimination variable could be achieved by engaging the 
effective taxation rates, and by considering the various allowances and relief both at the 
company level and at an individual level. 
47 This is to say, firstly that capital gains may not 
only face a lower statutory rate than dividends, but are also typically taxed upon realisation, 
not on accrual and secondly effective income and corporation taxation rates are lowered by 
47 For this purpose an analysis software tool has been developed, the European Tax Analyser which, simulates the 
assessment of a representative firm taking into account all relevant taxes, their interaction and special features of 
245 
Sir John Cass Business School 
Dividend Policy in Europe: Chapter 6 
allowances and remunerations. It has been proven difficult to calculate at the present stage of 
my study. 
Another limitation of my thesis is that I do not consider the microstructure effects as an 
explanation to the ex-dividend price movements. The price drop by less than the amount of 
dividend on the ex-dividend day could be related to discreteness in prices rather than taxes 
(Bali and Hite, 1998) or to the bid-ask bounce (Frank and Jagannathan, 1998). 
The effectiveness of corporate governance systems in mitigating information asymmetries 
cannot be generalised. 48 More accurate measures of information asymmetries are proposed by 
Krishnaswami and Subramanian (1999) who use three different measures of information 
asymmetry based on the analyst's earnings forecasts. Data should report forecasts for each 
firm based on the analyst's earnings estimates. Krishnaswami and Subramanian (1999), and 
Christie (1987) firstly use the forecast errors in earnings measured as the ratio of the absolute 
difference between the forecast earnings and the actual earnings per share (EPS) to the share 
price at the beginning of the dividend announcement month. Higher forecast errors are 
expected to indicate higher informational asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors. 49 Secondly, the standard deviation of forecasts, measured as the standard deviation 
of the last earnings forecasts preceding the dividend announcement could be used as a proxy 
for information asymmetries. This variable represents the dispersion among analysts about a 
consensus estimate of the forecast. Since disagreement amongst analysts is an indication of 
the lack of available information about the firm the standard deviation of forecasts is another 
metric of the level of information asymmetry about the firm. In order to overcome criticism of 
the use of forecast enrorsSO as a measure of information asymmetry and control for the 
correlation between forecast errors and earnings volatility, Krishnaswami and Subramanian 
(1999) propose a third measure of information asymmetry, that is, the normalised forecast 
error defined as the ratio of the forecast error in earnings to the earnings volatility of the firm 
the tariffs such as tax credit and reduced tax rates. Unfortunately, the software was impossible to obtain due to 
high costs. 
48 See Halpern (1999) and Jovanovic (2001) 
49 Elton, Gruber and Gultekin (1984) argue on the appropriateness of forecast errors as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. They provide a detailed analysis of the forecast errors in the earnings of a wide cross-section firms. 
They examine the size, pattern and source of these errors by partitioning them into errors derived from 
mispredicting economy-wide factors, industry-wide factors and firm-specific factors. They show that the errors 
decrease as the predictions get closer to the end of the fiscal year and find that nearly 84 percent of the forecast 
error in the final month can be attributed to misestimation of firm-specific factors rather than to misestimation of 
economy or industry factors. Moreover, Ang and Ciccone (2001) argue that if there is reliable and relevant 
information available about the firm, the ability of the analysts to predict the future performance should be 
enhanced. 
so Some firms may have higher forecast errors because they have more volatile earnings and not because they have 
higher levels of information asymmetry. 
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(earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the firm's earnings in the five year period 
before the event announcement). 
Literature has to offer more explanations to the dividend policy relevance, which are not 
considered in my thesis. For example, transaction costs, flotation costs, and irrational investor 
behaviour. Lease, Kalay, Loewenstein and Sang (2000) view these frictions as relatively 
minor in the total scheme of imperfections. Although the theoretical and empirical finance 
literature devotes relatively little attention to the first two frictions, a growing body in the 
literature exists on the behavioural explanations for dividend policy relevance. For example, 
Shefrin and Statman (1984) present a behavioural framework explaining why some investors 
want to receive cash dividends. This framework is based on the theory of self control 
presented by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and the theory of choice under uncertainty described 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Miller and Shiller (1986) argue that introducing 
behavioural elements to explain dividend policy is natural because many anomalies appear in 
dividend policy. Frankfurter and Lane (1984) describe several behavioural economic theories 
of dividends. One involves theories of habits (non-random behaviour based on past 
experience), which may reflect cultural and societal factors rather than rational economic 
behaviour. 
Finally, the literature has not offered a complete model of dividend policy that would have 
allowed me to test all these factors simultaneously. In the last Chapter of my thesis, I offered 
a joint test of the information signalling and free cash flow hypotheses. However, it was not 
possible to include the tax and other determinants of dividend policy into the model. 
Similarly, in Chapter 4, I tested for the joint impact of earnings and dividend signalling but 
the other hypotheses were not incorporated. 
The extent to which these factors affect my results is a matter of further research. The results 
of my thesis suggest that European firms follow different dividend policies because of 
differences in the taxation and corporate governance systems, as well as, in the financial and 
institutional characteristics. Furthermore, the impact of these factors on their dividend policies 
is different across the countries. It is therefore, imperative for investors, managers, and policy 
makers to fully understand the unique taxation, financial, institutional and corporate 
governance factors that affect the dividend policy in various countries. However, much work 
remains to better understand different corporate dividend policies across countries. I would 
characterise my thesis as the start of testing the dividend policy in European countries. 
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APP NDIX 1. TIIF MILLER AND MODI 
. 
LIANI DIVIn 
. 
ND IRRELEyANCI, ll1: Q1t(Z ZQQL 
Let dft be to equal the dividend per share paid by the firm j during period t, 11. , the share price and then 
the Return in period t would be equal to: 
R_ 
(d j. r + Pj, t+l - Pj. r) 
= 
(d j., + Pj. r+, ) 
-1 Pj., P) 
,a 
Rearranging, 
(d j, t + Pj, t+, pi, t = 1+R, 
This equation can be restated in terms of the firm rather than the value of an individual share so one 
can drop the j subscript. The value of the firm, V,, would be equal to the number of shares at the 
beginning of period t, N,, multiplied by P,; i. e. V, =N, P,, alternatively 
V, = 
(N, d, +N, P,. ý1) 
` 1+R, 
while the total dividends paid during t would be equal to D, =N, d,. Given the level of firm's 
investment, It, the total net profit would be equal to X, 
- 
D, where X, is the cash flow generated from 
existing projects. If mt+l is the new shares (if any) sold during t, at the ex-dividend closing price Pt,, 
such that N, +1=N, +m, +i, then miP, +i=I, -(Xt-D, ) and 
yr 
= 
Dt + Vr+l 
- 
mt+i 1+1 
=X, 
-1 r +V , 
1 +R, 1+R, 
Since D, does not appear directly among the arguments and since X1, It, V141 and R, are all independent 
of D, it follows that the current value of the firm must be independent of the current value dividend 
decision. MM concluded that dividend policy does not matter when dealing with firm valuation. 
Therefore, the company should pay dividends according to the preferences of the clientele who 
invests in the company. In the MM model, the market value of equity is determined by the firm's 
investment in new projects I and the cash flow generated from the existing projects X,. 
Moreover, it should be noted that this analysis implicitly assumes 100 percent equity financing. It can 
be extended straightforwardly to include debt financing. In this case, debt issues as well as equity 
issues can finance dividends. The choice between debt or equity financing does not affect the value of 
the firm, since capital markets are perfect and complete. 
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APPENDIX 2. FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL ES 
. 
AR II VIS-A-VIS TIIF Tmº' IIYPOTj SE 
DIVIDEND Pnt. rrv 
RES AR 
.H 
ST IS 
DIVIDEND 
TAXATION 
HYPOTHESIS 
SIGNALING 
HYPOTHESIS 
AGENCY 
HYPOTImsiS 
Accept Reject Accept Re ect Accept Re ect 
Aharony and Swary (1980)  
Ambarish, John and Williams 
(1987)  
Bell and Jenkinson (2001)  
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 
(1997)  
Bernheim and Wantz (1995)  ý/ 
Bhattacharya (1979)  
Christie (1994)  
De Angelo, De Angelo and 
Skinner (1996)  
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994)   V 
Dewenter and Warther (1998)  ý/ 
Dhillon and Johnson (1994) 
Downes and Heinkel (1982)  
Eades, Hess and Kim (1984, 
1994)  
Easterbrook (1984) 
 
Elton and Gruber (1970)  
Jensen (1986) 
 
Jensen and Johnson (1995)  
John and Williams (1985)  
Kalay (1982)  
Kao and Wu (1994)  
Karpof and Walking (1988)  
La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000)  
Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986)  
Lang and Litzenberger (1989)   
Lasfer (1995,1996)  
Long, Malitz and Sefcik (1994)  
Manuel, Brooks and Schadler 
(1993)  
Men ah (1993)  
Michaely (1991)  
Miller and Rock (1985)  
Morgan and Thomas (1998)  
Penman (1983) 
 
Petit (1972) 
 
Poterba and Summers (1985)  
Smith and Watts (1992)  
Williams (1988 
 
Yoon and Starks (1995) 
 
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YEAR LOWER BAND 
BASIC 
BAND 
HIGHER 
BAND YEAR 
LOWER 
BAND 
BASIC 
BAND 
HIGHER 
BANI) 
1986-87 29% 40%-60% 1993-96 20% 25% 40% 
1987-88 27% 40%-60% 1996-97 20% 24% 40% 
1988-89 25% 40% 1997-98 20% 23% 40% 
1989-90 25% 40% 1998-99 20% 23% 40% 
1990-91 25% 40% 1999-00 10% 23% 40"kß 
1991-92 25% 40% 2000-01 10% 22% 4U7h 
IL_ 1992-93 20% 25% 40% 
Source: Inland Revenue, Appendix A2 
1 The basic rate of tax on dividend income is 20 percent 
2 The basic rate of tax on dividends and savings income is 20 percent 
3 The basic rate on dividends is 10 percent 
4 The higher rate of tax on dividends is 32.5 percent 
YEAR 
ANNUAL 
EXEMPT 
AMOUNT 
RATE YEAR 
AMMIAL 
' 
AMOUNT 
1986-87 6300 30% 1996-97 6300 1TR 
1987-88 6600 30% 1997-98 6500 Cf It 
1988-91 5000 RIncome a es ITa 1998-991 6800 1T11 
1991-92 5500 ITR 1999-00 7100 [Tit 
1992-95 5800 ITR 2000-01 7200 [Tit 
1995-96 6000 ITR 
Source: Inland Revenue 
From 1998-99 onwards, taper relief may reduce the proportion of gains chargeable according to the years the 
asset is held 
(: T MAIN MARTIAL AIA tl ML YEAR BATE RELME ACT YE" RATE IlEl. dl L Acl 
1986-87 35% 3/200 29/71 1994.95 33% 1/50 20/80 
1987-88 35% 1/50 27/73 1995-96 33% 1/50 20/80 
1988-89 35% 1/40 25/75 1996-97 33% 9/400 20/80 
1989-90 35% 1/40 25/75 1997-98' 31% 1/40 20/80 
1990-91 34% 9/400 25/75 1998-99 31% 1/40 20/80 
1991-93 33% 1/50 25/75 1999-00 30% 1/40 
---- 
1993-94 33% 1/50 9/31 2000-01 30% 1/40 
---- 
Source: Inland Revenue, Appendix A6 
'ACT abolished on 6 April 1999 for pension funds 
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CORPORATION TAX RATES FOR THE PERIOD 
YEAR 
CT ON RETAINED 
EARNINGS 
CT ON 
DISTRIBUTED 
EARNINGS 
SOLIDARITY 
CHARGE 
LOCAL 
TAXIS 
1986-1990 56% 50% 
1990-91 50% 46% 
1991-1992 50% 46% 3.75% 
1992-1994 50% 46% 
1994-1995 45% 42% 
1995-1998 45% 42% 7.5% 
1998-2002 40% 30% 5.5%n 13%-20% 
INCOME AND CAPITAL GAINS TAx ATEs 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX 
YEAR 
HIGHER TAX BASIC TAX Short-Term As Income Tax 
PAYER PAYER 
Long-Term 
12 months 
Tax Exempt 
1986-1990 56% 22% IMPUTATION CREDIT 
1991-1994 53% 19% Pre-1994 36% 
1995-2002 51% 19% Post-1994 30% 
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INCOME TAX RATES 
YEAR 
INCOME IN 
MILLION FRANCS RATE % YEAR 
INCOME IN 
M ILLION FRANCS 
1ýATF: % 
1986-88 U to 21 900 0 1995-96 U to 21 610 0 
Up to 47 900 12 Up to 49 440 12 
Up to 84 300 25 Up to 87 020 25 
Up to 136 500 35 Up to 140 900 35 
Up to 222 100 45 Up to 229 200 45 
Up to 273 900 50 Up to 282 730 50 
Over 273 900 56.8 Over 282 730 56.8 
1989-1991 Up to 21900 0 1996-97 U to 21610 0 
Up to 47 900 12 Up to 49 440 12 
Up to 84 300 25 U to 87 0? 0 23 
Up to 136 500 35 U to 140 9C)U 35 
Up to 222 100 45 Up to 229 200 45 
Up to 273 900 50 Up to 282 730 50 
Over 273 900 56.8 Over 282 730 56.8 
1991-92 Up to 21 900 0 1997-98 U to 21 610 0 
Up to 47 900 12 Up to 49 440 12 
Up to 84 300 25 Up to 87 020 25 
U to 136 500 35 U to 140 900 33 
Up to 222 100 45 Up to 229 200 45 
Up to 273 900 50 Up to 282 730 SQ 
Over 273 900 56.8 June 1997 Over 282 730 54 
1993-94 Up to 21900 0 1998.1999 U to 26 100 0 
Up to 47 900 12 Up to 51 340 10.5 
U to 84 300 25 Up to 90 370 24 
Up to 136 500 35 U to 146 320 11 
U to 222 100 45 U to 238 080 41 
Up to 273 900 50 Up to 293 600 48 
Over 273 900 56.8 Over 293 600 54 
1994-1995 Up to 21 210 0 1999.2001 Up to 26 600 0 
U to 48 570 12 U to 52 320 8.25 
Up to 85 480 25 Up to 92 090 21.75 
Up to 138 410 35 U to 149 1 10 31.75 
Up to 225 210 45 U to 242 620 41.75 
Up to 277 730 50 Up to 299 200 47.25 
Over 277 730 56.8 Over 299 200 53,25 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES AND AVOIR FISCAL. 
CAPITAL GAINS Ayoii FISCAL 
YEAR RATE % YEAR RATE % 
1986-December 
1998 
16% +3.9% Social 
Contribution 1986-1993 50% 
Januar 1999 As Income 1993 ONWARDS 100% 
NOTE: For the Corporation Taxation Rates see Text Section 2.4.3 
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YEAR 
INCOME IN 
MILLION 
LIRAS 
RATE YEAR 
INCOME IN 
MILLION 
LIRAS 
RATE: 
1986-88 Up to 6 12% 1992-1998 Up to 7.2 10% 
Up to 11 22% Up to 14.4 22% 
Up to 28 27% Up to 30 2711, 
Up to 50 34% Up to 60 34% 
Up to 100 41% U to 150 41 %X> 
Up to 150 48% Up to 300 46% 
Up to 300 53% Over 300 51'X; 
Up to 600 58% 1998-1999 Up to 15 18.5% 
Over 600 62% Up to 30 26.5% 
1989-1991 Up to 6 10% Up to 60 33.5% 
Up to 12 22% U to 135 39.5% 
Up to 30 26% Over 135 45.5% 
Up to 60 33% 1999.2001 Up to 20 18.5% 
Up to 150 40% Up to 30 25.5% 
Up to 300 45% Up to 60 33. äX 
Up to 300 50% Up to 135 39.5% 
1991-92 Up to 6.8 10% Over 135 45.5% 
Up to 13.5 22% 
Up to 33.7 26% 
Up to 67.6 33% 
IMU TATt AXATIQN C1tE1 ITS: 
Up to 168.8 40% 1986 1997 Up to 337.7 45% - : 
56.25% 
1998 2001 58 73% Over 337.7 51% - : . 
CAPITAL. GAINS TAX RATES 
Before 1991: Income Tax Rate 
From 1991: Ordinary tax rate or, at taxpayer's option, substitutive tax with the following 
rates: 
" 25% when capital gains derives from the alienation of "Qualified" 
participation' 
" 15% when the capital gains derives from alienation of other artici ations2 
From 1 July " 27% if the participation sold is "Qualified" 
1998: 
" 12.5% in all other cases 
' Participation rates: 2% of the capital for listed companies, 5% for the non-listed companies, 10% for partnerships 
2Tax base is equal to 7% of the price of the sale 
3 2% of the voting power or 5% of the capital for listed companies, at least 20% of the voting power or 25% of the capital 
from non-listed companies 
YEAR CT RATE ILOR 
1986-1994 36% 16.2% 
1995-2001 37% 16.2% 
SOURCE: I am grateful to the European Federation of Accountants for providing me with the Italian Taxation 
Rates 
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APPENDIX 4: ILLUSTRATION OF TILE EUROPEAN INIP ITATIpSYSTE 
(Based on 1998 Taxation-Rates) 
PANEL A: CORPORATION LEVEL 
Taxable Income 100 
Corporation Tax (T c= 31 %) (31) 
Profit After Tax 69 
Advanced Corporation Tax (20%) 17.25 
Grossed Up Dividend 86.25 
Mainstream Company Tax Liability 31-17.25 1: 1.75 
PANEL B: SHAREHOLDER LEVEL 
EXEMPT 
BASIC 
TAXPAYER 
20%O 
HIGHER 
TAXPAYER 
(40%) 
Cash Dividend Received 69 69 69 
Imputation Credit (tax already paid at the company 
level) 17.25 17.25 17.25 
Taxable Dividend Income 86.25 86.25 86.25 
Personal income Tax (0) (17.25) (34.75) 
Dividend Tax Credit 17.25 17.25 17.25 
Personal Tax Liability 
-17.25 0 17.25 
NET DIVIDEND RECEIVED 86.25 69 51.5 
Source: Own Calculations 
PANEL A: CORPORATION LEVEL PROFIT RETENTION 
PROFIT 
DISTRIBUTION 
Taxable Income 100 1(x) 
Trade Tax on Income (16% average Tax Rate') (16) (16) 
Corporation Tax 
, =40% (33.60) 33.60 
Reduction of T to 30% on distributed profits 8.40 
Solidarity Charge (1.85) 139 
Income After Taxes 48.55 57.41 
Dividends 57.41 
Withholding Tax (T,, = 25%) 14.. 35 
Solidarity Charge (5.5%) 
Dividends to Shareholders 
.. 
42,27 
PANEL B: SHAREHOLDER LEVEL 
EXEMPT 
BASIC 
TAXPAYER 
(24%) 
111Cln: 1t 
TAXPAYER 
(53%) 
Individual Shareholder Dividend 42.27 42.27 42.27 
Credible Corporation Tax (9/16 of 57.41) 30.40 30.40 30.40 
Total Taxable Income 72.67 72.67 72.67 
Individual Income Tax 13.58 (30) 
Dividend Tax Credit 14-35 14-35 
Total 56.62 57.39 40.47 
Reimbursement to Shareholder 14.35 0.77 
. 
15.65 
Source: Doing Business in Germany, 1998, UDO international and Own Calculations 
'The trade tax on income rates vary between 14% and 20% depending on the municipality 
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PANEL A: CORPORATION LEVEL 
Taxable Income 100 
Corporation Tax 33.33%+3.33%) (36.66) 
Profit After Tax 63.34 
Avoir Fiscal (40% on 63.34) 25.33 
Grossed Up Dividend 88.67 
Corporation tax on Gross Dividends (36 % %) 32.5 
Avoir Fiscal 25.33 ý ýý RM 
Tax Payable 7.11 
Net Dividend Distributed 56.17 
PANEL B: SHAREHOLDER LEVEL EXEMPT 
BASIC 
TAXPAYER 
(35%) 
HIGHER 
TAXPAYER 
5% 
Dividend Received 56.167 56.167 56.167 
Avoir Fiscal 25.33 25.33 25.31 
Taxable Income 81.50 81.50 
Personal Income Tax 28.5 46-1 
Avoir Fiscal already paid 25.33 25.33 
Net Tax Liability 3.18 20.95 
NET DIVIDEND RECEIVED 81.497 52.98 35.20 
Source: Doing Business in France, 1998, BDO International and Own Calculations 
APPENDIX 4.4 The Italian Full Imputation System 
PANEL A: CORPORATION LEVEL 
Profits 100 
Local Tax (ILOR = 16.2%) (16.20) 
Earnings Subject to National Taxes 83.80 
National Tax (IRPEG=36%) (30.17) 
Net Earnings Available to Shareholders 53.63 
Individual Individual Individual 
PANEL B: 
Investor Investor Investor 
SHAREHOLDER 20% 36% 50% Corporate Mutual 
LEVEL 
(Lower) (Basic) Tax (Iligher) Investor Funds Tax 
Bracket Tax B acket Br acket 
Cash Dividend 53.63 53.63 53.63 53.63 53.63 
10%Witholdin Tax (5.36) (5.3 (5.36) (5-10) (5.36) 
Net Dividend 48.27 48.27 48.27 48.27 48.27 Received 
Personal Tax (16.76) (30.17) (41.90) (30.17) 
Recovery of Tax 30.17 30.17 30.17 30.17 Credit 
Recovery of 5.36 5.36 5.36 5.36 Withholding Tax 
EFFEcTIVE_DIVIDEND 67.04 53.63 41.90 53.63 48.27 
Tax Credit or Net Tax 18.77 5.36 6.37 5.36 5.36) 
Source: Michaely and Murgia (1995) 
In 1997 the rate of IRPEG was 37percent and the rate of ILOR was 16.2percent. In 1977 ILOR was made deductible 
from IRPEG. In 1991 the deductibility was reduced to 75percent and in 1993 totally abolished. 
2 On the sum of Gross Dividend (53.63) plus Tax Credit (56.25percent of 53.63 = 30.17) 
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APPENDIX 5: Tim DIVIDPNI) TAX CREDIT IN Ca? 1 MAN 
SouxcE: McDonald (2001) 
Dividend Tax Credit Mechanism. Suppose that a company has pre-tax income of x and is taxed at 
rate t, This leaves x(1-t, ) to distribute. Suppose this amount is paid as dividend. The dividend tax 
credit gives shareholders a credit for taxed already paid by the corporation. This is accomplished by 
giving shareholders a fractional credit of (tc / 1-ta) on the cash amount of the dividend. Net of all taxes, 
the shareholder receives [x-(1-m)], which is equivalent to having pre-tax corporate income taxed at 
the shareholder's tax rate, m. However, the foreign shareholder receives [x-(1-t, )] pre-tax and receives 
no tax credit. Gross dividend is equal to the net dividend [x(1-t, )] plus the tax credit. 
Cash Dividend Paid: 
Dividend Tax Credit: 
Taxable Income: 
Personal Income Tax at m: 
Dividend Plus Credit Less Tax: 
x 
x xt, 
x (1-tj + x4 -x 
xrn 
x (1-tj + xt, 
- 
xm =x (1-111) 
§36 of the German Income Tax Law. §36 Addresses stock-lending transactions. If German resident 
A lends stock to German resident B, B can take the dividend tax credit. However, if the lender is not a 
German resident, B can take the tax credit only on the pro rate amount by which the gross dividend 
exceeds lending fees. Since lending fees will always include at least the net dividend, this reduces the 
ability of the German resident to use the tax credit if the lender is foreign. 
Simple stock loans are rendered unprofitable by these rules. For example, consider a stock loan 
around the ex-date for a company that pays 100 units of dividend. Suppose the German borrower 
aggress to pay the lender 120 units. Under §36, the German borrower would be able to use only the 
fraction (142.86-120)/142.86 of the tax credit. The German borrower would therefore receive only 
[100+42,86(22.86/142.86)=106.86, while paying 120. 
Let k be the tax credit rate and yk the fraction of the credit paid by the borrower to the Icndcr in a 
stock loan. If a German investor borrows the stock at rate yk to earn the tax credit k, the borrower 
profit is: 
k1+k-(1+yk)- 
l+k 
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This is positive only if y, the fraction of the credit paid to the lender, is less than [k/(1+2k)-0.2308]. 
The lender must therefore be paid no more than 1.0989 of the net dividend. 
§50c of the German Income Tax Law. This section disallows in some circumstances the tax 
deductibility of capital losses due to the payment of a dividend. ' The loss is always disallowed if the 
shares are not acquired on an exchange. If shares are exchange traded, since 1994 the loss is 
disallowed if (i) the shares are not held for at least 10 days, or (ii) if the market risk of the position is 
limited (e. g. the position is hedged). In addition, capital losses attributable to a dividend are always 
non-deductible if the stock is acquired other than by exchange trading. 
APPEND DIVIDENDS FOR TAX PU POS ?S IN FRANCE 
SouRCE: Word Tax Advisor, International Tax Developments, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, February 2002 
On 28th December 2001, the French tax authorities published an Instruction that provides a restrictive 
definition of dividends for certain tax purposes and limits the scope of the Avoir Fiscal, i. e. the tax 
credit attached to French-source dividends. The new definition and the new rules apply to income 
received during 2001 for companies whose fiscal year ends on or after 21 December 2001. 
The French Tax Code contains a very broad definition of "distributed income" for tax purposes; for 
example, profits that are not booked in reserves or any amounts lent to a shareholder fall within the 
definition. Before the recent Instruction, the tax authorities considered as dividends only amounts that 
were attributed to all shareholders in proportion to their shares in the capital of the company and 
distributed following a legitimate decision made under company law. 
The Instruction restricts the scope of distributions that are considered to be dividends for purposes of 
the avoir fiscal and the precompte to: 
" Distributions decided on at the annual shareholder meeting (i. e. the meeting approving the 
accounts) that are in line with the civil and commercial rules applicable to dividends, and 
0 Interim dividends decided by the competent body of the company. 
According to this more restrictive interpretation, the following are no longer considered dividends 
and, thus, do not give rise to the avoir fiscal or the precompte: 
" Distributions of reserves decided other than by the annual shareholder meeting; 
" Distributions or prepayments of liquidation bonuses, and 
0 Payments arising from a reduction of share capital or acquisition of one's own shares. 
The notion of a loss "due to payment of a dividend" is ambiguous since one could in theory impute a loss whatever the 
actual change in the stock price, and use this imputed loss to adjust the basis of the position. For example, if there were 1 
unit of dividend, it would be reasonable to impute a capital loss in the range of (I 
- 
1.4286) units. In practice. however, the 
restriction binds only if there is an actual loss on the stock. Thus if a dividend were paid and the share price happened to rise, 
the investor would receive the full credit. 
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Under the new Instruction, in the case where a shareholder meeting decides on an exceptional 
distribution of a significant amount out of distributable reserves, that distribution is not a dividend but 
rather a partial liquidation of assets. Consequently, the shareholders arc not entitled to the avoir fiscal 
and no precompte liability arises for the company. 
Although the Instruction restricts the dividend definition, it provides opportunities when structuring 
an acquisition. Under the French participation exception, a parent company is not taxable on income 
distributed by a subsidiary. At the same time, the avoir fiscal received by the parent company could 
not be utilised to pay the corporate income tax due by the parent. Thus, until before the new 
Instruction, if a subsidiary made a distribution out of "old" reserves, the subsidiary was required to 
pay the precompte but the parent could not offset the avoir fiscal against its own corporate income tax 
liability. Under the new rules, a parent company will be able to receive distributions of "old" reserves 
from its subsidiaries without any precompte having to be paid by the subsidiary. Consequently, the 
new rules are essentially beneficial to parent companies that do not intent to pass on to their 
shareholders income received form their subsidiaries. These restrictions in the Instruction are also 
applicable to non-residents. Some of France's tax treaties specifically provide for the transfer of the 
avoir fiscal to certain non-resident recipients according to the same rules that apply when the avoir 
fiscal is granted to French residents. 
Although the instruction does not specifically refer to withholding tax on dividends, it would appear 
that the Instruction's restrictive dividend definition would sometimes have relevance for the purposes 
of reduced withholding tax rates under France's tax treaties (or the exemption from withholding tax 
under the EU parent/subsidiary directive). In the case where the treaty defines dividends as "income 
treated as a distribution by the tax laws of the state in which the company making the distribution is 
resident", the broader treaty definition will prevail. In such cases, the reduced rate of withholding tax 
will apply to any "distributed income" and will not be restricted only to "dividends". 
The investigation of the consequences of this new Instruction on the dividend policy of the French 
companies is beyond the scope of the present PhD study. However, this constitutes an interesting 
subject of further research, as it would be particularly interesting to investigate the effect of this new 
Instruction on the dividend policy of the French Companies. One way to precede this proposed study 
could be to group a number of French companies according to their shareholding structure and 
compare the dividend policy before and after 31$t December 2002 both in an intra- and inter-group 
level. If taxation is a determinant of the dividend policy of the firm, then it should be expected that in 
the after- the new Instruction period companies would restrict their sources of dividend payouts 
within the scope of the new definition in order for the shareholders to be entitled to the avoir fiscal. 
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